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This	  study	  examines	  the	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  right	  of	  khulʿ	  in	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence	  and	  its	  practical	  implementation	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  	  Previous	  research	  
presents	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  as	  only	  allowing	  a	  khulʿ	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  
husband	  coupled	  with	  a	  financial	  liability	  placed	  upon	  the	  wife.	  	  This	  thesis	  argues	  
that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  fundamental	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  under	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh,	  
which	  is	  capable	  of	  providing	  divorce	  rights	  to	  women	  without	  the	  husband’s	  
consent	  and	  financial	  recompense.	  	  This	  research	  also	  illustrates	  the	  judicial	  
activism	  exhibited	  by	  the	  Pakistani	  courts,	  which	  has	  created	  a	  no-­‐fault	  khulʿ	  
surpassing	  existing	  statutory	  provisions.	  To	  date,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  studies	  on	  the	  
efficacy	  of	  these	  developments,	  so	  this	  research	  assesses	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  
new	  liberal	  divorce	  laws	  have	  filtered	  down	  into	  Pakistani	  society.	  	  Through	  
qualitative	  interviews	  and	  participant	  observations,	  this	  study	  examines	  married	  
Muslim	  women’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  the	  obstacles	  that	  female	  litigants	  face	  
whilst	  trying	  to	  utilise	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  Lahore	  courts.	  	  The	  findings	  reveal	  that	  whilst	  
the	  khulʿ	  has	  empowered	  some	  women	  within	  the	  marital	  domain,	  religious	  and	  
cultural	  norms	  as	  well	  as	  practical	  problems	  within	  the	  courts	  have	  curtailed	  the	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INTRODUCTION:	  A	  WOMAN’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  A	  KHULʿ 	  AND	  MARITAL	  
EMANCIPATION	  IN	  PAKISTAN	  
	  
This	  study	  is	  a	  socio-­‐legal	  investigation	  regarding	  law,	  empowerment	  and	  access	  to	  
legal	  remedies	  for	  married	  women	  in	  Pakistan.	  Women’s	  lives	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  
shaped	  by	  gender	  disparities	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  home,	  state	  and	  society.	  	  This	  research	  is	  
therefore	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  law	  on	  khulʿ	  and	  examines	  whether	  this	  female-­‐initiated	  
divorce	  right	  can	  provide	  an	  effective	  legal	  remedy	  for	  married	  women	  in	  Pakistan.	  
Islamic	  law	  is	  often	  criticised	  for	  the	  gender	  disparities	  inherent	  in	  its	  laws	  of	  
divorce1.	  	  Men	  have	  a	  unilateral	  right	  to	  divorce	  their	  wives	  at	  will,	  through	  the	  
utterance	  of	  the	  word	  talāq	  (I	  divorce	  you),	  whilst	  a	  woman	  must	  seek	  redress	  
through	  the	  courts	  if	  she	  wishes	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  her	  
husband2.	  	  One	  such	  right	  is	  the	  khulʿ	  where	  a	  wife	  may	  ask	  her	  husband	  for	  a	  
divorce3.	  	  In	  British	  colonial	  India	  	  and	  the	  first	  fifteen	  years	  of	  post-­‐independence	  
Pakistan,	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  (Muslim	  scholars)	  and	  the	  judiciary	  interpreted	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  
being	  conditional	  upon	  a	  husband’s	  explicit	  consent	  coupled	  with	  the	  compulsory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Amira	  Mashhour,	  “Islamic	  Law	  and	  Gender	  Equality—Could	  There	  be	  a	  Common	  
2	  Classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  specifically	  mentions	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
grounds	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  seek	  a	  judicial	  divorce,	  assuming	  that	  she	  will	  seek	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  
all	  other	  situations.	  These	  grounds	  include	  impotence,	  insanity	  of	  the	  husband,	  
putative	  widowhood	  of	  90	  years,	  a	  false	  accusation	  of	  adultery,	  apostasy	  and	  a	  
marriage	  contracted	  before	  the	  age	  of	  puberty.	  	  A	  husband	  can	  also	  delegate	  the	  
right	  of	  divorce	  to	  his	  wife,	  known	  as	  talāq-­‐ul-­‐tafwīḍ,	  which	  will	  be	  inserted	  into	  the	  
marriage	  contract.	  	  See	  John	  Esposito	  with	  Natana	  DeLong-­‐Bas,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  
Family	  Law	  (Syracuse:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  32-­‐34	  
3	  Hisham	  M.	  Ramadan,	  Understanding	  Islamic	  Law:	  From	  Classical	  to	  Contemporary	  
	  (New	  York:	  Alta	  Mira	  Press,	  2006),	  120-­‐121.	  
	  
2	  
return	  of	  the	  mahr	  (dower)	  by	  the	  wife.	  	  This	  was	  presumed	  to	  be	  the	  correct	  
position	  under	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  and	  ultimately	  rendered	  the	  khulʿ	  obsolete,	  
since	  most	  husbands	  were	  unwilling	  to	  facilitate	  a	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce4.	  	  In	  
1939,	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  was	  passed	  in	  India,	  providing	  new	  
but	  limited	  statutory	  fault-­‐based	  grounds	  for	  Muslim	  women	  to	  divorce	  their	  
husbands5,	  but	  the	  khulʿ	  itself	  remained	  a	  defunct	  remedy.	  	  In	  1959	  the	  Pakistani	  
judiciary	  finally	  passed	  a	  landmark	  decision	  allowing	  women	  to	  be	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  
irrespective	  of	  their	  husbands’	  wishes.	  	  Despite	  a	  faltering	  start,	  the	  khulʿ	  has	  now	  
become	  an	  indispensible	  right	  utilised	  by	  Pakistani	  women	  when	  initiating	  a	  
divorce.	  
	  
An	  examination	  of	  judicial	  statistics	  on	  family	  law	  cases	  reveals	  that	  female-­‐initiated	  
divorces	  have	  been	  steadily	  rising6.	  It	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  30	  
per	  cent	  rise	  in	  khulʿ	  applications	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years7,	  leading	  many	  religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “Talāq-­‐i-­‐Tafwīḍ	  and	  Stipulations	  in	  the	  Marriage	  Contract:	  Important	  	  
Means	  of	  Protecting	  the	  Position	  of	  a	  South	  Asian	  Muslim	  Wife,”	  Modern	  Asian	  
Studies	  16,	  no.	  2	  (1982):	  277-­‐309.	  
5	  The	  1939	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  remains	  applicable	  in	  Pakistan	  
post-­‐independence	  but	  the	  judiciary	  has	  been	  very	  reluctant	  to	  enforce	  its	  
provisions	  in	  favour	  of	  wives.	  	  See	  Chapter	  Four	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis.	  
6	  See	  Judicial	  Statistics	  of	  Pakistan:	  Annual	  Report	  2013	  (Secretariat,	  Law	  &	  Justice	  
Commission	  Pakistan,	  2013).	  Accessed	  May	  16th	  2016.	  
http://www.ljcp.gov.pk/Menu%20Items/Publications/2013/2013.pdf.	  	  During	  
interviews	  with	  judges,	  lawyers	  and	  clerks,	  it	  was	  ascertained	  that	  75	  to	  80	  per	  cent	  
of	  all	  family	  cases	  were	  khulʿ	  applications.	  	  In	  2013,	  15375	  family	  cases	  were	  
initiated	  in	  the	  district	  courts	  of	  Lahore,	  with	  an	  additional	  backlog	  of	  10427	  cases	  
pending	  from	  the	  previous	  years.	  	  If	  a	  conservative	  estimate	  of	  75	  per	  cent	  is	  used	  to	  
work	  out	  possible	  khulʿ	  applications,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  7820	  divorce	  applications	  
were	  lodged	  in	  the	  court	  during	  2013,	  with	  a	  backlog	  of	  7820	  cases.	  
7	  See	  “Divorce	  rate	  surges”,	  The	  Nation	  News,	  available	  at	  
http://nation.com.pk/lahore/03-­‐Mar-­‐2014/divorce-­‐rate-­‐surges	  last	  accessed	  
	  
3	  
clerics	  to	  denounce	  the	  current	  law	  on	  khulʿ	  as	  un-­‐Islamic8.	  	  They	  claim	  that	  Ḥanafī	  
fiqh	  does	  not	  allow	  a	  court	  to	  pass	  a	  khulʿ	  without	  a	  husband’s	  consent	  and	  demand	  
its	  repeal.	  Despite	  its	  growing	  popularity,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  in-­‐depth	  studies	  of	  the	  
legal	  nature	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  women	  to	  initiate	  khulʿ	  
proceedings;	  nor	  are	  there	  any	  official	  statistics	  on	  the	  number	  of	  women	  
specifically	  seeking	  a	  khulʿ.	  This	  research	  is	  therefore	  significant,	  as	  it	  will	  provide	  a	  
new	  theological	  understanding	  of	  khulʿ	  under	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence,	  which	  has	  been	  
used	  to	  curtail	  women’s	  rights	  to	  divorce	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  subcontinent.	  	  This	  
research	  will	  seek	  to	  show	  that	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  used	  as	  a	  liberating	  force	  to	  
empower	  rather	  than	  disempower	  women	  within	  the	  marital	  arena	  whilst	  also	  
serving	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  further	  reforms.	  	  This	  research	  is	  also	  important	  because	  it	  
will	  review	  and	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  current	  legislation	  on	  female-­‐initiated	  
divorce	  rights.	  It	  will	  provide	  a	  unique	  insight	  into	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Muslim	  
married	  women	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  how	  these	  perceptions	  can	  either	  be	  a	  
deterrent	  to	  female	  empowerment	  in	  divorce	  or	  a	  motivation	  to	  bypass	  social	  and	  
cultural	  obstacles	  to	  obtain	  marital	  freedom.	  	  The	  field	  study	  will	  also	  seek	  to	  reveal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
October	  20th	  2015;	  “Divorce	  rates	  climb”	  Pakistan	  Today,	  available	  at	  
http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/06/26/city/lahore/divorce-­‐rates-­‐climb/	  
last	  accessed	  October	  20th	  2015,	  “Divorce	  rate	  rising	  30%	  yearly	  over	  
incompatibility”,	  Daily	  Times,	  Available	  at	  
http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/karachi/03-­‐Mar-­‐2007/divorce-­‐rate-­‐rising-­‐30-­‐
yearly-­‐over-­‐incompatibility	  last	  accessed	  October	  20th	  2015.	  	  
8	  “Khulʿ	  Without	  Husband’s	  Consent	  is	  Un-­‐Islamic:	  CII,”	  The	  Express	  Tribune,	  
February	  18th	  2016,	  accessed	  May	  9th	  2016	  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1049717/khula-­‐without-­‐husbands-­‐consent-­‐is-­‐un-­‐
islamic-­‐rules-­‐cii/;	  “Why	  Aren’t	  any	  Religious	  Scholars	  Denouncing	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  





the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  empowering	  women	  within	  the	  marital	  arena	  
and	  provide	  important	  suggestions	  for	  law	  reform.	  
	  
1.1	  The	  Rationale	  for	  the	  Research	  
The	  subordinate	  status	  of	  women	  in	  Muslim	  countries	  has	  become	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  
much	  academic	  writing	  in	  recent	  years9.	  	  The	  revival	  of	  Islamic	  norms	  throughout	  
the	  Muslim	  world	  is	  often	  equated	  with	  increased	  oppression	  towards	  women,	  
symbolised	  by	  the	  wearing	  of	  the	  veil	  and	  segregation	  of	  the	  sexes10.	  	  Combined	  with	  
pre-­‐existing	  patriarchal	  cultural	  and	  societal	  structures,	  the	  violation	  of	  women’s	  
rights	  has	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  governments,	  NGOSs	  and	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  in	  
recent	  years11.	  The	  personal	  status	  laws	  of	  a	  particular	  state	  can	  also	  be	  
symptomatic	  of	  women’s	  low	  position	  in	  society12,	  particularly	  laws	  relating	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  Chitra	  Raghavan	  et	  al.	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  Women’s	  Rights	  In	  Muslim	  
Socieites,	  (Brandeis	  Series	  on	  Gender,	  Culture,	  Relgion	  and	  Law,	  2012);	  Lila	  Abu-­‐
Lughod,	  Do	  Muslim	  Women	  Need	  Saving?	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Vrinda	  
Narain,	  Gender	  and	  Community;	  Muslim	  Women’s	  Rights	  in	  India	  (University	  of	  
Toronto	  Press,	  2001);	  Haideh	  Moghissi	  ed,	  Women	  and	  Islam:	  Critical	  Concepts	  in	  
Sociology,	  (Routledge,	  2005).	  
10	  Esposito	  and	  DeLong-­‐Bas,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  105.	  
11	  See	  Naz	  K.	  Modirazdeh,	  “Taking	  Islamic	  Law	  Seriously:	  NGOs	  and	  the	  Battle	  for	  
Muslim	  Hearts	  and	  Minds,”	  Harvard	  Human	  Rights	  Journal	  19	  (2006):	  191-­‐192.	  
Modirazdeh	  notes	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  economic,	  military	  and	  media	  issues	  in	  the	  
Muslim	  world,	  particularly	  after	  the	  events	  of	  9/11.	  See	  also	  Aziza	  al-­‐Hibri,	  “Islam,	  
Law	  and	  Customs:	  Redefining	  Muslim	  Women’s	  Rights”,	  American	  University	  
International	  Law	  and	  Policy	  12	  (1997):	  1,	  4.	  
12	  Essam	  Fawzy,	  “Muslim	  Personal	  Status	  Law	  in	  Egypt:	  The	  Current	  Situation	  and	  
Possibilities	  of	  Reform	  Through	  Internal	  Initiatives”,	  in	  Women’s	  Rights	  and	  Islamic	  
Family	  Law:	  Perspectives	  on	  Reform,	  ed.	  Lynn	  Welchmann	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  
2004),	  27.	  	  
	  
5	  
divorce	  and	  polygamy13.	  The	  subordination	  of	  women	  within	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  
can	  create	  a	  platform	  for	  their	  subjugation	  in	  other	  spheres	  of	  life:	  thus,	  advocating	  
reform	  within	  these	  parameters	  has	  wider	  consequences	  for	  women	  in	  the	  
economic,	  social	  and	  political	  arena14.	  	  Pakistan	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  phenomenon	  
and	  an	  examination	  of	  women’s	  position	  within	  the	  family	  domain	  reveals	  that	  
many	  of	  them	  are	  subject	  to	  stringent	  patriarchal	  norms15.	  	  
	  
Although	  Pakistan	  was	  the	  first	  Muslim	  country	  to	  have	  a	  female	  prime	  minister	  and	  
women	  who	  belong	  to	  the	  middle	  upper	  classes	  have	  won	  some	  levels	  of	  
emancipation16,	  many	  women	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  subject	  to	  immense	  poverty17	  and	  
high	  levels	  of	  illiteracy18.	  	  Within	  the	  family	  domain,	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  baby	  girl	  is	  met	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Esposito,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  134.	  Esposito	  notes	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  
Tunisian,	  Somalian	  and	  Egyptian	  governments	  to	  improve	  women’s	  rights	  in	  
marriage	  and	  divorce.	  
14	  See	  Bharathi	  Anandhi	  Venkatraman,	  “Islamic	  States	  and	  United	  Nations	  
Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  all	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  Against	  Women:	  Are	  
the	  Shari’a	  and	  the	  Convention	  Compatible?”	  American	  University	  Law	  Review	  44	  
(1995):	  1949,	  1950-­‐51.	  Venkatraman	  considers	  CEDAW	  a	  “brand	  apart	  from	  other	  
treaties	  because	  it	  seeks	  to…influence	  cultural	  values	  that	  prescribe	  the	  traditional	  
roles	  of	  men	  and	  women	  in	  marriage,	  family	  relations	  and	  other	  situations	  that	  are	  
fertile	  ground	  for	  sexual	  stereotypes”.	  
15	  Maliha	  Gull	  Tarar	  and	  Venkat	  Pulla,	  “Patriarchy,	  Gender	  Violence	  and	  Poverty	  
amongst	  Pakistani	  Women:	  A	  Social	  Work	  Inquiry,” International	  Journal	  of	  Social	  
Work	  and	  Human	  Services	  Practice	  Horizon	  Research	  Publishing	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  56.	  
16	  Thamina	  Rashid,	  “Empowerment	  and	  Subordination	  of	  Pakistani	  Women,”	  in	  
Pakistan:	  From	  the	  Rhetoric	  of	  Democracy	  to	  the	  Rise	  of	  Militancy,	  ed.	  Ravi	  Kalia	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  85-­‐104.	  
17	  According	  to	  the	  Gender	  Inequality	  Index	  (GII),	  which	  reflects	  gender-­‐based	  
inequalities	  in	  three	  dimensions	  —reproductive	  health,	  empowerment	  and	  
economic	  activity—Pakistani	  women	  have	  a	  GII	  value	  of	  0.56,	  ranking	  the	  nation	  at	  
a	  very	  low	  123rd	  out	  of	  146	  countries	  (Human	  Development	  Report	  2013).	  	  	  
18	  Historically,	  Pakistan	  spends	  very	  little	  on	  education:	  a	  meagre	  2.1	  percent	  of	  its	  
GDP	  in	  2012.	  	  In	  2011,	  Pakistan’s	  overall	  literacy	  rate	  was	  already	  low,	  at	  58	  per	  
cent,	  whilst	  women’s	  literacy	  was	  even	  lower,	  at	  just	  46	  per	  cent,	  with	  only	  18.3	  per	  
	  
6	  
with	  disappointment	  and	  even	  despair,	  and	  from	  the	  outset	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  a	  
daughter	  is	  a	  temporary	  visitor,	  her	  birth	  family	  merely	  an	  ephemeral	  pit-­‐stop,	  since	  
she	  ultimately	  belongs	  to	  her	  future	  husband	  and	  his	  family.	  Saigol	  (1995)	  discusses	  
the	  impact	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  systems	  and	  argues	  that	  a	  woman	  is	  generally	  
considered	  a	  social	  burden	  or	  liability	  for	  the	  family	  and	  is	  always	  compelled	  to	  
think	  that	  marriage	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  her	  major	  goal	  in	  life19.	  	  From	  an	  early	  age,	  
senior	  women	  of	  the	  family	  will	  begin	  a	  process	  of	  indoctrination	  as	  to	  the	  correct	  
norms	  of	  behaviour	  to	  follow.	  Girls	  are	  taught	  to	  be	  respectful	  and	  courteous	  at	  all	  
times:	  in	  reality,	  this	  can	  translate	  into	  submissiveness,	  obedience	  and	  readiness	  to	  
surrender	  in	  practical	  terms20.	  	  If	  a	  girl	  wishes	  to	  assert	  her	  legal	  or	  religious	  
rights,21	  she	  will	  be	  viewed	  as	  rebellious	  and	  recalcitrant	  and	  ostracised	  if	  necessary	  
in	  order	  to	  force	  her	  to	  submit.	  	  	  	  Throughout	  her	  life,	  she	  will	  be	  expected	  to	  submit:	  
before	  marriage,	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  her	  father	  and	  brothers,	  and	  later,	  after	  
marriage,	  to	  her	  husband’s	  authority22	  and	  that	  of	  the	  more	  senior	  women	  in	  his	  
household.	  	  Moreover,	  her	  value	  and	  status	  in	  her	  husband’s	  family	  are	  only	  truly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cent	  of	  women	  gaining	  secondary	  or	  higher	  education	  between	  2006	  and	  2010	  
(Human	  Development	  Report	  2013).	  
19	  Robina	  Saigol,	  "Domestic	  Knowledge	  Systems	  and	  Patriarchy",	  in	  Unveiling	  the	  
Issues:	  Pakistani	  Women's	  Perspectives	  on	  Social,	  Political	  and	  Ideological	  Issues,	  eds.	  
Nighat	  Said	  Khan	  et	  al.	  (Lahore:	  ASR	  Publications,	  1995),	  142.	  
20	  A	  common	  proverb	  that	  many	  Pakistani	  women	  have	  heard	  whilst	  growing	  up	  is	  
“Dolli	  bap	  ki	  ghar	  say	  our	  janaza	  shohar	  kai	  ghar	  say,"	  meaning	  “She	  will	  leave	  her	  
father’s	  house	  as	  a	  bride	  and	  only	  emerge	  from	  her	  husband's	  house	  in	  her	  coffin.”	  
21	  A	  right	  to	  marry	  a	  person	  of	  her	  choice	  or	  insist	  upon	  inheritance	  rights,	  for	  
example.	  
22	  Most	  recently	  on	  May	  26th	  2016	  the	  Pakistan	  Islamic	  Council	  of	  Ideology	  proposed	  
ammendments	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Protection	  Bill	  arguing	  a	  husband	  was	  allowed	  to	  
‘lightly	  beat	  his	  wife’	  if	  she	  is	  disobedient.	  	  See	  Tim	  Craig,	  	  	  “Pakistani	  husbands	  can	  





cemented	  when	  she	  has	  borne	  him	  a	  child,	  particularly	  a	  son,	  since	  her	  participation	  
in	  the	  family	  is	  directly	  linked	  through	  her	  children23.	  	  The	  embodiment	  of	  a	  good	  
pious	  Pakistani	  Muslim	  girl	  is	  reflected	  in	  her	  ability	  to	  look	  after	  her	  husband	  and	  
her	  future	  extended	  family24.	  Even	  where	  families	  are	  able	  to	  afford	  maids	  and	  
housekeepers,	  a	  woman’s	  sphere	  of	  responsibility	  still	  remains	  within	  her	  
household	  and	  how	  well	  she	  is	  able	  to	  manage	  her	  family	  affairs25.	  
	  
Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  obstacles	  that	  women	  face	  within	  the	  family	  domain	  is	  
domestic	  violence.	  Intimate	  Partner	  Violence	  (IPV)	  is	  a	  stark	  reality	  faced	  by	  many	  
women	  in	  Pakistan,	  with	  an	  alarming	  number	  of	  women	  having	  experienced	  verbal,	  
physical	  or	  sexual	  abuse	  from	  their	  husbands26.	  Moreover	  violence	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  
IPV	  but	  expands	  to	  abuse	  and	  insults	  by	  the	  wife’s	  in-­‐laws	  and	  sisters-­‐in-­‐law	  too27.	  
Unfortunately	  domestic	  violence	  is	  deeply	  embedded	  within	  the	  culture	  and	  fabric	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Anna	  Winkvist	  and	  Humaira	  Akther,	  “God	  Should	  Give	  Daughters	  to	  Rich	  Families	  
Only:	  Attitudes	  Towards	  Childbearing	  Among	  Low-­‐Income	  Women	  in	  Punjab,	  
Pakistan,”	  Social	  Science	  and	  Medicine	  51,	  no.	  1	  (2000):	  81.	  
24	  Zehra	  Arshad,	  The	  Economic	  Contribution	  of	  Pakistani	  Women	  Through	  Their	  
Unpaid	  Labor	  (Islamabad:	  Society	  for	  Alternative	  Media	  and	  Research	  and	  
Healthbridge,	  2008),	  iii.	  
25	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  79	  per	  cent	  of	  Pakistani	  women	  can	  be	  labelled	  as	  
homemakers,	  spending	  up	  to	  eight	  hours	  a	  day	  performing	  major	  tasks	  of	  cooking,	  
cleaning	  and	  fetching	  water,	  and	  a	  total	  of	  sixteen	  hours	  if	  other	  minor	  household	  
chores	  are	  included.	  	  See	  Zehra	  Arshad,	  The	  Economic	  Contribution	  of	  Pakistani	  
Women	  through	  their	  Unpaid	  Labour,	  6-­‐9.	  
26	  T.	  S.	  Ali	  et	  al.	  “Dowry	  Practices	  and	  their	  Negative	  Consequences	  from	  a	  Female	  
Perspective	  in	  Karachi,”	  Pakistan	  Health	  5	  (2013):	  85.	  
27	  T.S.	  Ali,	  and	  I.	  Bustamante-­‐Gavino,	  “Prevalence	  of	  and	  Reasons	  for	  Domestic	  
Violence	  Among	  Women	  From	  Low	  Socioeconomic	  Communities	  of	  Karachi,”	  
Eastern	  Mediterranean	  Health	  Journal,	  13	  (2007):	  1417-­‐1426.	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of	  Pakistani	  society	  as	  a	  result	  of	  systemic	  and	  endemic	  abuse28.	  Whether	  or	  not	  
Islam	  allows	  violence	  towards	  women	  is	  a	  contentious	  issue.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  
Muslims	  would	  agree	  that	  Islam	  does	  allow	  chastisement,	  albeit	  mild	  chastisement.	  	  
Although	  others	  disagree,29	  they	  are	  in	  the	  minority,	  and	  many	  Pakistani	  men	  
consider	  physical	  chastisement	  of	  their	  wives	  as	  a	  divinely	  given	  right	  protected	  by	  
the	  Qurʾān30.	  	  It	  has	  been	  reported	  that	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  households	  have	  experienced	  
some	  form	  of	  domestic	  violence31	  and	  that	  this	  covers	  a	  wide	  area	  of	  abuse.	  	  Marital	  
violence	  in	  Pakistan	  includes	  verbal	  abuse,	  sexual	  and	  physical	  abuse,	  hitting,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Manar	  Waheed,	  “Domestic	  Violence	  in	  Pakistan:	  The	  Tension	  Between	  
Intervention	  and	  Sovereign	  Autonomy	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Law”,	  Brook	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law,	  29	  (2003-­‐2004):	  939.	  
29	  See	  Muhammad	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri,	  The	  Glorious	  Qur’an;	  English	  Translation	  (London:	  
Minhaj-­‐ul-­‐	  Qurʾān	  Publications,	  2012),	  56,	  who	  provides	  a	  translation	  negating	  the	  
right	  to	  strike	  ‘rebellious’	  wives.	  	  He	  translates	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  4:34,	  which	  is	  
often	  used	  to	  justify	  men	  beating	  their	  wives	  as	  “...But	  those	  women	  whom	  you	  fear	  
will	  disobey	  and	  defy,	  admonish	  them;	  and	  (if	  they	  still	  do	  not	  approve)	  separate	  them	  
(from	  yourselves)	  in	  beds	  and	  (if	  they	  still	  do	  not	  improve)	  turn	  from	  them,	  striking	  a	  
temporary	  parting”.	  See	  also	  Sisters	  in	  Islam	  and	  Yasmin	  Masidi,	  Are	  Muslim	  Men	  
Allowed	  to	  Beat	  their	  Wives?	  (Kuala	  Lumpur:	  United	  Selangor	  Press,	  2009);	  Amina	  
Wadud,	  Qurʼan	  and	  Woman	  Rereading	  the	  Sacred	  Text	  from	  a	  Woman's	  Perspective.	  
(New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  
30	  Khanum	  Shaikh,	  “New	  Expressions	  of	  Religiosity:	  Al-­‐Huda	  International	  and	  the	  
Expansion	  of	  Islamic	  Education	  for	  Pakistani	  Women,”	  in	  Women	  and	  Islam,	  ed.	  
Zayn.	  R.	  Kassm	  (Westport:	  Praeger,	  2010),	  178.	  
31	  R.	  Coomeraswarmy	  (2005)	  “The	  Varied	  Contours	  of	  Violence	  against	  Women	  in	  
South	  Asia.	  Key	  Gender	  Issues	  in	  South	  Asia:	  A	  Resource	  Package,”	  Technical	  Papers	  
presented	  at	  the	  5th	  South	  Asia	  regional	  ministerial	  conference	  celebrating	  Beijing	  
Plus	  Ten	  (Islamabad:	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Fund	  for	  Women	  (UNIFEM),	  
2005);	  Hina	  Jilani,	  and	  E.	  Ahmed,	  “Violence	  against	  Women:	  The	  Legal	  System	  
Institutional	  Responses	  in	  Pakistan”	  in	  Violence,	  Law	  and	  Women’s	  Rights	  in	  South	  
Asia,	  ed.	  S.	  Gooneselere	  (Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage,	  2004),	  148-­‐206.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  
Institute	  of	  Medical	  Sciences	  has	  also	  reported	  that	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  married	  women	  
have	  reported	  some	  form	  of	  sexual	  or	  physical	  abuse.	  	  See	  Carol	  Anne	  Douglas	  et	  al,	  




kicking,	  slapping,	  rape	  and	  murder32.	  	  Moreover,	  those	  women	  who	  are	  brave	  
enough	  to	  file	  complaints	  are	  subject	  to	  further	  abuse,	  not	  just	  from	  the	  family	  but	  
also	  from	  police	  authorities33.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  state	  institutions	  to	  provide	  relief	  to	  
victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  only	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  reoccurrence	  with	  no	  
deterrent,	  trapping	  women	  between	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  crime	  and	  the	  law	  and	  
its	  enforcers34	  
	  
As	  well	  as	  being	  kicked,	  slapped,	  beaten	  and	  sexually	  abused,	  many	  Pakistani	  
women	  are	  doused	  in	  acid,	  set	  on	  fire	  or	  mutilated	  in	  other	  ways35.	  A	  common	  form	  
of	  attack	  is	  known	  as	  ‘stove-­‐burning’,	  where	  the	  alleged	  abuser	  claims	  that	  the	  
woman’s	  clothes	  caught	  fire	  or	  that	  an	  unstable	  gas	  cooker,	  as	  commonly	  used	  in	  
poorer	  Pakistani	  homes,	  exploded	  and	  burnt	  her.	  	  In	  reality,	  many	  of	  these	  incidents	  
occur	  as	  a	  means	  of	  controlling	  women	  to	  ensure	  that	  dinners	  are	  made	  on	  time,	  the	  
house	  is	  kept	  clean	  or	  that	  other	  domestic	  abuse	  is	  not	  officially	  reported36.	  	  The	  
abuser,	  most	  often	  the	  husband,	  will	  douse	  the	  woman	  in	  kerosene	  in	  the	  kitchen	  
and	  then	  set	  her	  on	  fire	  using	  the	  stove37.	  	  Many	  terrible	  crimes	  have	  been	  reported	  
in	  Pakistan	  and	  highlighted	  by	  the	  media,	  and	  one	  can	  only	  wonder	  about	  those	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  F.	  Clitella	  and	  J.	  Willet,	  “Creating	  a	  Safe	  Haven	  in	  Pakistan,”	  International	  Social	  
Work	  53,	  no.	  3	  (2010):	  409.	  
33	  Crime	  or	  Custom?	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  Pakistan	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  
1999),	  52-­‐68	  
34	  Hina	  Jillani,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Democratic	  Development	  in	  Pakistan	  (Human	  
Rights	  Commission,	  1998),	  140-­‐141.	  
35	  See	  Critelli	  and	  Willet,	  “Creating	  a	  Safe	  Haven	  in	  Pakistan,”	  409,	  who	  note	  that	  
nose	  cutting	  is	  a	  particularly	  gruesome	  act	  of	  degradation	  and	  humiliation	  evident	  in	  
Pakistan.	  
36	  Elizabeth	  Schneider,	  Battered	  Women	  and	  Feminist	  Law	  Making	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  2000),	  21-­‐22.	  
37	  Crime	  or	  Custom?	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  Pakistan,	  30.	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go	  unreported38.	  Another,	  more	  culture-­‐specific	  form	  of	  domestic	  violence	  is	  called	  
‘honour	  killings’,	  where	  women	  are	  literally	  killed	  as	  a	  way	  of	  restoring	  honour	  to	  a	  
family	  which	  feels	  that	  it	  has	  lost	  it	  due	  to	  some	  alleged	  action	  by	  the	  female	  in	  the	  
family39.	  	  Tragically,	  hundreds	  of	  women	  are	  killed	  every	  year	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  
honour,	  which	  again	  only	  reflects	  those	  numbers	  that	  have	  actually	  been	  reported,	  
with	  most	  going	  unreported40.	  The	  shame	  and	  dishonour	  that	  surrounds	  any	  women	  
who	  seek	  redress	  is	  so	  great	  that	  even	  when	  women	  experience	  severe	  beatings	  and	  
mutilations,	  police	  and	  other	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  impede	  them	  from	  seeking	  
redress	  by	  discouraging	  complaints41.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  state	  and	  its	  enforcement	  
agencies	  are	  not	  only	  incapable	  but	  also	  unwilling	  to	  protect	  women	  against	  
violence	  and	  bring	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  these	  crimes	  to	  justice42.	  There	  are	  no	  special	  
domestic	  violence	  units	  or	  specialised	  training,43	  and	  police	  officers	  often	  treat	  these	  
cases	  as	  private	  familial	  issues	  based	  on	  culture	  and	  custom	  rather	  than	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Women	  in	  Pakistan:	  Disadvantaged	  and	  Denied	  their	  Rights,	  Human	  Rights	  are	  
Women’s	  Rights	  (Amnesty	  International,	  1995).	  	  “Woman	  Set	  on	  Fire	  by	  Husband”	  
The	  Express	  Tribune.	  	  Accessed	  October	  6th	  2014.	  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/274811/woman-­‐set-­‐on-­‐fire-­‐by-­‐husband-­‐and-­‐in-­‐laws/	  	  
39	  These	  types	  of	  honour	  killings	  have	  become	  commonplace	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  occur	  
not	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  divorce	  cases	  but	  also	  for	  much	  more	  minor	  and	  trivial	  
reasons.	  	  They	  can	  occur	  ‘when	  a	  wife	  does	  not	  serve	  a	  meal	  quickly	  enough	  or	  when	  
a	  man	  dreams	  that	  his	  wife	  betrays	  him’.	  	  See	  Women	  in	  Pakistan:	  Disadvantaged	  and	  
Denied	  their	  Rights,	  3.	  
40	  Radhika	  Coomaraswamy,	  “Human	  Security	  and	  Gender	  Violence,”	  Economic	  and	  
Political	  Weekly	  40,	  no.	  44/45,	  (2005):	  4731.	  
41	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Crime	  or	  Custom?	  45.	  	  
42	  See	  Shahnaz	  Khan,	  Zina,	  Transnational	  Feminism	  and	  the	  Moral	  Regulation	  of	  
Pakistani	  Women	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2006),	  66,	  who	  details	  the	  infamous	  Saima	  
Sarwar	  case	  where	  a	  woman	  was	  shot	  dead	  in	  front	  of	  her	  lawyer	  for	  attempting	  to	  
instigate	  a	  divorce	  against	  her	  husband.	  	  Despite	  avid	  media	  attention	  and	  the	  public	  
nature	  of	  the	  slaying,	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  crime	  were	  never	  brought	  to	  justice.	  
43	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Crime	  or	  Custom,	  52.	  	  In	  Lahore	  and	  Karachi,	  it	  was	  noted	  
that	  none	  of	  the	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  had	  their	  cases	  handled	  according	  to	  
the	  Pakistani	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Code.	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perpetration	  of	  a	  crime44.	  	  Police	  officers	  will	  disregard	  many	  complaints	  or	  proceed	  
to	  belittle	  the	  complainant,	  trivialising	  the	  matter45.	  Instead,	  they	  encourage	  victims	  
of	  abuse	  to	  reconcile	  with	  their	  abusers46	  rather	  than	  risk	  dishonour	  through	  public	  
disclosure47.	  	  By	  encouraging	  reconciliation	  and	  often	  refusing	  even	  to	  deliver	  a	  
caution	  to	  the	  abuser,	  they	  reinforce	  the	  abuser’s	  power	  and	  control	  over	  the	  
survivor48.	  Yet	  police	  apathy	  is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  abuses	  that	  such	  women	  will	  face.	  	  
Having	  been	  the	  victims	  of	  abuse,	  they	  are	  then	  likely	  to	  face	  similar	  abuse	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  police	  authorities	  themselves49.	  	  Women	  have	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  
‘beaten,	  kicked,	  and	  raped	  in	  the	  police	  stations	  to	  humiliate	  them,	  to	  intimidate	  
them	  or	  to	  extract	  money’50.	  	  
	  
Within	  this	  context,	  the	  importance	  of	  female	  marital	  emancipation	  is	  acutely	  
evident.	  An	  intellectual	  engagement	  with	  a	  secure	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  extremely	  
significant	  for	  women,	  as	  it	  can	  contribute	  to	  their	  overall	  empowerment.	  	  
Challenging	  existing	  hierarchies	  within	  families	  can	  become	  a	  springboard	  to	  secure	  
greater	  rights	  within	  the	  public	  sphere51.	  	  A	  right	  to	  secure	  an	  exit	  from	  marriage	  is	  
not	  merely	  an	  academic	  question,	  however,	  but	  an	  extremely	  pressing	  necessity	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.,	  53.	  
45	  Ibid.	  
46	  Hina	  Jilani, Human	  Rights	  and	  Democratic	  Development	  in	  Pakistan,	  143	  
47	  Ibid.,	  142.	  
48	  Karla	  Fischer,	  Neil	  Vidmar	  and	  Rene	  Ellis,	  “The	  Culture	  of	  Battering	  and	  the	  Role	  
of	  Mediation	  in	  Domestic	  Violence	  Cases,”	  SMU	  Law	  Review	  46	  (1993):	  2159.	  
49	  Women	  in	  Pakistan:	  Disadvantaged	  and	  Denied	  their	  Rights,	  7-­‐18;	  Crime	  or	  
Custom,	  45-­‐46.	  
50	  Women	  in	  Pakistan:	  Disadvantaged	  and	  Denied	  their	  Rights,	  7-­‐18.	  	  
51	  Karin	  Carmit	  Yefet,	  “Lifting	  the	  Egyptian	  Veil:	  A	  Constitutional	  Road	  Map	  to	  




Pakistani	  women.	  The	  freedom	  to	  divorce	  can	  amount	  to	  freedom	  from	  violence,	  
abuse	  and	  humiliation;	  an	  escape	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  that	  can	  be	  life-­‐
threatening.	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	  women	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  
position	  and	  thus	  access	  to	  justice	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  recourse.	  Courts	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
public	  domain	  and	  traditionally	  women	  have	  less	  connection	  with	  the	  public	  sphere	  
than	  their	  male	  counterparts:	  thus,	  the	  courts	  might	  be	  beyond	  their	  reach	  in	  their	  
daily	  lives52.	  	  Law	  and	  legal	  language	  has	  a	  persona	  of	  unobtainability,	  an	  
incomprehensible	  set	  of	  legal	  requirements	  that	  may	  be	  too	  complicated	  for	  them	  to	  
fulfil.	  	  This	  research	  is	  therefore	  important,	  as	  it	  will	  not	  only	  assess	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
statutory	  provisions	  in	  providing	  marital	  freedom	  but	  also	  analyse	  what	  motivates	  
some	  Pakistani	  women	  to	  bypass	  strong	  cultural	  restraints	  and	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  
and	  why	  many	  others	  remain	  silent.	  Dahl	  (1987)	  argues	  that	  women’s	  life	  
experiences	  and	  lived	  realities	  are	  integral	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  relationship	  
between	  women	  and	  the	  law53.	  	  Through	  a	  process	  of	  “looking	  upwards	  from	  below	  
to	  see	  both	  law,	  reality	  and	  morality	  from	  a	  women’s	  point	  of	  view”,	  one	  can	  develop	  
new	  understandings	  of	  law	  and	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  customary	  practices	  and	  
public	  opinion54.	  Cain	  (1992)	  argues	  that	  “legal	  scholarship	  is	  not	  feminist	  unless	  it	  
is	  grounded	  in	  women’s	  experience”55.	  	  This	  study,	  then,	  will	  develop	  a	  critical	  
consciousness	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  women	  are	  able	  to	  access	  the	  formal	  process	  
of	  law.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  See	  Osama	  Siddique,	  Pakistan's	  Experience	  with	  Formal	  Law:	  An	  Alien	  Justice	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  
53	  T.	  S.	  Dahl,	  Women’s	  Law:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Feminist	  Jurisprudence	  (Oslo:	  
Norwegian	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  
54	  Ibid.,	  13.	  




1.2	  Theoretical	  Basis	  of	  this	  Study	  
This	  study	  will	  adopt	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  and	  draw	  upon	  a	  theoretical	  
framework	  that	  is	  partly	  based	  on	  feminist	  legal	  scholarship,	  third	  world	  feminists	  
and	  Islamic	  feminists.	  	  This	  research	  will	  take	  a	  wider	  view	  that	  law	  is	  a	  ‘process’	  
and	  a	  site	  for	  ‘discursive	  struggle’,	  enabling	  it	  to	  capture	  the	  possibilities	  and	  
limitations	  of	  law56.	  It	  questions	  whether	  formal	  state	  law	  situated	  within	  
patriarchal	  and	  plural	  legal	  settings	  can	  provide	  justice	  for	  the	  suffering	  of	  women57.	  	  
Can	  women	  use	  formal	  laws	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  social	  change	  and	  provide	  economic	  
and	  physical	  security?	  	  Feminist	  legal	  theory	  works	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  even	  
gender	  neutral	  laws	  discriminate	  between	  men	  and	  women,	  as	  the	  law	  invokes	  
certain	  stereotypical	  images	  of	  women,	  such	  as	  mothers,	  wives,	  daughters	  and	  
sisters,	  with	  which	  women	  must	  identify	  themselves.	  	  Law	  is	  viewed	  as	  ‘male’	  and	  
male	  values	  are	  reflected	  in	  legal	  rules	  and	  institutions.	  MacKinnon	  (1997)	  argues	  
that	  male	  systems	  of	  justice	  create	  patriarchal	  powers,	  causing	  the	  oppression	  of	  all	  
women58.	  	  Kapur	  (2006)	  questions	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  law	  to	  bring	  about	  social	  
change.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  although	  law	  has	  been	  important	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  
women’s	  human	  rights,	  it	  cannot	  displace	  dominant	  discourses	  of	  class	  and	  socio-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Ratna	  Kapur,	  “Subversive	  Sites:	  Feminists’	  Engagement	  with	  the	  Law	  in	  India”	  in	  
Writing	  the	  Women’s	  Movement	  Reader,	  ed.	  Malla	  Kullar	  (New	  Delhi:	  Zuban,	  2005),	  
152.	  
57	  See	  F.B.	  Rothman	  et	  al,	  Gender	  and	  Law:	  Theory,	  Doctrine	  (New	  York:	  Aspen	  Law	  
and	  Business,	  1998).	  	  
58	  See	  C.	  MacKinnon,	  Feminism	  Unmodified:	  Discourses	  on	  Life	  and	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  
Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1997).	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economic	  positions59.	  	  In	  post-­‐colonial	  societies,	  formal	  legal	  strategies	  have	  not	  
proven	  effective	  in	  providing	  satisfactory	  remedies	  to	  women,	  whilst	  the	  presence	  
of	  local	  cultural	  practices	  has	  hindered	  women’s	  ability	  to	  claim	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  
‘equality’	  and	  ‘non-­‐discrimination’60.	  	  These	  areas	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  of	  
this	  research,	  which	  reveals	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  married	  women	  interviewed	  
were	  not	  only	  sceptical	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  but	  also	  highly	  critical	  of	  women	  who	  pursued	  
divorce	  in	  the	  court,	  contravening	  societal	  norms.	  	  	  
	  
In	  her	  analysis	  of	  legal	  reforms	  under	  the	  Hindu	  Marriage	  Law	  in	  India,	  Basu	  (2001)	  
observes	  that	  law	  alone	  cannot	  improve	  the	  status	  of	  women	  until	  the	  state	  
succeeds	  in	  removing	  illiteracy	  and	  ignorance	  and	  creates	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  
to	  change	  social	  attitudes61.	  	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Mukhopadhyay	  (1998)	  argues	  that	  
while	  laws	  may	  be	  gender	  neutral,	  they	  do	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  actual	  
lived	  experiences	  of	  women;	  nor	  do	  they	  take	  into	  account	  external	  norms	  that	  
control	  many	  facets	  of	  women’s	  lives	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  the	  private	  domain62.	  	  
Thus,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  provide	  substantive	  improvements	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  
women	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  Hence,	  laws	  passed	  in	  India	  aiming	  to	  protect	  women	  
against	  domestic	  violence,	  rape	  or	  dowry-­‐related	  violence	  have	  actually	  operated	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  in	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  eds.	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and	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61	  M.	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  Marriage:	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  (New	  Delhi,	  New	  
York:	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  University	  Press,	  2001).	  
62	  S.	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  of	  Justice:	  Women	  and	  Law	  in	  Society	  (Delhi:	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against	  the	  larger	  interests	  of	  women,	  since	  judicial	  decisions	  have	  been	  influenced	  
by	  patriarchy,	  with	  legislation	  merely	  becoming	  a	  token	  gesture	  of	  the	  state’s	  
commitment	  to	  protect	  women63.	  	  Within	  this	  vein,	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  this	  research	  
will	  evaluate	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  judiciary	  in	  its	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
statutory	  laws	  of	  divorce	  and	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  It	  will	  investigate	  what	  strategies,	  if	  any,	  
have	  been	  employed	  by	  the	  courts	  to	  ensure	  that	  formal	  laws	  actually	  benefit	  
women	  and	  where	  they	  have	  encountered	  problems	  to	  this	  effect.	  
	  
Carol	  Smart	  (1996)	  argues	  that	  the	  ‘uneven	  development’	  of	  law	  means	  that	  it	  must	  
also	  be	  recognised	  that	  there	  are	  distinctions	  between	  law	  as	  legislation,	  the	  law	  in	  
practice	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  that	  law	  in	  practice64.	  	  Law	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  
merely	  a	  tool	  for	  oppression	  or	  capitalism;	  rather,	  it	  can	  facilitate	  as	  well	  as	  be	  an	  
obstacle	  to	  change65.	  	  A	  discourse	  of	  law	  is	  not	  homogenous	  and	  affects	  citizens	  in	  
different	  ways	  where	  gendered	  identities	  and	  positions	  are	  cultivated66.	  	  It	  can	  be	  a	  
strong	  power	  in	  creating	  and	  perpetuating	  gendered	  identities,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
ways	  can	  be	  found	  to	  use	  these	  discourses	  to	  challenge	  those	  constructions67.	  
Chapter	  Seven,	  for	  example,	  will	  reveal	  the	  different	  experiences	  of	  the	  participants	  
who	  applied	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  courts.	  	  For	  some,	  the	  judiciary	  was	  merely	  an	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extension	  of	  the	  patriarchal	  structures	  to	  which	  they	  had	  been	  subject	  within	  their	  
marriages,	  whilst	  for	  others,	  the	  courts	  provided	  some	  marital	  relief.	  	  There	  are	  
competing	  power	  structures	  that	  law	  on	  its	  own	  cannot	  challenge:	  thus,	  rather	  than	  
focusing	  simply	  on	  law	  reform,	  we	  must	  look	  for	  ‘other	  non-­‐legal	  strategies	  and	  local	  
struggles’68.	  
	  
1.3	  Third	  World	  Feminism	  and	  ‘Adaptive	  Prefences’.	  
Although	  this	  research	  draws	  inspiration	  from	  feminist	  legal	  perspectives,	  it	  is	  also	  
important	  to	  consider	  Third	  World	  feminist	  perspectives,	  which	  take	  a	  ‘women-­‐
centred’	  focus,	  as	  ignoring	  women’s	  multiple	  identities	  and	  can	  be	  just	  as	  oppressive	  
and	  essentialist	  as	  a	  male-­‐dominated	  discourse69.	  	  Chandra	  Mohanty	  (1991)	  is	  
critical	  of	  the	  essentialist	  approach,	  as	  it	  assumes	  that	  women	  are	  a	  homogenous	  
group	  even	  within	  differing	  cultural	  identities70.	  	  She	  also	  argues	  that	  this	  pits	  ‘First	  
World	  women’	  against	  ‘Third	  World	  women’,	  with	  the	  former	  being	  categorised	  as	  
white,	  middle	  class	  and	  heterosexual71.	  	  An	  essentialist	  approach	  perceives	  women	  
as	  passive	  victims	  of	  religious	  extremism,	  oppressive	  cultural	  traditions	  and	  male	  
oppression	  rather	  than	  considering	  women	  as	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  group	  within	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particular	  local	  contexts72	  who	  respond	  to	  oppression	  in	  various	  ways.	  	  This	  is	  
particularly	  important	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  results	  of	  this	  research,	  which	  found	  that	  
the	  participants	  used	  different	  strategies	  to	  withstand	  male	  oppression.	  	  Some	  
women	  chose	  to	  remain	  in	  abusive	  marriages;	  others	  preferred	  to	  use	  bargaining	  
and	  manipulation	  tools	  within	  their	  marriages,	  whilst	  some	  women	  resorted	  to	  
formal	  legal	  remedies	  to	  obtain	  marital	  freedom.	  Chapter	  Six	  of	  this	  research,	  for	  
instance,	  displayed	  a	  vexing	  problem	  regarding	  the	  conflict	  between	  providing	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  life	  choices	  made	  by	  women	  who	  appear	  to	  be	  “stultifying	  and	  
dominating	  and	  in	  that	  way	  incompatible	  with	  autonomous	  agency”73	  and	  
respecting	  the	  choices	  and	  preferences	  made	  by	  women	  who	  appear	  to	  accept,	  
adapt	  to	  and	  even	  prefer	  oppressive	  circumstances.	  Therefore	  feminist	  theories	  of	  
‘adaptive	  preferences’	  or	  ‘deformed	  desires’	  and	  ‘patriarchal	  bargaining’	  in	  relation	  
to	  women’s	  autonomy	  are	  used	  to	  analyse	  participant	  responses74.	  Many	  feminists	  
consider	  adaptive	  preferences	  as	  harmful	  preferences,	  as	  they	  have	  been	  adopted	  as	  
a	  response	  to	  unjust	  social	  conditions,	  such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  a	  patriarchal	  society	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where	  men	  are	  deemed	  superior	  to	  women75.	  Thus,	  Pakistani	  women	  who	  would	  
rather	  remain	  in	  an	  abusive	  marriage	  than	  opt	  for	  a	  khulʿ,	  and	  who	  censure	  those	  
who	  do	  take	  that	  route,	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  ‘adaptive	  preferences’,	  since	  
many	  of	  these	  women	  do	  not	  consider	  themselves	  as	  having	  rights	  that	  are	  being	  
violated,	  but	  believe	  instead	  that	  it	  is	  their	  ‘lot	  in	  life’	  to	  put	  up	  with	  such	  abuse.	  
Feminists	  such	  as	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  (2000)	  describe	  adaptive	  preferences	  as	  
‘deformed	  desires’	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  should	  be	  discarded,	  as	  they	  undermine	  a	  
person’s	  ability	  to	  make	  independent	  decisions,	  and	  are	  thus	  impairments	  to	  
autonomy76.	  However,	  a	  competing	  interpretation	  is	  provided	  by	  Uma	  Narayan	  
(2002).	  She	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  women	  within	  a	  patriarchal	  society	  always	  enjoy	  
their	  subordinate	  status,	  and	  argues	  that	  they	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  ‘dupes’	  of	  
that	  system77.	  The	  situation	  is	  thus	  more	  complex,	  as	  many	  women	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  
cultural	  and	  religious	  constraints	  that	  curtail	  their	  actions	  but	  can	  still	  make	  
informed	  and	  rational	  decisions	  that	  benefit	  them	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  So,	  for	  example,	  
a	  Pakistani	  woman	  may	  choose	  to	  remain	  in	  an	  abusive	  marriage,	  as	  the	  alternative,	  
divorce,	  will	  result	  in	  abject	  poverty	  and	  homelessness.	  She	  may	  not	  like	  her	  
choices,	  but	  she	  has	  to	  ‘bargain	  with	  patriarchy’	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  best	  result	  
possible	  for	  her	  under	  the	  circumstances.	  Thus,	  part	  two	  of	  Chapter	  Six	  will	  use	  the	  
narratives	  presented	  in	  part	  one	  to	  explore	  these	  themes	  and	  further	  understand	  
the	  responses	  of	  the	  participants.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  women	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interviewed	  cannot	  be	  understood	  or	  explained	  by	  the	  general	  labels	  of	  autonomous	  
or	  non-­‐autonomous	  behaviour.	  Rather,	  the	  results	  illustrate	  multifarious	  
approaches	  to	  marital	  conflict	  by	  the	  participants,	  who	  shape	  their	  lives	  in	  response	  
to	  uncontrollable	  and	  sometimes	  unforeseen	  circumstances	  that	  do	  sometimes	  
undercut	  autonomy,	  but	  which	  in	  other	  cases	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  rational	  choices	  that	  
promote	  their	  self-­‐governance.	  
	  
1.4	  Women	  as	  Agents	  of	  Change	  
Feminist	  legal	  theorists	  and	  Third	  World	  feminism	  emphasise	  the	  concept	  of	  
‘woman’s	  agency’	  as	  a	  useful	  tool	  to	  illustrate	  a	  realistic	  and	  dignified	  account	  of	  
women’s	  resistance	  to	  male	  oppression.	  ‘Woman’s	  agency’	  focuses	  on	  a	  woman’s	  
strength,	  her	  ability	  to	  resist,	  the	  strategies	  she	  adopts	  to	  improve	  her	  situation	  and	  
her	  capacity	  to	  control	  and	  direct	  her	  life	  through	  individual	  action.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  
agency	  allows	  meaning	  to	  be	  given	  to	  a	  set	  of	  traditional	  norms	  that	  may	  be	  marked	  
by	  contradictions	  and	  might	  thus	  offer	  no	  clear	  and	  consistent	  principles	  for	  life78.	  	  
Agency	  becomes	  the	  ‘story	  of	  oneself’,	  allowing	  contradictory	  practices	  to	  become	  a	  
coherent	  and	  consistent	  story	  and	  thus	  to	  become	  more	  bearable79.	  	  Women’s	  
agency	  is	  struggling	  against	  gender	  discrimination	  and	  negotiating	  women’s	  social	  
and	  cultural	  relations	  and	  identities.	  Kapur	  (2005)	  argues	  that	  after	  recognising	  a	  
woman’s	  multiple	  identity,	  focus	  should	  shift	  to	  her	  instances	  of	  resistance,	  so	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  N.	  Naffine,	  “In	  Praise	  of	  Legal	  Feminism,”	  Legal	  Studies	  22,	  no.	  1	  (2002):	  86.	  
79	  Ibid.,	  86.	  
	  
20	  
women	  are	  not	  always	  perceived	  as	  victims80.	  An	  essentialist	  approach	  can	  
sometimes	  ignore	  the	  strengths	  of	  women	  who	  engage	  in	  a	  continuous	  daily	  battle	  
within	  their	  limited	  resources	  to	  provide	  as	  best	  as	  they	  can	  for	  their	  families	  and	  
children.	  	  Women’s	  diverse	  identities	  can	  be	  reflected	  in	  their	  survival	  strategies,	  
ranging	  from	  new	  theological	  interpretations	  to	  an	  outright	  rejection	  of	  religion,	  
from	  personal	  development	  to	  armed	  struggles81.	  	  
	  
Taking	  this	  into	  consideration,	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti’s	  (1988)	  concept	  of	  patriarchal	  
bargains	  will	  be	  used	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  of	  analysis	  in	  this	  research,	  to	  understand	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  women	  strategise	  in	  the	  critical	  moment	  of	  divorce	  in	  the	  
patriarchal	  and	  patrilineal	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  Kandiyoti	  (1988)	  defines	  the	  concept	  
of	  patriarchal	  bargaining	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  women	  use	  various	  strategies	  
within	  a	  set	  of	  “concrete	  constraints”	  that	  vary	  according	  to	  ethnicity,	  class,	  caste	  
and	  geographical	  location82.	  	  In	  particular,	  she	  focuses	  on	  the	  manipulation	  and	  
subordination	  of	  women	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  North	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  (including	  
Pakistan,	  India	  and	  Iran)	  by	  which	  women	  maximise	  their	  security83.	  Kandiyoti’s	  
(1988)	  description	  of	  classical	  patriarchy	  provides	  a	  benchmark	  of	  Pakistani	  
women’s	  position	  from	  which	  they	  negotiate	  their	  lives.	  	  Pakistan	  is	  a	  society	  whose	  
social	  values	  and	  norms	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  classically	  patriarchal,	  with	  its	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salient	  features	  including	  female	  seclusion,	  subordination	  and	  segregation.	  	  
However,	  in	  the	  last	  thirty	  years,	  the	  advancement	  of	  technology	  and	  economic	  
development	  has	  meant	  that	  a	  social	  transformation	  is	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  
parameters	  of	  women’s	  lives	  and	  has	  lead	  to	  a	  relaxation	  of	  some	  of	  the	  patriarchal	  
rules	  of	  the	  society:	  a	  transition	  emulating	  the	  transition	  from	  traditionalism	  to	  
modernity.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  women	  from	  both	  the	  lower	  working	  
class	  and	  the	  urban	  middle	  class	  have	  responded	  to	  modernization	  and	  actively	  
engage	  in	  patriarchal	  bargaining,	  the	  strategies	  they	  adopt	  to	  negotiate	  release	  from	  
abusive	  marriages	  in	  the	  hope	  to	  achieve	  a	  better	  life.	  Patriarchal	  bargaining	  in	  my	  
research	  is	  the	  rationalization	  by	  women	  regarding	  their	  prospects	  of	  marriage	  and	  
divorce	  and	  other	  initiatives	  to	  obtain	  a	  better	  life.	  	  	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  Kabeer’s	  (2005)	  concept	  of	  empowerment	  is	  also	  
an	  important	  analytical	  tool	  in	  examining	  Pakistani	  women’s	  bargaining	  for	  and	  
exercise	  of	  their	  agency84.	  	  Kabeer	  (2005)	  defines	  empowerment	  as	  ‘the	  process	  by	  
which	  those	  who	  have	  been	  denied	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  choices	  acquire	  such	  an	  
ability’,85	  but	  in	  order	  to	  be	  empowered,	  one	  must	  have	  been	  disempowered	  in	  the	  
first	  place86.	  	  Empowerment,	  she	  argues,	  is	  a	  process	  of	  change	  and	  identifies	  certain	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criteria	  as	  qualifiers	  of	  empowerment,	  such	  as	  choice,	  which	  implies	  the	  ‘possibility	  
of	  alternatives’	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  chosen	  otherwise87.	  Empowerment	  is	  further	  
broken	  down	  into	  three	  categories:	  resources,	  which	  facilitate	  the	  expansion	  of	  
agency,	  which	  will	  then	  bring	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  achievements.	  	  Kabeer	  (199b)	  
does	  not	  limit	  resources	  to	  economic	  factors	  alone,	  but	  also	  includes	  human	  and	  
social	  resources,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  enhance	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  a	  choice88.	  	  Agency	  is	  
described	  as	  “the	  ability	  to	  define	  one’s	  goals	  and	  act	  upon	  them”89.	  	  It	  does	  not	  refer	  
to	  simply	  observable	  action	  but	  “also	  encompasses	  the	  meaning,	  motivation	  and	  
purpose	  which	  individuals	  bring	  to	  their	  activity,	  their	  sense	  of	  agency,	  or	  the	  power	  
within”90.	  	  Kabeer	  (1999b)	  widens	  the	  scope	  of	  agency	  to	  also	  include	  bargaining	  
and	  negotiation,	  subversion	  and	  resistance,	  as	  well	  as	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  of	  
reflection	  and	  analysis	  that	  can	  be	  exercised	  by	  individuals	  and	  groups91.	  	  
	  
Combining	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  empowerment,	  namely	  resources	  and	  agency,	  
Kabeer	  (1999b)	  defines	  the	  third	  element	  of	  empowerment	  as	  
achievements/outcomes,	  which	  is	  the	  “potential	  people	  have	  for	  living	  the	  lives	  they	  
want”92.	  Kabeer	  (1999a)	  argues	  that	  economic	  gain	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  determinant	  in	  
assessing	  achievement;	  rather,	  a	  woman’s	  sense	  of	  her	  own	  worth	  is	  also	  important:	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“What	  matters	  for	  women’s	  ability	  to	  bargain	  for	  a	  better	  deal	  within	  their	  
households	  and	  families	  is	  their	  perceived	  rather	  than	  their	  actual	  economic	  
contribution”93.	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  empowerment	  is	  an	  important	  analytical	  tool	  in	  examining	  Pakistani	  
women’s	  exercise	  and	  bargaining	  of	  their	  agency.	  	  Kabeer’s	  three	  interrelated	  
aspects	  of	  empowerment	  –	  agency,	  resources	  and	  achievement	  –	  will	  help	  me	  to	  
examine	  what	  motivates	  women	  to	  consider	  divorce	  and	  their	  experiences	  and	  
expectations	  regarding	  it.	  	  	  Access	  to	  education	  (social	  resources),	  employment	  
opportunities	  (economic	  resources)	  and	  family	  support	  and	  friends	  (human	  
resources)	  are	  all	  resources	  that	  are	  available	  to	  women	  to	  various	  degrees.	  	  Since	  
these	  are	  all	  elements	  of	  expanding	  agency,	  my	  research	  explores	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  women	  are	  able	  to	  exercise	  their	  power	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	  the	  
negotiation	  strategies	  they	  use	  to	  improve	  their	  lives.	  	  During	  the	  critical	  moments	  
of	  a	  marital	  breakdown,	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  Pakistani	  women	  able	  to	  use	  their	  
agency	  and	  achieve	  their	  goals?	  	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  education,	  economic	  
independence	  and	  family	  social	  status	  open	  up	  opportunities	  to	  negotiate	  in	  marital	  
disputes,	  and	  conversely,	  how	  might	  these	  very	  factors	  impede	  and	  be	  a	  detriment	  
to	  the	  actualization	  of	  agency?	  	  Kabeer’s	  concept	  of	  effective	  agency	  will	  also	  be	  used	  
to	  examine	  whether	  those	  women	  who	  have	  managed	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce	  have	  been	  
able	  to	  realise	  a	  better	  life	  for	  themselves.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




1.5	  Islamic	  Feminist	  Perspective	  
The	  discussion	  above	  has	  highlighted	  feminist	  legal	  scholarship	  as	  the	  theoretical	  
framework	  of	  this	  research.	  	  However,	  feminist	  writings	  within	  an	  Islamic	  political,	  
socio-­‐economic	  and	  cultural	  context	  are	  also	  important	  to	  this	  research,94	  as	  this	  
study	  is	  focused	  on	  a	  Muslim	  country	  where	  the	  state’s	  very	  foundations	  are	  based	  
upon	  Islam95.	  	  Within	  the	  last	  five	  decades,	  the	  constitutions	  adopted	  by	  Pakistan	  
have	  created	  a	  legal	  hierarchy	  whereby	  Islam	  is	  the	  primary	  norm	  with	  which	  laws	  
must	  be	  consistent.	  	  The	  Objectives	  Resolution,	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  part	  of	  
the	  preamble	  of	  the	  constitution,	  was	  adopted	  as	  a	  substantive	  part	  of	  the	  existing	  
constitution	  by	  General	  Zia	  in	  1985	  as	  Article	  2A96.	  	  It	  is	  important,	  then,	  to	  
investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Pakistani	  legal	  framework	  implements	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Islamic	  feminism	  appeared	  in	  the	  1990s	  within	  different	  geographical	  locations.	  	  
Among	  the	  first	  scholars	  to	  use	  this	  term	  were	  Ziba	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  and	  Afsaneh	  
Najmabadeh,	  whilst	  explaining	  its	  use	  by	  Iranian	  women	  in	  the	  Iranian	  women’s	  
journal	  Zanam.	  	  In	  1996	  the	  Saudi	  Arabian	  scholar	  Mai	  Yamani	  discussed	  Islamic	  
feminism	  in	  her	  book	  Feminism	  and	  Islam,	  whilst	  Turkish	  scholar	  Nilofer	  Gole	  
described	  new	  feminist	  paradigms	  emerging	  in	  Turkey	  in	  the	  1990s;	  detailed	  by	  
Margot	  Badran,	  Feminism	  in	  Islam:	  Secular	  and	  Religious	  Convergences	  (London:	  One	  
World	  Publications,	  2009),	  43.	  
95	  Pakistan	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  nation	  states	  whose	  Grund	  Norms	  were	  based	  upon	  
an	  Islamic	  ideology.	  	  In	  1949,	  this	  ideology	  was	  formulated	  into	  the	  ‘Objectives	  
Resolution’	  of	  the	  first	  constitution	  passed	  by	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  of	  Pakistan,	  
which	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘Whereas	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  entire	  universe	  belongs	  to	  
Allah	  Almighty	  alone	  and	  the	  authority	  which	  he	  has	  delegated	  to	  the	  state	  of	  
Pakistan,	  through	  its	  people	  for	  being	  exercised	  within	  the	  limits	  prescribed	  by	  Him	  
is	  a	  sacred	  trust;	  Wherein	  the	  Muslims	  shall	  be	  enabled	  to	  order	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  
individual	  and	  collective	  sphere	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  teachings	  and	  requirements	  
of	  Islam	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Holy	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna.’	  	  See	  Martin	  Lau,	  The	  Role	  of	  
Islam	  in	  the	  Legal	  System	  (Leiden:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2009).	  
96	  Article	  2-­‐A	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan	  states:	  ‘The	  
principles	  and	  provisions	  set	  out	  in	  the	  ‘Objectives	  Resolution’	  reproduced	  in	  the	  
Annex	  are	  hereby	  made	  a	  substantive	  part	  of	  the	  constitution’.	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Islamic	  notions	  of	  marital	  freedom,	  equity	  and	  justice	  for	  women.	  	  Islamic	  feminism	  
works	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  status	  of	  Muslim	  women	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  
cannot	  be	  determined	  merely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religion;	  rather,	  they	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  
possessing	  multiple	  identities,	  since	  ethnicity,	  class	  and	  race	  all	  influence	  their	  
status.	  Moreover,	  even	  the	  term	  ‘Muslim	  women’	  is	  contested,	  as	  it	  implies	  a	  
monolithic	  uniformity	  that	  in	  reality	  does	  not	  exist	  within	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  as	  
women	  in	  Muslim	  communities	  differ	  according	  to	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  positions	  as	  
well	  as	  their	  race,	  class	  and	  ethnicity97.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  it	  is	  also	  
important	  to	  discuss	  how	  Islamic	  feminists	  are	  calling	  for	  a	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  
Qurʾān	  and	  Shariah	  according	  to	  more	  egalitarian	  principles	  that	  do	  not	  discriminate	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender	  as	  well	  as	  the	  right	  to	  both	  enter	  freely	  and	  then	  leave	  a	  
marriage	  if	  needed.	  	  Islamic	  feminism	  works	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  
interpretations	  of	  sacred	  texts	  are	  not	  the	  exclusive	  authority	  of	  the	  earlier	  religious	  
scholars	  but	  that	  one	  must	  return	  to	  the	  original	  teachings	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	  and	  appreciate	  its	  egalitarian	  principles.	  Badran	  (2009)	  classifies	  such	  
feminists	  into	  three	  groups:	  those	  women	  scholars	  who	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  
Qurʾān	  (Fatima	  Naseef,	  Riffat	  Hassan);	  those	  who	  emphasise	  the	  need	  to	  reinterpret	  
the	  Qurʾān	  in	  order	  to	  reformulate	  the	  Shariah	  (Pakistani	  Shaheen	  Sadar,	  Lebanese	  
Aziza	  Al-­‐Hibri),	  and	  a	  third	  group	  who	  focus	  on	  the	  need	  to	  re-­‐examine	  the	  hadith	  
(Turkish	  Hidayet	  Tuksal,	  Moroccan	  Fatima	  Mernissi)98.	  	  	  Although	  they	  may	  
encompass	  diverse	  views,	  a	  unifying	  factor	  among	  Islamic	  Feminists	  is	  that	  they	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  See	  L.	  Ahmad,	  Women	  and	  Gender	  in	  Islam:	  Historical	  Roots	  of	  a	  Modern	  Debate	  
(New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti	  (ed.),	  Women,	  Islam	  and	  
the	  State	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  1991).	  
98	  Badran,	  Feminism	  in	  Islam:	  Secular	  and	  Religious	  Convergences,	  247.	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not	  restrict	  themselves	  within	  an	  Islamic	  framework;	  rather,	  Islamic	  feminism	  is	  
articulated	  within	  multifarious	  discourses,	  including	  human	  rights	  and	  democratic	  
and	  nationalist	  discourses.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  diversity	  of	  voices	  which	  contribute	  
to	  the	  debate	  regarding	  human	  rights	  within	  an	  Islamic	  paradigm,	  a	  common	  thread	  
is	  the	  empowerment	  of	  Muslim	  women	  within	  a	  rethinking	  of	  Islam99.	  	  Islamic	  
feminists	  argue	  that	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  conditions	  in	  which	  Islam	  was	  
revealed	  as	  well	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  and	  cultural	  context	  is	  necessary	  to	  
reinterpret	  Qurʾānic	  texts	  and	  the	  formulation	  of	  Islamic	  principles.	  	  Feminism	  may	  
have	  originated	  in	  the	  West	  but	  is	  a	  movement	  against	  the	  discriminatory	  practices	  
against	  women	  that	  have	  existed	  in	  all	  cultures	  and	  countries	  and	  must	  lead	  to	  the	  
empowerment	  of	  all	  women.	  	  	  Badran	  (2009)	  states	  that	  “a	  feminist	  discourse	  exists	  
within	  the	  Islamic	  Paradigm,	  which	  derives	  its	  understanding	  and	  mandate	  from	  the	  
Qurʾān	  and	  Sunna	  of	  the	  Prophet	  and	  seeks	  rights	  and	  justice	  for	  women	  and	  
men”100.	  	  Islamic	  feminists	  argue	  that	  Islam	  has	  always	  worked	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  
women	  and	  can	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  if	  we	  return	  to	  the	  original	  sources.	  	  The	  issues	  
raised	  are	  not	  aimed	  directly	  at	  divine	  revelation,	  but	  rather	  are	  an	  objection	  to	  
patriarchal	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  hadith	  by	  religious	  scholars101.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  Mai	  Yamani	  (ed.),	  Feminism	  in	  Islam:	  Legal	  Literacy	  Perspectives	  (United	  
Kingdom:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  1996),	  1-­‐33.	  
100	  Margot	  Badran,	  Feminism	  in	  Islam:	  Secular	  and	  Religious	  and	  Convergences,	  242.	  
101	  F.	  Hussain,	  Muslim	  Women	  (Worcester:	  Croom	  Helm,	  1984),	  37.	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This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  translation	  of	  verse	  4:34	  of	  the	  Qurʾān,	  which	  is	  
used	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  men	  to	  physically	  chastise	  their	  wives102.	  	  During	  a	  marital	  
conflict,	  this	  verse	  advises	  a	  husband	  to	  first	  talk	  to	  his	  wife	  about	  the	  marital	  
discord.	  	  If	  this	  fails,	  then	  he	  is	  instructed	  to	  leave	  the	  marital	  bed,	  and	  failing	  that,	  to	  
‘adriboo’	  his	  wife.	  	  The	  most	  commonly	  translated	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  adriboo	  is	  ‘to	  
beat’	  and	  this	  translation	  is	  used	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  English	  translations	  consulted	  
during	  this	  research.	  However,	  Qadri	  (2014)	  states	  that	  adriboo	  has	  several	  
meanings	  in	  Arabic,	  such	  as	  ‘to	  forsake,	  to	  avoid	  and	  to	  leave’103.	  	  Qadri	  (2014)	  
argues	  that	  to	  attribute	  ‘to	  beat’	  as	  its	  only	  meaning	  is	  a	  misinterpretation	  of	  this	  
word,	  as	  the	  principles	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐Qurʾān	  dictate	  that	  verses	  in	  the	  Qurʾān	  must	  be	  
interpreted	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  Qurʾānic	  verses	  and	  authentic	  hadith104.	  	  Thus,	  in	  his	  
translation	  of	  this	  verse,	  he	  translates	  adriboo	  as	  “striking	  a	  temporary	  parting”105.	  	  
	  
A	  similar	  pattern	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  misogynist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  
Despite	  specific	  Qurʾānic	  injunctions	  to	  the	  contrary,	  women	  were	  denied	  the	  legal	  
remedy	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  by	  colonial	  courts	  in	  British	  India	  as	  well	  as	  in	  post-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Al-­‐	  Qurʾān:	  4:34	  “As	  to	  those	  women	  on	  whose	  part	  you	  see	  ill-­‐conduct,	  admonish	  
them	  (first),	  (next),	  refuse	  to	  share	  their	  beds,	  (and	  last)	  beat	  them	  (lightly,	  if	  it	  is	  
useful),	  but	  if	  they	  return	  to	  obedience,	  seek	  not	  against	  them	  means	  (of	  
annoyance)”.	  	  Translation	  taken	  from	  Dr.	  Muhammad	  Taqi-­‐ud-­‐Din	  Al-­‐Hilali	  and	  Dr.	  
Muhammad	  Muhsin	  Khan,	  The	  Noble	  Qurʾān:	  Translation	  of	  the	  Meanings	  of	  The	  
Noble	  Qurʾān	  in	  the	  English	  Language,	  (King	  Fahd	  Complex;	  no	  date)	  113.	  See	  
Chapter	  Seven,	  which	  highlights	  the	  views	  of	  members	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  legal	  
profession,	  who	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  a	  key	  verse	  used	  by	  men	  to	  control	  
‘insubordinate’	  wives.	  	  
103	  Interview	  Dr.	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri,	  Canada	  June	  2014.	  	  	  
104	  Interview	  Dr.	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri,	  Canada	  June	  2014.	  	  
105	  The	  Glorious	  Qurʾān:	  English	  Translation,	  Muhammad	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri	  (London:	  
Minhaj	  Publications,	  2012),	  56.	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independence	  Pakistan106.	  	  When	  women	  were	  finally	  allowed	  to	  utilise	  this	  divorce	  
procedure,	  the	  right	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  was	  formulated	  with	  a	  mandatory	  payment	  of	  some	  
compensation	  to	  the	  husband	  by	  the	  wife,	  as	  opposed	  to	  one	  dependent	  on	  the	  
particular	  circumstances	  of	  each	  case.	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  provide	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  law	  of	  khulʿ	  and	  illustrate	  that	  not	  only	  has	  it	  been	  consistently	  
misinterpreted	  by	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  but	  that	  positive	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  interpretations	  of	  
this	  remedy	  were	  also	  ignored	  in	  favour	  of	  male	  supremacy.	  
	  
The	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  why	  certain	  verses	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  pertaining	  to	  women	  
were	  interpreted	  to	  affect	  them	  negatively	  and	  are	  continuing	  to	  do	  so.	  Haddad	  and	  
Esposito	  (1998)	  argue	  that	  classical	  divine	  revelation	  was	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  
by	  early	  9th	  century	  scholars	  in	  a	  socio-­‐historical	  context	  who	  were	  influenced	  by	  
their	  local	  cultural	  norms	  of	  a	  patriarchal	  society	  as	  well	  as	  their	  diverse	  
geographical	  locations107.	  	  The	  functions	  of	  the	  extended	  family	  and	  traditional	  roles	  
of	  men	  and	  women	  evident	  in	  a	  patriarchal	  society	  were	  reflected	  in	  the	  Muslim	  
family	  law	  of	  those	  times108.	  	  Whilst	  underscoring	  the	  egalitarian	  basis	  of	  the	  Qurʾān,	  
Engineer	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  “Shariah	  must	  be	  seen	  both	  in	  its	  cultural	  as	  well	  as	  
normative	  and	  transcendental	  spirit”109.	  	  Therefore	  a	  reformulation	  of	  Shariah	  
should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  judgments	  of	  past	  jurists,	  since	  their	  
interpretations	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  social	  mores	  of	  their	  times;	  nor	  did	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  See	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Three	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis.	  
107	  Y.	  Haddad	  and	  J.	  Esposito,	  Islam,	  Gender	  and	  Social	  Change	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1998).	  
108Ibid.,	  8.	  
109	  A.A.	  Engineer,	  The	  Rights	  of	  Women	  in	  Islam	  (India:	  New	  Dawn	  Press,	  2004),	  17.	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consider	  themselves	  completely	  infallible110.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  
Arabic	  language	  is	  incredibly	  rich,	  with	  each	  word	  having	  multiple	  meanings	  and	  
nuances,	  so	  that	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verses	  can	  be	  reinterpreted	  by	  not	  merely	  considering	  
the	  literal	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  but	  also	  through	  a	  look	  at	  the	  deeper	  spirit	  of	  the	  
message	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  itself111.	  	  Ali	  (2003)	  argues	  that:	  
	  
“What	  is	  not	  acknowledged	  by	  many	  Muslims	  today	  is	  that	  we	  have	  lapsed	  into	  an	  
acceptance	  of	  status	  quo,	  a	  situation	  where	  social,	  economical	  and	  political	  disparity	  
has	  taken	  over	  our	  capacity	  for	  independent	  thought.	  	  We	  feel	  that	  there	  is	  more	  
security	  in	  treading	  familiar	  terrain	  rather	  than	  embarking	  on	  the	  challenging	  task	  
of	  separating	  the	  egalitarian	  tradition	  of	  Islam	  from	  its	  cultural	  elitist	  
manifestation.”112	  
	  
The	  challenging	  task	  outlined	  by	  Ali	  (2003)	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  numerous	  
juristic	  methods	  to	  create	  a	  reformation	  within	  Islamic	  law.	  	  Many	  Muslim	  scholars	  
and	  Islamic	  feminists	  advocate	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  independent	  
thinking	  (ijtihād)113.	  	  Takhayyur	  (eclecticism)	  and	  talfīq	  (amalgamation)	  are	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Ibid.	  
111	  Rifat	  Hassan,	  “An	  Islamic	  Perspective,”	  in	  Religion	  and	  Sexuality:	  Studies	  on	  the	  
Impact	  of	  Religious	  Teachings	  on	  Women,	  ed.	  J.	  Becher	  (Geneva:	  World	  Council	  of	  
Churches	  Publications,	  1990),	  100-­‐128.	  	  
112	  Shaheen	  Ali,	  “(Re)Claiming	  Our	  Histories:	  A	  Reflection	  on	  Women,	  Islam	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  in	  Contemporary	  Muslim	  Communities,”	  Paper	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Day,	  
10th	  December,	  2003,	  Islamabad.	  
113	  Ijtihād	  literally	  means	  to	  struggle,	  to	  strive	  or	  to	  engage	  in	  strenuous	  physical	  or	  
mental	  effort	  towards	  a	  particular	  activity.	  	  Ijtihād	  is	  a	  methodology	  that	  allows	  
human	  endeavour	  and	  knowledge	  to	  develop,	  expand	  and	  provide	  reformation	  of	  
law	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  based	  upon	  divine	  revelation.	  	  See	  Asaf	  A.	  A.	  Fyzee,	  Outlines	  of	  
Muhammadan	  Law	  (New	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1964);	  N.J.A.	  Coulson,	  
History	  of	  Islamic	  Law	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  1964);	  Joseph	  
Schacht,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Islamic	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1964);	  W.	  A.	  
Hallaq,	  History	  of	  Islamic	  Legal	  Theories:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Sunni	  Usul	  al-­‐Fiqh	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997);	  B.	  Weiss,	  “Interpretation	  in	  Islamic	  
Law:	  The	  Theory	  of	  Ijtihad,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  26,	  no.	  2	  (1978):	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important	  juristic	  techniques	  that	  have	  been	  employed	  by	  Muslim	  jurists	  and	  states	  
to	  fulfil	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  developing	  society.	  	  The	  process	  of	  takhayyur	  allows	  a	  scholar	  
to	  choose	  between	  the	  opinions	  of	  individual	  scholars	  within	  a	  single	  school	  or	  from	  
amongst	  different	  schools,	  whilst	  talfīq	  allows	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  opinions	  within	  
the	  schools	  of	  law114.	  	  Ali	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  revival	  of	  these	  
Islamic	  juristic	  techniques	  to	  reflect	  the	  egalitarian	  and	  democratic	  nature	  of	  the	  
Islamic	  tradition115.	  	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four.	  
	  
1.6	  Literature	  review	  
Although	  female-­‐initiated	  divorces	  are	  on	  the	  increase	  in	  Pakistan,	  there	  is	  a	  paucity	  
of	  literature	  regarding	  the	  practical	  implementation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  courts	  and	  
women’s	  lived	  experiences	  when	  applying	  for	  a	  divorce	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  Research	  on	  
the	  khulʿ	  has	  been	  limited	  to	  its	  judicial	  development	  by	  the	  courts	  through	  a	  textual	  
analysis	  of	  case	  law	  (which	  will	  be	  discussed	  later),	  rather	  than	  its	  practical	  
implementation.	  However,	  Pakistan	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  few	  previous	  studies	  that	  
expose	  the	  limits	  of	  legislation	  and	  argue	  that	  these	  legal	  endeavours	  have	  failed	  to	  
deliver	  gender	  justice.	  These	  studies	  are	  important,	  as	  they	  place	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
khulʿ	  within	  a	  larger	  framework	  regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  law	  reform	  to	  improve	  the	  
rights	  of	  women	  within	  a	  patriarchal	  society	  such	  as	  Pakistan.	  	  Jilani	  (1994),	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199-­‐212;	  Muhammad	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri,	  Ijtihād;	  Meanings,	  Application	  and	  Scope	  
(London:	  Minhaj	  Publications,	  2007).	  
114	  Wael	  Hallaq,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Islamic	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2009),	  117.	  
115	  Shaheen	  Ali,	  “(Re)Claiming	  Our	  Histories:	  A	  Reflection	  on	  Women,	  Islam	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  in	  Contemporary	  Muslim	  Communities,”	  Paper	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Day,	  
10th	  December	  2003,	  Islamabad.	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prominent	  human	  rights	  lawyer	  in	  Pakistan,	  argues	  that	  legislation	  has	  always	  been	  
implemented	  through	  male-­‐dominated	  institutions,	  including	  the	  legislature,	  police	  
and	  judiciary116.	  	  These	  institutions	  protect	  patriarchal	  privilege,	  and	  the	  proper	  
implementation	  of	  laws	  that	  would	  entail	  the	  curtailment	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  men	  in	  
favour	  of	  women	  has	  not	  occurred.	  	  Even	  though	  recent	  years	  have	  seen	  a	  stark	  
increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  women	  elected	  into	  Parliament	  and	  local	  government,	  
their	  voices	  remain	  silent	  and	  they	  are	  precluded	  from	  any	  major	  role	  in	  
policymaking	  and	  legislation117.	  	  Jillani	  (1994)	  argues	  that	  unless	  social	  institutions	  
are	  changed	  and	  local	  social	  values	  and	  traditions	  do	  not	  take	  precedence,	  
legislation	  cannot	  become	  an	  effective	  tool	  to	  overcome	  injustice118.	  Zia	  (1995)	  
highlights	  the	  pivotal	  role	  played	  by	  religious	  groups	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  
discriminatory	  practices,	  particularly	  against	  women,	  and	  questions	  whether	  formal	  
laws	  can	  ever	  provide	  justice	  to	  women	  when	  laws	  are	  misinterpreted	  in	  the	  name	  
of	  Islam	  to	  their	  detriment119.	  She	  argues	  that	  those	  who	  hold	  the	  power	  to	  control	  
and	  implement	  the	  law	  either	  belong	  to	  the	  feudal	  landed	  aristocracy	  or	  come	  from	  
military	  and	  bureaucratic	  backgrounds120.	  	  Any	  attempt	  to	  provide	  justice	  for	  
vulnerable	  groups	  or	  minorities	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  ruling	  elite	  and	  their	  
interests121.	  	  Shaheen	  Ali	  (2003)	  examines	  the	  efficacy	  of	  legal	  literacy	  courses	  run	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Hina	  Jilani,	  “Law	  as	  an	  Instrument	  of	  Social	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for	  women	  in	  Pakistan122.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  although	  these	  courses	  proved	  useful	  by	  
raising	  awareness	  of	  existing	  legislation,	  women	  were	  still	  reluctant	  to	  engage	  with	  
formal	  laws	  for	  empowerment.	  	  She	  found	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  religious	  and	  cultural	  
norms	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  powerful	  deterrent	  within	  a	  plural	  legal	  society	  such	  as	  
Pakistan123.	  	  
	  
In	  her	  work,	  Shaheed	  (1997)	  continues	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  religion	  in	  
Muslim	  societies	  to	  justify	  patriarchal	  structures124.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  plural	  legal	  
systems	  co-­‐exist	  with	  formal	  laws,	  the	  former	  derived	  from	  religious	  scripture	  or	  
other	  cultural	  norms.	  	  Unfortunately,	  when	  there	  is	  a	  choice	  to	  be	  made	  between	  the	  
two,	  then	  those	  laws	  that	  are	  disadvantageous	  to	  women	  are	  predominantly	  chosen.	  	  
She	  provides	  an	  analysis	  of	  a	  husband’s	  right	  to	  orally	  divorce	  his	  wife	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  
Although	  it	  has	  been	  made	  subject	  to	  notification	  provisions	  by	  the	  Muslim	  Family	  
Law	  Ordinance	  1961	  (MFLO),	  since	  an	  oral	  divorce	  is	  permissible	  under	  classical	  
Islamic	  law,	  the	  notification	  requirements	  are	  rarely	  enforced125.	  	  Conversely,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  rape	  and	  adultery,	  formal	  laws	  that	  discriminated	  against	  women	  were	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  Shaheen	  Ali,	  “A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  Family	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan:	  A	  Woman’s	  
Perspective,”	  in	  Women’s	  Law	  in	  Legal	  Education	  in	  Pakistan:	  North	  South	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  eds.	  Shaheed,	  F.	  and	  R.	  Mehdi	  (New	  Social	  Science	  Monographs,	  1997),	  
198-­‐223.	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  Ibid.,	  209.	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  Fareeda	  Shaheed,	  “Controlled	  or	  Autonomous:	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  and	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  Experience	  of	  the	  
Network,	  Women	  Living	  Under	  Muslim	  Laws,”	  Signs,	  19,	  no.	  4	  (1994):	  997-­‐1019.	  	  
See	  also	  Fareeda	  Shaheed,	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  Women	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  Fareeda	  Shaheed	  and	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  
(New	  Social	  Science	  Monographs,	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  1000.	  
	  
33	  
followed	  in	  Pakistan	  rather	  than	  classical	  Islamic	  texts126.	  	  Jillani	  and	  Jehanghir	  
(2003)	  examine	  the	  impact	  on	  women	  of	  the	  Hudood	  Ordinances,	  which	  
criminalised	  adultery,	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  became	  a	  powerful	  weapon	  in	  the	  hands	  
of	  men	  to	  oppress	  and	  control	  women127.	  	  General	  Zia	  justified	  the	  passing	  of	  these	  
laws	  exclusively	  upon	  an	  Islamic	  premise	  and	  rallied	  religious	  ʿulamāʾ	  in	  its	  support.	  	  
However,	  these	  laws	  were	  used	  to	  facilitate	  sexual	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  
impeded	  women’s	  right	  to	  obtain	  justice	  in	  cases	  of	  rape.	  	  More	  recently,	  Werlhof	  
(2014)	  discusses	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  2010	  Acid	  Control	  and	  Acid	  Crime	  Prevention	  Act	  
on	  women	  subject	  to	  violence	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  Act	  has	  had	  very	  
limited	  success	  in	  protecting	  women	  from	  violence.	  	  One	  reason,	  amongst	  many,	  is	  
the	  failure	  by	  the	  state	  to	  provide	  support	  from	  other	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  as	  
well	  as	  assistance	  from	  other	  support	  networks.	  	  The	  police	  in	  particular	  are	  
accused	  of	  not	  taking	  these	  crimes	  seriously	  by	  failing	  to	  pursue	  criminal	  sanctions	  
against	  the	  perpetrators128.	  	  This	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  findings	  in	  this	  research,	  
which	  found	  that	  police	  authorities	  failed	  to	  pursue	  various	  criminal	  sanctions	  
issued	  by	  family	  court	  judges	  against	  ex-­‐husbands.	  Police	  authorities	  were	  reluctant	  
to	  pursue	  arrest	  warrants	  against	  husbands	  who	  had	  failed	  to	  pay	  child	  support	  or	  
did	  not	  return	  property	  to	  their	  ex-­‐wives.	  	  The	  studies	  above	  highlight	  the	  general	  
failure	  of	  legal	  measures	  to	  provide	  any	  meaningful	  improvement	  to	  the	  daily	  lives	  
of	  women.	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  Ibid.	  	  See	  also	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
127	  Asma	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  and	  Hina	  Jilani,	  The	  Hudood	  Ordinances:	  A	  Divine	  Sanction?	  
(Lahore:	  Rohtas	  Books,	  2003),	  21.	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With	  respect	  to	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  particular,	  there	  has	  been	  limited	  research	  regarding	  the	  
judicial	  development	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  the	  attempts	  of	  the	  court	  to	  cultivate	  a	  no-­‐fault	  
khulʿ	  device.	  Carroll	  (1996)	  provides	  an	  extremely	  useful	  analysis	  of	  judicial	  
decisions	  related	  to	  the	  khulʿ129.	  	  In	  1959,	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  delivered	  a	  
verdict	  in	  the	  ground-­‐breaking	  case	  of	  Balquis	  Fatima,	  which	  created	  the	  judicial	  
precedent	  of	  granting	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  women	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband130.	  	  
Carroll	  (1996)	  puts	  forward	  an	  excellent	  account	  of	  the	  legal	  arguments	  submitted	  
by	  counsel	  in	  this	  case	  and	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  judges.	  	  She	  
dissects	  the	  judgment	  provided	  by	  all	  of	  the	  justices	  and	  explains	  the	  rationale	  
behind	  their	  innovative	  judgment.	  	  However,	  in	  her	  treatment	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
case	  of	  Khurshid	  Bibi131	  (which	  reinforced	  the	  lower	  court’s	  decision	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Balquis	  Fatima),	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  latter	  case	  “reiterated	  many	  of	  the	  same	  
arguments	  and	  referred	  to	  much	  of	  the	  same	  material”	  as	  the	  Balquis	  Fatima	  case	  
and	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  similar	  in-­‐depth	  analysis132.	  This	  research	  will,	  however,	  
seek	  to	  show	  that	  Carroll’s	  (1996)	  assertions	  are	  inaccurate,	  as	  the	  Justices	  took	  a	  
more	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  their	  legal	  reasoning	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ	  which	  had	  a	  
major	  impact	  on	  subsequent	  case	  law.	  	  This,	  it	  will	  be	  argued,	  was	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  
creating	  a	  legal	  device	  that	  was	  a	  more	  palatable	  remedy	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  other	  
members	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  Carroll’s	  (1996)	  work	  has	  also	  become	  a	  little	  dated,	  as	  it	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does	  not	  include	  the	  judicial	  developments	  regarding	  what	  compensation,	  if	  any,	  a	  
woman	  must	  provide	  at	  the	  dissolution	  of	  her	  marriage,	  nor	  the	  judicial	  response	  to	  
the	  recent	  amendments	  to	  s.	  10(4)	  of	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act133.	  
	  
Yefet’s	  (2011)	  work	  is	  also	  very	  useful	  to	  this	  study,	  as	  it	  provides	  an	  examination	  of	  
the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  divorce	  in	  Pakistan,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  judicial	  
development	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  Although	  Yefet	  follows	  the	  model	  detailed	  by	  Carroll	  
(1996),	  her	  work	  is	  more	  recent	  and	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  judicial	  decisions	  
regarding	  the	  relaxation	  of	  rules	  of	  compensation.	  	  Yefet	  (2011)	  also	  places	  the	  khulʿ	  
within	  the	  wider	  debate	  of	  readdressing	  gender	  imbalance	  of	  power	  through	  a	  
stricter	  implementation	  of	  the	  rights	  ameliorated	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  Constitution.	  	  She	  
argues	  that	  the	  right	  to	  marriage	  is	  a	  fundamental	  right	  protected	  by	  the	  
constitution	  which	  necessarily	  entails	  the	  right	  to	  be	  free	  to	  marry,	  and	  that	  cultural,	  
religious	  or	  judicial	  efforts	  that	  hinder	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights	  prevent	  
women	  from	  being	  free	  to	  marry	  and	  thus	  contravene	  the	  Pakistani	  constitution.	  
	  
Masud	  (2012)	  provides	  a	  very	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology’s	  
reccomendations	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  divorce	  laws	  in	  general	  and	  the	  khul‘	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  The	  amendments	  now	  require	  courts	  to	  pass	  the	  khulʿ	  without	  a	  determination	  of	  
fact	  regarding	  who	  was	  at	  fault.	  A	  wife	  is	  entitled	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  if	  there	  has	  been	  an	  
irretrievable	  breakdown	  in	  the	  marriage	  and	  attempts	  at	  reconciliation	  have	  failed	  
(S.	  10	  (5)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  Moreover,	  courts	  are	  
now	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  khulʿ	  cases	  are	  completed	  within	  four	  months	  of	  the	  
original	  submission	  of	  the	  plaint	  of	  khulʿ	  with	  mandatory	  guidelines	  regarding	  the	  
amount	  of	  khulʿ	  to	  be	  returned	  (S.	  12	  (A)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  
of	  2015).	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specifically	  in	  Pakistan134.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  social	  concerns	  of	  the	  time	  created	  
conflicting	  tensions	  regarding	  interpretation	  of	  women’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  laws,	  not	  
only	  in	  present	  day	  Pakistan	  but	  during	  the	  formative	  period	  of	  Islam,	  where	  jurists	  
were	  influenced	  by	  the	  gender	  discrimination	  that	  existed	  in	  pre-­‐Islamic	  Arabia135.	  	  
Indeed	  Masud	  (2012)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  contemporary	  authors	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  
Qurʾān	  does	  not	  make	  the	  return	  of	  the	  dower	  a	  compulsory	  element	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  
but	  rather	  it	  is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  wife.	  	  This	  thesis	  expands	  upon	  this	  
argument	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  and	  will	  show	  that	  the	  early	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  did	  
not	  construe	  compensation	  an	  automatic	  right	  of	  the	  husband	  during	  a	  khulʿ.	  
	  
Munir’s	  (2014)	  study	  is	  more	  recent	  and	  provides	  an	  interesting	  analysis	  of	  the	  law	  
of	  khulʿ	  within	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  Islamic	  fiqh	  (the	  Ḥanafī,	  Mālikī,	  Shāfiʿī	  and	  Ḥanbalī	  
schools)136.	  	  Munir	  argues	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  jurists	  (including	  Ḥanafī	  jurists)	  
did	  not	  allow	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  a	  wife	  without	  the	  express	  consent	  of	  the	  
husband,	  the	  exception	  being	  Mālikī	  jurists,	  who	  considered	  it	  appropriate	  for	  a	  
woman	  apply	  to	  the	  qāḍī	  (Muslim	  judge)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute.	  With	  respect	  to	  
Ḥanafī	  jurists,	  he	  states	  that	  both	  Al-­‐Sarakhsī	  and	  Al-­‐Kāsānī	  (eminent	  Ḥanafī	  jurists)	  
emphasise	  the	  contractual	  nature	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  The	  jurists	  state	  that	  a	  contract	  
requires	  an	  offer	  of	  khulʿ	  with	  the	  mahr	  as	  compensation,	  and	  that	  a	  husband	  must	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freely	  accept	  such	  an	  offer.	  	  Munir	  (2014)	  concludes	  from	  this	  that	  such	  an	  
agreement	  can	  only	  occur	  if	  a	  husband	  gives	  his	  free	  consent	  to	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  This	  line	  
of	  reasoning	  is	  adopted	  by	  many	  other	  authors,	  all	  of	  whom	  presume	  that	  Ḥanafī	  
jurists	  did	  not	  allow	  a	  khulʿ	  without	  the	  express	  consent	  of	  the	  husband137.	  	  Zantout	  
(2006),	  for	  example,	  investigates	  past	  and	  present	  understandings	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  
light	  of	  Ḥanafī	  doctrines.	  	  She	  provides	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  application	  of	  
marriage	  and	  divorce	  laws	  between	  modern	  Egypt	  and	  under	  the	  old	  Ottoman	  
Empire138.	  However,	  her	  underlying	  thesis	  is	  that	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  does	  not	  
provide	  any	  remedy	  for	  women	  who	  wish	  to	  initiate	  a	  khulʿ	  without	  their	  husbands’	  
consent.	  Whilst	  both	  Munir	  (2014)	  and	  Zantout	  (2006)	  provide	  a	  useful	  analysis	  of	  
the	  different	  approaches	  of	  the	  jurists	  to	  the	  law	  of	  khulʿ,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  
Two	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  these	  views	  are	  based	  on	  a	  fundamental	  misunderstanding	  
regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence.	  	  Specifically,	  it	  will	  be	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shown	  that	  the	  consensual	  nature	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  was	  only	  emphasised	  in	  an	  extra-­‐
judicial	  khulʿ	  where	  a	  court	  was	  not	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  between	  the	  
husband	  and	  wife.	  	  However,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  dispute,	  Ḥanafī	  
jurists	  specifically	  permit	  the	  matter	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  court	  irrespective	  of	  the	  
husband’s	  consent,	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  previous	  understandings	  of	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh.	  	  
Indeed,	  this	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  made,	  as	  ʿulamāʾ	  in	  Pakistan	  
continually	  justify	  their	  attempts	  at	  limiting	  reform	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  basing	  their	  views	  
on	  a	  misconception	  of	  Ḥanafī	  law	  on	  the	  matter.	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  studies	  above	  provide	  a	  textual	  analysis	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  as	  yet	  there	  have	  
been	  no	  field	  studies	  regarding	  the	  practical	  implementation	  of	  this	  right	  in	  the	  
courts.	  	  This	  research	  therefore	  hopes	  to	  fill	  this	  academic	  gap	  and	  provide	  a	  new	  
insight	  into	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  the	  family	  courts	  of	  Lahore	  and	  provide	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  legal	  implementation	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  
There	  have,	  however,	  been	  a	  number	  of	  field	  studies	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  women’s	  
experiences	  and	  problems	  within	  marriage	  and	  what	  remedies,	  if	  any	  have	  been	  
used	  by	  women	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  situations.	  	  Whilst	  these	  studies	  do	  not	  delve	  
directly	  into	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights,	  they	  do	  provide	  a	  general	  context	  
within	  which	  to	  situate	  the	  current	  research.	  	  	  Qadir	  et	  al	  (2005)	  investigated	  
marital	  satisfaction	  in	  Pakistan	  (concentrating	  on	  the	  cities	  of	  Islamabad	  and	  
Rawalpindi)	  and	  found	  that	  although	  most	  women	  expressed	  the	  need	  to	  achieve	  
satisfaction	  within	  the	  marriage,	  the	  onus	  was	  on	  the	  wife	  to	  achieve	  this	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satisfaction:	  she	  needed	  to	  be	  content	  with	  her	  destiny	  and	  circumstances139.	  With	  
respect	  to	  divorce,	  they	  found	  that	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  felt	  that	  it	  would	  be	  very	  
difficult	  to	  survive	  in	  Pakistani	  society	  without	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  husband140.	  	  All	  of	  
the	  participants	  not	  only	  considered	  divorce	  to	  be	  a	  curse	  but	  even	  thought	  that	  to	  
engage	  in	  one	  would	  be	  a	  selfish	  act	  that	  would	  be	  hurtful	  to	  parents141.	  	  	  
	  
In	  Critelli’s	  (2012)	  study,	  women’s	  marriage	  experiences	  were	  examined	  in	  
Pakistan,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  women’s	  ability	  to	  enter	  and	  extricate	  themselves	  from	  
marriage	  through	  the	  tools	  available	  to	  them	  by	  law142.	  The	  narratives	  of	  these	  
women	  illustrated	  a	  chasm	  between	  women’s	  rights	  articulated	  by	  law	  and	  the	  law	  
in	  practice143.	  All	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  fled	  to	  a	  women’s	  shelter	  in	  a	  major	  city	  of	  
Pakistan.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  engaged	  in	  divorce	  proceedings	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  either	  forced	  marriages	  by	  their	  parents	  or	  fleeing	  from	  abusive	  husbands.	  
Critelli	  (2012)	  found	  that	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  deemed	  to	  have	  transgressed	  
social	  conventions	  by	  leaving	  abusive	  marriages	  and	  were	  subject	  to	  severe	  
reprisals	  from	  their	  families,	  which	  included	  beatings144.	  	  Whilst	  Critelli’s	  (2012)	  
research	  found	  that	  women	  in	  this	  study	  “were	  beginning	  to	  question	  traditional	  
values	  and	  to	  voice	  greater	  expectations	  of	  choice	  about	  the	  terms	  of	  their	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marriages”145,	  the	  current	  research	  explores	  this	  more	  deeply	  and	  illustrates	  that	  
many	  women	  are	  actively	  engaged	  in	  making	  life	  choices	  through	  the	  utilization	  of	  
legal	  remedies.	  
	  
Tazeen	  Ali	  et	  al	  (2012)	  explored	  the	  perceptions	  of	  married	  women	  towards	  marital	  
violence	  and	  coping	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  them	  among	  women	  living	  in	  Karachi,	  
Pakistan.	  	  It	  was	  found	  that	  violence	  was	  directed	  more	  towards	  poorer	  women,	  
uneducated	  women	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not	  bring	  a	  large	  dowry146.	  	  Informants	  
believed	  that	  educated	  women	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  their	  rights	  as	  
compared	  with	  their	  poorer	  and	  uneducated	  counterparts.	  	  These	  particular	  results	  
resonate	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  research.	  	  Ali	  et	  al	  (2012)	  also	  found	  that	  women	  
from	  higher	  socio-­‐economic	  strata	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  themselves	  and	  
seek	  divorce	  as	  a	  means	  of	  escape	  from	  violent	  marriages147.	  	  This,	  however,	  is	  
contrary	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  current	  research,	  which	  found	  that	  it	  is	  women	  from	  
lower	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  seek	  a	  divorce	  than	  their	  
wealthier	  counterparts.	  	  Ali	  et	  al	  (2012)	  draw	  their	  conclusions	  from	  the	  
perceptions	  and	  views	  of	  the	  informants	  themselves	  rather	  than	  from	  an	  actual	  
survey	  of	  divorce	  litigants.	  	  However,	  the	  current	  research	  aims	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
accuracy	  of	  the	  participants’	  perceptions,	  and	  thus	  a	  survey	  of	  female	  divorce	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litigants	  was	  carried	  out	  to	  ascertain	  a	  more	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  backgrounds	  of	  
the	  female	  litigants.	  	  	  
	  
Rubeena	  Zakar	  et	  al	  (2012)	  documented	  the	  coping	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  female	  
victims	  of	  spousal	  violence	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  They	  found	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
participants	  used	  emotional-­‐focused	  strategies	  such	  as	  placating	  their	  husbands,	  
avoiding	  confrontations	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  religious	  activities148.	  	  However,	  seeking	  
help	  through	  formal	  strategies	  such	  as	  divorce	  litigation	  was	  found	  to	  be	  extremely	  
rare149.	  	  However,	  Zakar	  et	  al’s	  (2012)	  study	  only	  involved	  participants	  from	  low	  
middle	  class	  families	  and	  excluded	  women	  belonging	  to	  the	  lower	  working	  class.	  	  
Zakar	  et	  al	  (2012)	  acknowledge	  that	  their	  sample	  was	  not	  representative,	  as	  it	  only	  
represented	  urban	  middle	  class	  women150.	  	  In	  contrast,	  this	  current	  research	  found	  
that	  participants	  from	  the	  lower	  working	  classes	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  formal	  
legal	  remedies,	  but	  this	  particular	  demographic	  was	  excluded	  from	  Zakar	  et	  al’s	  
(2012)	  study.	  
	  
Since	  there	  has	  been	  no	  specific	  research	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  khulʿ	  in	  Pakistani	  courts,	  
it	  is	  apt	  to	  look	  at	  field	  studies	  in	  other	  Muslim	  countries	  to	  provide	  a	  template	  for	  
the	  current	  research.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  brief	  overview	  will	  be	  provided	  of	  khulʿ	  studies	  in	  
Egypt,	  Libya	  and	  Morocco	  before	  we	  return	  to	  the	  Pakistani	  domain.	  This	  will	  help	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situate	  this	  research	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  Muslim	  women	  
elsewhere	  and	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  to	  compare	  and	  contrast	  the	  results.	  	  
Egyptian	  women	  received	  the	  right	  to	  pursue	  a	  judicial	  khulʿ	  in	  2000	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  in	  Egyptian	  history151,	  and	  there	  has	  been	  a	  plethora	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  this	  new	  law.	  Current	  work	  on	  the	  divorce	  laws	  of	  Egypt	  falls	  into	  
two	  distinct	  categories.	  There	  are	  studies	  by	  prominent	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  who	  
provide	  a	  textual	  analysis	  of	  the	  laws	  and	  court	  system,	  such	  as	  Al-­‐Lamsawy	  (2006),	  
Zuwein	  (2006),	  Sheta	  (2006),	  Mansour	  (2006)	  and	  Al-­‐Bakri	  (2004).	  	  However,	  
others	  have	  specifically	  addressed	  and	  critiqued	  the	  current	  system,	  concentrating	  
on	  its	  drawbacks	  and	  effects	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  Egyptian	  women,	  including	  Singerman	  
and	  Ibrahim	  (2003),	  Tadrus	  (2003),	  Fawzy	  (2004),	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (2004),	  
Moussa	  (2005)	  and	  Sonneveld	  (2006,	  2012):	  these	  studies	  are	  more	  relevant	  to	  the	  
current	  research.	  	  	  
	  
Tadrus	  (2003)	  and	  Sonneveld	  (2006)	  found	  that	  the	  new	  Egyptian	  law	  aroused	  
intense	  debates	  in	  the	  media	  and	  judicial	  arenas,	  but	  these	  did	  not	  revolve	  around	  
the	  need	  for	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  sexes,	  focusing	  rather	  on	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  stability	  
and	  security	  of	  the	  family	  would	  be	  undermined.	  	  These	  discussions	  did	  not	  entail	  
the	  promotion	  or	  violation	  of	  rights;	  nor	  was	  any	  discourse	  related	  to	  citizenship	  or	  
constitutional	  rights152.	  Rather,	  the	  khulʿ	  was	  criticised	  for	  emulating	  westernised	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modes	  of	  family	  life153.	  	  Women	  were	  perceived	  as	  being	  more	  emotional	  than	  men,	  
and	  it	  was	  anticipated	  that	  the	  new	  law	  would	  result	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  divorce	  rates	  
and	  destabilisation	  of	  Egyptian	  families	  and	  would	  promote	  ‘spinsterhood’.	  	  Katulis	  
(2004)	  found	  that	  women	  suffered	  an	  onerous	  financial	  burden	  if	  they	  initiated	  
divorce,	  while	  husbands	  would	  often	  freely	  bully	  their	  wives	  into	  asking	  for	  a	  
khulʿ154.	  	  Sharmani’s	  (2008)	  ethnographic	  research	  on	  the	  litigation	  process	  
highlighted	  that	  women	  applying	  for	  khulʿ	  receive	  little	  emotional	  or	  financial	  help	  
from	  the	  extended	  family,	  whilst	  heavy	  financial	  obligations	  were	  stipulated	  by	  
judges	  asking	  women	  to	  pay	  back	  the	  shabka	  (engagement	  gifts)	  and	  qayma	  (items	  
and	  furniture	  that	  the	  wife	  brings	  to	  the	  marriage).	  	  Fawzy	  (2004)	  describes	  how	  
many	  judges	  ordered	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  that	  was	  over	  and	  above	  the	  amount	  
stipulated	  in	  the	  marriage	  contract155.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  current	  research	  in	  Pakistan	  
found	  that	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  proved	  to	  be	  of	  little	  significance	  when	  pursuing	  a	  
khulʿ,	  whilst	  it	  was	  the	  female	  litigants	  who	  were	  forthright	  in	  demanding	  the	  return	  
of	  marital	  gifts	  rather	  than	  their	  ex-­‐husbands.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  indication	  of	  
the	  higher	  generosity	  of	  Pakistani	  husbands	  in	  foregoing	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr.	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Rather,	  it	  reflects	  the	  nominal	  amounts	  of	  mahr	  given	  to	  Pakistani	  wives	  in	  marriage	  
compared	  to	  the	  much	  higher	  amounts	  provided	  to	  Egyptian	  wives156.	  
	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (2004)	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  court	  procedures,	  
finding	  a	  backlog	  of	  cases	  and	  inefficient	  courts	  that	  were	  unable	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
unprecedented	  number	  of	  cases157.	  	  Singerman’s	  (2005)	  research	  illustrated	  
rampant	  bias	  and	  sexism	  towards	  female	  litigants158.	  Judges	  often	  viewed	  wives	  as	  
‘lewd’	  and	  ‘immoral’,	  assuming	  that	  their	  motivation	  was	  a	  desire	  for	  another	  man	  
and	  thus	  sometimes	  refusing	  their	  petitions159.	  	  Judges	  expressed	  their	  pity	  at	  
children	  stigmatised	  for	  their	  mothers’	  khulʿ	  requests,	  but	  showed	  no	  sensitivity	  to	  
the	  plight	  of	  trapped	  wives160.	  Sonneveld	  (2010)	  observed	  that	  judges	  are	  
predominantly	  from	  upper	  class	  backgrounds,	  whilst	  khulʿ	  litigants	  are	  from	  lower	  
classes:	  thus,	  both	  carry	  different	  perceptions	  about	  marriage	  and	  divorce.	  	  	  This	  is	  
reflected	  in	  judges	  who	  often	  see	  women	  as	  taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  husband’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  Dianne	  Singerman	  and	  B.	  Ibrahim,	  “The	  Costs	  of	  Marriage	  in	  Egypt:	  A	  Hidden	  
Dimension	  in	  the	  New	  Arab	  Demography,”	  in	  The	  New	  Arab	  Family,	  ed.	  N.S.	  Hopkins	  
(Cairo:	  American	  University	  in	  Cairo	  Press,	  2003),	  80-­‐116.	  
157	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Divorced	  From	  Justice:	  Women’s	  Unequal	  Access	  To	  Divorce	  
In	  Egypt	  (2004),	  24.	  
158	  Diane	  Singerman,	  “Rewriting	  Divorce	  in	  Egypt:	  Reclaiming	  Islam,	  Legal	  Activism,	  
and	  Coalition	  Politics”,	  in	  Remaking	  Muslim	  Politics:	  Pluralism,	  Condensations,	  
Democratization,	  ed.	  Robert	  W.	  Hefner	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
2005),	  163.	  	  
159	  Nadia	  Sonneveld,	  Reinterpretation	  of	  Khulʿ'	  in	  Egypt:	  Intellectual	  Disputes,	  the	  
Practice	  of	  Courts	  and	  Everyday	  Life	  (Leiden:	  Leiden	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  
chapters	  4.5-­‐4.7,	  5.7,	  6.4.	  	  See	  also	  Nadia	  Sonneveld,	  ‘Khulʿ‘	  Divorce	  in	  Egypt:	  How	  
Family	  Courts	  are	  providing	  a	  ‘Dialogue’	  Between	  Husband	  and	  Wife,”	  Anthropology	  
of	  the	  Middle	  East	  5,	  no.	  2	  (2010):	  100-­‐120.	  
160	  Mariz	  Tadros,	  What	  Price	  Freedom?,	  AL-­‐Ahram,	  Mar.7-­‐13,	  2002,	  accessed	  January	  
21st	  2016	  http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/576/fe1.htm;	  	  
	  
45	  
financial	  investment	  in	  the	  marriage161.	  	  Bernard-­‐Maugiron	  and	  Dupret	  (2008)	  
noted	  how	  judges	  sometimes	  failed	  to	  implement	  the	  law	  of	  automatic	  right	  of	  
divorce	  if	  a	  husband	  re-­‐marries	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  added	  extra	  conditions	  to	  the	  
khulʿ	  for	  women	  to	  fulfil162.	  The	  Egyptian	  legislature	  also	  gives	  judges	  an	  enormous	  
discretionary	  power	  of	  interpretation:	  for	  example,	  to	  assess	  subjective	  notions	  like	  
the	  harm	  inflicted	  on	  the	  wife	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  valid	  grounds	  for	  the	  husband’s	  
absence,	  which	  are	  again	  interpreted	  on	  very	  narrow	  grounds.	  	  This	  judicial	  
conservatism	  was	  a	  constant	  observation	  throughout	  the	  Egyptian	  studies	  and	  is	  in	  
contrast	  to	  some	  of	  the	  findings	  in	  this	  study.	  	  The	  current	  research	  suggests	  that	  
similar	  biases	  exist	  within	  some	  members	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  judiciary	  that	  negatively	  
affect	  female	  litigants	  when	  pursuing	  their	  divorce	  claims.	  	  Certain	  family	  court	  
judges	  insisted	  on	  mandatory	  reconciliation	  attempts	  even	  when	  it	  was	  clearly	  
apparent	  that	  the	  marriage	  had	  irretrievably	  broken	  down.	  	  This	  sometimes	  forced	  
female	  litigants	  to	  face	  abusive	  husbands	  at	  close	  quarters	  in	  court.	  	  However,	  there	  
were	  many	  other	  judges	  in	  Pakistan	  who	  also	  provided	  a	  more	  ‘female	  friendly’	  
approach	  to	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  khulʿ	  case	  law	  and	  field	  work	  observations	  
during	  this	  research	  illustrate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  judicial	  enterprise	  has	  been	  
undertaken	  to	  create	  a	  no-­‐fault	  khulʿ	  device	  to	  ensure	  that	  women	  find	  a	  much	  
easier	  path	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce.	  	  This	  also	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  more	  flexible	  and	  
lenient	  approach	  regarding	  the	  compensation	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  wife	  to	  her	  husband	  
as	  compared	  to	  her	  Egyptian	  counterparts.	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Research	  into	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  has	  not	  been	  limited	  to	  Egypt	  but	  has	  
also	  occurred	  in	  other	  Muslim	  countries.	  	  	  Hassani-­‐Nezhad	  and	  Sjorgen	  (2014)	  
traced	  the	  impact	  of	  khulʿ	  law	  reform	  on	  women’s	  labour	  supply	  in	  Middle	  East	  and	  
North	  African	  countries.	  	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  eighteen	  countries,	  they	  found	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  
had	  a	  higher	  frequency	  in	  younger	  women	  (24-­‐34)	  than	  in	  older	  women	  (35-­‐55)163.	  	  
This	  is	  line	  with	  the	  current	  study,	  which	  found	  that	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  
who	  pursued	  a	  khulʿ	  were	  less	  than	  thirty,	  with	  the	  majority	  being	  less	  than	  twenty-­‐
four.	  	  Hassani-­‐Nezhad	  &	  Sjorgen	  (2014)	  also	  found	  a	  positive	  impact	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  as	  
it	  resulted	  in	  a	  10	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  the	  labour	  force164.	  The	  khulʿ	  was	  found	  to	  
increase	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  women	  within	  marriage	  and	  thus	  enabled	  more	  
women	  to	  enter	  the	  labour	  market165.	  	  Women	  often	  threatened	  to	  walk	  out	  of	  their	  
marriages	  if	  their	  husbands	  refused	  to	  grant	  them	  permission	  to	  work,	  and	  thus	  the	  
threat	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  was	  used	  as	  an	  effective	  manipulation	  tool166.	  	  This,	  however,	  was	  
not	  reflected	  within	  the	  current	  research.	  	  Only	  a	  very	  small	  minority	  of	  the	  
participants	  were	  able	  to	  use	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  bargaining	  tool	  in	  their	  marriages,	  whilst	  
the	  majority	  were	  forced	  to	  pursue	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  endure	  the	  breakdown	  of	  their	  
marriage.	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Layish	  (1988)	  looked	  at	  the	  customary	  practices	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  known	  as	  the	  Sijill	  in	  
Libyan	  courts167.	  	  He	  found	  that	  the	  customary	  khulʿ	  did	  not	  only	  include	  repaying	  
the	  balance	  of	  the	  dower	  but	  also	  involved	  additional	  payments168.	  	  Wives	  engaged	  
in	  elaborate	  negotiations	  in	  court	  to	  obtain	  their	  khulʿ,	  with	  disputes	  surrounding	  
the	  contents	  of	  the	  financial	  recompense	  to	  the	  husband.	  	  Layish	  (1988)	  delved	  
through	  Libyan	  case	  law	  and	  analysed	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  both	  parties	  negotiate	  
this	  contractual	  release.	  	  He	  also	  dealt	  with	  the	  tension	  between	  customary	  and	  
religious	  law,	  whereby	  courts	  were	  quite	  happy	  to	  give	  preference	  to	  custom	  over	  
religion	  even	  if	  the	  former	  was	  more	  detrimental	  to	  the	  wife.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  
courts	  were	  not	  concerned	  with	  these	  tensions	  and	  were	  more	  concerned	  that	  an	  
amicable	  settlement	  could	  be	  reached169.	  	  This	  again	  contrasts	  starkly	  with	  the	  
Pakistani	  judiciary,	  which	  took	  great	  pains	  in	  ensuring	  that	  religious	  scriptures	  were	  
followed	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  device	  over	  the	  last	  fifty	  years.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  
Pakistani	  judiciary	  entered	  into	  very	  nuanced	  debates	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  
religious	  laws	  overriding	  local	  customary	  laws,	  which	  were	  detrimental	  to	  the	  well	  
being	  of	  women170.	  
	  
Loukili	  and	  Michele	  Zirari-­‐Devif	  	  (2004)	  concentrate	  on	  Morocco	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  
model	  it	  uses	  surpasses	  any	  form	  of	  judicial	  khulʿ	  to	  date.	  	  Men	  and	  women	  are	  given	  
the	  equal	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  under	  the	  law	  of	  shiqaq	  if	  there	  are	  irreconcilable	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differences	  between	  the	  husband	  and	  the	  wife.	  	  Both	  the	  husband	  and	  the	  wife	  have	  
the	  right	  to	  initiate	  court	  proceedings	  and	  the	  court	  must	  make	  a	  decision	  within	  six	  
months171.	  	  Zoglin	  (2009)	  notes	  that	  women	  initiate	  the	  majority	  of	  divorces	  and	  
that	  uncontested	  divorces	  run	  quite	  smoothly172.	  	  Moreover,	  unlike	  the	  judicial	  khulʿ,	  
a	  woman	  has	  greater	  prospects	  of	  being	  awarded	  interim	  financial	  rights	  until	  her	  
divorce	  is	  finalised	  and	  has	  a	  much	  less	  onerous	  financial	  liability173.	  	  These	  findings	  
contrast	  with	  the	  current	  research,	  in	  which	  it	  was	  found	  that	  khulʿ	  cases	  could	  
become	  protracted	  if	  a	  husband	  was	  a	  recalcitrant	  litigant	  and	  Pakistani	  women	  had	  
no	  prospects	  of	  gaining	  any	  financial	  relief	  from	  their	  husbands	  despite	  court	  orders	  
to	  the	  contrary.	  	  However,	  Bordat	  et	  al	  (2011)	  note	  that	  the	  Moroccan	  divorce	  law	  
reforms	  have	  only	  served	  to	  assist	  women	  living	  in	  urban	  areas,	  whilst	  most	  women	  
belonging	  to	  rural	  populations	  are	  unaware	  of	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  divorce174.	  	  They	  
also	  found	  that	  local	  authorities	  posed	  obstacles	  to	  women	  seeking	  implementation	  
of	  their	  rights,	  whilst	  many	  judges	  provided	  limited	  interpretations	  of	  the	  law	  based	  
upon	  conservative	  readings	  of	  religious	  scriptures175.	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1.7	  Aims	  and	  Objectives	  of	  the	  Study	  
The	  literature	  review	  with	  respect	  to	  Pakistan	  reveals	  that	  there	  has	  been	  some	  
work	  on	  the	  judicial	  development	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  khulʿ	  and	  its	  formulation	  into	  a	  
no-­‐fault	  divorce	  right	  for	  women.	  However,	  whilst	  these	  works	  provide	  invaluable	  
information	  regarding	  the	  legal	  development	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  the	  
rationales	  behind	  the	  court	  actions;	  nor	  do	  they	  delve	  into	  the	  legal	  methodologies	  
adopted	  by	  the	  judiciary	  when	  they	  adopted	  this	  ‘new’	  version	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  
Moreover,	  all	  of	  the	  previous	  studies	  work	  from	  the	  (inaccurate)	  premise	  that	  the	  
legal	  decisions	  adopted	  by	  the	  judiciary	  represent	  a	  move	  away	  from	  classical	  
Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence,	  which	  did	  not	  allow	  a	  woman	  to	  be	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  without	  
her	  husband’s	  consent.	  The	  literature	  review	  above	  also	  highlights	  the	  complete	  lack	  
of	  information	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  khulʿ	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  women	  in	  
Pakistan.	  There	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  women	  are	  
even	  aware	  of	  their	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  and	  whether	  formal	  legislation	  has	  
been	  able	  to	  successfully	  provide	  an	  exit	  from	  unhappy	  marriages	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  
	  
This	  research	  is	  therefore	  split	  into	  two	  parts.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  
examine	  the	  legal	  and	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  argue	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
continual	  misconception	  regarding	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  under	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence,	  which	  is	  still	  prevalent	  today.	  	  Through	  an	  examination	  of	  primary	  
and	  secondary	  Ḥanafī	  sources,	  it	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  is	  
quite	  capable	  of	  providing	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights	  without	  a	  husband’s	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consent	  and	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  financially	  penalise	  women	  for	  seeking	  a	  
divorce.	  	  An	  investigation	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  female	  initiated	  divorce	  
rights	  will	  be	  presented,	  outlining	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  in	  providing	  legitimacy	  to	  
reform	  efforts.	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  by	  working	  within	  acceptable	  parameters	  of	  
existing	  classical	  principles	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  reforms	  in	  divorce	  law	  have	  the	  potential	  
to	  be	  more	  effective	  within	  pre-­‐existing	  patriarchal	  structures	  that	  exist	  in	  a	  country	  
such	  as	  Pakistan.	  
	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  research	  consists	  of	  an	  ethnographic	  study	  of	  one	  hundred	  
women	  from	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  educational	  backgrounds	  living	  in	  
Lahore.	  	  Structured	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  are	  used	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  
grounded	  methodology	  to	  asses	  participant’s	  knowledge	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  their	  views	  
regarding	  female	  initiated	  divorce	  rights.	  	  Moreover	  an	  additional	  thirty-­‐two	  women	  
are	  interviewed,	  who	  are	  either	  going	  through	  the	  process	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  or	  have	  
obtained	  one	  and	  are	  pursuing	  post-­‐divorce	  ancillary	  relief,	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  how	  
the	  khulʿ	  is	  implemented	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  unstructured	  
interviews	  of	  female	  litigants,	  as	  well	  as	  structured	  interviews	  of	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  
and	  observations	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  Family	  Courts	  of	  Lahore,	  this	  part	  of	  the	  
ethnographic	  study	  investigates	  which	  factors	  are	  at	  play	  that	  either	  limit	  or	  
facilitate	  the	  seeking	  of	  redress	  from	  the	  courts.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  reveal	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
courts	  in	  this	  legal	  enterprise	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  have	  they	  promoted	  or	  




The	  rationale	  for	  splitting	  this	  research	  into	  two	  parts	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  effective	  legal	  
methodology	  from	  part	  one	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  address	  problems	  in	  the	  current	  law	  of	  
khulʿ	  found	  through	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Part	  one	  of	  this	  thesis	  provides	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  and	  the	  judiciary	  in	  their	  efforts	  for	  reform	  of	  
female	  initiated	  divorce	  rights	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  subcontinent.	  	  This	  analysis	  provides	  
the	  backdrop	  to	  suggest	  which	  legal	  methodologies	  and	  strategies	  can	  be	  used	  for	  
the	  basis	  of	  reforms,	  to	  tackle	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  process	  highlighted	  through	  
part	  two	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  This	  research	  for	  example,	  will	  illustrate	  how	  the	  principles	  
of	  takhayyur	  and	  talfīq	  were	  extremely	  significant	  in	  developing	  a	  number	  of	  
women-­‐friendly	  codes	  of	  family	  laws	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  subcontinent176.	  	  Mawlana	  
Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi	  successfully	  used	  the	  principle	  of	  takhayyur	  in	  his	  support	  for	  
the	  Dissolution	  of	  Marriages	  Act	  1939,	  which	  gave	  Muslim	  women	  in	  India	  the	  
statutory	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  its	  colonial	  history.	  Thanawi’s	  
engagement	  with	  takhayyur	  in	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent	  is	  contrasted	  with	  other	  
juristic	  techniques	  employed	  by	  jurists	  in	  post-­‐independence	  Pakistan	  to	  improve	  
female	  divorce	  rights	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success.	  This	  thesis	  highlights	  the	  
need	  to	  explore	  more	  deeply	  the	  Islamic	  principles	  of	  talfīq	  and	  takhayyur	  when	  
considering	  reforms	  to	  Muslim	  personal	  law.	  	  This	  will	  not	  only	  to	  help	  distinguish	  
between	  the	  actual	  teachings	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  customary	  practices	  but	  also	  to	  give	  
legitimacy	  to	  any	  new	  formulations	  that	  will	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  millions	  of	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Muslims	  who	  follow	  Islam,	  and	  their	  scholars	  to	  whom	  they	  look	  for	  advice	  on	  
issues	  pertaining	  to	  Islamic	  law.	  
	  	  
It	  is	  hoped	  that	  this	  research	  will	  answer	  the	  following	  research	  questions:	  
	  
1) Does	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  permit	  women	  to	  initiate	  a	  khulʿ	  without	  the	  
consent	  of	  their	  husbands	  and	  what	  are	  the	  rules	  regarding	  compensation?	  
2) What	  reform	  strategies	  can	  be	  learnt	  from	  the	  statutory	  development	  of	  
female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights?	  	  
3) What	  was	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  no-­‐
fault	  legal	  device?	  
4) What	  are	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Pakistani	  married	  women	  towards	  female-­‐
initiated	  divorce?	  
5) How	  effective	  is	  the	  court	  system	  in	  implementing	  the	  khulʿ	  device?	  
6) How	  effective	  is	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  providing	  marital	  relief	  to	  women?	  
	  
1.8	  Structure	  of	  the	  Work	  
This	  research	  consists	  of	  eight	  chapters	  and	  is	  split	  into	  two	  parts;	  a	  legal	  and	  
historical	  examination	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  (Chapters	  Two	  to	  Four)	  and	  an	  ethnographic	  
study	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  (Chapters	  Five	  to	  Seven).	  This	  introductory	  
chapter	  is	  followed	  by	  Chapter	  Two,	  which	  provides	  the	  theological	  basis	  for	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  khulʿ	  under	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence.	  	  It	  attempts	  to	  present	  a	  more	  accurate	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representation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  under	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  and	  provide	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  
compensation	  rules	  as	  applied	  by	  the	  Ḥanafī	  jurists.	  
	  
Chapter	  Three	  examines	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  
rights	  in	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐independence	  Pakistan.	  	  It	  traces	  the	  impetus	  for	  reform	  and	  
the	  theological	  questions	  that	  were	  raised	  during	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  
Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  1939	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Family	  Law	  Ordinance	  1964,	  which	  
created	  statutory	  fault-­‐based	  divorce	  rights	  for	  women.	  	  This	  chapter	  is	  important,	  
as	  it	  provides	  a	  useful	  insight	  into	  the	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  methodologies	  
used	  by	  reform	  activists	  of	  that	  time,	  which	  have	  consequences	  for	  present	  day	  law	  
reform	  in	  Pakistan.	  
	  
Chapter	  Four	  provides	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  Pakistani	  case	  law	  and	  traces	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  statutory	  laws	  of	  divorce	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  a	  no-­‐	  
fault	  khulʿ	  device.	  	  This	  chapter	  illustrates	  that	  the	  courts	  deliberately	  adopted	  a	  
high	  standard	  of	  proof	  for	  women	  relying	  on	  statutory	  provisions	  and	  encouraged	  
them	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  khulʿ	  instead.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  was	  not	  always	  
a	  judicial	  strategy	  adopted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  male	  chauvinistic	  attitudes	  to	  financially	  
penalise	  women	  for	  divorcing	  men;	  rather,	  it	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  desperately	  
needed	  relief	  to	  women	  without	  raising	  the	  ire	  of	  the	  religious	  right	  and	  military	  
dictators,	  who	  were	  themselves	  engaged	  in	  a	  process	  of	  rescinding	  the	  existing	  




Chapter	  Five	  provides	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  grounded	  methodology	  used	  when	  designing	  
the	  research	  project.	  	  It	  provides	  details	  on	  the	  scope	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  project	  
as	  well	  as	  details	  of	  the	  qualitative	  nature	  of	  the	  study.	  	  Details	  are	  provided	  of	  the	  
interview	  techniques	  utilised	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sampling	  methodology	  used	  to	  choose	  
the	  research	  site	  and	  the	  participants.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  researcher,	  ethical	  
considerations	  and	  the	  obstacles	  faced	  during	  the	  research	  process	  are	  also	  
discussed.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  Six	  presents	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  fieldwork,	  which	  was	  
conducted	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Lahore	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  years	  between	  2013	  and	  2014.	  	  
The	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  responses	  of	  married	  women	  regarding	  
their	  knowledge	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  Key	  themes	  and	  sub-­‐themes	  that	  have	  
emerged	  from	  the	  data	  collection	  are	  analysed	  and	  the	  chapter	  applies	  the	  
theoretical	  discussion	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  participants’	  responses.	  
	  
Chapter	  Seven	  presents	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  district	  
courts	  of	  Lahore.	  It	  outlines	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  during	  
their	  court	  proceedings	  and	  their	  primary	  reasons	  for	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  This	  
chapter	  also	  includes	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  women’s	  agency	  in	  order	  to	  
assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  an	  effective	  device	  in	  providing	  relief	  to	  




The	  final	  chapter	  in	  this	  research	  provides	  an	  overall	  summary	  of	  the	  research	  and	  
states	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study.	  	  It	  also	  contains	  reform	  proposals	  to	  help	  facilitate	  
the	  process	  of	  khulʿ	  during	  the	  court	  proceedings	  and	  suggests	  what	  other	  measures	  
need	  to	  be	  adopted	  post-­‐divorce	  to	  improve	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  women	  who	  use	  the	  




THE	  INTERPRETATION	  OF	  THE	  KHULʿ	  IN	  LIGHT	  OF	  THE	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2.0	  Introduction	  
This	  chapter	  will	  provide	  the	  theological	  basis	  for	  the	  legal	  remedy	  of	  khulʿ	  under	  
Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence.	  Although	  all	  four	  schools	  of	  Sunni	  Islamic	  law	  recognise	  khulʿ	  
as	  a	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  right,	  this	  chapter	  will	  focus	  only	  on	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence,	  as	  this	  has	  been	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  limiting	  female	  divorce	  rights	  in	  
the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  subcontinent	  and	  is	  the	  Islamic	  school	  of	  law	  practiced	  by	  the	  majority	  
of	  Muslims	  in	  Pakistan177.	  The	  literature	  review	  in	  Chapter	  One	  revealed	  that	  a	  
common	  misconception	  exists	  in	  past	  and	  present	  scholarship	  that	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence	  only	  allows	  a	  khulʿ	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband,	  and	  that	  a	  wife	  
must	  necessarily	  return	  her	  mahr	  (dower)	  or	  provide	  some	  form	  of	  compensation	  to	  
her	  husband	  in	  return	  for	  the	  divorce,	  irrespective	  of	  who	  is	  at	  fault	  in	  the	  marital	  
breakdown178.	  The	  idea	  that	  a	  husband’s	  consent	  was	  obligatory	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  
sub-­‐continent	  meant	  that	  until	  1959,	  courts	  refused	  to	  entertain	  khulʿ	  applications	  if	  
the	  husband	  refused	  his	  wife	  this	  right.	  A	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  
to	  the	  period	  of	  British	  colonial	  rule	  of	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent.	  Before	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  It	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  97%	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  population	  is	  Muslim,	  77%	  of	  
whom	  are	  Sunni	  Muslims	  and	  subscribe	  to	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school	  of	  law.	  See	  Sayyid	  Rami	  
al	  Rifai,	  Who	  is	  the	  Main	  Body	  of	  the	  Ummah:	  Muslim	  Demographics	  (Sunna	  Muakada,	  
2013),	  7	  
178	  Ibid.,	  n.136	  
	  
57	  
codification	  of	  Anglo-­‐Muslim	  law,	  British	  judges	  in	  India	  referred	  to	  local	  clerics	  for	  
clarification	  of	  legal	  points	  based	  on	  Islamic	  law179.	  These	  local	  maulvis	  provided	  
abstract	  answers	  to	  hypothetical	  questions	  posed	  by	  the	  judges:	  answers	  which	  
were	  then	  applied	  in	  a	  formalised	  and	  rigid	  manner.	  Since	  the	  original	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  
were	  in	  Arabic,	  in	  essence	  this	  third-­‐hand	  information	  was	  being	  used	  by	  the	  judges	  
to	  implement	  what	  they	  perceived	  as	  ‘Muhammadan	  Law’.180.	  The	  judges	  were	  also	  
wary	  regarding	  genuine	  differences	  that	  existed	  within	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  and	  
did	  not	  favour	  the	  diversity	  of	  Islamic	  law	  and	  the	  variances	  that	  occur	  in	  its	  
application.	  In	  order	  to	  rectify	  the	  situation,	  and	  to	  replicate	  the	  British	  common	  law	  
legal	  system,	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  were	  translated	  into	  English	  to	  ensure	  
some	  uniformity	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Muslim	  personal	  law181.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  
decision	  to	  select	  just	  a	  few	  texts	  for	  translation,	  and	  then	  opt	  to	  follow	  them	  blindly,	  
created	  a	  rigid	  system	  of	  law	  with	  little	  or	  no	  room	  for	  judicial	  discretion.	  	  
	  
Al-­‐Marghīnānī’s	  al-­‐Hidāya182	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  principle	  text	  to	  be	  followed.	  After	  
being	  translated	  into	  Persian183,	  it	  was	  then	  translated	  from	  Persian	  into	  English	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  Michael	  Anderson,	  “Legal	  scholarship	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  in	  British	  India,”	  in	  
Ravindra	  S.	  Khare,	  Perspectives	  on	  Islamic	  Law,	  Justice	  and	  Society	  (Lanham:	  
Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2009),	  73.	  
180	  Ibid.,	  73.	  
181	  Muhammad	  Khalid	  Masud.	  “Qāḍīs	  and	  their	  Courts:	  A	  Historical	  Survey,”	  in	  
Dispensing	  Justice	  in	  Islam	  Qāḍīs	  and	  Their	  Judgments,	  ed.	  Khalid	  Masud	  et	  al.	  
(Leiden:	  Brill,	  2003),	  39.	  
182	  Al-­‐Hidāya	  fī	  sharḥ	  Bidāya	  al-­‐Mubtadī,	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  is	  a	  
corpus	  of	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  compiled	  in	  the	  12th	  Century	  by	  Burhān	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Farghānī	  al-­‐
Marghīnānī.	  	  
183	  Three	  maulvis	  were	  given	  the	  task	  of	  translating	  the	  work:	  Molla	  Taj-­‐Addeen,	  
Meer	  Mohammed	  Hossein	  and	  Molla	  Sharreet	  Oolla	  Cheema.	  	  See	  Shahbaz	  Ahmad	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Charles	  Hamilton.	  Although	  errors	  were	  discovered	  in	  both	  the	  Persian	  and	  the	  
English	  version,	  unfortunately	  only	  the	  Persian	  version	  was	  corrected	  in	  1807184.	  
This	  text	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Principles	  and	  Precedents	  of	  
Mohmmadan	  Law	  by	  W.H.	  MacNaughten	  (1870),	  which	  purported	  to	  contain	  the	  
basic	  principles	  of	  Islamic	  Ḥanafī	  law.	  However,	  this	  text	  primarily	  contained	  
MacNaughten’s	  own	  generalisations	  on	  legal	  principles,	  without	  any	  references185,	  
after	  which	  a	  number	  of	  precedent	  cases	  and	  answers	  were	  provided	  which	  “glossed	  
over	  areas	  of	  problematic	  interpretation”186.	  Later,	  the	  voluminous	  Fatāwa	  
ʿĀlamgīrī187	  was	  translated	  into	  an	  abridged	  one-­‐volume	  text,	  which	  contained,	  
according	  to	  its	  author,	  “the	  doctrines	  of	  the	  Haneefa	  sect	  on	  all	  the	  subjects	  to	  
which	  the	  Moohummudan	  Law	  is	  usually	  applied	  by	  the	  British	  Courts	  of	  Justice	  in	  
India”188.	  	  Anderson	  (2009)	  notes	  that	  “those	  few	  texts	  that	  were	  translated	  came	  to	  
be	  treated	  as	  authoritative	  codes	  rather	  than	  as	  discrete	  statements	  within	  a	  larger	  
spectrum	  of	  scholarly	  debate”189	  and	  as	  a	  result	  they	  “minimised	  doctrinal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  Samee	  Uzair,	  “Genealogical	  Analysis	  of	  Islamic	  Law	  Books	  Relied	  on	  in	  the	  
Courts	  of	  Pakistan”,	  Al-­‐Adwa	  (December	  31,	  2013),	  3.	  	  
184	  Anderson,	  “Legal	  scholarship	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  in	  British	  India”,	  74.	  
185	  See	  W.H.	  MacNaughten,	  Principles	  &	  Precedents	  of	  Moohummudan	  Law	  (Reprint	  
of	  the	  1870	  edition.	  Lahore:	  Pakistan	  Educational	  Press),	  1-­‐81.	  
186	  Anderson,	  “Legal	  scholarship	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  in	  British	  India”,	  74.	  
187	  A	  set	  of	  fatwas,	  legal	  edicts	  compiled	  during	  the	  17th	  Century	  rule	  of	  Aurenzeb	  
over	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent	  that	  consisted	  of	  over	  thirty	  volumes	  of	  Islamic	  legal	  
principles	  based	  on	  the	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh.	  See	  M.	  Reza	  Pirbhai,	  Reconsidering	  Islam	  in	  a	  
South	  Asian	  Context	  (Leiden:	  Brill	  Academic,	  2009),	  131-­‐154.	  
188	  Neil	  Benjamin	  Edmonstone	  Baillie,	  A	  Digest	  of	  Moohummudan	  Law;	  The	  Doctrines	  
of	  the	  Imameea	  Code	  of	  Jurisprudence	  on	  the	  Most	  Important	  of	  the	  Same	  Subjects	  
(Waterloo	  Place:	  Smith,	  Elder	  &	  Co,	  1870),	  i.	  
189	  Anderson,	  “Legal	  Scholarship	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  in	  British	  India”,	  73.	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differences	  and	  presented	  Shariah	  as	  something	  it	  had	  never	  been:	  a	  fixed	  body	  of	  
immutable	  rules	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  interpretation	  and	  judicial	  discretion”190.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  khulʿ.	  A	  study	  of	  the	  English	  
translation	  of	  Marghīnānī’s	  al-­‐Hidāya	  and	  the	  Fatāwa	  ʿĀlamgīrī	  reveals	  that	  the	  
nineteenth-­‐century	  British	  colonial	  rulers	  attempted	  to	  legally	  define	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  
one	  or	  two	  sentences	  to	  facilitate	  judges’	  understanding	  and	  application	  of	  it.	  The	  
Hidāya,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  concise	  text	  and	  states	  legal	  doctrines,	  but	  does	  not	  
elaborate	  upon	  many	  of	  its	  principles	  through	  explanations	  and	  examples.	  The	  
failure	  to	  translate	  similar	  but	  more	  substantial	  treatises	  negated	  the	  importance	  of	  
many	  other	  works	  that	  have	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  classical	  Islamic	  literature	  because	  
they	  expand,	  explain	  and	  then	  help	  jurists	  and	  the	  fuqahāʾ	  to	  apply	  legal	  doctrines	  in	  
a	  more	  flexible	  and	  easily	  understandable	  manner.	  The	  work	  of	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām191,	  
for	  example,	  is	  a	  very	  well	  recognised	  sharḥ	  (explanation	  or	  commentary)	  of	  the	  
Hidāya	  and	  provides	  legal	  examples	  for	  ease	  of	  understanding.	  This	  sharḥ	  (along	  
with	  other	  Ḥanafī	  texts)	  is	  normally	  read	  by	  jurists	  concurrently	  with	  the	  Hidāya	  for	  
a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence192.	  However,	  only	  the	  
Hidāya	  was	  translated	  during	  British	  colonial	  rule,	  without	  any	  accompanying	  texts	  
to	  help	  explain	  and	  expand	  on	  the	  basic	  principles	  presented193.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  Ibid.,	  75.	  
191	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām,	  Sharḥ	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  2003).	  
192	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Muhammad	  b.	  Aḥmad	  b.	  Abī	  Sahl	  Abū	  Bakr	  al-­‐Sarakhsī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐
Mabsut,	  vol.	  3,	  part	  6	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  2001),	  199-­‐231,	  which	  is	  an	  
extremely	  authoritative	  work	  and	  a	  sharḥ	  of	  Muhammad	  al-­‐Shaybānī’s	  al-­‐Aṣl.	  
193	  Anderson,	  “Legal	  Scholarship	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  in	  British	  India”,	  74.	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In	  respect	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  relying	  on	  a	  select	  few	  secondary	  sources	  has	  set	  a	  precedent	  
of	  continual	  misinterpretation	  of	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  on	  this	  matter.	  The	  translation	  of	  al-­‐
Marghīnānī’s	  al-­‐Hidāya	  begins	  with	  the	  lexical	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  khulʿ,	  after	  
which	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  2:229	  is	  paraphrased	  to	  explain	  its	  permissibility.	  
Thereafter,	  the	  legal	  effect	  is	  explained,	  along	  with	  when	  and	  how	  much	  
compensation	  needs	  to	  be	  paid,	  and	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  “the	  sacred	  text	  goes	  
to	  establish	  two	  points;	  one,	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  Khoola	  in	  a	  judicial	  view;	  and	  the	  
other,	  its	  admissibility	  between	  the	  parties	  and	  God	  Almighty194”.	  	  Whilst	  al-­‐
Marghīnānī	  does	  clearly	  state	  that	  in	  a	  dispute	  he	  does	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  
this	  judicial	  process	  and	  it	  is	  subsumed	  within	  other	  legal	  intricacies	  dealing	  with	  
divorce.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  expand	  on	  this	  point	  may	  have	  led	  scholars	  to	  
ignore	  or	  even	  bypass	  this	  important	  area	  when	  referring	  to	  his	  work.	  As	  will	  be	  
seen	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  this	  thesis,	  up	  until	  1959,	  Pakistani	  judges	  believed	  that	  
Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  did	  not	  allow	  courts	  to	  entertain	  khulʿ	  applications,	  despite	  
these	  clear	  wordings	  of	  the	  Hidāya,	  and	  therefore	  denied	  women	  the	  right	  to	  exit	  
clearly	  unhappy	  and	  often	  violent	  marriages.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  sharḥ	  of	  the	  Hidāya,	  
Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  explains	  the	  permissibility	  of	  going	  to	  court	  in	  the	  second	  sentence	  
of	  his	  chapter	  on	  the	  khulʿ.	  He	  goes	  into	  much	  greater	  detail	  about	  the	  linguistic	  
translation	  of	  verse	  2:229,	  explaining	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  courts	  are	  empowered	  to	  pass	  
the	  khulʿ,	  thus	  negating	  any	  possibility	  of	  misunderstanding	  that	  a	  husband’s	  
permission	  is	  needed	  to	  effect	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence195.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Ibid.,	  315.	  
195	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām,	  Muhammad	  b.	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Waḥīd,	  Sharḥ	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr,	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  




Similarly,	  in	  respect	  of	  compensation	  in	  return	  for	  the	  mahr,	  al-­‐Marghīnānī	  begins	  
his	  basic	  definition	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  divorce	  “in	  lieu	  of	  a	  compensation	  paid	  by	  the	  
wife196”,	  and	  then	  expands	  upon	  this	  much	  later	  in	  the	  text,	  stating	  that	  if	  the	  
aversion	  “be	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  husband,	  it	  would	  be	  abominable	  for	  him	  (the	  
husband)	  to	  take	  anything	  from	  her	  because	  of	  the	  sacred	  text.”197	  A	  scholar	  or	  
judge	  reading	  just	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  translation	  might	  therefore	  have	  assumed	  
that	  khulʿ	  can	  only	  be	  affected	  with	  some	  form	  of	  recompense	  for	  the	  wife,	  if	  he/she	  
does	  not	  delve	  deeper	  into	  the	  text	  to	  investigate	  the	  exceptions	  to	  this	  rule.	  In	  
contrast,	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  goes	  into	  much	  greater	  detail,	  discussing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
“abomination”	  (as	  noted	  in	  the	  Hidāya),	  describing	  it	  not	  just	  as	  al-­‐makrūh198	  but	  al-­‐
makrūh	  al-­‐taḥrīmī199.	  This	  constitutes	  a	  much	  severer	  prohibition	  than	  the	  Hidāya,	  
leaving	  the	  reader	  in	  no	  doubt	  that	  compensation	  is	  not	  always	  payable	  by	  the	  wife.	  	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  lack	  of	  English	  translations	  of	  this	  and	  other	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  
has	  meant	  that	  judges	  and	  other	  scholars	  have	  relied	  on	  the	  English	  version	  of	  the	  
Hidāya	  and	  a	  few	  sparse	  texts	  for	  their	  juristic	  opinions.	  MacNaughten	  (1870),	  for	  
example,	  describes	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  “divorce	  purchased”	  in	  the	  margins	  of	  his	  text,	  and	  
then	  only	  dedicates	  one	  sentence	  to	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  entire	  book,	  stating;	  “A	  wife	  is	  at	  
liberty,	  with	  her	  husband’s	  consent,	  to	  purchase	  from	  him	  her	  freedom	  from	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  Hamilton,	  The	  Hidāya,	  314.	  
197	  Ibid.,	  315.	  
198	  An	  act	  that	  is	  considered	  abominable	  or	  highly	  disliked.	  
199	  An	  act	  that	  is	  so	  disliked	  that	  it	  almost	  nears	  the	  status	  of	  a	  forbidden	  (ḥarām)	  
act.	  	  See	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām,	  Sharḥ	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr,	  192.	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bonds	  of	  marriage200”.	  MacNaughten	  (1870)	  provides	  no	  further	  explanation	  of	  the	  
procedure	  and	  thus	  leads	  the	  reader	  to	  assume	  that	  these	  are	  indeed	  the	  only	  
parameters	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Baillie’s	  (1870)	  translation	  of	  Fatāwā	  Ālamgīrī	  is	  also	  a	  very	  
difficult	  text	  to	  follow.	  Rather	  than	  presenting	  basic	  principles	  of	  law	  and	  then	  
providing	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  these	  principles,	  Baillie’s	  translation	  delves	  directly	  
into	  how	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  to	  be	  pronounced	  and	  what	  particular	  words	  are	  to	  be	  used201.	  
Thereafter,	  five	  pages	  are	  dedicated	  to	  hypothetical	  cases	  regarding	  different	  
scenarios	  involving	  the	  payment	  or	  non-­‐payment	  of	  the	  dower202.	  The	  chapter	  
concludes	  by	  providing	  eight	  basic	  laws	  relating	  to	  the	  khulʿ.	  At	  no	  point	  is	  there	  any	  
discussion	  regarding	  the	  need	  for	  the	  husband’s	  consent	  or	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  
recourse	  to	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  debate,	  it	  
would	  seem	  that	  subsequent	  scholars	  interpreted	  Baillie’s	  work	  as	  not	  only	  
necessitating	  the	  need	  for	  compensation	  in	  all	  cases	  but	  that	  a	  khulʿ	  must	  be	  effected	  
only	  through	  some	  mutual	  agreement,	  contrary	  to	  the	  rulings	  of	  these	  classical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  William	  MacNaughten,	  Principles	  &	  Precedents	  of	  Moohummudan	  Law:	  A	  selection	  
of	  Legal	  Opinions	  Involving	  Those	  Points,	  Delivered	  in	  The	  Several	  Courts	  of	  Judicature,	  
Together	  With	  Illustrative	  and	  Explanatory	  Notes	  and	  Preliminary	  Remarks	  (Lahore:	  
Law	  Publishing	  Company,	  1870),	  60.	  
201	  Baillie,	  A	  Digest	  of	  Moohummudan	  Law,	  129.	  	  
202	  Ibid.,	  129-­‐134.	  This	  also	  includes	  the	  view	  that	  if	  a	  husband	  forces	  his	  wife	  to	  
obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  she	  will	  not	  be	  liable	  to	  pay	  any	  recompense	  to	  him.	  Baillie	  states	  “If	  a	  
man	  should	  compel	  his	  wife	  into	  an	  agreement	  for	  a	  ransom,	  he	  would	  do	  what	  is	  
unlawful;	  and	  if	  he	  should	  repudiate	  her,	  the	  repudiation	  would	  be	  valid	  without	  any	  
obligation	  on	  her	  part	  to	  deliver	  what	  she	  had	  agreed	  to	  give”	  (134).	  However,	  in	  a	  
subsequent	  edition	  of	  the	  text	  where	  additions	  and	  amendments	  have	  been	  inserted,	  
Baillie	  states	  that	  if	  a	  wife	  does	  give	  some	  recompense	  under	  these	  conditions,	  not	  
only	  does	  she	  have	  no	  right	  to	  seek	  its	  return,	  but	  such	  an	  act	  by	  the	  husband	  is	  only	  
considered	  a	  matter	  of	  conscience.	  See	  Neil	  Baillie,	  A	  Digest	  of	  Moohummudan	  Law;	  
The	  Doctrines	  of	  the	  Imameea	  Code	  of	  Jurisprudence	  on	  the	  Most	  Important	  of	  the	  
Same	  Subjects,	  Revised	  With	  Some	  Additions	  of	  the	  Text	  and	  a	  Supplement	  on	  Sale	  and	  
Loan	  and	  Mortgage	  (Lahore:	  Premier	  Book	  House,	  1957)	  306.	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Ḥanafī	  authorities.	  Another	  example	  is	  of	  Asaf	  Fyzee	  (1964),	  a	  notable	  legal	  
authority	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  quoted	  by	  several	  Pakistani	  judges	  in	  their	  cases203.	  	  He	  
claims	  to	  follow	  the	  “illustrious	  example	  of	  MacNaughten204”,	  and	  then	  cites	  the	  
English	  translation	  of	  Fatāwā	  Ālamgīrī	  in	  support	  of	  his	  view	  that	  there	  are	  two	  
essential	  conditions	  for	  a	  khulʿ:	  “common	  consent	  of	  the	  husband	  and	  wife,	  and	  as	  a	  
rule,	  some	  ‘iwad	  (consideration)	  passing	  from	  the	  wife	  to	  the	  husband205”.	  As	  a	  
result	  of	  reliance	  upon	  these	  secondary	  sources,	  Fyzee	  (1964)	  fails	  to	  provide	  any	  
information	  regarding	  judicial	  intervention	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dispute	  or	  that	  a	  wife	  need	  
not	  provide	  any	  compensation	  to	  her	  husband	  if	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  nushūz	  
(marital	  discord)206.	  
	  
This	  legal	  scholarship	  meant	  that	  women	  in	  Pakistan	  had	  no	  legal	  remedy	  to	  initiate	  
a	  divorce	  unless	  they	  could	  prove	  specific	  fault-­‐based	  events	  outlined	  in	  statutory	  
divorce	  laws.	  However,	  these	  laws	  proved	  to	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  apply,	  since	  
wives	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  reliable	  witnesses	  to	  prove	  they	  had	  suffered	  abuse	  
within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  marital	  home.	  The	  khulʿ	  thus	  became	  a	  defunct	  remedy	  
amongst	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  sub-­‐continent,	  as	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  appeared	  to	  provide	  
no	  especial	  relief	  to	  women.	  The	  khulʿ	  was	  only	  resurrected	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  See	  Chapter	  Four.	  
204	  Fyzee,	  Outlines	  of	  Muhammadan	  Law,	  155.	  
205	  Ibid.,	  155.	  
206	  Another	  notable	  text	  was	  Dinshaw	  Mulla’s	  Mahomedan	  Law	  (Lahore:	  Kausar	  
Brothers,	  1981),	  first	  published	  in	  1905,	  which	  was	  also	  relied	  on	  greatly	  by	  courts	  
in	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent	  and	  contained	  the	  same	  views.	  See	  Mathias	  Rohe,	  Islamic	  
Law	  in	  Past	  and	  Present	  (Leiden:	  Koninklijke	  Brill,	  2015),	  370.	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through	  judicial	  activism	  exhibited	  by	  a	  number	  of	  liberal-­‐minded	  judges207.	  The	  
remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  investigate	  the	  application	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  by	  
Ḥanafī	  jurists	  and	  attempt	  to	  dispel	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  can	  only	  be	  affected	  
through	  mutual	  consent	  and	  the	  necessary	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  or	  some	  form	  of	  
compensation.	  It	  will	  show	  that	  women	  were	  needlessly	  refused	  the	  legal	  right	  of	  
khulʿ	  as	  a	  result	  of	  misunderstandings	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  Ḥanafī	  
madhhab:	  misunderstandings	  that	  are	  still	  prevalent	  today.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Literal	  and	  Lexical	  Meaning	  of	  Khulʿ	  
Al-­‐Khulʿ	  is	  originally	  derived	  from	  the	  root	  words	  of	  kh-­‐l-­‐ʿ.	  	  Al-­‐khalʿ	  is	  the	  verbal	  
noun	  of	  al-­‐khulʿ,	  whose	  lexical	  meaning	  refers	  to	  ‘extraction’	  or	  to	  ‘remove’208.	  
Although	  the	  Qurʾān	  does	  not	  use	  the	  word	  al-­‐khulʿ	  specifically	  for	  female-­‐initiated	  
divorce,	  it	  is	  used	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  context	  of	  removal	  or	  detachment:	  e.g.	  khalaʿa	  
thawbahū	  wa	  naʿlahū,	  “he	  removed	  his	  clothes	  and	  shoes”209.	  In	  the	  Qurʾān,	  Moses	  is	  
asked	  to	  remove	  his	  shoes,	  and	  the	  words	  f-­‐akhlaʿ	  naʿlayk	  are	  used,	  where	  f-­‐akhlaʿ	  
indicates	  that	  the	  shoes	  were	  removed	  from	  his	  body210.	  The	  lexical	  meaning	  of	  
extraction	  or	  separation	  is	  associated	  with	  al-­‐khalʿ	  and	  al-­‐khulʿ,	  since	  the	  marital	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  See	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  this	  thesis	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis.	  
208	  Al-­‐Rāghib	  al-­‐Aṣfahānī,	  Mufradāt	  al-­‐Qurʾān	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub,	  2004),	  174;	  
Badr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  Al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya	  (Beirut:	  Dār-­‐ul-­‐Kutub,	  2000)	  506.	  
See	  also	  al-­‐Fīrūzābādī,	  al-­‐Qāmūs	  al-­‐Muḥīṭ,	  vol.	  2	  (Beirut:	  al-­‐Maktaba	  al-­‐ʿAṣriyya,	  
2009).	  	  
209	  Ḥusayn	  b.	  ʿAwda	  al-­‐ʿAwāyisha,	  al-­‐Mawsūʿa	  al-­‐Fiqhiyya	  al-­‐Muyassara,	  vol.	  5	  
(Beirut:	  Dār	  Ibn	  Ḥazm,	  2004)	  334:	  al-­‐Jawharī,	  al-­‐Ṣiḥāḥ,	  vol.	  3	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  Iḥyāʾ	  al-­‐
Turāth	  al-­‐ʿArabī,	  1999),	  1003.	  
210	  Al-­‐Jawharī,	  quoted	  by	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  506.	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relationship	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  libās,	  meaning	  a	  dress	  in	  Islamic	  teachings211.	  
The	  term	  al-­‐khulʿ	  is	  also	  derived	  from	  khalʿ	  al-­‐thawb,	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  thawb,	  
clothes212.	  According	  to	  the	  Qurʾān,	  the	  process	  of	  nikāḥ	  signifies	  the	  adornment	  of	  
the	  marital	  dress	  by	  both	  spouses	  during	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  marriage213.	  If	  a	  wife	  
therefore	  wishes	  to	  exercise	  her	  right	  of	  separation	  through	  al-­‐khulʿ	  she	  is	  viewed	  as	  
metaphorically	  removing	  and	  depriving	  both	  parties	  of	  the	  marital	  dress,	  or	  
extracting	  herself	  from	  it214.	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  describes	  this	  as	  izāla	  milk	  al-­‐nikāḥ:	  
the	  removal	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  nikāḥ215.	  The	  word	  khalaʿa	  is	  also	  used	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  emerging	  from	  the	  obedience	  of	  Allah,	  and	  thus	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  equated	  with	  
coming	  out	  of	  the	  bond	  of	  the	  marital	  conjugal	  relationship216.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Khulʿ	  in	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  Hadith	  
The	  primary	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  dedicate	  a	  separate	  chapter	  to	  the	  khulʿ,	  denoting	  its	  
significance	  in	  Islamic	  jurisprudence,	  and	  all	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  a	  type	  of	  divorce	  where	  
a	  wife	  can	  secure	  her	  release	  from	  the	  marriage,	  and	  in	  some	  instances	  provide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām,	  Sharḥ	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr,	  188.	  
212	  Ibn	  al-­‐Athīr,	  al-­‐Nihāya,	  vol.	  1	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Marʿifa,	  2009),	  520;	  Muhammad	  
ʿĀbid	  al-­‐Sindī	  al-­‐Madanī,	  al-­‐Ḥanafī	  al-­‐Mawāhib	  al-­‐Laṭīfa	  Sharḥ	  Musnad	  al-­‐Imam	  Abī	  
Ḥanīfa	  vol.5	  (Damascus:	  Dār	  al-­‐Nawādir,	  2014)	  104.	  
213	  Al-­‐Qurʾān	  2:187,	  “They	  are	  like	  clothes	  for	  you	  and	  you	  are	  like	  clothes	  for	  them”.	  
214	  Al-­‐Azharī,	  Tahdhīb	  al-­‐Lugha	  (Dār	  Iḥyāʾ	  al-­‐Turāth	  al-­‐ʿArabī;	  Beirut,	  2001).	  
Muhammad	  ʿĀbid	  al-­‐Sindī	  al-­‐Madanī,	  al-­‐Ḥanafī	  al-­‐Mawāhib	  al-­‐Laṭīfah	  Sharḥ	  Musnad	  
al-­‐Imam	  Abī	  Ḥanīfa,	  104.	  
215	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām,	  Sharḥ	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr,	  188.	  
216	  Ibn	  al-­‐Athīr,	  al-­‐Nihāya,	  520	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some	  form	  of	  compensation	  to	  her	  husband217.	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  jurists	  is	  based	  on	  
the	  Qurʾānic218	  verses	  2:229219,	  4:19220,	  4:20221	  and	  4:35222	  and	  on	  several	  hadith.	  
Verse	  2:229	  is	  the	  principle	  verse	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  which	  allows	  a	  woman	  to	  seek	  
marital	  release	  if	  she	  or	  her	  husband	  fears	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  abide	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  Muhammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Aṣl,	  vol.	  4	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  Ibn	  Ḥazm,	  
2012),	  549;	  Abū	  Bakr	  Aḥmad	  ibn	  ʻAlī	  al-­‐Rāzī	  al-­‐Ḥanafī	  al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ,	  Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  
Vol.1	  (Lahore:	  Sohayl	  Academy,	  1980),	  390;	  Abū	  Muḥammad	  ʿAlī	  ibn	  Aḥmad	  ibn	  
Saʿīd	  Ibn	  Ḥazm,	  al-­‐Muḥallā,	  vol.	  9	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub,	  2010),	  210;	  Burhān	  al-­‐Dīn	  
al-­‐Farghānī	  al-­‐Marghīnānī,	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  trans.	  Imran	  Ahsan	  Khan	  Nyazee	  (Bristol:	  
Amal	  Press,	  2007),	  29-­‐47;	  Badr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  Vol.	  5	  
(Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub,	  2000),	  507;	  Zayn	  al-­‐Dīn	  ibn	  Ibrāhīm	  ibn	  Muḥammad	  Ibn	  
Nujaym,	  al-­‐Baḥr	  al-­‐Rāʾiq,	  vol.	  10	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kitāb,	  no	  date),	  322;	  Muhammad	  b.	  
Aḥmad	  b.	  Abī	  Sahl	  Abū	  Bakr	  al-­‐Sarakhsī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Mabsūṭ,	  vol.	  3	  part	  6	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  
al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  2001),	  199-­‐231;	  Abū	  Bakr	  b.	  Masʿūd	  al-­‐Kāsānī,	  Badāʾiʿ	  al-­‐
Ṣanāʾiʿ,	  vol.4	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  2010),	  315;	  Muhammad	  Amīn	  b.	  
ʿĀbidīn,	  Radd	  al-­‐Muḥtār	  ʿalā	  Durr	  al-­‐Mukhtār	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Fikr,	  2015),	  487;	  Ibn	  
Kamāl	  Bāshā	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  al-­‐Īḍāḥ,	  vol.	  1	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub,	  2007)	  
218	  All	  translations	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  following	  translation:	  
Muhammad	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri,	  The	  Glorious	  Qurʾān;	  English	  Translation	  (London:	  
Minhaj-­‐ul-­‐Qurʾān	  Publications,	  2012).	  
219	  Al-­‐	  Qurʾān	  2:229:	  “Divorce	  is	  (revocable)	  two	  times	  (only).	  Then	  either	  retain	  
(the	  wife)	  with	  honour	  (in	  marital	  relationship)	  or	  release	  her	  with	  kindness.	  And	  it	  
is	  not	  lawful	  for	  you	  to	  take	  back	  anything	  of	  that	  which	  you	  have	  given	  them,	  unless	  
both	  fear	  that	  (now	  by	  maintaining	  marital	  ties)	  they	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  observe	  the	  
limits	  set	  by	  Allah.	  If	  you	  fear	  that	  both	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  keep	  within	  Allah’s	  limits,	  
then	  (in	  that	  case)	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  sin	  upon	  either	  of	  them	  if	  the	  wife	  (herself)	  may	  
give	  up	  something	  as	  recompense	  to	  free	  herself	  (from	  this	  distressing	  bond).	  These	  
are	  the	  limits	  (set)	  by	  Allah.	  So,	  do	  not	  exceed	  them.	  And	  those	  who	  exceed	  the	  limits	  
prescribed	  by	  Allah,	  it	  is	  they	  who	  are	  the	  wrongdoers”.	  
220	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:19:	  “O	  believers!	  It	  is	  not	  lawful	  for	  you	  to	  become	  heirs	  to	  women	  
by	  force.	  And	  do	  not	  retain	  them	  by	  force	  in	  order	  to	  take	  (back)	  from	  them	  a	  
portion	  of	  what	  you	  gave	  them,	  unless	  they	  commit	  open	  indecency.	  And	  treat	  them	  
honourably.	  Then	  if	  you	  dislike	  them,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  you	  dislike	  a	  thing	  and	  Allah	  
places	  in	  it	  abundant	  good”.	  
221	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:20:	  “And	  if	  you	  seek	  to	  take	  a	  wife	  in	  place	  of	  another	  and	  you	  have	  
(by	  now)	  given	  to	  her	  heaps	  of	  wealth,	  yet	  do	  not	  take	  back	  any	  part	  of	  it.	  Do	  you	  
want	  to	  take	  that	  wealth	  (back)	  by	  means	  of	  unjust	  accusation	  and	  manifest	  sin?”	  
222	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:35:	  “And	  if	  you	  fear	  a	  breach	  between	  the	  two,	  then	  appoint	  one	  
arbitrator	  from	  the	  husband’s	  family	  and	  the	  other	  from	  the	  wife’s	  family.	  If	  both	  
(the	  arbitrators)	  resolve	  to	  bring	  about	  settlement,	  Allah	  will	  create	  harmony	  
between	  them.	  Indeed,	  Allah	  is	  All-­‐Knowing,	  All-­‐Aware”.	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the	  limits	  of	  Allah	  whilst	  remaining	  within	  the	  marriage.	  Under	  these	  circumstances	  
a	  wife	  can	  initiate	  a	  release,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  may	  offer	  some	  recompense	  to	  her	  
husband.	  The	  Qurʾān	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  details	  of	  what	  constitutes	  going	  beyond	  
“the	  limits	  of	  Allah”,	  so	  one	  must	  refer	  to	  the	  hadith	  for	  further	  explanation.	  As	  to	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  recompense,	  the	  Qurʾān	  (4:19)	  is	  clear	  that	  husbands	  cannot	  force	  
their	  wives	  to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ	  through	  coercion	  or	  misbehaviour.	  Even	  if	  they	  have	  
given	  large	  amounts	  of	  mahr	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage,	  a	  husband	  who	  wishes	  to	  
divorce	  his	  wife	  (and	  therefore	  necessarily	  relinquish	  that	  mahr)	  cannot	  force	  his	  
wife	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  having	  the	  mahr	  returned	  as	  some	  form	  of	  
compensation223.	  In	  cases	  of	  marital	  conflict,	  the	  Qurʾān	  also	  provides	  the	  option	  for	  
the	  matter	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  a	  third	  party	  or	  arbitrators	  to	  solve	  such	  disputes224.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  Qurʾān	  provides	  very	  few	  details	  regarding	  khulʿ	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  to	  
be	  employed,	  precedents	  from	  the	  Sunna	  (practices	  of	  the	  Prophet)	  are	  used	  to	  
elaborate	  the	  matter	  further.	  The	  primary	  ahadith	  (sayings	  of	  the	  Prophet)	  on	  this	  
subject	  describe	  the	  wife	  of	  Thābit	  b.	  Qays	  approaching	  the	  Prophet	  and	  requesting	  
a	  release	  from	  her	  marriage225.	  There	  are	  several	  versions	  of	  the	  hadith	  that	  refer	  to	  
Thābit’s	  wife	  as	  either	  Ḥabība	  or	  Jamīla226.	  Although	  most	  of	  the	  jurists	  consider	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:20.	  
224	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:35.	  
225	  Muhammad	  b.	  Ismāʿīl	  al-­‐Bukhārī,	  al-­‐Ṣaḥīḥ,	  trans.	  Muhammad	  Muhsin	  Khan,	  vol.	  7	  
(Dār	  al-­‐Salām;	  1997)	  Hadith	  5273,	  5274,	  5275	  (132-­‐133);	  Abū	  Dāwūd	  Sulaymān	  ibn	  
al-­‐Ash‘ath	  al-­‐Azdi	  as-­‐Sijistani	  al-­‐Sunan,	  trans.	  Nasīr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Khaṭṭāb,	  vol.	  3.	  
(Maktaba	  Dār	  al-­‐Salām,	  2008)	  Hadith	  2227,	  al-­‐Nasāʾī,	  al-­‐Sunan,	  trans.	  Nasīr	  al-­‐Dīn	  
al-­‐Khaṭṭāb,	  vol.	  4	  (Maktaba	  Dār	  al-­‐Salām)	  Hadith	  3491-­‐3492.	  	  
226	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  al-­‐ʿAsqalānī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Barī,	  vol.	  9	  (Cairo:	  Dār	  al-­‐Hadīth,	  2004),	  455	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to	  be	  one	  event227,	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  al-­‐ʿAsqalānī	  states	  that	  the	  ṣaḥīḥ	  (authenticity)	  of	  all	  
the	  chains	  of	  the	  hadith	  indicate	  that	  Thābit	  was	  married	  more	  than	  once,	  and	  upon	  
each	  occasion	  gave	  his	  garden	  as	  the	  mahr228.	  This	  would	  explain	  why	  Thābit’s	  wife	  
is	  mentioned	  as	  Jamīla	  and	  Ḥabība	  in	  some	  hadith,	  as	  well	  as	  Maryam	  al-­‐Maghāliyya	  
and	  Zaynab	  bint	  ʿAbd	  Allāh	  b.	  Ubayy	  b.	  Salūl	  in	  other	  hadith229.	  Moreover,	  the	  
reasons	  given	  by	  Thābit’s	  wife	  for	  initiating	  a	  divorce	  also	  vary,	  giving	  further	  
credence	  to	  this	  theory.	  In	  the	  most	  common	  version	  of	  the	  hadith,	  Thābit’s	  wife	  
requests	  the	  Prophet’s	  permission	  to	  separate	  from	  Thābit.	  She	  specifically	  states	  
that	  she	  does	  not	  blame	  Thābit	  for	  any	  wrongdoing,	  but	  fears	  that	  she	  will	  fall	  into	  
kufr,	  i.e.	  behave	  in	  an	  un-­‐Islamic	  manner230.	  The	  Prophet	  asks	  her	  if	  she	  will	  return	  
the	  garden	  belonging	  to	  Thābit,	  to	  which	  she	  agrees.	  The	  Prophet	  then	  orders	  Thābit	  
to	  take	  the	  garden	  and	  divorce	  his	  wife231.	  In	  Bukhārī’s	  version,	  Thābit’s	  wife	  
absolves	  him	  of	  any	  wrongdoing,	  clearly	  indicating	  that	  she	  was	  not	  required	  to	  
prove	  why	  she	  wanted	  the	  divorce.	  Moreover,	  the	  Prophet	  does	  not	  ask	  her	  to	  
elaborate	  on	  the	  reasons	  for	  her	  request,	  merely	  asking	  her	  if	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  return	  
her	  husband’s	  orchard.	  	  
	  
However,	  other	  hadith	  indicate	  that	  she	  did	  have	  reasons	  for	  her	  aversion	  and	  
request	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Jamīla/Ḥabība	  is	  to	  have	  said	  several	  different	  things	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  Al-­‐Zamakhsharī,	  quoted	  by	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  507.	  
228	  Al-­‐ʿAsqalānī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Barī,	  455.	  
229	  Muhammad	  ʿĀbid	  al-­‐Sindī	  al-­‐Madanī	  Al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  al-­‐Mawāhib	  al-­‐Laṭīfa	  sharḥ	  
Musnad	  al-­‐Imam	  Abī	  Ḥanīfa,	  vol.	  5	  (Damascus:	  Dār	  al-­‐Nawādir,	  2014),	  101.	  
230	  Al-­‐Bukhārī,	  al-­‐Ṣaḥīḥ,	  Hadith	  7:5273.	  
231	  Al-­‐Bukhārī,	  al-­‐Ṣaḥīḥ,	  Hadith	  7:5273	  and	  5274;	  Ibn	  Mājah,	  Al-­‐Sunan,	  3:2056.	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Prophet:	  “I	  cannot	  endure	  or	  bear	  to	  be	  live	  with	  him”232,	  or	  that	  she	  “did	  not	  like	  
him”233,	  or	  that	  she	  found	  him	  ugly	  and	  wanted	  to	  spit	  in	  his	  face234.	  In	  other	  reports	  
Thābit	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  caused	  his	  wife	  physical	  pain235	  or	  even	  broken	  her	  
arm236.	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  al-­‐ʿAsqalānī	  also	  describes	  Thābit	  as	  “having	  displayed	  harsh	  
behaviour”237.	  However,	  Thābit’s	  wife	  does	  not	  feel	  it	  necessary	  to	  mention	  this	  
behaviour	  to	  the	  Prophet	  in	  the	  principal	  hadith	  narrated	  by	  Bukhārī,	  perhaps	  
knowing	  that	  he	  is	  either	  already	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  or	  will	  ask	  for	  clarification	  if	  
needed.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  if	  a	  wife	  merely	  fears	  that	  she	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
fulfil	  the	  commandments	  of	  Allah	  (by	  not	  being	  able	  to	  fulfil	  the	  rights	  of	  her	  
husband)	  she	  will	  be	  entitled	  to	  a	  khulʿ238.	  Since	  the	  Qurʾān	  clearly	  states	  an	  yakhāfā,	  
“if	  you	  fear”,	  then	  actual	  harm	  or	  hatred	  need	  not	  be	  established;	  rather,	  the	  
anticipation	  or	  fear	  that	  hatred	  or	  abhorrence	  will	  lead	  to	  marital	  dispute	  will	  be	  
enough	  to	  request	  a	  khulʿ239	  What	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  hadith	  and	  the	  jurists’	  reports	  is	  
that	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  request	  for	  khulʿ	  were	  not	  considered	  important:	  merely	  
that	  a	  request	  for	  a	  divorce	  was	  made	  and	  then	  granted	  upon	  the	  return	  of	  some	  
compensation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232	  Al-­‐Bukhārī,	  al-­‐Ṣaḥīḥ	  ,	  Hadith	  7:5275.	  	  
233	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  al-­‐ʿAsqalānī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Barī,	  9:457.	  	  
234	  Ibn	  Mājah,	  al-­‐Sunan,	  3:2057.	  In	  this	  particular	  hadith,	  Ḥabība	  bint	  Sahl	  informs	  
the	  Prophet:	  “If	  it	  were	  not	  the	  fear	  of	  Allah	  when	  he	  enters	  me,	  I	  would	  spit	  in	  his	  
(Thābit’s)	  face.”	  See	  also	  al-­‐ʿAsqalānī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Barī,	  9:457,	  who	  quotes	  a	  hadith	  from	  
Imam	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Razzāq,	  reporting	  from	  Maʿmar	  that	  Jamīla,	  the	  wife	  of	  Thābit,	  said:	  
“Oh	  Prophet,	  he	  is	  ugly	  and	  I	  am	  beautiful	  and	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  live	  with	  him.”	  
235	  Abū	  Dāwūd,	  al-­‐Sunan,	  3:2228.	  
236	  Al-­‐Nasāʾī,	  al-­‐Sunan	  al-­‐Kubrā.	  	  
237	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  al-­‐ʿAsqalānī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Barī,	  9:457.	  
238	  Ḥusayn	  b.	  ʿAwda	  al-­‐ʿAwāyisha,	  al-­‐Mawsūʿa	  al-­‐Fiqhiyya	  al-­‐Muyassara,	  336.	  
239	  Ibid.,	  336.	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2.3	  Khulʿ	  and	  the	  Husband’s	  Consent	  
In	  past	  and	  present	  scholarship	  pertaining	  to	  the	  khulʿ,	  it	  has	  been	  posited	  by	  some	  
scholars	  that	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  dictates	  that	  a	  husband’s	  consent	  is	  needed	  
before	  a	  khulʿ	  can	  be	  affected,	  clearly	  going	  against	  the	  textual	  readings	  of	  the	  hadith	  
mentioned	  above.	  The	  perception	  that	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  requires	  the	  husband	  to	  give	  his	  
consent	  was	  particularly	  prevalent	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  subcontinent	  during	  the	  late	  
nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  and	  negatively	  affected	  women	  as	  a	  result.	  
As	  will	  be	  explained	  later	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  was	  used	  to	  govern	  
issues	  relating	  to	  all	  family	  law	  cases	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  subcontinent.	  This	  erroneous	  
conception	  of	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  meant	  that	  judges	  in	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐partition	  Pakistan	  
refused	  to	  allow	  women	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  their	  
husbands’	  consent.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  1959	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  decided	  
to	  override	  so-­‐called	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  and	  allow	  a	  newly	  formulated	  judicial	  
right	  of	  khulʿ	  irrespective	  of	  the	  husband’s	  wishes240.	  Unaware	  that	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence	  was	  being	  misinterpreted,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  engaged	  in	  what	  it	  
deemed	  as	  ijtihād	  and	  formulated	  what	  it	  perceived	  as	  a	  new	  version	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  
Unfortunately,	  since	  the	  judges	  did	  not	  base	  their	  judgment	  upon	  the	  classical	  
Ḥanafī	  texts,	  for	  almost	  a	  decade	  the	  lower	  courts	  either	  refused	  to	  implement	  the	  
decision	  entirely	  or	  prolonged	  existing	  cases,	  instituting	  extremely	  high	  evidentiary	  
requirements	  for	  women	  to	  fulfil	  before	  a	  khulʿ	  was	  granted.	  Although	  the	  Pakistani	  
courts	  have	  now	  radically	  changed	  their	  position	  and	  formulated	  a	  no-­‐fault	  based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  Mst.	  Balqis	  Fatima	  v.	  Najm-­‐ul-­‐Ikram	  Qureshi,	  PLD	  1959	  (W.P)	  Lahore	  566.	  See	  
Chapter	  Four	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  this	  case.	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khulʿ,	  a	  careful	  review	  of	  the	  primary	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  below	  will	  illustrate	  that	  married	  
women	  were	  unnecessarily	  restricted	  and	  forced	  to	  remain	  in	  unhappy	  and	  often	  
violent	  marriages	  due	  to	  a	  misrepresentation	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
khulʿ.	  
	  
In	  his	  formative	  work	  on	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence,	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  describes	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  al-­‐
ikhtilāʿ	  –	  the	  process	  of	  the	  wife	  detaching	  or	  extricating	  herself	  from	  the	  marriage	  –	  
and	  states	  that	  this	  is	  a	  permissible	  separation241.	  He	  makes	  no	  reference	  to	  the	  
necessity	  of	  the	  husband’s	  consent	  as	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  to	  the	  divorce,	  and	  instead	  
engages	  in	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  what	  compensation,	  if	  any,	  
is	  required.	  Similarly,	  in	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣaghīr242,	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  quotes	  a	  hadith	  direct	  
from	  Abū	  Ḥanīfa,	  in	  which	  the	  wife	  of	  Thābit	  comes	  to	  the	  Holy	  Prophet	  and	  declares	  
that	  she	  no	  longer	  wishes	  live	  with	  her	  husband,	  and	  is	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  after	  she	  
agrees	  to	  return	  Thābit’s	  garden243.	  In	  this	  particular	  version	  of	  the	  hadith,	  there	  is	  
no	  mention	  that	  Thābit	  was	  even	  present	  during	  the	  discussion,	  and	  is	  merely	  
ordered	  to	  return	  his	  garden244.	  Thābit	  is	  assigned	  a	  completely	  passive	  role	  during	  
the	  process	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  no	  mention	  is	  made	  regarding	  the	  necessity	  of	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  Muhammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Aṣl,	  vol.	  4	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  Ibn	  Ḥazm,	  
2012)	  549.	  
242	  Muhammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣaghīr	  (Karachi:	  Idāra	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  
1990),	  216.	  
243	  See	  also	  Abū	  Ḥanīfa,	  al-­‐Musnad	  in	  al-­‐Ḥanafī	  al-­‐Mawāhib	  al-­‐Laṭīfa	  sharḥ	  Musnad	  
al-­‐Imam	  Abī	  Ḥanīfa	  Muhammad	  ʿĀbid	  al-­‐Sindī	  al-­‐Madanī,	  vol.	  5	  (Damascus:	  Dār	  al-­‐
Nawādir,	  2014),	  99.	  	  
244	  In	  the	  versions	  provided	  by	  al-­‐Dāraquṭnī	  in	  his	  al-­‐Sunan	  and	  in	  al-­‐Bayhaqī’s	  al-­‐
Sunan	  al-­‐Kubrā,	  the	  Prophet	  receives	  the	  garden	  from	  Thābit’s	  wife	  and	  declares	  the	  
divorce	  without	  any	  mention	  that	  Thābit	  was	  present.	  See	  Muhammad	  ʿĀbid	  al-­‐Sindī	  
al-­‐Madanī,	  al-­‐Ḥanafī	  al-­‐Mawāhib,	  106.	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consent.	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  states	  that	  if	  either	  of	  the	  spouses	  fears	  that	  they	  will	  break	  the	  
commandments	  of	  Allah	  by	  continuing	  with	  the	  marriage,	  then	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  
the	  wife	  to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ245.	  The	  consent	  of	  the	  husband	  is	  not	  made	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  
for	  the	  khulʿ;	  rather,	  for	  al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ,	  the	  failure	  of	  either	  the	  husband	  or	  the	  wife	  to	  
present	  “good	  behaviour”	  within	  the	  marriage	  will	  cause	  the	  “spirit	  of	  the	  nikāḥ”	  to	  
be	  broken	  and	  lead	  the	  way	  towards	  a	  khulʿ246.	  The	  same	  position	  is	  taken	  by	  Ibn	  
Ḥazm,	  who	  defines	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  al-­‐iftidāʾ:	  a	  separation	  when	  a	  wife	  hates	  her	  
husband247.	  If	  a	  wife	  fears	  that	  she	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  fulfil	  her	  marital	  obligations	  
due	  to	  this	  hate,	  then	  she	  has	  the	  right	  to	  gain	  fa-­‐lahā:	  freedom	  from	  the	  marriage248.	  
It	  is	  not	  required	  that	  the	  husband	  reciprocates	  this	  hate	  or	  that	  he	  must	  necessarily	  
consent	  to	  the	  khulʿ:	  instead,	  it	  is	  what	  the	  wife	  feels,	  and	  her	  worries	  about	  her	  
marital	  obligations,	  that	  are	  of	  primary	  concern.	  If	  she	  cannot	  live	  amicably	  with	  her	  
husband,	  then	  that	  is	  sufficient	  cause	  to	  be	  granted	  a	  khulʿ249.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  the	  
consent	  of	  the	  wife	  that	  is	  the	  primary	  condition	  of	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  It	  is	  the	  
wife	  who	  must,	  without	  any	  coercion,	  either	  desire	  a	  khulʿ	  or	  freely	  consent	  to	  one	  if	  
the	  husband	  initiates	  the	  demand250.	  
	  
In	  his	  chapter	  on	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  through	  his	  commentary	  on	  al-­‐Marghīnānī’s	  al-­‐
Hidāya,	  al-­‐ʿAynī	  provides	  four	  different	  views	  of	  the	  fuqahāʾ	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  390.	  
246	  Ibid.,	  391-­‐392.	  
247	  Ibn	  Ḥazm,	  al-­‐Muḥallā,	  210.	  
248	  Ibid.	  
249	  Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn,	  quoted	  by	  Muhammad	  al-­‐ʿImrānī,	  Fiqh	  al-­‐Usra	  al-­‐Muslilma	  fī	  al-­‐
Muhājar,	  vol.	  2	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub,	  2001),	  187.	  
250	  Ibn	  Nujaym,	  al-­‐Baḥr	  al-­‐Rāʾiq,	  322.	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before	  providing	  his	  own	  view	  on	  the	  matter.	  Al-­‐ʿAynī	  states	  that	  the	  ashʿariyya251	  
requires	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  one	  of	  two	  conditions	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  be	  entitled	  to	  a	  khulʿ:	  
the	  wife	  does	  not	  like	  her	  husband,	  or,	  if	  she	  stays	  with	  him,	  she	  cannot	  fulfil	  his	  
conjugal	  rights252.	  The	  second	  view	  posited	  is	  that	  of	  Ibn	  Sīrīn,	  Saʿīd	  b.	  Jubayr	  and	  
Ḥasan	  al-­‐Baṣrī,	  all	  of	  whom	  state	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  cannot	  be	  granted	  without	  the	  
intervention	  of	  the	  qāḍī253.	  Al-­‐ʿAynī	  expresses	  the	  third	  view:	  that	  other	  fuqahāʾ	  
have	  stated	  that	  a	  wife	  cannot	  be	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  unless	  she	  specifically	  informs	  her	  
husband	  that	  she	  can	  no	  longer	  obey	  him	  and	  cannot	  perform	  the	  obligatory	  ghusl,	  
implying	  that	  the	  wife	  no	  longer	  wishes	  to	  have	  sexual	  relations	  with	  her	  
husband254.	  The	  fourth	  view	  is	  that	  there	  must	  be	  some	  argument	  between	  the	  two	  
parties	  before	  a	  khulʿ	  can	  be	  granted.	  After	  summarising	  the	  views	  of	  these	  fuqahāʾ,	  
al-­‐ʿAynī	  provides	  his	  own	  view	  on	  the	  matter.	  He	  bases	  his	  view	  on	  the	  Qurʾānic	  
verse	  2:229,	  stating	  that	  if	  there	  is	  a	  dispute	  between	  the	  spouses	  and	  they	  fear	  that	  
by	  staying	  together	  as	  husband	  and	  wife	  they	  cannot	  fulfil	  the	  commandments	  of	  
Allah,	  there	  is	  no	  harm	  if	  the	  wife	  frees	  herself	  from	  that	  relationship,	  and	  in	  doing	  
so	  she	  may	  return	  some	  compensation	  and	  thus	  detach	  herself	  from	  her	  husband255.	  
Neither	  al-­‐ʿAynī	  nor	  al-­‐Marghīnānī	  stipulates	  that	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband	  is	  a	  
pre-­‐requisite	  for	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  Al-­‐ʿAynī	  states	  that	  if	  the	  matter	  is	  not	  
resolved	  between	  the	  two	  parties,	  the	  wife	  has	  the	  option	  to	  go	  to	  court	  and	  apply	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  An	  early	  theological	  school	  of	  thought	  in	  Islam	  and	  the	  followers	  of	  Abū	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  
al-­‐Ashʿarī.	  	  
252	  Badr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  507.	  
253	  Ibid.,	  507.	  




for	  a	  khulʿ,	  as	  was	  implemented	  in	  the	  case	  Thābit’s	  wife256.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  wife	  has	  
the	  right	  to	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  the	  court	  implies	  that	  this	  will	  be	  irrespective	  of	  the	  
husband’s	  wishes.	  Why	  else	  would	  a	  wife	  be	  allowed	  to	  refer	  her	  case	  to	  the	  court	  if	  
a	  qāḍī	  does	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  dissolve	  the	  marriage	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  
husband?	  Such	  a	  right	  would	  be	  useless	  and	  of	  no	  value.	  	  
	  
Al-­‐Sarakhsī	  begins	  his	  chapter	  on	  the	  khulʿ	  by	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  a	  wife	  
to	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  that	  its	  legal	  effect	  will	  be	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  ṭalāq-­‐ul-­‐bāʾin,	  an	  
irrevocable	  divorce257.	  Again	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  need	  for	  the	  husband’s	  
consent.	  Rather,	  Al-­‐Sarakhsī	  states	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  can	  be	  agreed	  upon	  mutually	  
between	  both	  parties;	  or,	  if	  not,	  the	  case	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  any	  other	  third	  party	  or	  a	  
qāḍī258.	  Indeed,	  al-­‐Sarakhsī	  is	  of	  the	  view	  that	  even	  if	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  obtained	  through	  
al-­‐ikrāh,	  coercion	  of	  the	  husband,	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  still	  valid259.	  If	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  still	  considered	  
valid	  when	  a	  husband	  is	  forced	  to	  give	  it,	  this	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  the	  husband’s	  
role	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  a	  passive	  one.	  If	  a	  wife	  requests	  a	  khulʿ,	  either	  he	  can	  
agree	  or	  the	  matter	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  a	  third	  party	  which	  has	  the	  power	  to	  override	  
the	  husband’s	  wishes.	  This	  also	  reflects	  the	  passive	  role	  given	  to	  Thābit	  in	  all	  of	  the	  
hadith.	  Thābit	  is	  never	  asked	  by	  the	  Prophet	  about	  his	  opinion	  regarding	  his	  wife’s	  
demand,	  but	  is	  ordered	  to	  grant	  her	  a	  divorce	  and	  accept	  the	  garden	  in	  return.	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  Ibid.	  
257	  Al-­‐Sarakhsī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Mabsūṭ,	  199.	  Although	  its	  legal	  affect	  will	  be	  of	  a	  ṭalāq-­‐ul-­‐
bāʾin	  the	  khulʿ,	  it	  is	  still	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  to	  be	  the	  right	  of	  the	  wife.	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Al-­‐Kāsānī’s	  chapter	  on	  the	  khulʿ	  also	  contains	  nothing	  pertaining	  to	  the	  requirement	  
of	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband260.	  Instead,	  his	  primary	  discussion	  revolves	  around	  
the	  legal	  effect	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  comparing	  the	  Ḥanafī	  juristic	  view	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  has	  the	  
legal	  effect	  of	  being	  an	  irrevocable	  ṭalāq	  with	  the	  Ḥanablī	  view	  that	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  
a	  khulʿ	  is	  al-­‐naskh.	  However,	  in	  both	  events	  the	  nikāḥ	  is	  totally	  repudiated	  by	  the	  
khulʿ261.	  Moreover,	  al-­‐Kāsānī	  also	  states	  that	  whilst	  some	  fuqahāʾ	  require	  a	  qāḍī	  to	  
affect	  a	  khulʿ,	  in	  his	  opinion	  the	  khulʿ	  can	  be	  obtained	  extra-­‐judicially	  if	  mutually	  
agreed	  between	  the	  parties,	  or	  through	  recourse	  to	  the	  qāḍī	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dispute262.	  
Similarly,	  al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ263	  and	  Ibn	  Kamāl	  Bāshā	  al-­‐Ḥanafī264	  are	  all	  of	  the	  view	  that	  a	  wife	  
has	  the	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  khulʿ,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute	  may	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  the	  
courts	  for	  a	  settlement.	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  mentions	  that	  Ḥasan	  al-­‐Baṣrī	  and	  Ibn	  Sīrīn	  only	  
allowed	  a	  khulʿ	  through	  recourse	  to	  a	  court	  because	  they	  feared	  that	  a	  wife’s	  rights	  
might	  be	  violated	  if	  the	  matter	  is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  spouses.	  However,	  al-­‐
Jaṣṣāṣ	  states	  that	  ʿUmar	  b.	  al-­‐Khaṭṭāb,	  ʿUthmān	  b.	  ʿAffān,	  ʿAlī	  b.	  Ṭālib,	  ʿUmar	  b.	  ʿUmar,	  
Shurayḥ,	  Ṭāwūs	  and	  al-­‐Ẓuhrī	  all	  allow	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  be	  settled	  through	  a	  court,	  or	  by	  
mutual	  consent,	  or	  through	  the	  intervention	  of	  any	  third	  person265.	  	  
	  
The	  exegetes	  have	  also	  interpreted	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  2:229	  as	  providing	  courts	  
with	  the	  authority	  to	  settle	  disputes	  during	  matrimonial	  conflict.	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī	  states	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  vol.	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  (Beirut:	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  al-­‐Kutub	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  315.	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  91.	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  Badāʾiʿ	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  Ibn	  Kamāl	  Bāshā	  al-­‐Ḥanafīyya,	  al-­‐Īḍāḥ,	  vol.	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  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub,	  2007).	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that	  the	  words	  an	  yakhāfā,	  “if	  they	  both	  fear”	  (in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  verse),	  refer	  to	  
both	  the	  husband	  and	  wife,	  but	  the	  words	  in	  khiftum,	  “if	  you	  fear”,	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  
spouses	  but	  to	  a	  third	  party266,	  or	  to	  the	  sultan	  or	  those	  who	  work	  on	  his	  behalf267.	  
Moreover,	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  goes	  into	  great	  depth	  about	  the	  right	  of	  a	  woman	  to	  
address	  the	  court	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ268.	  After	  presenting	  
Bukhārī’s	  version	  of	  the	  hadith	  where	  the	  Prophet	  grants	  Thābit’s	  wife	  a	  khulʿ,	  he	  
provides	  an	  explanation	  through	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  2:229:	  
	  
So	  if	  you	  fear	  that	  both	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  keep	  within	  Allah’s	  limits,	  then	  (in	  that	  case)	  
there	  shall	  be	  no	  sin	  upon	  either	  of	  them	  if	  the	  wife	  (herself)	  may	  give	  up	  something	  as	  
recompense	  to	  free	  herself	  (from	  this	  distressing	  bond).	  
	  
Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  states	  that	  the	  Arabic	  words	  fa-­‐in	  khiftum,	  “so	  if	  you	  fear”,	  
specifically	  refer	  to	  the	  al-­‐aʾimma	  wa	  al-­‐ḥukkām:	  the	  learned	  people	  (judges)	  or	  the	  
rulers269.	  Allah	  has	  made	  it	  a	  condition	  that	  if	  “you”	  –	  the	  rulers	  and	  judges	  –	  “fear	  
that	  both”,	  namely	  the	  husband	  and	  wife,	  will	  transgress	  the	  limits	  set	  by	  God	  and	  
are	  unable	  to	  resolve	  “your”	  marital	  dispute,	  then	  the	  matter	  should	  be	  raised	  before	  
the	  court,	  presided	  over	  by	  the	  aʾimma	  and	  ḥukkām.	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  further	  states	  
that	  Allah	  has	  given	  this	  authority	  to	  the	  courts	  and	  empowered	  them	  to	  provide	  a	  
khulʿ	  to	  the	  wife.	  He	  uses	  the	  word	  tamkīn	  to	  signify	  that	  the	  courts	  have	  the	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  Sīrīn,	  all	  of	  whom	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  a	  khulʿ	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  only	  be	  granted	  by	  a	  qāḍī.	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  sharḥ	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  192-­‐193.	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authority	  to	  affect	  a	  khulʿ270.	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām’s	  opinion	  that	  the	  courts	  have	  the	  right	  
to	  grant	  a	  khulʿ	  again	  implies	  that	  this	  authority	  can	  be	  exercised	  irrespective	  of	  the	  
wishes	  of	  the	  husband.	  Otherwise,	  recourse	  to	  the	  courts	  would	  be	  of	  no	  practical	  
use	  to	  a	  wife.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  therefore	  apparent	  from	  the	  discussion	  above	  that	  the	  perception	  that	  Ḥanafī	  
fiqh	  only	  allows	  a	  wife	  to	  proceed	  with	  a	  khulʿ	  with	  her	  husband’s	  consent	  is	  a	  
misconception	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  situation	  has	  been	  
confused	  with	  an	  inaccurate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term	  al-­‐mubāraʾa	  and	  its	  
connection	  to	  the	  khulʿ,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  
	  
2.4	  Al-­‐Mubāraʾa	  
Some	  contemporary	  commentators	  describe	  al-­‐mubāraʾa	  as	  al-­‐khulʿ	  by	  mutual	  
consent,	  whereby	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  are	  agreed	  to	  by	  both	  the	  husband	  and	  
wife271.	  Others	  have	  termed	  it	  an	  extra-­‐judicial	  khulʿ	  whereby	  no	  recourse	  is	  made	  to	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  Doi,	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  96-­‐97;	  Hammudah	  Abd	  al-­‐Ali,	  The	  Family	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  in	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  (Oak	  Brook,	  IL:	  American	  Trust	  Publications,	  1977),	  244;	  Joel	  
Nichols	  ed.,	  Marriage	  and	  Divorce	  in	  a	  Multi-­‐Cultural	  Context:	  Multi-­‐Tiered	  Marriage	  
and	  the	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  of	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  Law	  and	  Religion	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2012),	  40;	  Rakesh	  Kumar	  Singh,	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  on	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  Law	  (Delhi:	  Universal	  
Law	  Publishing,	  2011),	  135;	  Asma	  Jahanghir	  and	  S.	  Abid,	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  &	  
Exhaustive	  Commentary	  on	  Manual	  of	  Family	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  (Lahore:	  Civil	  &	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  Law	  Publications,	  2004),	  130	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the	  court,	  since	  the	  husband	  has	  agreed	  to	  the	  khulʿ	  at	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  wife272.	  
This	  definition,	  however,	  is	  also	  inaccurate	  with	  respect	  to	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence,	  
which	  provides	  a	  much	  more	  detailed	  and	  technical	  analysis	  of	  this	  term.	  Whilst	  
discussing	  the	  legal	  effects	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  both	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  and	  al-­‐Marghīnānī	  note	  that	  
al-­‐khulʿ	  and	  al-­‐mubāraʾa	  are	  the	  same	  regarding	  their	  legal	  effects273.	  This	  fact,	  I	  
believe,	  may	  have	  partly	  contributed	  to	  the	  misunderstanding	  regarding	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  al-­‐mubāraʾa	  by	  some	  scholars.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  khulʿ	  has	  been	  
wrongly	  interpreted	  as	  requiring	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband.	  If	  the	  mubāraʾa	  has	  
the	  same	  legal	  effect	  as	  the	  khulʿ,	  it	  appears	  that	  this	  was	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  a	  
mubāraʾa	  must	  by	  definition	  also	  mean	  divorce	  by	  mutual	  consent.	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  primary	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  reveals	  that	  the	  mubāraʾa	  is	  not	  
considered	  a	  khulʿ	  just	  because	  it	  has	  been	  effected	  through	  the	  mutual	  consent	  of	  
both	  spouses.	  Rather,	  it	  requires	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  elements:	  the	  release	  of	  the	  
husband	  from	  his	  financial	  obligation	  to	  support	  his	  wife	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  
spouses	  when	  any	  such	  agreement	  is	  made.	  Al-­‐Sarakhsī	  states	  that	  if	  a	  wife	  agrees	  to	  
give	  up	  her	  right	  to	  al-­‐nafaqa	  (food	  and	  clothing)	  and	  al-­‐suknā	  (housing)	  as	  
compensation	  for	  the	  khulʿ,	  then	  the	  khulʿ	  will	  be	  termed	  a	  mubāraʾa,	  since	  the	  
husband	  will	  be	  absolved	  of	  his	  financial	  liability	  to	  provide	  food	  and	  shelter	  to	  his	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  Muhammad	  al-­‐Shaybānī’s,	  al-­‐Aṣl	  in	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Mabsūṭ,	  al-­‐Sarakhsī,	  201;	  Al-­‐
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  al-­‐Hidāya,	  304.	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wife274.	  Al-­‐Shaybānī	  is	  of	  the	  view	  that	  even	  if	  the	  wife	  agrees	  to	  give	  up	  both	  these	  
rights,	  the	  husband	  will	  still	  be	  liable	  to	  provide	  al-­‐suknā	  to	  his	  wife	  during	  her	  ʿidda	  
period.	  He	  states	  that	  the	  wife	  cannot	  give	  up	  this	  financial	  liability,	  even	  voluntarily,	  
and	  the	  husband	  will	  always	  be	  liable	  for	  al-­‐suknā	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  divorce275.	  
However,	  being	  absolved	  of	  the	  liability	  to	  provide	  al-­‐nafaqa	  will	  entail	  that	  the	  
khulʿ	  will	  be	  known	  as	  a	  mubāraʾa.	  Thus	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  mubāraʾa	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  
effect,	  for	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  release	  of	  the	  legal	  obligations	  upon	  the	  
husband.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  if	  a	  wife	  has	  to	  pay	  some	  recompense	  to	  the	  
husband,	  he	  in	  turn	  will	  be	  released	  from	  his	  financial	  liability	  to	  pay	  any	  
outstanding	  deferred	  mahr	  payment,	  and	  thus	  will	  be	  absolved	  of	  any	  financial	  
obligation	  to	  his	  wife.	  Thus	  the	  khulʿ	  will	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  effect	  as	  the	  mubāraʾa.	  	  
	  
Al-­‐Kāsānī	  states	  that	  the	  word	  mubāraʾa	  is	  derived	  from	  barāʾat,	  meaning	  to	  become	  
free	  or	  to	  be	  released.	  When	  a	  husband	  is	  freed	  from	  his	  financial	  obligation	  and	  
responsibilities	  or	  ibrāʾ,	  then	  the	  khulʿ	  will	  be	  termed	  a	  mubāraʾa276.	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī	  
adds	  to	  this	  definition	  and	  states	  that	  a	  mubāraʾa	  is	  like	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  its	  legal	  effect	  
because	  through	  both	  of	  these	  acts,	  each	  of	  the	  spouses	  is	  released	  from	  their	  
marital	  responsibilities277.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  word	  mubāraʾa	  is	  derived	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  Al-­‐Sarakhsī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Mabsūṭ,	  207.	  
275	  Al-­‐	  Shaybānī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Asl,	  549-­‐550	  
276	  Al-­‐Kāsānī,	  Badāʾiʿ	  al-­‐Sanāʾiʿ,	  330.	  Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn	  also	  states	  that	  the	  word	  mubāraʾa	  
has	  been	  derived	  from	  baraa’a,	  meaning	  renunciation.	  He	  refers	  to	  the	  breach	  of	  the	  
peace	  treaty	  of	  Ḥudaybiya,	  upon	  which	  a	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  was	  revealed	  stating	  that	  
the	  treaty	  had	  been	  renounced.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  a	  wife	  renounces	  her	  financial	  
rights	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  mubāraʾa.	  See	  Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn,	  Radd	  al-­‐Muḥtār,	  487.	  
277	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī,	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  323.	  	  See	  also	  al-­‐Mullā	  ʿAlī	  al-­‐Qārī,	  Fatḥ	  Bāb	  al-­‐ʿInāya,	  
vol.	  2	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutu,	  2009),	  287.	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from	  bara’ah,	  and	  grammatically	  belongs	  to	  the	  chapter	  of	  mufāʿala,	  according	  to	  the	  
principles	  of	  Arabic	  grammar	  (al-­‐ṣarf).	  Any	  Arabic	  noun	  from	  the	  chapter	  of	  
mufāʿala	  denotes	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  two	  parties,	  and	  that	  is	  
why,	  when	  the	  financial	  release	  of	  the	  husband	  is	  being	  negotiated,	  both	  of	  the	  
spouses	  must	  be	  present	  when	  this	  occurs278.	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī	  makes	  no	  allusion	  to	  
the	  requirement	  of	  mutual	  consent	  of	  both	  parties	  in	  his	  definition	  of	  mubāraʾa.	  
However,	  this	  is,	  of	  course,	  implied,	  as	  both	  the	  husband	  and	  wife	  will	  have	  to	  agree	  
to	  any	  release	  of	  financial	  obligations	  on	  either	  side.	  	  
	  
Al-­‐ʿAynī	  differs	  slightly	  from	  al-­‐Marghīnānī	  regarding	  the	  application	  of	  mufāʿala	  in	  
the	  definition	  of	  mubāraʾa279.	  He	  states	  that	  this	  may	  refer	  to	  one	  party	  expressly	  
(the	  wife)	  and	  to	  the	  other	  impliedly	  (the	  husband),	  or	  to	  both	  expressly,	  but	  in	  
either	  case	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  release	  of	  the	  marital	  obligations	  owed	  by	  both	  parties	  to	  
each	  other280.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Ibn	  Ḥammām	  provides	  the	  opinion	  of	  Abū	  Yūsuf,	  
who	  states	  that	  mubāraʾa	  is	  derived	  from	  barāʾa	  min	  al-­‐jānibayn:	  the	  release	  of	  two	  
sides281.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  barāʾa	  or	  release	  is	  of	  jānibayn,	  or	  both	  sides,	  from	  their	  
financial	  obligations.	  Abū	  Yūsuf	  states	  that	  the	  barāʾa	  should	  be	  of	  both	  sides	  and	  
should	  involve	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  marital	  dress	  of	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  nikāḥ282.	  
Although	  the	  spouses	  terminate	  their	  mutual	  marital	  responsibilities,	  Imam	  al-­‐
Ṭaḥāwī	  agrees	  with	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  that	  this	  is	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  husband’s	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  Al-­‐Marghīnānī,	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  304.	  
279	  Al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  526.	  	  
280	  Ibid.	  




responsibility	  to	  pay	  al-­‐nafaqa,	  and	  not	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  liability	  for	  providing	  al-­‐
suknā	  during	  the	  period	  of	  ʿidda283.	  
	  
What	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  analysis	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  is	  that	  in	  both	  instances	  the	  
wife	  has	  the	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  from	  her	  husband.	  If	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  affected	  
through	  mutual	  consent,	  it	  will	  still	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  mubāraʾa	  under	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence	  unless	  both	  parties	  are	  present	  and	  the	  wife	  also	  agrees	  to	  release	  her	  
husband	  from	  his	  obligation	  to	  pay	  al-­‐nafaqa	  during	  the	  ʿidda.	  If	  the	  husband	  agrees	  
to	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  accepts	  some	  form	  of	  financial	  compensation,	  then	  this	  khulʿ	  will	  
also	  be	  known	  as	  a	  mubāraʾa.	  This	  is	  because	  he	  has	  been	  absolved	  of	  any	  financial	  
responsibility	  to	  pay	  any	  al-­‐mahr	  al-­‐muʿajjal,	  or	  deferred	  dower,	  to	  his	  wife.	  
However,	  if	  a	  husband	  agrees	  to	  the	  khulʿ	  (through	  mutual	  consent)	  but	  does	  not	  
require	  his	  wife	  to	  repay	  the	  mahr	  (meaning	  that	  his	  liability	  to	  pay	  her	  any	  deferred	  
mahr	  persists)	  and/or	  agrees	  to	  continue	  to	  support	  his	  wife	  during	  the	  ʿidda	  
period,	  the	  divorce	  will	  be	  termed	  a	  khulʿ.	  If	  the	  case	  is	  referred	  to	  the	  court	  and	  a	  
judge	  orders	  the	  divorce	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  wife,	  this	  too	  is	  termed	  a	  khulʿ,	  
irrespective	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  husband	  consents.	  It	  is	  the	  existence	  or	  absence	  
of	  the	  financial	  liability	  of	  the	  husband	  that	  is	  crucial	  in	  creating	  a	  distinction	  
between	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  divorce,	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  mutual	  consent	  of	  both	  
parties.	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  Imam	  al-­‐Ṭaḥāwī,	  al-­‐Yaneeb‘	  in	  Sharḥ	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr,	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām,	  209	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2.5	  Khulʿ	  and	  Compensation	  
The	  khulʿ	  has	  often	  been	  criticised	  as	  a	  process	  where	  a	  wife	  must	  ransom	  herself	  in	  
order	  to	  gain	  release	  from	  the	  marital	  bond284.	  In	  a	  society	  where	  a	  woman	  has	  a	  
weaker	  socioeconomic	  position	  than	  that	  of	  her	  male	  counterparts	  (as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
Pakistan),	  this	  can	  create	  an	  onerous	  financial	  liability	  upon	  her.	  If	  the	  wife	  is	  unable	  
to	  provide	  any	  financial	  recompense,	  this	  can	  leave	  her	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  a	  cruel	  and	  
malicious	  husband,	  who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  release	  her	  through	  a	  ṭalāq,	  or	  may	  make	  
her	  life	  so	  unbearable	  within	  the	  marriage	  that	  she	  is	  forced	  to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ	  at	  her	  
own	  legal	  expense.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  perception	  amongst	  many	  Muslims	  and	  
contemporary	  scholars	  that	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  conditional	  upon	  the	  wife’s	  
return	  of	  the	  mahr.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  in	  Pakistan,	  all	  the	  lawyers,	  judges	  and	  
lecturers	  in	  family	  law	  interviewed	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  this	  was	  the	  correct	  
position	  under	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh.	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  by	  the	  wife	  is	  an	  
indispensable	  element	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  that	  both	  Pakistani	  law	  and	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence	  endorse	  this	  fact.	  Although	  in	  many	  cases	  a	  judge	  may	  waive	  this	  right	  
in	  favour	  of	  the	  wife,	  this	  was	  merely	  viewed	  as	  judicial	  discretion	  and,	  it	  was	  
argued,	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  actual	  position	  under	  the	  Pakistani	  statutory	  provisions	  
or	  the	  Ḥanafī	  madhhab285.	  Moreover,	  the	  women	  interviewed	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  research	  also	  enunciated	  the	  same	  opinion.	  Even	  those	  women	  who	  had	  only	  a	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  Doreen	  Hinchcliffe,	  “Divorce	  in	  Pakistan:	  Judicial	  Reform”,	  Journal	  of	  Islamic	  and	  
Comparative	  Law,	  2	  (1968a),	  25;	  Taslima	  Monsoor,	  From	  Patriarchy	  to	  Gender	  
Equity.	  Family	  Law	  and	  its	  Impact	  on	  Women	  in	  Bangladesh	  (Dhaka:	  University	  Press	  
Ltd,	  1999),	  190.	  
285	  See	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  this	  thesis	  for	  examples	  of	  judicial	  dispensation	  of	  the	  
requirement	  to	  repay	  any	  mahr.	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very	  superficial	  knowledge	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  all	  stated	  that	  it	  is	  the	  right	  of	  a	  woman	  to	  
gain	  a	  divorce	  only	  if	  she	  is	  able	  to	  return	  the	  mahr.	  This	  opinion	  was	  reiterated	  by	  
family,	  friends	  and	  other	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  colleagues	  during	  informal	  
discussions,	  all	  of	  whom	  were	  of	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  equates	  to	  the	  
giving	  up	  of	  the	  mahr.	  	  
	  
However,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  primary	  sources	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  reveal	  that	  
the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  is	  not	  always	  considered	  a	  binding	  and	  conditional	  element	  
of	  the	  khulʿ.	  Rather,	  the	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  have	  taken	  a	  much	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  in	  
respect	  of	  this	  matter	  and	  with	  regard	  to	  what,	  if	  anything	  at	  all,	  needs	  to	  be	  
returned	  by	  the	  wife.	  The	  central	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  that	  deals	  with	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  
khulʿ	  is	  verse	  2:229	  where	  recompense	  in	  matters	  of	  divorce	  is	  mentioned	  twice	  in	  
this	  verse.	  (Author’s	  bold	  highlights).	  	  
	  
“Divorce	  is	  (revocable)	  two	  times	  (only).	  Then	  either	  retain	  (the	  wife)	  with	  honour	  (in	  
marital	  relationship)	  or	  release	  her	  with	  kindness.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  lawful	  for	  you	  to	  
take	  back	  anything	  of	  that	  which	  you	  have	  given	  them,	  unless	  both	  fear	  that	  (now	  
by	  maintaining	  marital	  ties)	  they	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  observe	  the	  limits	  set	  by	  Allah. So	  
if	  you	  fear	  that	  both	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  keep	  within	  Allah’s	  limits,	  then	  (in	  that	  case)	  
there	  shall	  be	  no	  sin	  upon	  either	  of	  them	  if	  the	  wife	  (herself)	  may	  give	  up	  
something	  as	  recompense	  to	  free	  herself	  (from	  this	  distressing	  bond).	  These	  are	  
the	  limits	  (set)	  by	  Allah.	  So,	  do	  not	  exceed	  them.	  And	  those	  who	  exceed	  the	  limits	  
prescribed	  by	  Allah,	  it	  is	  they	  who	  are	  the	  wrongdoers”.	  
	  
In	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  the	  addressee	  is	  the	  husband,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  
made	  unlawful	  for	  him	  to	  take	  anything	  back	  from	  his	  wife	  which	  he	  had	  previously	  
given	  to	  her.	  The	  exegetes	  have	  termed	  the	  ‘taking	  back’	  of	  something	  in	  the	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beginning	  of	  the	  verse	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr286.	  If,	  however,	  the	  
spouses	  cannot	  maintain	  the	  marital	  ties,	  then	  the	  procedure	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  exit	  the	  
marriage	  is	  given	  in	  the	  next	  part	  of	  the	  verse.	  This	  states	  that	  there	  is	  no	  sin	  if	  a	  
wife	  may	  (author’s	  italics)	  give	  some	  recompense	  to	  free	  herself	  from	  the	  marital	  
bond,	  but	  the	  passage	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  that	  exact	  amount	  should	  be.	  	  
	  
Zantout	  (2006)	  though	  takes	  a	  different	  approach.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  beginning	  of	  
this	  verse	  not	  only	  lays	  down	  the	  principle	  that	  some	  recompense	  must	  be	  given,	  but	  
also	  limits	  the	  recompense	  to	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  and	  no	  more	  during	  a	  khulʿ287.	  
The	  words	  min-­‐mā	  ātaytumūhunna	  (“that	  which	  you	  have	  given	  them”),	  which	  
precede	  the	  mention	  of	  the	  recompense	  given	  by	  the	  wife,	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  imply	  
that	  the	  compensation	  cannot	  exceed	  the	  value	  of	  the	  mahr,	  which	  would	  be	  more	  
“than	  which	  you	  have	  given	  them”,	  as	  the	  Qurʾān	  stipulates.	  However,	  a	  closer	  look	  
at	  this	  verse	  reveals	  that	  these	  words	  are	  in	  fact	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  procedure	  
outlined	  for	  the	  husband	  if	  he	  wishes	  to	  pronounce	  a	  ṭalāq,	  and	  not	  a	  khulʿ.	  The	  
Qurʾān	  firstly	  states	  that	  a	  “divorce	  is	  (revocable)	  two	  times	  (only)”,	  thus	  setting	  the	  
context	  for	  the	  verses	  that	  follow:	  “then	  either	  retain	  (the	  wife)	  with	  honour	  (in	  
marital	  relationship)	  or	  release	  her	  with	  kindness”.	  Here,	  reference	  is	  being	  made	  to	  
the	  husband’s	  right	  to	  ṭalāq,	  which	  is	  followed	  by	  placing	  a	  prohibition	  on	  the	  
husband’s	  taking	  back	  the	  mahr:	  “And	  it	  is	  not	  lawful	  for	  you	  to	  take	  back	  anything	  of	  
that	  which	  you	  have	  given	  them”.	  The	  husband	  is	  advised	  to	  treat	  his	  wife	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  li-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  582-­‐583;	  Ibn	  Kathīr,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Qurʾān	  al-­‐
Aẓīm,	  1:273	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Fikr,	  1980).	  
287	  Mida	  Zantout,	  “Khulʿ:	  Between	  Past	  and	  Present”,	  12-­‐13.	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honour,	  but	  if	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  do	  so	  then	  he	  is	  ordered	  to	  release	  her	  with	  kindness;	  
but	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  is	  determined	  as	  unlawful	  for	  him288.	  Thus,	  min-­‐mā	  
ātaytumūhunna	  is	  clearly	  directed	  at	  the	  husband	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ṭalāq,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  
	  
Only	  when	  the	  matter	  of	  ṭalāq	  has	  been	  clarified	  does	  the	  Qurʾān	  address	  the	  issue	  
of	  divorce	  at	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  wife:	  “So	  if	  you	  fear	  that	  both	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  keep	  
within	  Allah’s	  limits,	  then	  (in	  that	  case)	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  sin	  upon	  either	  of	  them	  if	  the	  
wife	  (herself)	  may	  give	  up	  something	  as	  recompense	  to	  free	  herself	  (from	  this	  
distressing	  bond)289”.	  The	  Qurʾān	  does	  not	  specify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  recompense;	  nor	  
does	  it	  place	  any	  minimum	  or	  maximum	  limit	  upon	  it.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  
Qurʾānic	  verse	  does	  not	  state	  that	  the	  giving	  of	  some	  recompense	  by	  the	  wife	  is	  
compulsory,	  but	  that	  there	  is	  no	  sin	  on	  her	  if	  she	  decides	  to	  give	  it	  and	  the	  husband	  
accepts	  it.	  The	  Arabic	  word	  junāḥ-­‐un	  is	  used	  to	  designate	  that	  the	  return	  of	  some	  
recompense	  is	  permissible,	  but	  is	  not	  a	  mandatory	  order.	  Qadri	  (1979)	  asserts	  that	  
junāḥ-­‐un	  (“there	  is	  no	  sin”)	  is	  used	  twenty-­‐four	  times	  within	  the	  Qurʾān	  in	  various	  
places,	  and	  each	  time	  it	  is	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  allowing	  an	  act,	  but	  never	  does	  it	  
constitute	  a	  direct	  ḥukm	  or	  commandment290.	  Verse	  2:198,	  for	  example,	  states:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  li-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  582-­‐583.	  
289	  Al-­‐	  Qurʾān:	  2:229	  
290	  Muhammad	  Tahir-­‐ul-­‐Qadri,	  Islamic	  Principles	  of	  Family	  Law	  (unpublished	  
manuscript	  with	  the	  author).	  Qadri	  (1979)	  provides	  24	  verses	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  where	  
the	  word	  junāḥ-­‐un	  has	  been	  used	  as	  pertaining	  to	  permissibility	  only	  2:198,	  2:229,	  
2:230,	  2:233,	  2:233,	  2:234,	  2:235,	  2:236,	  2:240,	  2:282,	  4:23,	  4:24,	  4:101,	  4:102,	  
4:128,	  5:93,24:29,	  24:58,	  24:60,	  24:61,	  33:5,	  33:51,	  33:55,	  33:60	  33:10.	  	  Qadri	  states	  
that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  ayah	  where	  junāḥ-­‐un	  is	  used	  as	  mandatory,	  which	  relates	  to	  




	  “And	  it	  is	  no	  sin	  on	  you	  if	  you	  (also)	  seek	  your	  Lord’s	  bounty	  (through	  trade	  during	  the	  
Hajj	  days)”.	  
	  
The	  word	  junāḥ-­‐un	  is	  used	  to	  indicate	  that	  pilgrims	  may	  if	  they	  wish	  engage	  in	  trade	  
during	  the	  hajj.	  This	  certainly	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  must	  engage	  in	  such	  trade,	  
merely	  that	  they	  are	  free	  to	  do	  so	  if	  they	  wish.	  Similarly,	  in	  verse	  2:	  30,	  the	  Qurʾān	  
states:	  	  
	  
“…But	  if	  he	  (the	  latter)	  also	  divorces	  her,	  in	  such	  a	  case	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  sin	  on	  both	  of	  
them	  (the	  former	  husband	  and	  the	  wife)	  if	  they	  return	  (once	  more	  to	  the	  wedlock)”.	  
	  
Again	  it	  is	  obvious	  from	  the	  context	  of	  the	  verse	  above	  that	  a	  divorced	  couple	  may	  
remarry,	  but	  not	  that	  they	  must	  marry.	  Through	  exegetical	  analogy	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  
with	  these	  and	  other	  verses	  highlighted,	  it	  cannot	  be	  said	  that	  there	  is	  a	  Qurʾānic	  
injunction	  that	  states	  that	  a	  khulʿ	  can	  only	  be	  effected	  through	  the	  return	  of	  the	  
mahr,	  as	  many	  believe.	  Instead,	  the	  Qurʾān	  is	  explicit	  in	  stating	  junāḥ-­‐un:	  that	  there	  
is	  no	  sin	  upon	  the	  wife,	  who	  may	  provide	  some	  recompense	  to	  release	  herself	  from	  
the	  marital	  bond,	  but	  not	  that	  she	  must	  do	  so,	  or	  that	  any	  such	  recompense	  must	  
constitute	  part	  of	  her	  mahr.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  prohibition	  upon	  the	  husband	  
in	  asking	  for	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  in	  the	  earlier	  part	  of	  the	  verse.	  Here	  the	  words	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
junāḥ	  as	  meaning	  wājib,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Shāfiʿī	  and	  Mālikī	  jurists,	  who	  state	  that	  
the	  qaṣr	  prayer	  is	  permissible.	  Abū	  Ḥanīfa	  argues	  that	  Allah	  has	  made	  the	  
shortening	  of	  prayer	  to	  ease	  the	  burden	  of	  ṣalāt	  on	  travellers,	  and	  as	  such,	  it	  is	  a	  
blessing	  that	  should	  be	  accepted	  as	  mandatory	  and	  not	  as	  permissible.	  The	  rationale	  
for	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  in	  this	  instance	  is	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  easiest	  option	  for	  a	  person	  
to	  comply	  with.	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used	  are	  ḥill-­‐un,	  meaning	  unlawful,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  direct	  commandment	  towards	  the	  
husband	  rather	  than	  a	  discretionary	  act,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  wife.	  
	  
Al-­‐Ṭabarī	  endorses	  this	  view	  in	  his	  commentary	  on	  the	  Qurʾān,	  and	  states	  that	  verse	  
2:229	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  wife	  must	  necessarily	  return	  the	  mahr	  if	  she	  requests	  a	  
khulʿ	  291.	  He	  states	  this	  is	  only	  required	  if	  it	  is	  proved	  that	  the	  nushūz	  is	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  wife,	  and	  quotes	  various	  ṣaḥāba	  and	  tābiʿīn	  to	  support	  his	  opinion292.	  Senior	  
ṣaḥāba293	  ʿAbd	  Allāh	  b.	  ʿAbbās	  mentions	  verse	  2:229,	  and	  in	  his	  opinion,	  if	  the	  wife	  
has	  misbehaved	  in	  the	  marriage,	  only	  then	  is	  it	  halal	  for	  the	  husband	  to	  request	  
some	  form	  of	  recompense	  to	  release	  her	  from	  the	  marriage294.	  According	  to	  ʿUrwa	  b.	  
al-­‐Zubayr,	  it	  is	  not	  lawful	  for	  a	  husband	  to	  receive	  any	  compensation	  unless	  it	  is	  
proven	  that	  the	  fasād	  (conflict)	  appears	  to	  have	  come	  from	  the	  wife’s	  side.	  ʿUrwa	  b.	  
al-­‐Zubayr	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  a	  wife	  who	  claims	  that	  she	  cannot	  fulfil	  her	  
husband’s	  sexual	  rights.	  In	  this	  instance,	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  the	  husband	  to	  receive	  
something	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  marital	  breakdown295.	  Similarly,	  Jabr	  b.	  Zayd	  is	  of	  the	  
opinion	  that	  if	  there	  is	  any	  sharh	  (mischief)	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  wife,	  then	  it	  is	  
permissible	  for	  the	  husband	  to	  ask	  for	  the	  mahr,	  but	  he	  too	  emphasises	  that	  this	  is	  
not	  a	  conditional	  element	  of	  the	  khulʿ296.	  In	  his	  explanation	  of	  verse	  2:229,	  al-­‐Rabīʿ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291	  Abū	  Jaʿfar	  Muhammad	  b.	  Jarīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī	  (Cairo:	  Dār	  Ibn	  al-­‐Jawzī,	  
2008),	  557.	  
292	  See	  also	  Ibn	  al-­‐Qaṭṭān	  al-­‐Fāsī,	  al-­‐Iqnāʿ	  fī	  Masāʾil	  al-­‐Ijmāʿ,	  93,	  who	  states	  that	  there	  
is	  ijmāʿ	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  the	  husband	  has	  committed	  ẓulm	  upon	  the	  wife,	  he	  has	  no	  
right	  to	  request	  the	  return	  of	  any	  compensation.	  
293	  The	  title	  given	  to	  the	  companions	  of	  the	  Prophet.	  
294	  Al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  557.	  
295	  Al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  557.	  
296	  Al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  558.	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states	  that	  if	  a	  wife	  is	  obedient	  to	  her	  husband	  and	  she	  behaves	  nicely	  towards	  him,	  
then	  the	  husband	  cannot	  force	  her	  to	  give	  him	  any	  compensation.	  Here	  it	  is	  clearly	  
implied	  that	  a	  husband	  cannot	  force	  a	  wife	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  
some	  recompense	  for	  the	  marital	  breakdown.	  Al-­‐Rabīʿ	  goes	  on	  to	  state	  that	  if	  the	  
husband	  has	  received	  anything	  from	  his	  wife	  (through	  such	  forceful	  separation),	  
then	  whatever	  he	  has	  received	  from	  her	  is	  ḥarām	  upon	  him.	  Only	  if	  is	  proven	  that	  
the	  nushūz	  or	  ẓulm	  is	  from	  the	  wife’s	  side	  is	  it	  permissible	  for	  the	  husband	  to	  get	  the	  
recompense297.	  Al-­‐Zuhrī	  is	  also	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  a	  husband	  cannot	  force	  his	  wife	  
to	  demand	  a	  khulʿ	  through	  coercion.	  He	  states	  that	  such	  an	  action	  is	  not	  jāʿiz	  
(permissible),	  and	  nor	  is	  the	  acceptance	  of	  any	  compensation	  in	  such	  an	  instance.	  A	  
wife	  is	  only	  liable	  to	  compensate	  her	  husband	  in	  any	  manner	  if	  it	  is	  proven	  that	  she	  
has	  acted	  in	  an	  inappropriate	  manner298.	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī	  also	  states	  that	  even	  though	  the	  
Qurʾānic	  verses	  4:19-­‐20299	  were	  revealed	  to	  relate	  to	  a	  husband’s	  right	  to	  a	  ṭalāq,	  
through	  exegetical	  analogy	  of	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verses,	  they	  also	  provide	  the	  basic	  
principles	  to	  be	  followed	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  matter	  of	  compensation	  in	  respect	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  Ibid.	  
298	  Al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  559.	  Ṭabarī	  also	  quotes	  ʿAmr	  b.	  Shuʿayb,	  Ṭāwūs	  and	  
ʿAlī	  b.	  Ṭālib,	  all	  of	  whom	  say	  that	  a	  husband	  can	  never	  receive	  more	  than	  the	  mahr	  as	  
compensation,	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  whilst	  Imam	  al-­‐Shaʿbī	  is	  quoted	  as	  saying	  
that	  he	  should	  always	  receive	  less	  than	  what	  he	  had	  given.	  Saʿīd	  b.	  al-­‐Musayyab	  
tābiʿī	  also	  does	  not	  approve	  of	  the	  husband	  receiving	  everything	  he	  gave	  his	  wife	  
and	  states	  that	  a	  husband	  should	  leave	  with	  his	  wife	  an	  amount	  of	  property	  that	  will	  
be	  sufficient	  for	  her	  livelihood	  (Al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  Tafsīr	  al-­‐Ṭabarī,	  574-­‐575).	  
299	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:19.	  “O	  believers!	  It	  is	  not	  lawful	  for	  you	  to	  become	  heirs	  to	  women	  
by	  force.	  And	  do	  not	  retain	  them	  by	  force	  in	  order	  to	  take	  (back)	  from	  them	  a	  
portion	  of	  what	  you	  gave	  them,	  unless	  they	  commit	  open	  indecency.	  And	  treat	  them	  
honourably.	  Then	  if	  you	  dislike	  them,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  you	  dislike	  a	  thing	  and	  Allah	  
places	  in	  it	  abundant	  good”	  Al-­‐Qurʾān,	  4:20.	  “And	  if	  you	  seek	  to	  take	  a	  wife	  in	  place	  
of	  another	  and	  you	  have	  (by	  now)	  given	  to	  her	  heaps	  of	  wealth,	  yet	  do	  not	  take	  back	  
any	  part	  of	  it.	  Do	  you	  want	  to	  take	  that	  wealth	  (back)	  by	  means	  of	  unjust	  accusation	  
and	  manifest	  sin?”	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of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  verse	  2:229300.	  Verses	  4:19-­‐20	  admonish	  husbands	  who	  wish	  to	  
remarry	  but	  forcibly	  retain	  their	  wives	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  wives	  may	  seek	  
separation	  themselves	  and	  thus	  relinquish	  their	  mahr.	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī	  argues	  that	  these	  
verses	  clearly	  state	  that	  a	  husband	  cannot	  cause	  harm	  to	  his	  wife	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  he	  
will	  gain	  back	  from	  his	  wife	  what	  he	  had	  already	  given	  (namely	  the	  mahr).	  Thus,	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  a	  khulʿ,	  if	  the	  nushūz	  or	  harm	  is	  from	  the	  husband,	  he	  has	  no	  right	  to	  ask	  
for	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr301.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  discussion	  above	  that	  the	  Qurʾān	  does	  not	  equate	  the	  return	  of	  
some	  recompense	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  of	  the	  grant	  of	  the	  khulʿ;	  rather,	  any	  such	  
compensation	  is	  something	  that	  is	  permissible,	  but	  not	  mandatory.	  Moreover,	  the	  
words	  of	  the	  hadith	  are	  also	  not	  specific	  regarding	  exactly	  what	  the	  recompense	  
should	  be,	  and	  certainly	  do	  not	  mention	  that	  it	  must	  necessarily	  constitute	  a	  return	  
of	  the	  mahr,	  as	  is	  commonly	  believed.	  In	  Bukhārī’s	  version	  of	  the	  hadith,	  the	  Prophet	  
asks	  Thābit’s	  wife	  to	  return	  the	  garden	  given	  to	  her	  by	  her	  husband,	  but	  does	  not	  
specify	  whether	  this	  was	  the	  mahr.	  Although	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  states	  that	  the	  garden	  in	  
this	  instance	  was	  the	  mahr	  that	  Thābit	  had	  given	  to	  his	  wife302,	  senior	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  
all	  adopt	  the	  view	  proffered	  by	  al-­‐Ṭabarī	  and	  al-­‐Qurṭubī	  above303.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  li-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  836.	  
301	  Al-­‐Qurṭubī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  li-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  497.	  
302	  Al-­‐Shaybānī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Aṣl,	  549.	  
303	  See	  al-­‐Zaylaʿī,	  Tabyīn	  al-­‐Ḥaqāʾiq,	  vol.	  7	  (Cairo:	  al-­‐Maṭbaʿ	  al-­‐Kubrā,	  1912),	  ʿAlāʾ	  al-­‐
Dīn	  al-­‐Ḥaskafī,	  Durr	  al-­‐Mukhtar	  fī	  sharḥ	  Tanwīr	  al-­‐Abṣār,	  in	  Ḥāshia	  Radd	  al-­‐Muḥtār,	  
Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn,	  vol.	  3	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Fikr,	  2005)	  489.	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Both	  al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  and	  al-­‐Marghīnānī	  adopt	  the	  same	  procedure	  as	  al-­‐Qurṭubī	  and	  use	  
verse	  4:20	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  to	  establish	  the	  basic	  principles	  governing	  the	  return	  of	  any	  
compensation	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  divorce:	  namely	  that	  if	  the	  nushūz	  is	  from	  the	  
husband,	  then	  his	  acceptance	  of	  compensation	  is	  makrūh	  (disapproved	  of)304.	  Al-­‐
Jaṣṣāṣ	  states	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  for	  a	  husband	  to	  force	  his	  wife	  to	  speak	  out,	  
particularly	  when	  the	  husband	  has	  no	  intention	  of	  keeping	  his	  wife	  but	  plans	  to	  
make	  her	  life	  so	  intolerable	  that	  she	  must	  opt	  for	  a	  divorce305.	  In	  such	  an	  event,	  it	  is	  
ḥarām	  for	  the	  husband	  to	  receive	  any	  compensation	  for	  the	  wife306.	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  also	  
considers	  it	  unlawful	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  wilfully	  give	  up	  a	  mahr	  if	  the	  nushūz	  is	  from	  the	  
husband.	  He	  argues	  that	  even	  though	  a	  wife	  may	  give	  up	  her	  claim	  to	  her	  dower	  
during	  the	  marriage,	  this	  will	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  respect	  to	  a	  khulʿ,	  as	  she	  will	  be	  
wilfully	  causing	  herself	  harm,	  which	  is	  not	  only	  morally	  unacceptable	  but	  also	  goes	  
against	  the	  other	  verses	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  text	  of	  the	  hadith307.	  Al-­‐ʿAynī	  also	  
alludes	  to	  verse	  4:20,	  and	  categorically	  states	  that	  if	  the	  nushūz	  is	  from	  the	  husband,	  
it	  is	  makrūh	  for	  him	  to	  receive	  any	  compensation	  from	  his	  wife,	  be	  it	  qalīl	  (a	  very	  
small	  amount)	  or	  kathīr	  (a	  very	  large	  amount308).	  Al-­‐ʿAynī	  reasons	  that	  a	  wife	  is	  
suffering	  double	  harm,	  analogous	  to	  what	  takes	  place	  in	  verses	  4:19-­‐20:	  the	  
emotional	  torture	  of	  her	  husband’s	  remarriage	  and	  then	  being	  penalised	  by	  having	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī,	  Al-­‐Hidāya,	  315;	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  392.	  
Interestingly,	  Charles	  Hamilton’s	  translation	  of	  The	  Hidāya	  clearly	  provides	  the	  
same	  in	  English	  but	  the	  Pakistani	  courts	  or	  lawyers	  have	  never	  mentioned	  this	  
particular	  ruling.	  	  
305	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  392.	  
306	  Ibid.,	  393.	  
307	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  refers	  to	  verse	  4:20	  and	  the	  text	  of	  the	  hadith	  provided	  in	  the	  Ṣaḥīḥ	  of	  
al-­‐Bukhārī.	  See	  al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  394.	  
308	  Al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  510.	  See	  also	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Ḥayy	  Lukhnawī,	  Sharḥ	  
al-­‐Wiqāya	  maʿ	  Ḥāshiya	  ʿUmda	  al-­‐Riʿāya,	  vol.	  3	  (Al-­‐Bāz	  al-­‐Makkah,	  2009),	  392.	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to	  provide	  recompense	  to	  her	  husband	  to	  release	  herself	  from	  such	  a	  marriage.	  The	  
behaviour	  is	  described	  as	  waḥshat	  –	  coercive	  –	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  husband.	  Thus,	  if	  a	  
husband	  has	  received	  any	  compensation	  under	  these	  circumstances,	  then	  he	  is	  
under	  a	  mandatory	  liability	  to	  return	  such	  recompense	  to	  his	  ex-­‐wife309.	  Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn	  
goes	  further,	  and	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  those	  scholars	  who	  label	  the	  act	  of	  receiving	  
unlawful	  compensation	  as	  al-­‐makrūh	  or	  al-­‐makrūh	  al-­‐taḥrīmī	  is	  in	  fact	  such	  a	  strong	  
a	  prohibition,	  “there	  should	  be	  no	  doubt	  about	  that	  fact310”.	  
	  
Al-­‐Sarakhsī	  states	  that	  if	  a	  husband	  is	  found	  to	  be	  at	  fault,	  then	  he	  forfeits	  his	  right	  to	  
request	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr,	  terming	  it	  al-­‐makrūh	  al-­‐taḥrīmī311.	  He	  too	  bases	  his	  
view	  on	  verse	  4:20.	  Interestingly,	  al-­‐Sarakhsī	  posits	  the	  example	  of	  a	  husband	  who	  
demands	  1000	  dirhams	  in	  return	  for	  declaring	  three	  ṭalāqs	  to	  a	  wife.	  If,	  on	  such	  an	  
occasion,	  a	  wife	  agrees	  to	  such	  a	  demand	  but	  her	  husband	  fails	  to	  pronounce	  the	  
three	  ṭalāqs	  and	  only	  gives	  one	  ṭalāq,	  the	  wife	  will	  only	  be	  liable	  to	  pay	  300	  dirhams	  
as	  compensation312.	  However,	  if	  the	  wife	  demands	  three	  ṭalāqs	  with	  an	  offer	  of	  1000	  
dirhams,	  a	  husband	  who	  only	  pronounces	  one	  ṭalāq	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  recoup	  any	  
amount	  of	  compensation	  due	  to	  his	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  agreement313.	  Here,	  
preferential	  treatment	  is	  given	  to	  the	  wife	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
agreement	  between	  the	  spouses.	  Al-­‐Sarakhsī	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  if	  the	  amount	  in	  
question	  is	  disputed,	  then	  the	  opinion	  of	  Abū	  Ḥanīfa	  is	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  lies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  Al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  510.	  	  
310	  Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn	  Radd	  al-­‐Muḥtār	  ʿalā	  Durr	  al-­‐Mukhtār,	  489.	  
311	  Al-­‐Sarakhsī,	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Mabsūṭ,	  215.	  	  
312	  Ibid.,	  213.	  
313	  Ibid.,	  214.	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with	  the	  husband	  to	  prove	  his	  claim.	  Since	  it	  is	  the	  wife	  who	  is	  required	  to	  pay,	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  any	  other	  witnesses	  the	  wife’s	  view	  will	  be	  accepted	  over	  that	  of	  the	  
husband314.	  Both	  al-­‐Kāsānī	  and	  al-­‐Qudūrī	  also	  regard	  any	  nushūz	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
husband	  as	  a	  coercive	  tactic	  to	  force	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  the	  wife,	  and	  thus	  labels	  it	  not	  
permissible315.	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  goes	  even	  further	  than	  his	  Ḥanafī	  counterparts	  and	  
states	  that	  if	  the	  nushūz	  is	  not	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  wife,	  then	  not	  only	  is	  it	  ḥarām	  for	  a	  
husband	  to	  receive	  any	  compensation	  from	  his	  wife,	  she	  cannot	  even	  voluntarily	  
give	  up	  the	  mahr	  through	  mutual	  consent,	  as	  this	  would	  cause	  her	  ḍarar	  (harm),	  
which	  he	  finds	  unacceptable316.	  
	  
These	  views	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  are	  extremely	  important,	  as	  they	  acknowledge	  the	  
fact	  that	  a	  wife	  should	  not	  be	  financially	  penalised	  if	  her	  husband	  is	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  
marital	  breakdown.	  As	  will	  be	  illustrated	  later	  in	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  fieldwork,	  
some	  women	  stated	  that	  they	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  due	  to	  their	  
liability	  to	  repay	  the	  mahr.	  Husbands	  were	  accused	  of	  deliberately	  inflating	  the	  
sums	  of	  the	  mahr	  and	  then	  making	  the	  lives	  of	  their	  wives	  intolerable	  so	  that	  they	  
were	  forced	  to	  leave	  the	  matrimonial	  home.	  However,	  rather	  than	  pronounce	  a	  
ṭalāq,	  husbands	  forced	  their	  wives	  to	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  returned	  the	  
inflated	  mahr.	  Although	  many	  recent	  Pakistani	  judges	  have	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  the	  
wife	  and	  absolved	  her	  of	  the	  need	  to	  pay	  any	  financial	  recompense	  to	  the	  husband	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  Ibid.	  
315	  Al-­‐Kāsānī,	  Badāʾiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣanāʾiʿ,	  329;	  Al-­‐Qudūrī,	  Mukhtaṣar	  al-­‐Qudūrī	  fī	  Fiqh	  Ḥanafī,	  
in	  al-­‐Lubāb	  fī	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Kitāb,	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Ghanī	  al-­‐Dimashqī	  al-­‐Maydānī	  al-­‐Ḥanafī	  
(Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kitāb	  al-­‐ʿArabī,	  2004),	  Part	  2,	  188.	  
316	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  194.	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due	  to	  his	  maltreatment,	  this	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  judicial	  activism	  by	  the	  judiciary	  
rather	  than	  the	  implementation	  of	  Muslim	  personal	  law317.	  The	  distinction	  is	  
important.	  If	  judges	  justify	  their	  actions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  rather	  
than	  their	  own	  personal	  judicial	  discretion,	  then	  the	  likelihood	  of	  other	  judges	  
following	  these	  precedents	  is	  much	  higher,	  as	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  arguing	  for	  
legislative	  changes	  in	  the	  law	  to	  penalise	  abusive	  husbands	  who	  force	  their	  wives	  to	  
apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Currently,	  Pakistani	  law	  requires	  a	  woman	  to	  return	  part	  of	  the	  
mahr,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  husband’s	  role	  in	  the	  marital	  dispute318.	  Even	  if	  it	  has	  been	  
established	  that	  the	  husband	  has	  been	  extremely	  violent	  and	  abusive	  towards	  his	  
wife,	  she	  is	  still	  liable	  to	  return	  part	  of	  the	  mahr	  to	  her	  husband.	  Unfortunately,	  
despite	  the	  clear	  views	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  above,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  dominant	  
perception	  amongst	  scholars,	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  that	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  is	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  that	  any	  relaxation	  of	  this	  
stipulation	  is	  merely	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  rule.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  there	  is	  no	  liability	  upon	  the	  wife	  to	  return	  any	  
compensation	  to	  her	  husband	  if	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  nushūz,	  if	  the	  wife	  is	  
responsible	  for	  the	  nushūz,	  the	  fuqahāʾ	  are	  unanimous	  that	  she	  must	  provide	  some	  
form	  of	  compensation	  to	  her	  husband	  upon	  her	  request	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  This	  can	  be	  
mutually	  agreed	  between	  the	  two	  spouses,	  or,	  in	  case	  of	  dispute,	  the	  matter	  can	  be	  
referred	  to	  a	  qāḍī,	  or	  to	  the	  court.	  There	  is,	  however,	  some	  disagreement	  amongst	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  See	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
318	  S.	  10	  (5)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  Prior	  to	  February	  




the	  jurists	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  husband	  can	  demand	  more	  than	  the	  mahr	  as	  
compensation	  for	  the	  khulʿ.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  the	  version	  proffered	  by	  al-­‐
Shaybānī	  relates	  to	  the	  situation	  where	  Thābit’s	  wife	  is	  willing	  to	  return	  more	  than	  
the	  garden	  but	  is	  refused	  by	  the	  Prophet.	  Al-­‐Shaybānī	  notes	  that	  the	  Prophet	  
disliked	  the	  return	  of	  more	  than	  the	  mahr	  as	  compensation	  for	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  did	  not	  
find	  this	  morally	  acceptable319.	  Al-­‐Shaybānī,	  however,	  argues	  that	  this	  reading	  is	  
only	  acceptable	  if	  it	  is	  proven	  that	  a	  wife	  has	  been	  nushūz:	  disobedient	  to	  her	  
husband.	  In	  this	  instance,	  ṭāba	  al-­‐faḍl	  liʾl-­‐zawj:	  “the	  husband	  may	  enjoy	  the	  
excess”320.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  this	  viewpoint	  is	  that	  the	  nikāḥ	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  
contractual	  agreement	  between	  the	  husband	  and	  wife.	  When	  entering	  the	  
agreement,	  just	  as	  a	  wife	  can	  request	  any	  amount	  of	  mahr	  from	  her	  husband	  as	  
compensation	  for	  entering	  into	  the	  marital	  contract,	  even	  it	  if	  is	  more	  than	  mahr	  al-­‐
mithl321,	  so,	  when	  she	  is	  breaking	  the	  marital	  covenant	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  own	  
wrongdoing,	  she	  can	  offer	  more	  compensation	  to	  her	  husband	  in	  return	  for	  this	  
breach.	  This	  is	  considered	  her	  own	  free	  choice	  in	  agreeing	  to	  give	  more	  than	  the	  
mahr.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute,	  she	  is	  entitled	  to	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  the	  court.	  Al-­‐
Shaybānī	  also	  qualifies	  his	  statement	  by	  stating	  that	  if	  it	  is	  found	  that	  the	  husband	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319	  Muhammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣaghīr,	  216.	  
320	  Ibid.	  
321	  A	  mahr	  al-­‐mithl	  refers	  to	  the	  dower	  which	  is	  given	  to	  the	  women	  who	  are	  related	  
to	  the	  wife’s	  father:	  for	  example,	  his	  aunts,	  sisters	  and	  cousins	  on	  the	  uncle’s	  side.	  To	  
give	  a	  proper	  dower	  to	  a	  female,	  her	  age,	  beauty,	  knowledge,	  intellect	  and	  character	  
will	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  lineage	  and	  property	  of	  her	  husband.	  	  
See	  Al-­‐Kāsānī,	  Badāʾiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣanāʾiʿ,	  2:287.	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nushūz	  and	  initiates	  the	  argument,	  then	  he	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  demand	  more	  than	  the	  
mahr322.	  	  
However,	  in	  his	  commentary	  on	  the	  Hidāya,	  Al-­‐ʿAynī	  states	  that	  al-­‐Marghīnānī	  
rejected	  al-­‐Shaybānī’s	  opinion,	  stating	  that	  this	  is	  not	  “part	  of	  our	  (Ḥanafī)	  view”323.	  
Even	  if	  it	  is	  proven	  that	  a	  wife	  is	  nushūz,	  taking	  more	  than	  the	  original	  mahr	  as	  
compensation	  is	  disapproved	  of,	  and	  he	  quotes	  the	  Prophet’s	  refusal	  of	  Thābit’s	  
wife’s	  offer	  to	  provide	  more	  than	  the	  garden.	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	  offers	  his	  view	  from	  the	  
opinions	  of	  Abū	  Ḥanīfa,	  Zufar	  and	  Abū	  Yūsuf,	  who	  clearly	  state	  that	  if	  the	  dispute	  
comes	  from	  the	  wife’s	  side	  then	  it	  is	  only	  permissible	  for	  a	  husband	  to	  request	  what	  
he	  had	  given	  to	  her	  (as	  the	  mahr)	  and	  nothing	  more324.	  Al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ,	  al-­‐Kāsānī,	  al-­‐
Qudūrī	  and	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  also	  regard	  the	  return	  of	  more	  than	  the	  mahr,	  in	  any	  
circumstance,	  to	  be	  morally	  reprehensible,	  and	  legally	  term	  it	  al-­‐makrūh	  
(abhorrent)325.	  Although	  al-­‐Kāsānī	  accepts	  that	  a	  wife	  can	  voluntarily	  offer	  more	  if	  
she	  so	  wishes,	  he	  believes	  that	  this	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  the	  wife	  harm,	  and	  is	  
thus	  an	  objectionable	  act326.	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  quotes	  a	  student	  of	  ʿAbd	  Allāh	  b.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322	  Muhammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣaghīr,	  216.	  
323	  Al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  301.	  
324	  Al-­‐Qudūrī,	  al-­‐Mukhtaṣar,	  392.	  
325	  Al-­‐Qudūrī,	  al-­‐Mukhtaṣar,	  188;	  al-­‐Kāsānī,	  Badāʾiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣanāʾiʿ,	  329;	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  
al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  194.	  See	  also	  ʿAllāma	  Abd-­‐ul-­‐Hayy	  
Lakhnawī,	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Wiqāya	  maʿ	  Ḥāshiya	  ʿUmda	  ʾal-­‐Riʿāya,	  vol.	  3	  (Al-­‐Bāz	  al-­‐Makkah,	  
2009),	  392,	  Al-­‐Jassās,	  Ahkām-­‐ul-­‐Qur’ān,	  394	  
326	  Al-­‐Kāsānī,	  Badāʾiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣanāʾiʿ,	  328.	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ʿAbbās,	  ʿAṭāʾ,	  who	  reports	  that	  the	  Prophet	  himself	  states	  that	  a	  husband	  cannot	  
receive	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  that	  he	  originally	  gave	  to	  his	  wife327.	  
Ḥanafī	  jurists	  are	  also	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  a	  wife	  is	  under	  no	  liability	  to	  recompense	  
her	  husband	  if	  she	  made	  no	  indication	  that	  she	  would	  financially	  compensate	  him	  
when	  she	  originally	  requested	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  he	  agreed	  to	  that	  request328.	  If,	  for	  
instance,	  a	  wife	  requests	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  her	  husband	  and	  states	  that	  it	  will	  be	  in	  
exchange	  for	  what	  she	  holds	  in	  her	  (empty)	  hand,	  then	  she	  will	  be	  able	  to	  have	  the	  
khulʿ	  without	  compensating	  her	  husband329.	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī	  states	  that	  if	  the	  wife’s	  
hand	  is	  empty,	  then	  she	  has	  not	  alluded	  to	  any	  māl330	  in	  return	  for	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  will	  
not	  be	  liable	  to	  return	  any	  māl	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  khulʿ331.	  Al-­‐Shaybānī	  
also	  states	  that	  no	  recompense	  is	  required	  of	  the	  wife	  if	  the	  badal332	  demanded	  by	  
the	  husband	  is	  not	  permissible	  in	  Islam333.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  Ibn	  al-­‐Hammām	  al-­‐Ḥanafī,	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Qadīr	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  194.	  This	  hadith	  is	  
reported	  by	  al-­‐Dāraquṭnī	  and	  al-­‐Bayhaqī.	  See	  also	  Ibn	  al-­‐Qaṭṭān	  al-­‐Fāsī,	  al-­‐Iqnāʿ	  fī	  
Masāʾil	  al-­‐Ijmāʿ,	  92,	  who	  states	  that	  there	  is	  ijmāʿ	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  husband	  can	  
request	  an	  equal	  or	  lesser	  amount	  of	  the	  dowry	  as	  compensation,	  but	  not	  more	  than	  
he	  has	  given.	  
328	  See	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  518.	  
329	  Ibid.	  
330	  Any	  monetary	  good	  or	  chattel	  of	  some	  value.	  
331	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī,	  al-­‐Hidāya,	  318.	  
332	  The	  return	  of	  some	  recompense.	  
333	  Muhammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  al-­‐Ṣaghīr,	  218.	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  give	  
examples	  of	  such	  items	  as	  alcohol	  and	  pork.	  See	  also	  al-­‐ʿAynī,	  al-­‐Bināya	  sharḥ	  al-­‐






This	  chapter	  has	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  regarding	  
the	  khulʿ	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  dispel	  the	  perception	  that	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  has	  a	  very	  limited	  
scope	  for	  women	  wishing	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce.	  It	  has	  been	  found	  that	  the	  question	  of	  
the	  husband’s	  consent	  is	  irrelevant	  if	  a	  woman	  wishes	  to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ.	  If	  her	  husband	  
agrees	  to	  her	  demand,	  the	  khulʿ	  will	  be	  an	  extra-­‐judicial	  divorce,	  with	  the	  husband	  
pronouncing	  a	  ṭalāq,	  and	  will	  be	  a	  considered	  a	  ṭalāq	  bāʾin334	  in	  its	  effect.	  However,	  
if	  he	  refuses	  her	  request,	  the	  wife	  has	  a	  right	  to	  seek	  redress	  from	  the	  court,	  and	  in	  
doing	  so	  need	  not	  prove	  any	  particular	  ground	  for	  divorce	  under	  khulʿ,	  but	  merely	  
that	  she	  no	  longer	  wishes	  to	  live	  with	  her	  husband.	  Moreover,	  in	  respect	  of	  
compensation,	  this	  is	  also	  not	  a	  compulsory	  element	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  but	  is	  dependent	  
upon	  who	  is	  at	  fault	  within	  the	  marital	  breakdown.	  If	  the	  wife	  is	  proven	  to	  be	  at	  
fault,	  then	  the	  husband	  has	  the	  right	  to	  receive	  some	  recompense	  from	  his	  wife,	  but	  
this	  must	  not	  be	  more	  than	  any	  mahr	  that	  he	  has	  given	  to	  her	  upon	  the	  contract	  of	  
the	  marriage.	  However,	  if	  the	  fault	  lies	  with	  the	  husband	  or	  if	  he	  has	  coerced	  his	  wife	  
to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ	  through	  misbehaviour,	  then	  the	  wife	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  repay	  any	  
compensation	  to	  her	  husband	  in	  return	  for	  the	  divorce.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  disputes	  
regarding	  any	  of	  these	  issues,	  both	  the	  husband	  and	  the	  wife	  have	  the	  right	  to	  go	  to	  
a	  court	  and	  have	  the	  matter	  resolved	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  highlighted	  above.	  
During	  the	  negotiations	  of	  divorce,	  if	  both	  spouses	  agree	  to	  release	  the	  husband	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334	  This	  is	  known	  as	  an	  irrevocable	  divorce.	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from	  his	  financial	  liabilities	  to	  support	  his	  wife,	  or	  to	  the	  return	  of	  any	  deferred	  
dower,	  then	  the	  divorce	  will	  be	  known	  as	  a	  mubāraʾa	  rather	  than	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  
	  
The	  importance	  of	  having	  an	  accurate	  depiction	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  regarding	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  cannot	  be	  underestimated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistani	  
society.	  If	  these	  principles	  had	  been	  allowed	  to	  flourish	  and	  develop	  in	  
contemporary	  times,	  then	  women	  would	  not	  have	  had	  to	  face	  the	  difficulties	  that	  
they	  did	  prior	  to	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  1939	  
and	  the	  Muslim	  Family	  Laws	  Ordinance	  1960335.	  Although	  these	  laws	  provided	  
some	  statutory	  relief,	  women	  faced	  difficult	  evidentiary	  hurdles	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  
their	  cases	  either	  under	  the	  statutory	  provisions	  or	  under	  the	  khulʿ.	  Despite	  further	  
reforms	  in	  2002,	  the	  continued	  patriarchal	  nature	  of	  some	  court	  proceedings	  and	  
the	  indignity	  of	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  continue	  to	  be	  massive	  deterrents	  to	  
women	  seeking	  escape	  from	  abusive	  marriages336.	  Unfortunately,	  calls	  for	  further	  
law	  reform	  in	  this	  area	  have	  been	  met	  with	  resistance	  from	  religious	  parties	  as	  well	  
as	  from	  members	  of	  civil	  society,	  primarily	  because	  they	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  correct	  
Ḥanafī	  stand	  on	  the	  matter.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  earlier	  attempts	  by	  the	  
Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology	  of	  Pakistan	  to	  assist	  women	  further	  in	  female-­‐initiated	  
divorce	  rights.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology	  was	  established	  in	  1962	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  examining	  
Pakistani	  laws	  and	  ensuring	  that	  they	  are	  not	  repugnant	  to	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	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  See	  Chapter	  Three.	  
336	  See	  results	  of	  field	  work	  in	  Chapter	  Seven.	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and	  Sunna337.	  The	  Council	  has	  constitutional	  protection	  under	  Article	  230	  and	  
reports	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Religious	  Affairs,	  which	  may	  submit	  its	  proposals	  to	  the	  
National	  Assembly.	  	  In	  2008	  the	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology	  took	  up	  a	  review	  of	  the	  
Muslim	  Family	  Laws	  Ordinance	  1961	  and	  provided	  its	  recommendations	  to	  Asif	  Ali	  
Zardari’s	  government	  on	  15th	  November	  2008338.	  Although	  it	  provided	  
recommendations	  on	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  law,	  controversy	  surrounded	  its	  request	  
to	  amend	  S.	  7	  of	  the	  MFLO	  to	  formally	  allow	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  without	  
recourse	  to	  the	  courts.	  The	  Council	  recommended	  that	  S.7	  be	  amended	  to	  include	  
the	  provision	  that	  if	  a	  woman	  demands,	  in	  writing,	  dissolution	  of	  her	  marriage,	  her	  
husband	  must	  divorce	  his	  wife	  within	  ninety	  days	  of	  the	  request.	  Failure	  of	  the	  
husband	  to	  do	  so	  will	  bring	  into	  effect	  the	  khulʿ	  after	  the	  ninety-­‐day	  expiration.	  The	  
husband	  will	  have	  no	  right	  to	  the	  return	  of	  his	  wife	  unless	  she	  withdraws	  her	  
request339.	  The	  Council	  also	  recommended	  that	  a	  wife	  would	  not	  be	  automatically	  
liable	  to	  repay	  her	  dower,	  and	  would	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	  courts	  to	  settle	  the	  return	  
of	  any	  property	  or	  gifts	  to	  her	  husband	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dispute340.	  Masud	  (2012)	  
argues	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Council	  was	  to	  review	  the	  laws	  with	  respect	  to	  
gender	  equality	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna341.	  	  If	  these	  
recommendations	  had	  been	  implemented,	  then	  wives	  would	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  have	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  Martin	  Lau,	  The	  Role	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Legal	  System	  of	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  (Leiden:	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Brill,	  2006),	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  Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology,	  Annual	  Report,	  2008-­‐9	  (Islamabad:	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  
Ideology,	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  Ibid.	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  Muhammad	  Khalid	  Masud,	  “Interpreting	  Divorce	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recourse	  to	  the	  courts	  in	  order	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce,	  and	  would	  be	  almost	  on	  a	  par	  
with	  their	  husbands	  regarding	  divorce	  rights.	  Predictably,	  these	  recommendations	  
were	  met	  with	  uproar	  from	  both	  members	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  and	  religious	  parties	  
and	  organisations.	  They	  deemed	  the	  Council’s	  proposals	  as	  being	  outside	  the	  tenets	  
of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  Sunna,	  since	  they	  believed	  that	  only	  a	  man	  has	  the	  right	  to	  
unilaterally	  divorce	  his	  wife342.	  Others	  called	  for	  the	  Council	  to	  be	  dissolved	  and	  
reconstituted343.	  Masud	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Council’s	  
recommendations	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  religious	  parties,	  civil	  society	  and	  
lawyers	  to	  recognise	  the	  difference	  between	  fiqh	  and	  Shariah344.	  Shariah	  is	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  divine	  laws	  revealed	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  hadith,	  whilst	  
fiqh	  are	  the	  legal	  principles	  and	  doctrines	  established	  from	  the	  Shariah	  by	  the	  four	  
main	  schools	  of	  thought.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  belief	  that	  both	  are	  divinely	  revealed	  
and	  immutable,	  as	  the	  origins	  of	  fiqh	  doctrines	  are	  based	  on	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  
Sunna,	  and	  thus	  one	  of	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  thought	  must	  be	  adhered	  to	  through	  the	  
process	  of	  taqlīd.	  Masud	  (2012)	  states	  that	  these	  perceptions	  fail	  to	  take	  into	  
account	  that	  the	  doctrines	  developed	  by	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  thought	  were	  created	  in	  
a	  particular	  social	  and	  cultural	  context,	  and	  that	  therefore	  complete	  adherence	  is	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  accessed	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344	  Masud,	  “Interpreting	  Divorce	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan”,	  47.	  
	  
101	  
not	  necessary,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  tradition	  of	  diversity	  in	  juristic	  interpretations	  in	  the	  
schools	  of	  law345.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  this	  may	  be	  true,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  this	  is	  the	  culture	  and	  understanding	  
of	  civil	  and	  religious	  society	  in	  Pakistan,	  which	  has	  been	  entrenched	  for	  hundreds	  of	  
years.	  Unless	  calls	  for	  reform,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  rights,	  are	  
addressed	  within	  the	  principles	  and	  doctrines	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Ḥanafī	  fuqahāʿ,	  
proposals	  for	  reform	  are	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  be	  accepted	  in	  the	  current	  Pakistani	  
diaspora.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  a	  lost	  opportunity	  by	  the	  Council	  in	  failing	  to	  apply	  
classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  to	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights	  and	  defend	  their	  
proposals	  for	  reform	  by	  applying	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  classical	  jurists	  highlighted	  in	  
this	  chapter.	  Rather	  than	  dispel	  the	  misconception	  that	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  is	  a	  narrow	  and	  
conservative	  madhhab	  with	  respect	  to	  female	  divorce	  rights,	  the	  Council	  
perpetuated	  this	  belief	  by	  citing	  the	  sacred	  texts	  directly,	  with	  a	  total	  disregard	  for	  
the	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  that	  exists,	  and	  which	  promotes	  rather	  that	  
curtails	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  within	  the	  divorce	  arena.	  If	  the	  Council	  had	  used	  a	  more	  
nuanced	  approach	  to	  their	  arguments,	  and	  created	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  defence	  of	  the	  
likely	  and	  obvious	  attacks	  by	  the	  religious	  right	  in	  Pakistan,	  the	  report	  might	  not	  
have	  received	  the	  negative	  response	  that	  it	  did,	  which	  led	  to	  its	  proposals	  being	  
shelved	  for	  another	  few	  decades.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  when	  
proposals	  for	  law	  reform	  are	  made	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  Islam,	  
adherence	  to	  the	  classical	  modes	  of	  juristic	  reasoning,	  be	  it	  within	  one	  school	  of	  




thought	  or	  through	  the	  process	  of	  takhayyur,	  means	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
acceptance	  and	  thus	  enforcement	  is	  much	  higher.	  This	  particular	  episode	  regarding	  
the	  failure	  to	  reform	  the	  laws	  of	  khulʿ	  in	  Pakistan	  clearly	  illustrates	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
new	  approach	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  in	  the	  area	  of	  female-­‐
initiated	  divorce	  rights.	  As	  will	  be	  illustrated	  later,	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  and	  then	  in	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  field	  study,	  although	  the	  Pakistani	  judiciary	  has	  now	  developed	  a	  fault-­‐
free	  khulʿ	  principle,	  women	  still	  face	  numerous	  obstacles	  when	  going	  to	  court	  in	  
order	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  implement	  ancillary	  matters	  of	  post-­‐divorce	  
maintenance	  and	  child	  support	  claims;	  whilst	  conservative	  religious	  leaders	  
continue	  their	  attacks	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  current	  law	  of	  khulʿ.	  If,	  however,	  the	  
recommendations	  posited	  by	  the	  Council	  had	  been	  implemented,	  many	  women	  
would	  have	  gained	  release	  from	  unhappy	  and	  violent	  marriages	  in	  a	  much	  more	  




THE	  DEVELOPMENT	  OF	  WOMEN’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  DIVORCE	  IN	  
PAKISTAN:	  A	  HISTORICAL	  AND	  THEOLOGICAL	  EXAMINATION	  
	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  is	  the	  school	  of	  thought	  practiced	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  Muslims	  
in	  India	  and	  Pakistan.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  illustrated	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  became	  a	  
defunct	  legal	  remedy	  under	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  both	  British	  colonial	  
judges	  and	  the	  ʿulamāʾ.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  statutory	  female	  divorce	  rights,	  and	  with	  a	  
defunct	  khulʿ	  remedy,	  women	  had	  no	  means	  to	  initiate	  divorces	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pak	  
subcontinent.	  In	  1939,	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  (DMMA)	  was	  
therefore	  passed	  by	  the	  colonial	  Indian	  legislature,	  giving	  Muslim	  women	  the	  
statutory	  right	  to	  sue	  for	  divorce	  before	  Indian	  courts346,	  and	  is	  still	  applicable	  in	  
Pakistan,	  India	  and	  Bangladesh347.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  colonial	  India,	  this	  was	  a	  
progressive	  piece	  of	  legislation,	  as	  Hindu	  women	  would	  only	  receive	  a	  similar	  right	  
twenty	  years	  later	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Marriage	  Act	  1955348,	  and	  British	  
women,	  although	  they	  had	  been	  given	  the	  right	  to	  divorce	  some	  years	  earlier,	  had	  
less	  chance	  to	  sue,	  having	  to	  prove	  that	  they	  had	  two	  grounds	  in	  order	  to	  file	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  Section	  2,	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  1939,	  hereafter	  called	  DMMA.	  	  	  
347	  M.	  Mannan,	  “The	  Development	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Law	  of	  Divorce	  in	  Pakistan,”	  Journal	  
of	  Islamic	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  5	  (1974):	  91.	  
348	  Law	  Commission	  of	  India	  Seventy-­‐First	  Report	  on	  the	  Hindu	  Marriage	  Act	  1955	  




divorce	  suit	  in	  a	  British	  court349.	  Through	  mapping	  the	  history	  of	  the	  DMMA,	  this	  
chapter	  will	  focus	  not	  just	  on	  the	  law	  itself	  and	  how	  it	  came	  to	  pass,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  
theological	  questions	  that	  were	  raised	  during	  its	  passing.	  What	  was	  the	  impetus	  for	  
reform,	  how	  did	  it	  pass,	  and	  what	  strategies	  were	  adopted	  to	  implement	  these	  new	  
laws?	  Such	  an	  investigation	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  can	  provide	  much-­‐needed	  insights	  
that	  can	  promote	  methodologies	  for	  law	  reform	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  present-­‐day	  Pakistan.	  
These	  questions	  are	  also	  interlinked	  with	  the	  British	  colonial	  impact	  on	  Muslim	  law,	  
which	  created	  a	  fixed	  and	  static	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  Muslims.	  Codification	  
of	  Islamic	  law	  indirectly	  exacerbated	  tensions	  between	  those	  who	  saw	  the	  law	  as	  
immutable,	  and	  thus	  were	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  ‘gates	  of	  ijtihād	  had	  closed’,	  and	  those	  
who	  argued	  that	  the	  law	  was	  changeable	  and	  malleable	  according	  to	  modern	  needs.	  
The	  controversy	  surrounding	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  in	  Islam	  exacerbated	  these	  
tensions	  over	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  solve	  this	  problem,	  which	  are	  still	  prevalent	  today.	  	  	  
	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  locating	  the	  DMMA	  within	  the	  larger	  
history	  of	  colonial	  India,	  and	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  British	  colonial	  impact	  on	  
Muslim	  personal	  law.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  then	  trace	  the	  impetus	  for	  reform	  and	  the	  
passing	  of	  the	  DMMA.	  It	  will	  look	  at	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ,	  particularly	  Maulana	  
Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi,	  in	  providing	  the	  theological	  basis	  for	  the	  legislation,	  as	  well	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349	  Under	  the	  1857	  Matrimonial	  Causes	  Act,	  husbands	  were	  only	  required	  to	  prove	  
the	  single	  ground	  of	  adultery,	  while	  wives	  had	  to	  prove	  an	  additional	  factor	  of	  
desertion,	  cruelty,	  incest,	  bigamy	  or	  practising	  an	  ‘unnatural	  vice’.	  	  This	  dual	  
standard	  was	  abolished	  under	  the	  1923	  Matrimonial	  Causes	  Act,	  with	  further	  
grounds	  for	  divorce	  introduced	  in	  1937	  which	  added	  cruelty,	  desertion	  and	  
incurable	  insanity	  as	  additional	  grounds	  for	  divorce.	  	  See	  Ann	  Sumner	  Holmes,	  “The	  
Double	  Standard	  in	  the	  English	  Divorce	  Laws,	  1857-­‐1923,”	  Law	  &	  Social	  Inquiry	  	  
20	  (2)	  (1995):	  601.	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the	  fragile	  coalition	  that	  was	  created	  to	  ensure	  its	  passing.	  Thirdly,	  the	  chapter	  will	  
move	  forward	  to	  the	  post-­‐partition	  era	  and	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Family	  Law	  
Ordinance	  1961	  (MFLO)	  in	  Pakistan,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  last	  major	  piece	  of	  
legislation	  regulating	  marriage	  and	  divorce.	  
	  
3.2	  British	  Colonial	  Impact	  on	  Muslim	  Law	  
The	  British	  occupation	  of	  India350	  had	  profound	  effects	  upon	  the	  development	  of	  
what	  is	  now	  termed	  ‘Anglo-­‐Muhammadan	  Law’351,	  perpetuating	  the	  idea	  that	  Islam	  
could	  be	  narrowed	  down	  to	  a	  few	  authoritative	  texts	  that	  are	  fixed	  and	  immutable.	  
The	  British	  assumed	  that	  Islamic	  law	  could	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  set	  of	  concrete	  rules	  and	  
codes	  to	  be	  applied	  irrespective	  of	  the	  social	  conditions	  in	  which	  these	  texts	  had	  
been	  written,	  or	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  were	  now	  being	  
applied.	  Previously,	  qāḍīs	  had	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  Islamic	  law	  through	  the	  
scriptures,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  using	  ijtihād	  when	  taking	  into	  account	  local	  customs352.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350	  The	  British	  occupation	  of	  India	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  East	  India	  Company,	  which	  
was	  formed	  in	  1600	  to	  pursue	  trade	  with	  the	  East	  Indies	  but	  concentrated	  on	  
trading	  in	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent.	  	  	  Through	  economic	  expansion	  and	  its	  own	  
private	  armies,	  it	  began	  to	  rule	  large	  areas	  of	  India,	  securing	  control	  in	  1757	  after	  
the	  Battle	  of	  Plassey.	  	  The	  company	  was	  later	  nationalised	  through	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  
Government	  of	  India	  Act	  1858,	  with	  the	  British	  Crown	  assuming	  direct	  control	  of	  
India.	  	  See	  John	  F.	  Riddick,	  The	  History	  of	  British	  India:	  A	  Chronology	  (Westport:	  
Praeger	  Publishers,	  2006).	  
351	  Scott	  Kugle	  defines	  this	  term	  as	  “both	  the	  Orientalized	  limitation	  imposed	  on	  
Islamic	  Law,	  and	  its	  gradual	  buttressing	  by	  Anglo	  legal	  concepts”.	  	  See	  Scott	  Alan	  
Kugle,	  “Framed,	  Blamed	  and	  Renamed:	  The	  Recasting	  of	  Islamic	  Jurisprudence	  in	  
Colonial	  South	  Asia,”	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies	  35,	  no.	  2	  (2001):	  266.	  
352	  Muhammad	  Khalid	  Masud,	  “Qadis	  and	  their	  Courts:	  A	  Historical	  Survey,”	  in	  
Dispensing	  Justice	  in	  Islam	  Qadis	  and	  Their	  Judgments	  ed.	  Khalid	  Masud	  et	  al.	  (Leiden:	  
Brill,	  2003),	  13-­‐4.	  	  See	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  qāḍīs	  in	  Francis	  Robinson,	  “Crisis	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These	  judges	  –	  heirs	  to	  the	  mujtahids	  (accepted	  authorities	  on	  Islam)	  of	  previous	  
centuries	  –	  came	  from	  diverse	  Muslim	  communities,	  and	  thus	  their	  application	  of	  
Islamic	  law	  was	  relatively	  fluid	  and	  varied.	  Qāḍīs	  and	  Muslim	  judges	  used	  a	  
combination	  of	  textual	  sources	  (the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna),	  prior	  decisions	  (known	  
as	  ijmāʿ	  if	  there	  was	  scholarly	  consensus),	  reasoning	  based	  upon	  analogy	  (qiyās),	  
and	  their	  own	  independent	  reasoning353	  when	  applying	  Islamic	  law.	  This	  led	  to	  
diversity	  in	  application,	  reflecting	  the	  needs	  and	  challenges	  of	  a	  complex	  society,	  
which	  was	  not	  a	  homogeneous	  entity	  composed	  entirely	  of	  Muslims	  but	  a	  mix	  of	  
different	  cultures	  and	  communities.	  	  
When	  the	  British	  East	  India	  Company	  and	  its	  successor,	  the	  British	  Crown,	  began	  its	  
administration	  of	  India,	  it	  claimed	  that	  it	  would	  maintain	  the	  Mughal	  tradition	  of	  
implementing	  the	  personal	  law	  of	  the	  Muslims	  and	  Hindus	  according	  to	  their	  own	  
religious	  laws354.	  In	  1772,	  Warren	  Hastings	  was	  appointed	  governor	  of	  Fort	  William,	  
and	  he	  introduced	  the	  1772	  Regulations355	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  Warren	  Hastings	  Plan	  
of	  1772),	  which	  required	  colonial	  courts	  to	  apply	  the	  native	  law	  in	  respect	  of	  
personal	  law.	  	  Charles	  Hamilton	  explains	  the	  rationale	  behind	  this	  plan	  in	  the	  
preface	  to	  his	  translation	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  text	  Al-­‐Hidāya:	  
“...	  nothing	  can	  so	  effectually	  contribute	  as	  preserving	  to	  the	  latter	  their	  ancient	  
established	  practices,	  civil	  and	  religious,	  and	  protecting	  them	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of	  Authority:	  Crisis	  of	  Islam?”	  Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Asiatic	  Society,	  19,	  no.	  3	  (2009):	  
339-­‐354.	  
353	  See	  Wael	  Hallaq,	  “Was	  the	  Gate	  of	  Ijtihād	  Closed?”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Studies	  16,	  no.	  3	  (1984);	  3-­‐41.	  
354	  Asaf	  A.	  A.	  Fyzee,	  “Islamic	  Law	  in	  India,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
5,	  no.	  4	  (1963):	  414.	  
355	  Kugle,	  “Framed,	  Blamed	  and	  Renamed”,	  262.	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own	  institutes;	  for	  however	  defective	  and	  absurd	  these	  may	  in	  many	  instances	  
appear,	  still	  they	  must	  be	  infinitely	  more	  acceptable	  than	  any	  which	  we	  could	  offer;	  
since	  they	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  accumulated	  prejudice	  of	  ages,	  and,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  
their	  followers,	  derive	  their	  origin	  from	  the	  Divinity	  itself”356.	  
	  
However,	  Warren	  Hastings’	  belief	  that	  he	  was	  continuing	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Mughals	  
was	  misguided357,	  since	  it	  was	  still	  the	  colonial	  courts	  which	  not	  only	  interpreted	  
the	  native	  law	  of	  the	  Muslims,	  but	  also	  decided	  what	  represented	  that	  law,	  by	  
translating	  only	  those	  texts	  that	  they	  deemed	  represented	  it.	  The	  introduction	  of	  
colonial	  courts	  created	  fixed	  institutions	  that	  served	  to	  maintain	  “effective	  political	  
control	  with	  minimal	  military	  involvement”358.	  Anderson	  (1990)	  describes	  how	  the	  
codification	  of	  Islamic	  law	  took	  place	  for	  ease	  of	  application	  by	  the	  new	  colonial	  
courts.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  British	  government	  assumed	  that	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  
Sunna	  were	  a	  rigid	  code	  of	  laws,	  without	  fully	  appreciating	  the	  context	  in	  which	  
these	  laws	  were	  written	  or	  considering	  the	  social	  context	  in	  which	  they	  were	  being	  
applied359.	  	  As	  was	  illustrated	  earlier,	  the	  Ḥanafī	  text	  of	  al-­‐Hidāya	  was	  translated	  
along	  with	  a	  sparse	  number	  of	  others,	  lending	  it	  definitive	  weight	  in	  the	  application	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356	  Charles	  Hamilton,	  trans.	  The	  Hedaya	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Islamic	  Laws,	  New	  Delhi,	  
(1985),	  iv,	  as	  quoted	  by	  Sharafi	  Mitra,	  “The	  Semi-­‐Autonomous	  Judge	  in	  Colonial	  
India:	  Chivalric	  Imperialism	  meets	  Anglo-­‐Islamic	  Dower	  and	  Divorce	  Law,”	  Indian	  
Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  Review	  46,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  62.	  
357	  Rohit	  De,	  “Mumtaz	  Bibi’s	  Broken	  Heart:	  The	  Many	  Lives	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  
Muslim	  Marriages	  Act,”	  The	  Indian	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  Review	  46,	  1	  (2009):	  
115.	  
358	  Michael	  Anderson,	  “Islamic	  Law	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Encounter	  in	  British	  India”,	  in	  
Islamic	  Family	  Law,	  eds.	  Chibli	  Mallat	  &	  Jane	  Connors	  (London:	  Graham	  and	  
Trotman,	  1990),	  205-­‐206.	  	  
359	  Ibid.,	  212.	  For	  further	  analysis	  of	  the	  codification	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  see	  Michael	  
Anderson,	  “Legal	  Scholarship	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  in	  British	  India”,	  in	  R.S	  Khare,	  
ed.,	  Perspectives	  on	  Islamic	  Law,	  Justice	  and	  Society	  (Lanham:	  Rowman	  and	  
Littlefield,	  1999),	  65-­‐91.	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and	  interpretation	  of	  Islamic	  law360.	  Rather	  like	  canon	  law,	  the	  British	  tried	  to	  codify	  
and	  thus	  contain	  the	  Shariah	  into	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  authoritative	  texts361.	  	  This	  led	  to	  a	  
fixed	  number	  of	  precepts	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  Muslim	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  creating	  a	  
Shariah	  that	  was	  considered	  final	  and	  absolute362,	  disregarding	  regional	  customs	  
when	  it	  suited	  them363.	  	  
	  
Unwittingly,	  however,	  the	  very	  mechanism	  employed	  to	  control	  and	  more	  easily	  
administer	  political	  rule	  served	  to	  polarise	  political	  identities	  based	  upon	  religion.	  
Differentiation	  through	  codification	  of	  Islamic	  laws	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  
separate	  courts	  segregated	  people	  into	  two	  distinct	  groups	  –	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  –	  
and	  then	  set	  them	  collectively	  against	  British	  rule,	  leading	  to	  partition	  in	  1947.	  	  
Although	  British	  policies	  served	  to	  dis-­‐unify	  the	  very	  community	  that	  they	  had	  
hoped	  to	  control,	  they	  also	  created	  a	  significant	  divide	  between	  Muslims.	  As	  the	  
newly	  formulated	  codes	  of	  law	  began	  to	  be	  assimilated	  by	  the	  Muslims	  and	  take	  
effect,	  the	  debate	  widened	  into	  what	  exactly	  constituted	  Islamic	  Law.	  	  Conservative	  
ʿulamāʾ364	  viewed	  Shariah	  as	  fixed	  and	  immutable,	  based	  purely	  upon	  the	  divinely	  
revealed	  texts,	  whilst	  modernist	  reformers365	  advocated	  a	  more	  fluid	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360	  Anderson,	  “Islamic	  Law	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Encounter,”	  214.	  
361	  Gregory	  Kozlowski,	  Muslim	  Endowments	  and	  Society	  in	  British	  India	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  126.	  	  
362	  Gregory	  Kozlowski,	  “Muslim	  Personal	  Law	  and	  Political	  Identity	  in	  Independent	  
India,”	  in	  Robert	  Baird,	  ed.,	  Religion	  and	  Law	  in	  Independent	  India	  (New	  Delhi:	  
Manohar,	  2005),	  103.	  
363	  Anderson,	  “Islamic	  Law	  and	  Colonial	  Encounters”,	  215.	  
364	  Such	  ʿulamāʾ	  included	  those	  who	  belonged	  to	  the	  Deoband	  School,	  trained	  at	  the	  
Dar-­‐ul-­‐Uloom,	  such	  as	  Maulana	  Rashid	  Ahmad	  Gangohi	  and	  Maulana	  Muhammad	  
Qasim	  Nantovi.	  	  	  
365	  Most	  notably	  Syed	  Ahmad	  Khan,	  Allama	  Muhammad	  Iqbal	  and	  Syed	  Ameer	  Ali.	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changeable	  interpretation	  through	  ijtihad,	  just	  as	  the	  qāḍīs	  had	  been	  practicing	  
earlier	  in	  history.	  
	  
The	  situation	  was	  further	  compounded	  by	  the	  colonial	  impact	  on	  Muslim	  personal	  
law.	  	  Although	  family	  laws	  were	  largely	  left	  untouched,	  with	  the	  use	  of	  binding	  case	  
law	  precedents	  used	  in	  decision-­‐making366,	  these	  precedents	  were	  not	  applied	  
consistently.	  Where	  British	  colonial	  rule	  found	  certain	  areas	  of	  Islamic	  law	  to	  
conflict	  with	  their	  British	  values,	  particularly	  in	  the	  area	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  they	  
adopted	  the	  modernist	  agenda	  of	  amending	  those	  areas	  that	  were	  offensive	  to	  
them367.	  As	  early	  as	  1872,	  the	  Indian	  Evidence	  Act	  was	  passed,	  contravening	  
perceived	  Ḥanafī	  law,	  which	  only	  allowed	  a	  woman	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  widow	  if	  her	  
husband	  had	  been	  absent	  for	  90	  years	  beginning	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  husband’s	  
birth368.	  The	  new	  law	  established	  (more	  in	  line	  with	  Mālikī	  law)	  that	  a	  seven-­‐year	  
absence	  would	  suffice	  in	  declaring	  putative	  widowhood369.	  Similarly,	  the	  British	  
colonial	  rulers	  passed	  the	  1929	  Child	  Marriage	  Restraint	  Act,	  establishing	  a	  
minimum	  age	  for	  marriage	  at	  16	  for	  girls	  and	  18	  for	  boys,	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366	  Mumtaz	  and	  Shaheed,	  Women	  in	  Pakistan,	  37.	  
367	  Commercial	  Laws	  relating	  to	  contracts	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  property	  were	  also	  
amended	  by	  laws	  of	  British	  origin	  to	  facilitate	  colonial	  economic	  benefit	  from	  the	  
region,	  as	  were	  the	  criminal	  codes	  and	  law	  of	  evidence.	  	  See	  Rubya	  Mehdi,	  The	  
Islamization	  of	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  (Richmond:	  Curzon	  Press,	  1994),	  158.	  
368	  In	  fact,	  this	  prohibition	  refers	  to	  the	  right	  to	  khiyār	  al-­‐faskh,	  nullification	  or	  
revocation	  of	  the	  nikāḥ.	  	  Under	  faskh,	  a	  woman	  need	  not	  go	  to	  court	  but	  has	  the	  right	  
to	  revoke	  her	  nikāḥ	  unilaterally.	  	  Under	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence,	  she	  does	  not	  have	  the	  
right	  to	  an	  extra-­‐judicial	  faskh	  if	  her	  husband	  has	  been	  absent,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  
preclude	  her	  from	  applying	  to	  the	  court	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  	  
369	  John	  Esposito	  and	  Natana	  Delong-­‐Bas,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law	  (Syracuse:	  
Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  75.	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limitation	  under	  Ḥanafī	  law.	  Penalties	  were	  outlined	  for	  those	  who	  broke	  the	  law,	  
applying	  to	  both	  men	  and	  parents	  or	  guardians370.	  	  
	  
In	  essence,	  the	  British	  employed	  a	  dual	  strategy	  in	  their	  legal	  interventions	  in	  order	  
to	  preserve	  their	  colonial	  state,	  which	  was	  in	  a	  precarious	  position371.	  They	  needed	  
to	  legitimise	  their	  rule,	  ensuring	  that	  insurgency	  and	  revolts	  did	  not	  occur,	  by	  
appearing	  to	  apply	  Islamic	  law	  to	  its	  Muslim	  subjects,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
guarantee	  that	  the	  law	  was	  a	  set	  of	  codes	  that	  British-­‐trained	  judges	  and	  magistrates	  
could	  easily	  apply	  without	  having	  to	  refer	  to	  external	  local	  religious	  bodies.	  Thus	  the	  
codification	  of	  certain	  Islamic	  civil	  laws	  into	  a	  static	  entity	  led	  to	  the	  term	  
‘Muhammadan	  law’372	  or	  ‘Anglo-­‐Muhammadan	  law’373,	  laying	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  
fixed,	  unchanging	  legal	  system	  that	  served	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  conservatives.	  Indeed,	  
Rohit	  De	  (2009)	  points	  out	  that	  “the	  colonial	  state,	  after	  having	  discovered	  the	  code,	  
was	  reluctant	  to	  deviate	  from	  it”374.	  	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  khulʿ.	  The	  
legislature	  construed	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  only	  permissible	  through	  the	  husband’s	  consent,	  
and,	  rather	  than	  delve	  further	  to	  assess	  the	  authenticity	  of	  this	  view,	  it	  was	  more	  
than	  happy	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  limited	  translated	  texts	  available,	  and	  looked	  for	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  S.4-­‐6	  Child	  Marriage	  Restraint	  Act	  1929.	  This	  involved	  imprisonment	  for	  up	  to	  
three	  months	  and	  the	  payment	  of	  a	  fine	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  courts	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  
injunctions	  against	  a	  proven	  child	  marriage.	  	  See	  Esposito	  and	  DeLong-­‐Bas,	  Women	  
in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  75	  
371	  Kugle,	  “Framed,	  Blamed	  and	  Renamed”,	  267.	  
372	  Fyzee,	  Outlines	  of	  Muhammadan	  Law,	  xxi.	  
373	  Esposito	  and	  DeLong-­‐Bas,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  74.	  
374	  De,	  “Mumtaz	  Bibi’s	  Broken	  Heart,”	  116.	  	  In	  1903,	  for	  example,	  Justice	  of	  the	  Privy	  
Council,	  Ameer	  Ali	  presented	  arguments	  to	  the	  court	  that	  certain	  classes	  of	  trusts	  
were	  permitted	  under	  Islam.	  	  Despite	  using	  his	  own	  knowledge	  of	  Arabic	  and	  
hadiths,	  his	  judgment	  was	  overturned.	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means	  to	  assist	  women.	  This	  also	  pacified	  the	  ʿulamāʾ,	  who	  were	  content	  to	  accept	  
this	  interpretation,	  as	  it	  reaffirmed	  the	  superior	  right	  of	  men	  over	  women	  and	  
ensured	  that	  Muslim	  wives	  remained	  subservient	  to	  their	  husbands375.	  The	  British	  
colonial	  rulers	  appeared	  to	  have	  no	  objection	  to	  these	  matters,	  since	  their	  own	  
national	  laws	  failed	  to	  provide	  adequate	  relief	  to	  married	  women	  in	  Britain.	  	  
However,	  wherever	  British	  moral	  sensibilities	  were	  offended,	  they	  did	  campaign	  for	  
reforms.	  This	  move	  away	  from	  those	  areas	  of	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  that	  the	  British	  felt	  were	  
too	  conventional,	  amending	  the	  laws	  to	  improve	  the	  rights	  of	  women,	  gave	  credence	  
to	  the	  modernists’	  approach	  that	  Islamic	  law	  could	  be	  more	  flexible	  in	  nature	  and	  be	  
subject	  to	  moulding	  by	  human	  hands.	  Thus	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  
divorce	  law.	  	  
	  
3.3	  Apostasy	  and	  the	  Impetus	  for	  Legal	  Reform	  of	  the	  Divorce	  Law	  
As	  British	  colonial	  rule	  became	  entrenched,	  religious	  identities	  became	  more	  
polarised.	  	  The	  growth	  of	  colonial	  state	  powers	  was	  matched	  by	  Muslim	  and	  Hindu	  
identity	  politics	  and	  nationalism,	  jockeying	  for	  authority	  against	  each	  other	  as	  well	  
as	  against	  the	  British	  Crown.	  During	  this	  tense	  period,	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  became	  
the	  focal	  point	  for	  some	  of	  this	  resistance.	  In	  colonial	  India,	  Ḥanafī	  law	  had	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375	  De,	  “Mumtaz	  Bibi’s	  Broken	  Heart,”	  116.	  	  Rohit	  De	  provides	  a	  quote	  from	  Lord	  
Justice	  Wilson	  illustrating	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  judiciary	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  form	  of	  
creativity:	  “…(it	  is	  dangerous)…	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  ancient	  texts	  of	  the	  Mohammadan	  
law,	  and	  even	  the	  precepts	  of	  the	  Prophet	  himself…deciding	  from	  them	  new	  rules	  of	  
law.	  	  The	  danger	  is	  equally	  great,	  whether	  reliance	  be	  placed	  on	  fresh	  texts	  newly	  
brought	  to	  light,	  or	  upon	  logical	  inferences	  drawn	  from	  old	  and	  undisputed	  law”	  
Baker	  Ali	  Khan	  v.	  Anjum	  Ara	  Begum	  (1903),	  30	  Indian	  Appeals,	  94	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interpreted	  as	  giving	  a	  Muslim	  man	  the	  unfettered	  right	  to	  divorce	  his	  wife	  with	  the	  
pronouncement	  of	  the	  words	  ṭalāq,	  meaning	  ‘I	  divorce	  you’.	  In	  contrast,	  women	  had	  
limited	  options.	  A	  husband	  could	  delegate	  his	  right	  of	  divorce	  to	  his	  wife,	  known	  as	  
ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ.	  Certain	  conditions	  could	  be	  stipulated	  in	  the	  marriage	  contract	  
which,	  if	  breached,	  meant	  that	  the	  wife	  would	  hold	  the	  right	  to	  divorce	  her	  
husband376.	  Alternatively,	  the	  wife	  could	  apply	  to	  the	  qāḍī	  for	  a	  judicial	  khulʿ,	  
requesting	  the	  husband	  to	  release	  her	  upon	  repayment	  of	  the	  mahr.	  However,	  both	  
these	  options	  were	  rarely	  used	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  their	  existence,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  cooperation	  required	  from	  the	  husband	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  contractual	  
stipulations	  in	  advance,	  or	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  to	  attend	  sessions	  called	  by	  the	  
qāḍī.	  	  
	  
Ḥanafī	  law	  also	  provides	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  minor	  girl	  to	  request	  an	  annulment	  of	  
her	  marriage.	  In	  1907,	  Maulana	  Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi	  confirmed	  this	  entitlement	  to	  
faskh	  (annulment)	  in	  his	  Imdād	  al-­‐Fatāwā,	  holding	  that	  a	  pre-­‐pubescent	  girl	  given	  in	  
marriage	  could	  validly	  ask	  for	  an	  annulment377.	  However,	  this	  came	  with	  an	  
important	  caveat:	  that	  the	  girl	  would	  have	  to	  make	  her	  request	  to	  a	  Muslim	  judge,	  
who,	  after	  verifying	  her	  claim,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  grant	  her	  the	  annulment.	  This	  
proved	  to	  be	  almost	  impossible,	  since	  there	  were	  very	  few	  or	  no	  Muslim	  judges	  
working	  within	  the	  British	  Indian	  legal	  system.	  The	  narrow	  application	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “Talāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ	  and	  Stipulations	  in	  the	  Marriage	  Contract:	  
Important	  Means	  of	  Protecting	  the	  Position	  of	  a	  South	  Asian	  Muslim	  Wife,”	  Modern	  
Asian	  Studies	  16,	  no.	  2	  (1982):	  277-­‐309.	  
377	  Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi,	  Imdād	  al-­‐Fatāwā,	  5	  Volumes,	  ed.	  Muhammad	  Shafi	  (Karachi:	  
Maktaba	  Dar	  al-­‐Ulum,	  1999),	  vol.	  2,	  Fask	  an-­‐Nikāḥ,	  467-­‐475.	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meant	  that	  the	  law	  provided	  no	  other	  relief	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  cruelty,	  desertion	  or	  
ill	  treatment	  by	  the	  husband,	  or	  the	  husband’s	  failure	  to	  maintain	  his	  wife.	  Thus,	  
apostasy	  became	  the	  only	  legal	  way	  out	  of	  unhappy	  marriages	  for	  Muslim	  women.	  
Ḥanafī	  law	  provides	  that	  apostasy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  Muslim	  spouse	  dissolves	  a	  Muslim	  
marriage378.	  Muslim	  women	  realised	  that	  a	  quick	  exit	  route	  from	  marriage	  existed	  if	  
they	  were	  willing	  to	  leave	  the	  fold	  of	  Islam,	  even	  temporarily.	  As	  women	  turned	  to	  
apostasy	  to	  rid	  themselves	  of	  intolerable	  marital	  ties,	  Urdu	  newspapers	  began	  to	  
publicise	  these	  cases,	  causing	  considerable	  concern	  in	  the	  Muslim	  community379.	  
The	  government	  was	  presented	  with	  petitions	  to	  overrule	  court	  rulings	  that	  
accepted	  apostasy	  as	  a	  valid	  cause	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriage.	  	  Crucially,	  the	  
courts	  found	  it	  irrelevant	  if	  the	  apostasy	  occurred	  as	  a	  ḥīla:	  a	  legal	  remedy	  cited	  in	  
order	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce.	  Apostasy	  itself	  was	  enough.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  
1920s	  and	  1930s,	  the	  High	  Court	  ruled	  that	  an	  apostate’s	  testimony	  was	  sufficient	  
proof	  of	  apostasy.	  	  It	  was	  deemed	  not	  to	  be	  the	  court’s	  place	  to	  ascertain	  the	  
genuineness	  of	  a	  claim380,	  and	  it	  was	  considered	  immaterial	  if	  the	  conversion	  was	  a	  
device	  employed	  merely	  to	  have	  the	  marriage	  dissolved381.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  claimant	  
had	  renounced	  Islam,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  see	  if	  she	  was	  now	  following	  her	  new	  
religion382.	  In	  one	  particularly	  disturbing	  case,	  a	  woman’s	  claim	  of	  apostasy	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378	  See	  Burhān	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Farghānī	  Al-­‐Marghīnānī,	  Al-­‐Hidāya,	  vol.	  I	  (Delhi:	  Mujtaba,	  
1960)	  328,	  which	  states:	  “When	  one	  of	  the	  spouses	  abandons	  Islam,	  separation	  
occurs	  without	  divorce.	  	  That	  is	  the	  view	  of	  Abu	  Ḥanīfa	  and	  Abu	  Yusuf.”	  	  
379	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife?	  	  Judicial	  Khulʿ	  in	  Pakistan,”	  Islamic	  
Law	  and	  Society	  3,	  no.	  1	  (1996):	  93.	  
380	  Mussamat	  Bakho	  v.	  Lal,	  All	  India	  Law	  Reports	  (1924),	  Lahore,	  397.	  
381	  Mst	  Rehmate	  v.	  Nikka,	  All	  India	  Law	  Report	  (1928),	  Lahore,	  954.	  
382	  Mst	  Sardaran	  v.	  Allah	  Baksh,	  All	  India	  Law	  Report	  (1934),	  Lahore,	  976.	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challenged,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  her	  claim	  she	  was	  asked	  to	  eat	  pork383.	  When	  she	  
refused,	  her	  claim	  was	  rejected	  and	  she	  was	  forced	  to	  appeal.	  Upon	  appeal	  to	  the	  
High	  Court,	  a	  special	  bench	  was	  convened,	  at	  which	  it	  was	  held	  that	  not	  only	  was	  the	  
marriage	  dissolved	  but	  that	  the	  declaration	  of	  apostasy	  itself	  was	  sufficient	  
evidence,	  and	  that	  no	  further	  investigation	  was	  required	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  contrary384.	  	  	  
	  
The	  policy	  of	  the	  courts	  to	  uphold	  women’s	  assertions	  of	  apostasy	  and	  dissolve	  
marriages	  caused	  consternation	  within	  the	  Muslim	  community.	  However,	  calls	  to	  
overrule	  the	  courts’	  decisions	  were	  met	  by	  resistance	  from	  the	  government	  for	  two	  
important	  reasons:	  a	  lack	  of	  alternative	  remedies	  available	  to	  women	  to	  dissolve	  
their	  marriages,	  and	  a	  textual	  reading	  of	  Ḥanafī	  law	  in	  this	  matter,	  which	  was	  also	  
supported	  by	  local	  ʿulamāʾ.	  In	  1913,	  Mawlana	  Thanawi	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  question	  
of	  the	  legality	  of	  a	  marriage	  after	  a	  woman	  had	  become	  murtad	  (an	  apostate).	  	  He	  
was	  unequivocal	  in	  his	  stance	  –	  the	  marriage	  was	  annulled:	  
“Uttering	  words	  of	  unbelief,	  intentionally	  and	  knowingly,	  whether	  one	  actually	  
believes	  in	  those	  words	  or	  not,	  whether	  it	  is	  one’s	  own	  view	  or	  someone	  else’s	  
instructions,	  necessarily	  constitutes	  unbelief	  in	  all	  cases”385.	  
In	  his	  fatwa,	  Thanawi	  stated	  that	  not	  only	  would	  a	  woman’s	  marriage	  be	  dissolved,	  
but	  also	  that	  she	  should	  be	  forced	  to	  convert	  and	  marry	  her	  former	  husband.	  	  In	  this	  
fatwa,	  it	  appears	  that	  Thanawi	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  women	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  consumption	  of	  pork	  strongly	  prohibited	  in	  Islam,	  but	  pork	  is	  seen	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  abhorrent	  food	  items.	  
384	  Mst.	  Reshman	  v.	  Khuda	  Baksh,	  All	  India	  Law	  Report	  (1938),	  Lahore,	  482-­‐85.	  
385	  Quoted	  in	  Khalid	  Masud,	  “Apostasy	  and	  Judicial	  Separation	  in	  British	  India”,	  
Islamic	  Legal	  Interpretation:	  Muftis	  and	  Their	  Fatwas,	  eds.	  Muhammad	  Khalid	  Masud	  
et	  al.	  (New	  York:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  194.	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so	  easily	  renouncing	  their	  faith	  than	  why	  women	  were	  leaving	  and	  turning	  to	  
apostasy	  in	  such	  numbers.	  	  He	  made	  no	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  women	  had	  no	  
other	  recourse	  to	  marital	  emancipation,	  but	  rather	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘terrible	  deed’	  of	  
apostasy	  itself.	  	  	  
As	  apostasy	  cases	  became	  more	  frequent,	  tensions	  were	  heightened	  not	  only	  
between	  Muslims	  and	  Hindus	  within	  the	  context	  of	  competition	  for	  numbers,	  but	  
also	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  British	  rule,	  due	  to	  Christian	  missionary	  activities	  in	  
the	  early	  1900s	  that	  supported	  these	  claims386.	  Apostasy	  was	  not	  a	  crime	  in	  British	  
India,	  and	  evangelical	  Christians	  were	  actively	  engaging	  in	  missionary	  work387.	  
Significantly,	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  where	  women	  petitioned	  the	  court	  rose	  
dramatically	  between	  1920	  and	  1925388.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  press	  media,	  
particularly	  Urdu	  publications,	  these	  cases	  received	  heightened	  publicity,	  and	  calls	  
for	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  divorce	  laws	  increased.	  
	  
3.4	  The	  Impact	  of	  Local	  Women’s	  Groups	  and	  their	  Calls	  for	  Divorce	  Law	  
Reform	  
With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  press	  media,	  the	  publicising	  of	  these	  events	  became	  more	  
widespread	  and	  the	  plight	  of	  women	  trapped	  in	  difficult	  marriages	  received	  
heightened	  publicity	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Gail	  Minhault	  (1998)	  discusses	  important	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  Masud,	  “Apostasy	  and	  Judicial	  Separation	  in	  British	  India”,	  195.	  
387	  Carroll,	  Qurʾān	  2:229,	  A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife?	  93.	  
388	  Muhammad	  Khalid	  Masud,	  Iqbal’s	  Reconstruction	  of	  Ijtihād	  (Lahore:	  Iqbal	  
Academy,	  2003),	  157.	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reformers	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  who	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  reform	  in	  colonial	  India.	  
One	  reformer	  was	  Sayyid	  Mumtaz	  Hassan	  Ali,	  who	  was	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  weekly	  
newspaper	  Tahzib	  un	  Niswan389,	  a	  newspaper/journal	  that	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  of	  its	  
kind	  dedicated	  to	  a	  female	  readership	  in	  Urdu.	  Mumtaz	  Ali	  believed	  that	  the	  position	  
of	  women	  within	  Islamic	  law	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  what	  was	  practiced.	  The	  major	  
reason	  for	  this	  discrepancy	  was	  twofold.	  Firstly,	  he	  believed	  that	  the	  rituals	  and	  
customs	  that	  were	  falsely	  attributed	  to	  Islam	  perpetuated	  gender	  stereotypes	  of	  
women	  and	  were	  practiced	  by	  women	  themselves	  to	  their	  own	  detriment.	  Secondly,	  
he	  believed	  that	  men	  also	  needed	  to	  understand	  that	  their	  perceived	  superiority	  
over	  women	  involved	  distinctions	  that	  had	  been	  a	  result	  of	  social	  custom	  and	  
culture	  rather	  than	  any	  Islamic	  legal	  practice390.	  As	  the	  impetus	  for	  reform	  
heightened,	  women	  also	  entered	  the	  public	  sphere,	  embracing	  the	  new	  language	  of	  
social	  reform.	  Forbes	  (1979)	  details	  the	  involvement	  of	  women	  in	  debates	  regarding	  
reform	  legislation	  and	  describes	  their	  impact	  as	  being	  crucial	  to	  policy-­‐making391.	  
An	  increasing	  number	  of	  Muslim	  women	  began	  to	  voice	  their	  opinions	  and	  
objections	  to	  polygamy	  and	  unilateral	  rights	  to	  divorce	  for	  men,	  and	  criticised	  the	  
virtually	  non-­‐existent	  right	  for	  women	  to	  get	  out	  of	  problematic	  marriages.	  The	  All	  
Indian	  Women’s	  Conference	  (AIWC)	  passed	  a	  resolution	  against	  polygamy	  in	  1918	  
during	  their	  annual	  meeting	  in	  Lahore,	  which	  caused	  “outrage	  in	  the	  Muslim	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  Gail	  Minhault,	  “Women’s	  Magazines	  in	  Urdu	  as	  Sources	  for	  Muslim	  Social	  
History”	  Indian	  Journal	  of	  Gender	  Studies	  5,	  no.	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  (September	  1998):	  201-­‐214.	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  See	  also	  Gail	  Minault,	  “Sayyid	  Mumtaz	  Ali	  and	  ‘Huquq	  un-­‐Niswan’:	  An	  Advocate	  of	  
Women’s	  Rights	  in	  Islam	  in	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  Modern	  Asian	  
Studies	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  (February	  1990),	  147-­‐172.	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  Geraldine	  Forbes,	  “Women	  and	  Modernity:	  The	  Issue	  of	  Child	  Marriage	  in	  India”,	  
Women’s	  Studies	  International	  Quarterly	  2,	  no.	  4	  (1979),	  407–19.	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Press”392.	  The	  AIWC	  also	  pressed	  for	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ	  to	  be	  included	  in	  marriage	  
contracts	  that	  would	  allow	  women	  to	  initiate	  divorce	  proceedings	  if	  contractual	  
stipulations	  in	  the	  marriage	  contract	  were	  breached393.	  In	  1931,	  a	  leading	  member	  
of	  the	  AIWC,	  after	  consultation	  with	  ʿulamāʾ,	  enacted	  a	  code	  called	  ‘Protection	  of	  the	  
Rights	  of	  Wives’,	  which	  allowed	  parties	  to	  gain	  relief	  from	  Mālikī	  law	  when	  such	  
relief	  was	  unavailable	  under	  Ḥanafī	  Law394.	  Two	  years	  later,	  Begum	  Sharifa	  Hamid	  
Ali,	  a	  former	  president	  of	  the	  AIWC,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  Bombay	  Law	  firm,	  
proposed	  a	  draft	  marriage	  contract	  that	  allowed	  stipulations	  within	  the	  marriage	  
contract	  to	  be	  inserted	  providing	  the	  right	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce395.	  The	  
entry	  of	  women	  into	  the	  public	  sphere	  showed	  a	  subtle	  shift	  in	  the	  debate	  for	  
reform.	  	  Now,	  women	  began	  to	  shape	  debates	  about	  their	  positions,	  rather	  than	  just	  
being	  passive	  observers	  of	  male-­‐framed	  debates.	  	  	  
	  
3.5	  Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi	  and	  Reform	  of	  the	  Divorce	  Law	  
As	  pressure	  mounted	  for	  change,	  the	  traditional	  approach	  advocated	  by	  Thanawi	  
and	  other	  ʿulamāʾ	  no	  longer	  seemed	  tenable.	  In	  the	  early	  1900s,	  the	  famed	  poet	  and	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  Minault,	  “Women,	  Legal	  Reform	  and	  Muslim	  Identity	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  Jura	  
Gentium:	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  of	  International	  Law	  and	  Global	  Politics,	  accessed	  
October	  23rd	  2012,	  http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/en/minault.htm.	  	  See	  
also	  Gail	  Minault,	  “Sisterhood	  or	  Separatism?	  	  The	  All-­‐India	  Muslim	  Ladies’	  
Conference	  and	  the	  Nationalist	  Movement,”	  in	  The	  Extended	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Political	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  in	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  ed.	  Gail	  Minault	  (Chanakyai	  Publication:	  
Delhi,	  1981),	  79-­‐84.	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  Aparna	  Basu	  and	  Ray	  Bharati,	  Women’s	  Struggle:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  All-­‐India	  
Women’s	  Conference,	  1972-­‐1990	  (New	  Delhi:	  Manohar,	  1990),	  188.	  	  See	  also	  Janaki	  
Nair,	  Women	  and	  Law	  in	  Colonial	  India	  (New	  Delhi:	  Khali,	  1996),	  79-­‐84.	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  Fyzee,	  Outlines	  of	  Muhammadan	  Law,	  Appendix	  C	  474.	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philosopher	  Muhammad	  Iqbal	  had	  begun	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  
the	  Asian	  subcontinent.	  He	  attributed	  their	  plight	  not	  to	  Islam	  but	  to	  the	  Muslim	  
jurists,	  whom	  he	  felt	  had	  derived	  these	  principles	  from	  the	  Qurʾān	  through	  their	  
own	  reasoning,	  arguing	  that	  they	  were	  not	  necessarily	  components	  of	  the	  religion	  
itself396.	  He	  was	  also	  critical	  of	  the	  methodology	  that	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  had	  been	  applying.	  
The	  Ḥanafī	  ʿulamāʾ	  of	  his	  time	  had	  been	  using	  precedents	  and	  qiyās,	  or	  legal	  
analogies,	  in	  their	  judgements;	  they	  had	  also	  not	  referred	  directly	  to	  the	  Qurʾān	  or	  
the	  Sunna	  to	  obtain	  their	  legal	  principles,	  but	  had	  worked	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  
existing	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence397.	  This,	  Iqbal	  noted,	  went	  against	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  
Ḥanafī	  school,	  causing	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  to	  “eternalize(d)	  the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  
founders	  and	  their	  immediate	  followers”398.	  	  Instead,	  Iqbal	  favoured	  the	  approach	  of	  
the	  Mālikī	  jurist	  al-­‐Shāṭibī,	  who	  developed	  the	  principle	  of	  maslahah	  (reason)	  and	  
maqāṣid	  (purpose),	  which	  entailed	  that	  any	  legal	  reasoning	  must	  also	  look	  at	  the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  Islamic	  law399.	  In	  1930,	  Iqbal	  delivered	  a	  lecture	  on	  ijtihād	  in	  which	  
he	  specifically	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  apostasy	  and	  urged	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  to	  create	  new	  
strategies	  to	  solve	  problems	  surrounding	  it:	  otherwise,	  he	  feared	  that	  the	  Islamic	  
edifice	  would	  crumble	  in	  the	  face	  of	  major	  societal	  shifts	  and	  stagnancy	  in	  the	  law,	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  Muhammad	  Iqbal,	  “Qawmi	  Zindagi”	  compiled	  by	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  Mu	  ‘in	  
Maqalat-­‐i-­‐Iqbal	  (Lahore:	  Sheikh	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  Masud,	  Iqbal’s	  Reconstruction	  of	  Ijtihad,	  162.	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  Ibid.	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  Khalid	  Masud,	  Muslim	  Jurists’	  Quest	  for	  the	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  (Leiden:	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  accessed	  February	  15th	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  See	  also	  Khalid	  
Masud,	  Islamic	  Legal	  Philosophy:	  A	  Study	  of	  Abu	  Ishaq	  al-­‐Shaitibi’s	  life	  and	  Works	  
(Islamabad:	  Islamic	  Research	  Institute,	  1977).	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resulting	  in	  its	  ultimate	  demise.	  In	  his	  lecture,	  Iqbal	  outlined	  al-­‐Shāṭibī’s	  doctrine	  
whilst	  addressing	  the	  problems	  that	  women	  faced	  in	  marriage:	  
“In	  the	  Punjab,	  as	  everybody	  knows,	  there	  have	  been	  cases	  in	  which	  Muslim	  women	  
wishing	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  undesirable	  husbands	  have	  been	  driven	  to	  apostasy.	  Nothing	  
could	  be	  more	  distant	  from	  the	  aims	  of	  a	  missionary	  religion.	  The	  law	  of	  Islam,	  says	  
the	  great	  Spanish	  jurist	  Imam	  Shāṭibī	  in	  his	  Al-­‐Muwafiqat,	  aims	  at	  protecting	  five	  
things:	  Din,	  Nafs,	  ‘Aql,	  Mal	  and	  Nasl.	  Applying	  this	  test	  I	  venture	  to	  ask:	  does	  the	  
working	  of	  the	  rule	  relating	  to	  apostasy,	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Hidāya,	  tend	  to	  protect	  
the	  interests	  of	  the	  Faith	  in	  this	  country?	  In	  view	  of	  the	  intense	  conservatism	  of	  the	  
Muslims	  of	  India,	  Indian	  judges	  cannot	  but	  stick	  to	  what	  are	  called	  standard	  works.	  
The	  result	  is	  that	  while	  the	  peoples	  are	  moving	  the	  law	  remains	  stationary”400.	  
	  
Iqbal	  criticised	  the	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  just	  a	  few	  limited	  texts	  of	  Muslim	  personal	  law,	  
and	  argued	  that	  any	  legal	  reasoning	  must	  never	  violate	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  and	  
spirit	  of	  the	  law,	  which	  entailed	  the	  protection	  of	  basic	  human	  rights.	  He	  urged	  the	  
ʿulamāʾ	  to	  engage	  in	  ijtihād	  on	  the	  real	  problems	  that	  women	  were	  facing	  in	  the	  
Indian	  subcontinent.	  One	  of	  al-­‐Shāṭibī’s	  objectives	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  law	  was	  the	  
protection	  of	  religion.	  If	  judicial	  methodology	  created	  legal	  reasoning	  that	  
contravened	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  purposes	  of	  the	  law,	  such	  as	  protection	  of	  the	  religion,	  
then	  that	  reasoning	  should	  be	  reviewed.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  British	  colonial	  India,	  
applying	  strict	  Ḥanafī	  laws	  codified	  by	  British	  colonial	  rule,	  which	  restricted	  the	  
avenues	  of	  divorce	  for	  women,	  was	  leading	  women	  away	  from	  the	  religion,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  protecting	  the	  religion.	  	  Iqbal	  was	  not	  requesting	  new	  interpretations	  of	  
the	  texts,	  but	  advocating	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  Islamic	  law	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  
when	  adopting	  qiyās.	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As	  pressure	  mounted	  through	  public	  opinion,	  the	  next	  leading	  Islamic	  scholar	  to	  
address	  this	  issue	  was	  again	  Maulana	  Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi.	  It	  is	  unclear	  to	  what	  
extent	  he	  was	  influenced	  by	  Iqbal’s	  work,	  but	  his	  U-­‐turn	  from	  his	  early	  fatwa	  of	  
1913	  suggests	  that	  he	  was	  now	  much	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  realities	  of	  society	  and	  the	  
necessity	  for	  the	  law	  to	  match	  its	  growth	  and	  developing	  needs.	  As	  pressure	  
mounted,	  he	  began	  corresponding	  with	  Mālikī	  scholars	  from	  the	  Hijaz	  in	  order	  to	  
solve	  the	  judicial	  problems	  that	  had	  beset	  contemporary	  Ḥanafī	  scholars.	  A	  
particular	  problem	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  Muslim	  judges	  to	  deal	  with	  common	  issues.	  The	  
phasing	  out	  of	  the	  qāḍī	  system	  had	  left	  a	  vacuum	  in	  legal	  authority.	  Who	  had	  the	  
authority	  to	  dissolve	  marriages	  if	  no	  Muslim	  judges	  were	  available	  in	  the	  courts?	  
Even	  relatively	  simple	  matters,	  such	  as	  what	  constituted	  the	  waiting	  period	  in	  cases	  
of	  divorce	  and	  widowhood,	  were	  not	  being	  resolved401.	  In	  1933,	  Thanawi	  published	  
his	  long-­‐awaited	  fatwa	  al-­‐Hīla	  al-­‐Nājiza	  li’l-­‐Halīlāt	  al-­‐’Ājiza	  (‘The	  Successful	  Device	  
for	  Helpless	  Wives’).	  
	  
Thanawi’s	  fatwa	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  shows	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  dealt	  
with	  the	  changing	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  found	  themselves	  under	  British	  colonial	  
rule.	  Their	  authority	  had	  come	  under	  attack	  with	  the	  phasing	  out	  of	  the	  qāḍīs	  and	  
the	  instituting	  of	  non-­‐Muslim	  judges	  in	  colonial	  courts	  to	  adjudicate	  on	  matters	  
relating	  both	  to	  Muslim	  civil	  and	  personal	  law.	  Whilst	  dealing	  with	  competing	  voices	  
from	  within	  their	  own	  ranks,	  it	  was	  important	  for	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  to	  reclaim	  their	  
exclusive	  authority	  to	  define	  Islamic	  law	  and	  interpret	  the	  Islamic	  tradition.	  Al-­‐Hīla	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al-­‐Nājiza	  li’l-­‐Halīlāt	  al-­‐’Ājiza	  is	  a	  significant	  work,	  as	  it	  illustrates	  the	  balancing	  act	  
performed	  by	  Thanawi	  to	  ensure	  that	  his	  fatwa	  received	  widespread	  support.	  
Thanawi’s	  use	  of	  takhayyur	  and	  talfīq	  was	  counterbalanced	  by	  his	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  
taqlīd	  (following	  an	  existing	  madhhab)	  on	  other	  major	  issues,	  ensuring	  that	  his	  
commitment	  to	  taqlīd	  was	  clearly	  evident	  so	  that	  he	  did	  not	  alienate	  the	  Ḥanafī	  
ʿulamāʾ.	  Their	  support	  was	  essential,	  since	  he	  would	  not	  only	  be	  moving	  away	  from	  
what	  they	  perceived	  as	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh,	  but	  would	  do	  so	  in	  support	  of	  enhancing	  a	  
woman’s	  right	  to	  divorce.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  solution	  he	  posited	  to	  relieve	  the	  plight	  of	  women	  was	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ	  and	  
the	  adoption	  of	  councils	  to	  replace	  courts	  that	  did	  not	  have	  Muslim	  judges.	  Although	  
ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ	  existed	  in	  some	  form	  or	  other	  in	  all	  four	  major	  schools	  of	  law,	  Indian	  
ʿulamāʾ	  were	  always	  reluctant	  to	  advocate	  this	  remedy,	  fearing	  abuse	  of	  this	  judicial	  
device	  by	  women.	  However,	  Thanawi’s	  inclusion	  of	  this	  in	  his	  fatwa	  is	  interesting,	  as	  
it	  not	  only	  provided	  benefit	  to	  women,	  but	  also	  showed	  his	  commitment	  to	  
following	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school.	  His	  allegiance	  to	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ,	  an	  established	  
principle	  under	  Islamic	  law,	  albeit	  a	  controversial	  one,	  demonstrated	  his	  
commitment	  to	  taqlīd	  and	  to	  the	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh,	  which	  was	  essential	  to	  ensure	  that	  he	  
had	  support	  for	  his	  fatwa	  from	  other	  ʿulamāʾ.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  appease	  conservative	  
ʿulamāʾ,	  he	  devoted	  one	  of	  his	  ‘important	  advices’,	  called	  zaroori	  mashwarah,	  to	  the	  
intellectual	  deficiency	  of	  women402.	  He	  argued	  that	  women	  were	  intellectually	  
deficient,	  which	  rendered	  it	  dangerous	  for	  them	  to	  be	  given	  a	  unilateral	  right	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




divorce;	  hence,	  specific	  restrictions	  must	  be	  placed	  upon	  women	  to	  avoid	  such	  
danger,	  and	  so	  there	  should	  be	  promotion	  of	  stipulations	  in	  the	  marriage	  
contract403.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  spent	  the	  first	  part	  of	  his	  fatwa	  advocating	  the	  
importance	  of	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ	  but	  then	  by	  detailing	  his	  own	  concerns	  not	  only	  
demonstrated	  to	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  that	  he	  was	  in	  tune	  with	  their	  reservations,	  but	  also	  
ensured	  that	  he	  could	  defend	  himself	  against	  any	  likely	  attacks	  on	  his	  credibility.	  In	  
essence,	  he	  was	  laying	  the	  foundations	  of	  support	  for	  the	  more	  radical	  reform	  
methodology	  that	  was	  to	  follow	  later	  in	  his	  fatwa.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  unfortunate,	  however,	  that	  rather	  than	  focus	  on	  the	  apparent	  ‘deficiency	  of	  
women’,	  Thanawi	  did	  not	  address	  the	  right	  of	  khulʿ,	  as	  he	  did	  with	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ,	  at	  
this	  important	  historical	  juncture.	  If	  Thanawi	  had	  presented	  a	  more	  accurate	  
position	  under	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  without	  a	  
husband’s	  consent,	  this	  might	  have	  provided	  a	  much	  easier	  marital	  exit	  route	  than	  
the	  fault-­‐based	  law	  reforms	  for	  which	  he	  campaigned.	  Nevertheless,	  an	  analysis	  of	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  methodological	  principles	  of	  takhayyur	  and	  talfīq	  were	  
used	  by	  Thanawi	  to	  ensure	  support	  for	  statutory	  divorce	  laws	  provides	  a	  useful	  
insight	  into	  the	  securing	  of	  further	  reforms	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  law	  of	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  
present	  day.	  Classical	  Muslim	  jurisprudence	  provides	  room	  for	  choosing	  either	  
minority	  interpretations	  within	  an	  existing	  school	  (takhayyur)	  or	  expanding	  
outwards	  into	  another	  school	  of	  law	  to	  resolve	  a	  particular	  problem	  (talfīq)404.	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Thanawi	  believed	  in	  the	  permissibility	  of	  these	  doctrines,	  and	  held	  that	  the	  
pronouncement	  of	  a	  fatwa	  under	  another	  school	  of	  law	  was	  allowed:	  
“It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school	  may	  be	  questioned	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  adequacy.	  	  
The	  answer	  to	  this	  criticism	  would	  be	  that	  this	  school	  does	  allow,	  with	  certain	  
conditions,	  subscription	  to	  the	  views	  of	  other	  mujtahids	  in	  the	  event	  of	  some	  dire	  
need”405.	  	  
	  
After	  consultation	  with	  Mālikī	  scholars,	  Thanawi,	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  Mufti	  
Kifayatullah	  and	  Maulana	  Husayn	  Ahmad	  Madani,	  put	  these	  principles	  into	  practice,	  
borrowing	  rulings	  from	  the	  Mālikī	  fiqh	  where	  he	  felt	  that	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school	  of	  
thought	  provided	  no	  recourse.	  However,	  he	  did	  so	  in	  a	  very	  nuanced	  way,	  taking	  
what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  essential	  elements	  to	  provide	  women	  with	  
marital	  relief.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  husband’s	  insanity,	  the	  prevailing	  view	  of	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  
at	  that	  time	  was	  that	  a	  woman	  could	  not	  petition	  for	  a	  divorce,	  whereas	  the	  Mālikī,	  
Shāfiʿī	  and	  Ḥanbalī	  schools	  of	  law	  all	  agreed	  that	  she	  could.	  In	  his	  fatwa,	  although	  
Thanawi	  had	  the	  option	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  Mālikī	  school,	  he	  chose	  instead	  to	  rely	  on	  
the	  opinion	  of	  Muhammad	  al-­‐Shaybānī,	  one	  of	  the	  prominent	  students	  of	  Abū	  
Ḥanīfa.	  This	  allowed	  him	  to	  manoeuvre	  very	  sensitively	  between	  the	  schools	  to	  
ensure	  that	  he	  retained	  the	  allegiance	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  ʿulamāʾ.	  	  Thanawi	  argued	  that	  al-­‐
Shaybānī	  accepted	  insanity,	  or	  janoon,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  three	  defects	  that	  warrant	  a	  
faskh,	  i.e.	  the	  option	  to	  divorce406.	  However,	  this	  is	  limited	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  wife	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discovers	  the	  insanity	  before	  the	  consummation	  of	  the	  marriage.	  	  Although	  Thanawi	  
proceeded	  to	  rely	  on	  Shaybānī’s	  rulings	  to	  prove	  his	  point,	  he	  returned	  to	  the	  Maliki	  
school	  for	  cases	  of	  insanity	  discovered	  after	  consummation.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  wife	  does	  
not	  initiate	  sexual	  relations	  after	  discovery	  of	  the	  insanity	  or	  expresses	  contentment	  
at	  the	  marriage,	  she	  still	  has	  the	  right	  to	  seek	  a	  divorce407.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  level	  of	  
insanity	  required	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  initiate	  proceedings,	  Thanawi	  again	  moved	  away	  
from	  Shaybānī’s	  view,	  which	  requires	  that	  the	  husband	  must	  be	  completely	  
unbearable	  to	  live	  with,	  and	  opted	  instead	  for	  the	  Mālikī	  opinion,	  which	  provides	  a	  
more	  lenient	  approach.	  Thanawi	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  husband	  does	  not	  reach	  the	  high	  
level	  of	  insanity	  required	  by	  Shaybānī,	  but	  the	  wife	  still	  cannot	  tolerate	  living	  with	  
him,	  she	  may	  rely	  on	  the	  Mālikī	  ruling,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  provide	  for	  
her,	  analogous	  to	  the	  case	  of	  a	  miserly	  husband.408	  
A	  similar	  approach	  is	  taken	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  missing	  husband,	  which	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  restrictive	  elements	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school409.	  	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  
commonly	  held	  view	  is	  that	  a	  woman	  can	  only	  remarry	  when	  her	  missing	  husband	  
reaches	  such	  an	  age	  that	  he	  must	  be	  presumed	  dead.	  This	  has	  ranged	  from	  70	  to	  90	  
years	  of	  age.	  In	  his	  chapter	  on	  missing	  husbands,	  Thanawi	  explains	  that	  the	  Ḥanafī	  
school	  has	  not	  always	  been	  as	  strict	  as	  this	  in	  implementing	  the	  rule,	  and	  gives	  
examples	  of	  Ḥanafī	  scholars	  of	  the	  earlier	  centuries	  adopting	  the	  more	  lenient	  Mālikī	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approach410.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  missing	  husband,	  the	  Mālikī	  school	  demands	  a	  four-­‐
year	  waiting	  period	  before	  a	  wife	  can	  request	  a	  divorce.	  Thanawi	  adopts	  this	  
position,	  but	  in	  an	  addendum	  placed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chapter,	  he	  mentions	  a	  
minority	  view	  within	  the	  Mālikī	  fiqh	  that	  allows	  a	  wife	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  divorce	  after	  
her	  husband	  has	  been	  missing	  for	  a	  year	  if	  she	  can	  wait	  no	  longer.411	  After	  
mentioning	  several	  times	  that	  this	  decision	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  lightly,	  Thanawi	  
ultimately	  concedes	  that	  this	  right	  is	  available	  to	  her	  if	  she	  fears	  the	  commitment	  of	  
zina	  (adultery).	  In	  effect,	  Thanawi	  is	  stating	  that	  a	  wife	  can	  apply	  to	  the	  court	  for	  an	  
immediate	  dissolution	  of	  her	  marriage	  after	  one	  year	  has	  lapsed.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  
Thanawi’s	  reasoning	  and	  concerns	  that	  although	  madhhab	  allegiance	  is	  of	  primary	  
importance,	  other	  social	  concerns	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  making	  a	  
ruling.	  Here,	  a	  woman’s	  sexual	  fulfilment	  is	  seen	  as	  one	  such	  concern	  that	  needs	  to	  
be	  taken	  seriously,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  Thanawi	  is	  prepared	  to	  go	  beyond	  his	  own	  
school	  and	  follow	  the	  minority	  opinion	  of	  another	  school.	  However,	  he	  comes	  to	  this	  
conclusion	  in	  a	  stepwise	  manner	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  reader	  is	  completely	  aware	  of	  
his	  allegiance	  and	  that	  he	  prioritises	  his	  own	  school	  of	  thought	  and	  moves	  away	  
from	  it	  out	  of	  necessity	  rather	  than	  mere	  choice.	  	  	  
Thanawi	  also	  borrows	  heavily	  from	  the	  Mālikī	  school	  in	  the	  case	  where	  a	  husband	  
fails	  to	  provide	  financially	  for	  his	  wife	  whilst	  refusing	  to	  divorce	  her.	  	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  
does	  not	  specifically	  mention	  this	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  divorce	  (since	  it	  assumes	  that	  she	  
would	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  the	  courts),	  so	  Thanawi	  presents	  a	  series	  of	  rulings	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based	  on	  Mālikī	  teachings.	  If	  a	  woman	  does	  her	  best	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce	  from	  her	  
husband	  but	  is	  not	  successful,	  then	  she	  may	  apply	  to	  the	  court	  for	  a	  divorce	  if	  there	  
is	  no	  other	  means	  of	  securing	  financial	  assistance	  for	  her,	  or	  if	  she	  can	  fulfil	  her	  
financial	  needs	  herself	  but	  must	  leave	  her	  husband	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  
fears	  that	  she	  might	  fall	  into	  sin412.	  
	  
The	  final,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  controversial,	  aspect	  of	  Thanawi’s	  fatwa	  concerns	  the	  
effect	  of	  apostasy	  on	  marriage.	  Thanawi	  asked	  his	  student,	  Muhammad	  Shafi,	  to	  
write	  this	  fatwa	  on	  his	  behalf,	  and	  it	  was	  signed	  and	  then	  attached	  to	  the	  original	  
fatwa.	  	  Previously,	  Thanawi	  had	  ruled	  that	  the	  majority	  opinion	  under	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  
was	  that	  apostasy	  necessarily	  dissolved	  a	  marriage,	  and	  so	  a	  woman	  would	  have	  to	  
be	  forced	  to	  convert	  and	  then	  remarry	  her	  first	  husband.	  However,	  circumstance	  
now	  dictated	  that	  this	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  feasible	  option,	  since	  no	  Muslim	  authority	  
existed	  to	  force	  a	  conversion	  and	  remarriage.	  Muhammad	  Shafi	  outlines	  three	  
opinions	  within	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school.	  The	  first	  opinion	  had	  already	  been	  posited	  by	  
Thanawi	  and	  other	  ʿulamāʾ:	  that	  apostasy	  dissolves	  a	  marriage.	  The	  second	  opinion	  
was	  a	  minority	  one	  held	  by	  the	  jurists	  of	  Balqh,	  Samarqand	  and	  Bukhara:	  that	  
apostasy	  did	  not	  annul	  or	  dissolve	  a	  marriage.	  The	  third	  opinion	  within	  Ḥanafī	  law	  
was	  that	  the	  apostasy	  of	  the	  wife	  resulted	  in	  her	  becoming	  a	  slave	  of	  the	  husband	  in	  
dar	  al-­‐Islam	  (the	  abode	  of	  Islam)413.	  Shafi	  rejected	  the	  third	  opinion	  outright,	  as	  not	  
only	  had	  slavery	  been	  banned	  in	  India,	  but	  this	  opinion	  was	  detrimental	  to	  women	  
and	  thus	  defeated	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  fatwa.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  first	  opinion,	  Shafi	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stated	  that	  due	  to	  the	  societal	  conditions	  in	  India,	  “it	  is	  impossible	  to	  act	  upon	  the	  
first	  opinion	  since	  after	  pronouncing	  the	  annulment	  of	  the	  marriage	  the	  Muslims	  
have	  no	  power	  to	  assert	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  marriage”414.	  He	  thus	  opted	  for	  the	  
minority	  opinion	  within	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school	  –	  that	  apostasy	  would	  no	  longer	  dissolve	  
a	  marriage	  –	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  major	  theological	  shift	  from	  rulings	  reaching	  back	  
hundreds	  of	  years.	  This	  fatwa	  was	  signed	  not	  only	  by	  Thanawi	  but	  also	  by	  other	  
Indian	  ʿulamāʾ,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  its	  insertion	  into	  the	  subsequent	  Dissolution	  of	  
Muslim	  Marriages	  Act.	  
	  
Thanawi’s	  work	  was	  of	  importance	  because	  it	  served	  to	  unify	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  in	  
demanding	  changes	  to	  the	  law	  that	  were	  now	  perceived	  as	  forming	  an	  ‘authentic’	  
version	  of	  Islam.	  	  By	  issuing	  Al-­‐Hīla	  al-­‐Nājiza	  li’l-­‐Halīlāt	  al-­‐’Ājiza,	  his	  fatwa	  contained	  
meticulous	  research	  and	  delicately	  formed	  legal	  arguments.	  	  It	  also	  enhanced	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  by	  creating	  new	  loci	  of	  authority	  that	  had	  been	  slowly	  
whittled	  away	  by	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  qāḍīs.	  For	  the	  British	  colonial	  rulers,	  it	  provided	  
a	  strong	  legal	  base	  from	  which	  they	  could	  create	  new	  legal	  change.	  	  They	  had	  
already	  been	  responsible	  for	  narrowing	  the	  scope	  of	  Islamic	  law	  through	  the	  
codifying	  of	  ‘Muhammadan	  Law’.	  Thanawi’s	  fatwa	  provided	  them	  with	  the	  impetus	  
to	  secure	  much-­‐needed	  rights	  without	  alienating	  the	  Muslim	  community	  by	  
legislating	  so	  directly	  in	  their	  personal	  sphere.	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This	  strong	  theological	  support	  brought	  together	  an	  ideologically	  diverse	  set	  of	  
Muslims	  to	  push	  forward	  divorce	  reform.	  Qazi	  Muhammad	  Kazmi,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  
bill,	  was	  a	  prominent	  lawyer,	  and	  represented	  the	  orthodox	  Jamat-­‐ul-­‐Mana415.	  He	  
led	  a	  committee	  which	  was	  supported	  by	  Jamia	  al-­‐’ulema	  al-­‐Hind,	  a	  broad	  umbrella	  
organisation	  of	  Indian	  ʿulamāʾ416,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  British-­‐trained	  Bohri-­‐Shia	  lawyer	  
Asaf	  A.A.	  Fyzee417,	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Jinnah,	  and	  Sir	  Zafrullah	  Khan,	  all	  prominent	  
reformist	  lawyers.	  	  The	  committee	  put	  forward	  Thanawi’s	  recommendations,	  with	  
particular	  emphasis	  that	  a	  married	  Muslim	  woman’s	  apostasy	  would	  not	  dissolve	  
her	  marriage,	  and	  that	  Muslim	  judges	  should	  be	  appointed	  to	  handle	  divorce	  cases.	  
However,	  the	  reformist	  lawyers	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  request	  for	  Muslim	  judges.	  The	  
ʿulamāʾ	  saw	  this	  as	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  courts	  to	  have	  the	  power	  to	  dissolve	  the	  
marital	  contract,	  but	  the	  lawyers	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  dangerous	  judicial	  precedent.	  After	  
much	  debate,	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  1939	  (DMMA)	  was	  passed.	  
Eight	  years	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  Al-­‐Hīla	  al-­‐Nājiza	  li’l-­‐Halīlāt	  al-­‐’Ājiza,	  the	  DMMA	  
expanded	  the	  number	  of	  situations	  where	  a	  woman	  would	  be	  entitled	  to	  divorce	  her	  
husband,	  which	  went	  far	  beyond	  what	  Thanawi	  had	  ever	  recommended.	  Not	  only	  
were	  women	  entitled	  to	  a	  divorce	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  husband’s	  impotence,	  financial	  
negligence	  or	  prolonged	  absence,	  but	  they	  were	  also	  allowed	  to	  petition	  for	  divorce	  
in	  cases	  where	  the	  husband	  “habitually	  assaults	  her	  or	  makes	  her	  life	  miserable	  by	  
cruelty	  of	  conduct	  even	  if	  such	  conduct	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  physical	  ill-­‐
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treatment”;418	  where	  he	  “associates	  with	  women	  of	  evil	  repute	  or	  leads	  an	  infamous	  
life”;419	  or	  in	  the	  case	  that	  “he	  has	  more	  wives	  than	  one,	  [he]	  does	  not	  treat	  her	  
equitably	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  injunctions	  of	  the	  Qur’an”420.	  All	  of	  these	  
provisions	  could	  be	  justified	  under	  Māliki	  law,	  and	  they	  show	  how	  far	  Thanawi’s	  
efforts	  to	  use	  Māliki	  rulings	  were	  taken,	  even	  at	  such	  an	  early	  date.	  
	  
When	  the	  law	  was	  finally	  passed,	  however,	  it	  differed	  in	  three	  crucial	  elements	  from	  
the	  original	  recommendations	  of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ.	  Firstly,	  the	  right	  to	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ	  was	  
not	  made	  part	  of	  the	  DMMA.	  Although	  it	  was	  recognised	  as	  a	  procedure	  under	  
Islamic	  law	  and	  could	  be	  enforced	  in	  the	  courts	  as	  a	  valid	  contract,	  it	  was	  not	  given	  
statutory	  protection.	  Secondly,	  the	  DMMA	  was	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  
and	  to	  all	  Shia	  Muslims	  as	  well.	  Finally,	  the	  cases	  were	  not	  reserved	  to	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  Muslim	  judges	  alone,	  as	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  had	  wanted,	  but	  would	  be	  heard	  
by	  all	  judges	  irrespective	  of	  faith.	  This	  last	  change	  caused	  the	  social	  consensus	  that	  
had	  been	  behind	  the	  bill	  to	  collapse.	  The	  Jamia-­‐ul-­‐ulema	  and	  Thanawi	  were	  unhappy	  
with	  the	  final	  form	  of	  the	  act,	  as	  it	  removed	  the	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  Muslim	  
judges	  to	  hear	  suits	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriages.	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  DMMA	  
gave	  powers	  to	  the	  court	  to	  dissolve	  a	  marriage	  contract,	  rather	  than	  just	  rescind	  it.	  
They	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  power	  to	  delegate	  a	  ṭalāq,	  which	  could	  
only	  be	  given	  to	  a	  Muslim421.	  	  They	  made	  several	  attempts	  to	  persuade	  Jinnah	  to	  
amend	  the	  legislation,	  declaring	  it	  un-­‐Islamic.	  If	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  could	  not	  conduct	  a	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  Dissolution	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marriage	  ceremony,	  how	  was	  it	  possible	  that	  non-­‐Muslims	  could	  then	  dissolve	  a	  
marriage422?	  The	  insistence	  on	  restricting	  the	  DMMA	  to	  the	  purview	  of	  Muslim	  
judges	  was	  also	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  to	  regain	  lost	  ground	  in	  the	  Indian	  
subcontinent.	  The	  codification	  of	  Islamic	  law	  into	  limited	  English	  texts	  wrested	  
authority	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  ʿulamāʾ	  and	  put	  it	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  secular-­‐
trained	  judges	  and	  lawyers.	  The	  Quazi’s	  Act	  of	  1880423	  had	  already	  taken	  away	  the	  
ʿulamāʾs’	  judicial	  and	  administrative	  powers,	  and	  so	  the	  DMMA	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
regain	  this	  lost	  authority.	  	  However,	  the	  reform	  process	  that	  Thanawi	  had	  so	  
diligently	  supported	  was	  not	  to	  be	  stopped,	  going	  far	  beyond	  what	  he	  had	  
envisaged.	  	  
	  
3.6	  Post-­‐Partition	  and	  Reform	  of	  the	  Divorce	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  
After	  partition	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  in	  1947,	  the	  
DMMA	  continued	  to	  retain	  its	  validity	  and	  applicability	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  Although	  
it	  had	  led	  to	  substantial	  reforms	  in	  the	  divorce	  laws,	  however,	  inequity	  still	  
remained424.	  	  The	  DMMA	  did	  not	  recognise	  incompatibility	  of	  temperament	  as	  a	  
hardship:	  thus,	  a	  woman	  could	  only	  sue	  for	  divorce	  if	  she	  could	  prove	  one	  of	  the	  
fault-­‐based	  grounds	  outlined.	  However,	  most	  women	  were	  unable	  to	  bypass	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422	  Archana	  Parashar,	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  and	  Family	  Law	  Reform	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  Code	  
and	  Gender	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  (London:	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  The	  Quazi’s	  Act	  of	  1880,	  Act	  XII.	  The	  preamble	  of	  the	  Act	  limits	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
qāḍīs	  to	  conducing	  marriage	  ceremonies	  and	  other	  religious	  rites	  whilst	  S4	  (a)	  
clearly	  states	  that	  no	  judicial	  or	  administrative	  powers	  are	  to	  be	  conferred	  upon	  
them.	  
424	  Esposito	  and	  DeLong-­‐Bas,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  79.	  	  See	  also	  Chapter	  
Four	  of	  this	  thesis	  for	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  DMMA.	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high	  evidentiary	  rules	  set	  by	  the	  courts.	  Moreover,	  the	  khulʿ	  was	  still	  being	  
interpreted	  as	  requiring	  a	  husband’s	  consent,	  and	  was	  given	  no	  statutory	  
importance.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  women	  still	  faced	  the	  prospect	  of	  suffering	  hardship	  
in	  a	  marriage,	  perhaps	  disliking	  their	  partners	  vehemently	  but	  having	  no	  recourse	  
to	  the	  law,	  unlike	  their	  husbands,	  who	  still	  had	  the	  unilateral	  right	  to	  divorce.	  
Importantly,	  if	  a	  husband	  took	  another	  wife	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  his	  first	  wife,	  the	  
DMMA	  did	  not	  outline	  this	  as	  sufficient	  grounds	  for	  the	  first	  wife	  to	  seek	  a	  divorce.	  
This	  issue	  came	  to	  the	  forefront	  when	  the	  third	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Pakistan,	  
Muhammad	  Ali	  Bogra,	  took	  a	  second	  wife425,	  permissible	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  
polygamy,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  catalyst	  for	  further	  reform.	  	  	  	  	  
As	  the	  newly	  formed	  Pakistani	  state	  gained	  its	  footing,	  calls	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  family	  
laws	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  circulate	  amongst	  the	  elite.	  Women’s	  groups	  began	  to	  
form	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  rights	  of	  women.	  Rouse	  (1984)	  describes	  these	  groups	  
as	  ‘bourgeois’426	  because	  the	  women	  belonged	  to	  either	  the	  ruling	  families	  or	  the	  
judiciary,	  which	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  less	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  state427.	  However,	  it	  
was	  this	  very	  demographic	  that	  served	  their	  cause	  well.	  The	  first	  wife	  of	  Prime	  
Minister	  Ali	  Bogra	  belonged	  to	  the	  All-­‐Pakistan	  Women’s	  Association	  (APWA),	  
which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  women’s	  groups	  advocating	  reform.	  It	  was	  led	  by	  
Begum	  Liaquat	  Ali	  Khan,	  who	  was	  the	  widow	  of	  the	  first	  prime	  minister	  of	  Pakistan,	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Liaquat	  Ali	  Khan428.	  	  Since	  members	  of	  the	  APWA	  all	  belonged	  to	  elite	  families,	  they	  
felt	  that	  Bogra’s	  actions	  set	  a	  dangerous	  precedent,	  and	  began	  protests	  against	  the	  
Prime	  Minister’s	  actions.	  Media	  attention	  was	  galvanised,	  and,	  as	  public	  opinion	  
gathered	  against	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  he	  commissioned	  a	  report	  to	  study	  the	  existing	  
laws	  on	  marriage,	  divorce,	  maintenance	  and	  other	  matters	  to	  see	  what	  reforms	  were	  
necessary.	  
	  
In	  1956	  the	  government	  appointed	  a	  seven-­‐member	  commission	  composed	  
predominantly	  of	  modern	  reformists.	  It	  was	  led	  by	  Chief	  Justice	  Abdur	  Rashid	  (and	  
was	  hence	  called	  the	  Rashid	  Commission),	  with	  one	  conservative	  scholar,	  Maulana	  
Haq,	  who	  ultimately	  wrote	  the	  dissenting	  opinion429.	  The	  Rashid	  Commission	  
addressed	  the	  methodology	  required	  for	  reform	  and	  proposed	  ijtihād	  as	  a	  
mechanism	  to	  initiate	  such	  reform.	  It	  outlined	  its	  definition	  of	  ijtihād	  as	  the	  
‘interpretative	  intelligence’	  of	  legislative	  enactments	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  within	  
the	  broad	  framework	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna430.	  This,	  it	  argued,	  was	  an	  
essential	  jurisprudential	  tool	  needed	  due	  to	  changing	  societal	  circumstances.	  
Justifying	  this	  reasoning,	  it	  drew	  on	  the	  famous	  philosopher	  Muhammad	  Iqbal	  and	  
his	  critical	  method	  of	  relying	  solely	  on	  established	  schools	  of	  thought	  when	  
addressing	  new	  problems	  that	  the	  Muslim	  community	  faced.	  Iqbal	  argued	  that	  the	  
Qurʾān	  provided	  a	  “dynamic	  outlook	  on	  life”,	  but	  that	  intellectual	  attitudes	  had	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  Haider,	  “Islamic	  Legal	  Reform,”	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  Mehdi,	  The	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  The	  Report	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  the	  Commission	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  reprinted	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reduced	  Islamic	  law	  to	  a	  state	  of	  immobility431.	  The	  Commission,	  citing	  Iqbal,	  
condemned	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law,	  stating	  that	  “‘undue	  reverence	  
for	  the	  past”	  had	  led	  scholars	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  era	  of	  creative	  and	  adaptive	  
legislation	  had	  passed432.	  The	  Rashid	  Commission	  lamented	  Muslim	  unwillingness	  
to	  cope	  with	  the	  rapidly	  advancing	  world:	  a	  world	  which	  required	  a	  modern	  
approach	  to	  enable	  “radical	  re-­‐modelling	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  judicial	  system”433.	  This	  
approach	  differed	  fundamentally	  from	  that	  of	  Thanawi	  when	  advocating	  reform	  of	  
the	  divorce	  law.	  Thanawi	  took	  great	  pains	  in	  asserting	  the	  importance	  of	  taqlīd	  and	  
following	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school	  of	  thought.	  He	  embraced	  doctrinal	  precedents	  as	  
fundamental	  postulates	  that	  underpinned	  the	  stability	  and	  certainty	  of	  Islamic	  
injunctions.	  Although	  he	  endorsed	  ijtihād	  within	  his	  fatwa,	  he	  did	  so	  carefully	  and	  
cautiously,	  appreciating	  the	  fact	  that	  ʿulamāʾ	  support	  for	  his	  radical	  reforms	  was	  
necessary	  if	  these	  reforms	  were	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  by	  the	  colonial	  rulers.	  
	  
The	  Rashid	  Commission	  was,	  however,	  not	  so	  subtle.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  tried	  to	  
pacify	  orthodox	  conservatives	  through	  its	  careful	  definition	  of	  ijtihād	  and	  the	  
manner	  of	  its	  employment.	  Ijtihād	  was	  described	  as	  the	  methodology	  from	  which	  
law	  was	  derived,	  rather	  than	  the	  law	  itself.	  Shariah	  was	  described	  as	  the	  fixed	  law	  of	  
Islam	  that	  was	  binding	  and	  could	  never	  be	  subject	  to	  change.	  This	  was	  distinguished	  
from	  fiqh,	  which	  was	  described	  as	  either	  having	  an	  interpretative	  function	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  law	  or	  as	  covering	  areas	  that	  were	  not	  envisaged	  by	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	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the	  Sunna434.	  Ijtihād	  was	  to	  take	  place	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  fiqh	  and	  not	  Shariah.	  The	  
Commission	  also	  reiterated	  its	  claims	  that	  it	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  going	  beyond	  the	  
fundamental	  principles	  of	  Islam,	  believing	  that	  if	  interpreted	  liberally,	  Qurʾānic	  
injunctions	  were	  capable	  of	  providing	  absolute	  justice435.	  However,	  as	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  who	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  engage	  in	  ijtihād,	  the	  Rashid	  Commission	  took	  
a	  more	  cavalier	  attitude.	  Traditionally,	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  had	  vested	  this	  
authority	  in	  mujtahids.	  The	  Rashid	  Commission,	  however,	  rebutted	  this	  tradition	  
and	  maintained	  that	  since	  Islam	  had	  no	  system	  of	  priesthood,	  and	  thus	  no	  
intellectual	  hierarchy,	  no	  person	  could	  claim	  to	  have	  special	  authority	  or	  privileges	  
when	  determining	  the	  law.	  The	  Rashid	  Commission	  had	  sent	  out	  hundreds	  of	  
questionnaires	  to	  the	  public	  to	  ascertain	  their	  views	  on	  key	  areas	  of	  reform.	  It	  
argued	  that	  the	  hundreds	  of	  Muslims	  who	  had	  answered	  the	  questionnaire	  were	  
exercising	  their	  judgment	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  fiqh,	  which	  they	  were	  free	  to	  do,	  
and	  that	  “law	  is	  ultimately	  related	  to	  life	  experiences	  which	  are	  not	  the	  monopoly	  of	  
the	  theologians	  only”436.	  The	  primary	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Rashid	  Commission	  
were	  to	  discourage	  polygamy	  and	  abolish	  the	  ‘triple	  ṭalāq’	  through	  regulation	  by	  the	  
courts.	  It	  also	  recommended	  compulsory	  registration	  of	  marriages,	  a	  prohibition	  on	  
child	  marriages,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  minimum	  age	  of	  marriage,	  procedural	  regulation	  
of	  the	  khulʿ,	  maintenance	  provisions	  for	  divorced	  women	  and	  inheritance	  rights	  for	  
grandchildren.	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Predictably,	  orthodox	  Muslims	  reacted	  vehemently	  to	  the	  Rashid	  Commission’s	  
reform	  proposals.	  Maulana	  Haq	  gave	  a	  scathing	  dissenting	  opinion	  regarding	  the	  
Rashid	  Commission’s	  findings	  and	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  report.	  One	  of	  his	  main	  
criticisms	  centred	  on	  the	  legal	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Rashid	  Commission	  in	  proposing	  
reforms.	  He	  described	  the	  members	  as	  laymen	  who	  had	  no	  right	  to	  formulate	  any	  
new	  reform	  agenda.	  	  Their	  views	  were	  described	  as	  un-­‐Islamic,	  and	  their	  definition	  
of	  ijtihād	  as	  a	  methodological	  tool	  within	  fiqh	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  derivation	  from	  religion,	  
based	  upon	  the	  personal	  whims	  of	  individuals	  whose	  definition	  of	  fiqh	  and	  ijtihād	  
was	  merely	  a	  distortion	  of	  religion437.	  
	  
This	  dissenting	  opinion	  reflected	  the	  tensions	  that	  existed	  not	  only	  within	  the	  
Rashid	  Commission	  itself	  but	  among	  the	  views	  of	  orthodox	  Muslims	  who	  felt	  that	  
the	  Rashid	  Commission	  was	  overstepping	  its	  legal	  authority	  within	  the	  Islamic	  
sphere.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  antagonism	  came	  from	  ʿulamāʾ	  who	  belonged	  to	  Jamaat-­‐i-­‐
Islami,	  a	  political	  organisation	  formed	  by	  Maulana	  Maududi438.	  This	  opposition	  was	  
part	  of	  a	  wider	  hostility	  that	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  felt	  towards	  the	  new	  military	  regime	  led	  by	  
Field	  Marshal	  Ayub	  Khan439.	  They	  viewed	  the	  military	  coup	  as	  a	  ploy	  to	  dismantle	  
the	  Islamic	  constitution	  and	  prevent	  Islamic	  parties	  from	  gaining	  victories	  in	  the	  
forthcoming	  elections440.	  	  Ayub	  Khan	  was	  also	  treated	  with	  suspicion,	  since	  he	  and	  
many	  of	  his	  contemporaries	  had	  been	  trained	  at	  Sandhurst	  and	  were	  “steeped	  in	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British	  Indian	  military	  tradition”441.	  	  Ayub	  Khan	  appointed	  British-­‐trained	  civil	  
servants	  to	  his	  cabinet	  and	  shifted	  the	  focus	  of	  constitutional	  debates	  “away	  from	  
why	  Pakistan	  was	  created	  to	  where	  Pakistan	  was	  heading,	  that	  is,	  from	  ideological	  
to	  developmental	  concerns”442.	  Part	  of	  this	  developmental	  process	  was	  the	  plan	  to	  
implement	  the	  Rashid	  Commission’s	  findings,	  which	  had	  reported	  earlier	  in	  1956.	  
Maulana	  Maududi	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  Commission’s	  definition	  of	  ijtihād	  and	  who	  
had	  the	  right	  to	  interpret	  law.	  He	  argued	  that	  if	  ijtihād	  was	  construed	  as	  an	  
“independent	  judgment	  upon	  a	  legal	  question”	  then	  this	  was	  no	  different	  from	  the	  
legal	  opinions	  of	  any	  modern	  legislator443.	  Conservative	  Muslims	  feared	  that	  if	  the	  
ability	  to	  interpret	  law	  was	  made	  so	  easy,	  then	  reforms	  proposed	  by	  the	  
Commission	  could	  be	  validated	  as	  Islamic	  and	  thus	  wrest	  further	  authority	  away	  
from	  the	  ʿulamāʾ.	  Maududi	  called	  into	  question	  the	  Commission’s	  claim	  that	  any	  
learned	  person	  has	  the	  right	  to	  interpret	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna.	  Maududi	  
believed	  this	  was	  the	  exclusive	  privilege	  of	  those	  who	  were	  well	  versed	  in	  the	  
Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna,	  and	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  neither	  the	  qualifications	  to	  
define	  ijtihād	  nor	  the	  right	  to	  practice	  it444.	  
	  
Despite	  strong	  opposition	  from	  conservative	  Muslims,	  women’s	  groups	  continued	  to	  
campaign	  for	  the	  proposals	  to	  be	  implemented.	  The	  newly	  burgeoning	  Pakistani	  
state	  was	  going	  through	  social	  and	  cultural	  change.	  Field	  Marshal	  Ayub	  Khan	  in	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particular	  had	  an	  aversion	  to	  extremist	  elements	  in	  society,	  whom	  he	  felt	  were	  
responsible	  for	  holding	  back	  the	  masses.	  Coupled	  with	  higher	  education	  and	  
employment	  for	  women,	  who	  were	  entering	  fields	  that	  had	  been	  impossible	  for	  
them	  to	  penetrate	  prior	  to	  partition,	  groups	  now	  had	  the	  impetus	  they	  required	  to	  
push	  for	  reform.	  	  The	  ‘bourgeois’	  element	  of	  the	  APWA	  and	  the	  United	  Front	  for	  
Women’s	  Rights	  (UFWA),	  which	  had	  once	  held	  them	  back	  from	  pushing	  through	  
serious	  reforms,	  now	  worked	  to	  these	  groups’	  advantage.	  Chief	  Justice	  Abdur	  Rashid	  
also	  had	  female	  relatives	  in	  the	  Women’s	  Action	  Forum445,	  and	  so,	  by	  combining	  
their	  efforts,	  they	  pressurised	  the	  government	  to	  pass	  the	  Muslim	  Family	  Law	  
Ordinances	  in	  1960	  (MFLO).	  The	  major	  reforms	  introduced	  by	  the	  MFLO	  included	  
the	  compulsory	  registration	  of	  the	  nikāḥ446,	  the	  placing	  of	  restrictions	  on	  the	  
practice	  of	  polygamy447	  and	  the	  adding	  of	  notice	  requirements	  for	  the	  ṭalāq448.	  
	  
Although	  it	  was	  hailed	  as	  a	  major	  success	  towards	  giving	  women	  greater	  rights	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  family	  law449,	  the	  MFLO	  failed	  to	  implement	  many	  of	  the	  
recommendations	  of	  the	  Rashid	  Commission.	  The	  Commission	  had,	  for	  instance,	  
recommended	  complete	  abolition	  of	  the	  ‘triple	  ṭalāq’	  and	  the	  requirement	  that	  
courts	  be	  informed	  of	  a	  husband’s	  intention	  to	  divorce	  so	  that	  they	  could	  adjudicate	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  Mumtaz	  and	  Shaheed,	  Women	  in	  Pakistan,	  58.	  
446	  S.5	  MFLO	  1961.	  
447	  S.	  6	  MFLO	  1961	  requires	  a	  husband	  to	  seek	  permission	  from	  the	  Arbitration	  
Council	  to	  contract	  another	  marriage.	  
448	  S.7	  MFLO	  1961	  requires	  a	  husband	  to	  notify	  the	  Arbitration	  Council	  and	  his	  wife	  
of	  his	  pronouncement	  of	  divorce	  and	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  reconciliation	  process	  
affected	  by	  the	  Council.	  
449	  See	  Muhammad	  Feroze,	  “The	  Reform	  in	  Family	  Laws	  in	  the	  Muslim	  World”,	  
Islamic	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  1	  (1962):	  126.	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over	  the	  matter.	  However,	  the	  MFLO	  watered	  down	  these	  provisions	  by	  simply	  
requiring	  a	  husband	  to	  notify	  the	  local	  union	  Arbitration	  Council	  of	  his	  
pronouncement.	  The	  Commission	  had	  also	  recommended	  the	  introduction	  of	  
supplementary	  legislation	  to	  make	  the	  khulʿ	  more	  certain	  and	  precise450,	  but	  this	  
recommendation	  was	  ignored	  in	  the	  final	  draft.	  Divorced	  women	  were	  also	  not	  
provided	  with	  any	  financial	  rights	  of	  maintenance,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  Commission.	  
Unlike	  the	  DMMA,	  which	  went	  much	  further	  than	  the	  reform	  proposals	  put	  forward	  
by	  Thanawi	  and	  his	  supporters,	  the	  MFLO	  was	  met	  with	  significant	  opposition	  from	  
conservative	  Muslims,	  who	  felt	  that	  the	  Commission	  was	  usurping	  many	  of	  the	  male	  
prerogatives	  of	  divorce	  and	  thus	  campaigned	  vehemently	  against	  it.	  The	  final	  form	  
of	  the	  MFLO	  indicates	  that	  the	  conservative	  forces	  in	  Pakistan	  were	  quite	  successful	  
in	  their	  campaign.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  Thanawi’s	  more	  nuanced	  and	  sophisticated	  
arguments	  proved	  more	  digestible	  to	  the	  religious	  community	  than	  those	  of	  the	  
Rashid	  Commission.	  
	  
Thanawi	  praised	  ijtihād	  throughout	  his	  fatwa,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  continually	  
emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  taqlīd	  in	  most	  matters.	  He	  defined	  ijtihād,	  but	  limited	  
it	  to	  areas	  where	  it	  was	  most	  needed.	  Moreover,	  when	  he	  needed	  to	  rely	  on	  even	  a	  
minority	  opinion	  of	  a	  different	  madhhab,	  he	  continually	  stressed	  caution,	  
emphasising	  that	  such	  interpretative	  legislation	  needed	  to	  be	  made	  carefully	  and	  
cautiously.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  although	  Thanawi	  eventually	  supported	  the	  
view	  that	  apostasy	  should	  not	  automatically	  dissolve	  a	  marriage,	  he	  did	  not	  write	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this	  fatwa	  himself,	  but	  asked	  his	  senior	  student	  to	  do	  so	  on	  his	  behalf.	  Although	  he	  is	  
often	  quoted	  as	  being	  its	  author,	  perhaps	  he	  wished	  to	  create	  a	  subtle	  distance	  from	  
it,	  acknowledging	  that	  this	  was	  a	  major	  shift	  from	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence.	  The	  Rashid	  
Commission,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  took	  a	  more	  open	  and	  obvious	  route.	  It	  made	  its	  
intentions	  clear	  from	  the	  outset,	  and	  seemed	  to	  do	  little	  to	  pacify	  the	  conservative	  
Muslims.	  Its	  language	  was	  couched	  in	  an	  almost	  arrogant	  way,	  claiming	  total	  
authority	  in	  interpreting	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  Sunna.	  Perhaps	  if	  it	  had	  employed	  the	  use	  
of	  more	  classical	  authorities,	  and	  at	  least	  attempted	  to	  show	  some	  deference	  to	  the	  
religious	  ʿulamāʾ,	  the	  opposition	  might	  not	  have	  been	  so	  great	  –opposition	  which	  
continues	  to	  this	  day.	  	  
	  
3.7	  Conclusion	  
Whilst	  looking	  at	  the	  history	  of	  divorce	  law	  in	  South	  Asia,	  two	  important	  debates	  
emerge	  regarding	  Muslim	  personal	  law.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  gender,	  
focusing	  in	  particular	  on	  improving	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  in	  law	  reform;	  and	  
secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  Muslim	  law	  itself.	  If	  Islam	  is	  divinely	  ordained,	  is	  it	  
immutable	  and	  unchanging,	  or	  is	  there	  scope	  for	  creativity	  and	  change	  according	  to	  
the	  needs	  of	  an	  evolving	  society?	  These	  two	  debates	  are	  closely	  intertwined.	  
Historical	  accounts	  of	  Muslim	  women	  in	  South	  Asia	  are	  couched	  within	  the	  
parameters	  of	  Islamic	  practices451,	  and	  this	  has	  led	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	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  Ahmed,	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consistent	  and	  uniform	  Muslim	  polity,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  highly	  differentiated	  and	  
heterogeneous	  community452.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  consensus	  amongst	  some	  
commentators	  that	  women’s	  rights	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Islamic	  
doctrine.	  The	  right	  to	  practice	  religion	  is	  put	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  to	  
gain	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  law	  and	  improve	  their	  situation453.	  	  However,	  throughout	  
this	  chapter	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  show	  that	  these	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive,	  and	  that	  
the	  debates	  and	  impetus	  for	  reform	  in	  the	  1930s	  regarding	  women’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  
were	  built	  upon	  the	  premise	  that	  equal	  access	  to	  Muslim	  law	  would	  naturally	  lead	  to	  
the	  improvement	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  
	  
Moreover,	  previous	  accounts	  of	  the	  DMMA	  have	  either	  focused	  simply	  on	  the	  
theological	  changes	  that	  it	  brought454	  or	  analysed	  it	  within	  a	  wider	  context	  of	  
galvanising	  national	  identities	  and	  the	  crisis	  that	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  were	  facing	  under	  
colonial	  rule	  in	  India	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  control	  the	  sphere	  of	  women’s	  roles	  in	  order	  
to	  reassert	  their	  religious	  authority455.	  However,	  the	  above	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452	  Zoya	  Hasan	  and	  Ritu	  Menon,	  Unequal	  Citizens:	  The	  Status	  of	  Muslim	  Women	  in	  
India	  (New	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  	  Their	  survey	  found	  that	  post-­‐
colonial	  academic	  literature	  was	  dominated	  by	  debates	  that	  viewed	  Muslims	  and	  
Muslim	  women	  as	  a	  monolithic	  category,	  perpetuating	  a	  reductive	  thesis	  of	  Islamic	  
history,	  culture	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  politics.	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  Rajan	  Sundar,	  The	  Scandal	  of	  the	  State:	  Women,	  Law	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  
Postcolonial	  India	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  	  See	  also	  Shibany	  Roy,	  
Status	  of	  Women	  in	  North	  India	  (New	  Delhi:	  B.R	  Publishers,	  1979),	  who	  sees	  Muslim	  
personal	  law	  as	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  the	  reason	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  women’s	  subordinate	  status.	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  Tahir	  Mehmood,	  Statute	  Law	  Relating	  to	  Muslims	  in	  India:	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  Study	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  Islamic	  and	  
Constitutional	  Perspectives	  (New	  Delhi:	  Institute	  of	  Objective	  Studies,	  1995);	  Fyzee,	  
Outlines	  of	  Muhammadan	  Law.	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  Minhault,	  “Women,	  Legal	  Reform	  and	  Muslim	  Identity	  in	  South	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  Kumkum	  
Sangari,	  “Gender	  Lines:	  Personal	  Laws,	  Uniform	  Laws,	  Conversions,”	  Social	  Scientist	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despite	  being	  flawed,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  DMMA	  illustrates	  how	  conservative	  
ʿulamāʾ,	  liberals,	  and	  women’s	  groups	  were	  able	  to	  create	  a	  consensus	  and	  pass	  a	  
law	  that	  enhanced	  women’s	  rights,	  going	  even	  further	  than	  they	  had	  themselves	  
envisaged456.	  By	  using	  the	  principles	  of	  taqlīd,	  takhayyur	  and	  talfīq,	  although	  this	  
proved	  to	  be	  the	  last	  alliance	  between	  conservative	  ʿulamāʾ	  and	  modernist	  
reformers,	  this	  strategy	  went	  against	  the	  fixed	  and	  static	  Muslim	  law	  that	  had	  been	  
imagined	  by	  the	  colonial	  state.	  
Finally,	  this	  episode	  illustrates	  the	  importance	  of	  gaining	  the	  support	  of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  
and	  other	  religious	  bodies	  when	  proposing	  reforms.	  Demands	  for	  change	  cannot	  
occur	  within	  a	  vacuum	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  	  Religious	  bodies	  in	  Muslim	  
countries	  cannot	  be	  ignored,	  particularly	  in	  Pakistan,	  where	  they	  hold	  great	  weight	  
and	  can	  sway	  public	  opinion.	  However,	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  often	  pit	  
themselves	  against	  the	  Shariah,	  or	  legislation	  that	  claims	  to	  be	  based	  on	  Shariah.	  
This,	  however,	  ignores	  the	  flexibility	  of	  Islamic	  teachings,	  the	  evolving	  character	  of	  
fiqh,	  and	  the	  important	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  equality	  that	  exist	  within	  Islamic	  
jurisprudence.	  Although	  the	  DMMA	  was	  not	  a	  perfect	  piece	  of	  legislation,	  and	  will	  be	  
the	  subject	  of	  critique	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  it	  is	  the	  MFLO	  that	  is	  continually	  
attacked	  as	  being	  ‘un-­‐Islamic’,	  with	  continuous	  calls	  for	  it	  to	  be	  rescinded.	  Most	  
recently,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology	  (CII),	  Maulana	  Mohammad	  
Khan	  Sherani,	  declared	  S.6	  of	  the	  MFLO	  to	  be	  un-­‐Islamic,	  as	  it	  requires	  a	  husband	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27,	  no.	  5/6	  (1999):	  17-­‐61.	  	  See	  also	  Archana	  Parashawar,	  Women	  and	  Family	  Law	  
Reform	  in	  India	  (New	  Delhi:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1996),	  155,	  who	  describes	  the	  efforts	  
of	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  to	  provide	  a	  limited	  right	  of	  divorce	  as	  illustrations	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
political	  process	  to	  confirm	  the	  hold	  of	  religion	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  people.	  
456	  De,	  “Mumtaz	  Bibi’s	  Broken	  Heart”,	  126.	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notify	  his	  wife	  of	  an	  impending	  second	  marriage	  and	  to	  request	  permission	  from	  the	  
local	  union	  councils457.	  However,	  during	  its	  inception,	  if	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  
had	  been	  taken	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  proposals	  for	  reform,	  and	  if	  emphasis	  had	  
been	  placed	  upon	  its	  validity	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  established	  Islamic	  principles	  
and	  the	  Ḥanafī	  madhhab,	  the	  perpetual	  attacks	  upon	  the	  MFLO	  might	  have	  lessened.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457	  Different	  clauses	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Family	  Law	  Ordinances	  are	  often	  attacked	  by	  the	  
Pakistan	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  Ideology	  as	  being	  un-­‐Islamic	  and	  out	  of	  the	  bounds	  of	  
Islam.	  	  See	  Dunya	  News,	  accessed	  April	  3rd	  2016	  
http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/214861-­‐Wifes-­‐permission-­‐not-­‐necessary-­‐for-­‐
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Chapter	  Three	  traced	  the	  legal	  and	  theological	  endeavours	  of	  lawyers	  and	  the	  
ʿulamāʾ	  of	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent	  to	  improve	  women’s	  right	  to	  seek	  a	  divorce.	  This	  
culminated	  in	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  (DMMA)	  in	  
1939,	  which	  increased	  the	  grounds	  upon	  which	  a	  Muslim	  woman	  could	  seek	  judicial	  
dissolution	  of	  her	  marriage.	  Based	  primarily	  on	  Mālikī	  fiqh,	  it	  radically	  enhanced	  
women’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  and	  was	  heralded	  by	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  and	  
academics	  as	  the	  legislature’s	  answer	  to	  the	  unilateral	  power	  of	  a	  Muslim	  man’s	  
right	  to	  divorce	  his	  wife458.	  Yet,	  whilst	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  DMMA	  provide	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  grounds	  for	  women	  to	  seek	  a	  divorce,	  the	  nature	  of	  court	  proceedings	  
meant	  that	  women	  found	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  prove	  their	  allegations.	  This	  
chapter	  will	  therefore	  examine	  the	  obstacles	  that	  women	  faced	  whilst	  relying	  on	  the	  
Act,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  courts’	  failure	  to	  successfully	  implement	  these	  reforms.	  Through	  a	  
critical	  examination	  of	  Pakistani	  case	  law,	  this	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  by	  
deliberately	  requiring	  extremely	  high	  standards	  of	  proof,	  the	  courts	  appear	  to	  have	  
made	  concerted	  efforts	  to	  discourage	  women	  from	  relying	  on	  the	  fault-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458	  Vinithia	  Johnson,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Operation	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  
Marriages	  Act,	  1939,”	  Journal	  of	  Divorce	  &	  Remarriage	  52	  (2011):	  95.	  
	  
144	  
grounds	  of	  the	  DMMA,	  and	  instead	  have	  encouraged	  them	  to	  pursue	  divorce	  under	  
the	  doctrine	  of	  khulʿ,	  which	  traditionally	  attracts	  a	  financial	  penalty.	  	  
	  
Part	  two	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  seek	  to	  show	  that	  this	  judicial	  strategy	  has	  not	  always	  
been	  adopted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  male	  chauvinistic	  attitudes	  to	  penalise	  women	  for	  daring	  
to	  initiate	  divorce,	  but	  has	  been	  applied	  by	  some	  judges	  to	  provide	  women	  with	  the	  
relief	  they	  need	  whilst	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  constraints	  
that	  prevail	  within	  Pakistani	  society	  against	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce.	  This	  part	  of	  
the	  chapter	  will	  also	  delineate	  the	  theological	  obstacles	  faced	  by	  the	  courts	  in	  
attempting	  to	  create	  a	  ‘no-­‐fault’	  khulʿ	  divorce	  law	  and	  the	  modifications	  they	  
introduced	  to	  this	  traditional	  doctrine.	  It	  will	  examine	  case	  law	  and	  illustrate	  that	  
despite	  early	  failings	  by	  the	  courts,	  rather	  than	  curtail	  women’s	  rights	  to	  marital	  
freedom,	  they	  have	  now	  made	  great	  strides	  in	  the	  area	  of	  divorce	  law	  reform.	  
	  
4.2	  Judicial	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  
(DMMA)	  1939	  
The	  DMMA	  was	  the	  final	  piece	  of	  family	  law	  legislation	  to	  be	  enacted	  before	  the	  	  
partition	  of	  India	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan	  as	  an	  independent	  state459.	  Although	  
it	  was	  intended	  to	  consolidate	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  dissolution	  of	  
marriages	  by	  women,	  its	  primary	  purpose	  was	  to	  relieve	  the	  ‘unspeakable	  misery’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459	  De	  Mumtaz,	  “Bibi’s	  Broken	  Heart”,	  84.	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faced	  by	  Muslim	  women	  trapped	  in	  unhappy	  marriages460.	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  DMMA	  
set	  out	  the	  grounds	  upon	  which	  a	  Muslim	  woman	  could	  apply	  to	  the	  court	  for	  a	  
divorce.	  This	  includes	  the	  husband’s	  desertion	  for	  four	  years461,	  the	  husband’s	  
neglect	  or	  failure	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  for	  two	  years462,	  the	  husband’s	  imprisonment	  
for	  seven	  years	  or	  more463,	  his	  impotence464,	  insanity,	  or	  contraction	  of	  a	  virulent	  
disease,465	  and	  the	  option	  of	  puberty466.	  Cruelty	  by	  the	  husband	  is	  another	  ground,	  
which	  is	  defined	  through	  six	  further	  elements:	  mental	  and	  psychological	  cruelty467,	  
the	  husband’s	  immoral	  conduct468,	  disposal	  of	  the	  wife’s	  property469,	  obstructing	  
her	  observance	  of	  her	  religion470	  and	  inequitable	  treatment	  of	  wives	  in	  a	  
polygamous	  marriage471.	  The	  final	  ground	  that	  a	  woman	  may	  rely	  upon	  is	  contained	  
in	  S.	  2	  (ix).	  This	  states	  that	  she	  may	  rely	  “on	  any	  other	  ground	  which	  is	  recognised	  as	  
valid	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriages	  under	  Muslim	  Law”472.	  Although	  the	  DMMA	  
does	  not	  specifically	  state	  what	  this	  entails,	  under	  classical	  Islamic	  law	  other	  valid	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460	  Statement	  of	  Objects	  and	  Reasons,	  Dissolution	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  1939.	  
461	  S.2(i)	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  1939	  (DMMA).	  
462	  S.2(ii)DMMA	  1939.	  
463	  S.2(iii)	  DMMA	  1939.	  
464	  S.2(v)DMMA	  1939.	  
465	  S2.	  (vi).	  	  See	  also	  Sohail	  Warraich	  and	  Cassandra	  Balchin,	  “Confusion	  Worse	  
Confounded:	  A	  Critique	  of	  Divorce	  Law	  and	  Legal	  Practice	  in	  Pakistan,”	  in	  Shaping	  
Women’s	  Lives:	  Laws,	  Practices	  in	  Pakistan,	  eds.	  Farida	  Shaheed	  et	  al	  (Karachi:	  
Shirkat	  Gah,	  1998),	  196.	  
466	  S.	  2	  (vii)	  DMMA.	  	  The	  option	  of	  puberty	  states	  that	  provided	  the	  marriage	  has	  not	  
been	  consummated	  if	  a	  father	  or	  other	  guardian	  has	  given	  his/her	  daughter	  in	  
marriage	  before	  she	  attained	  the	  age	  of	  sixteen	  years,	  and	  if	  the	  marriage	  was	  
repudiated	  before	  attaining	  the	  age	  of	  eighteen	  years,	  she	  may	  rely	  on	  this	  ground.	  
467	  S.2(viii)	  (a)	  DMMA	  1939.	  
468	  S.2(viii)(b)	  DMMA	  1939.	  
469	  S.2(viii)(d)	  DMMA	  1939.	  
470	  S.2(viii)(e)	  DMMA	  1939.	  
471	  S.2(viii)(f)	  DMMA	  1939.	  
472	  S2(ix)	  DMMA	  1939.	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grounds	  for	  divorce	  include	  the	  concept	  of	  liʾān,	  or	  false	  accusation	  of	  adultery	  
against	  the	  wife	  by	  the	  husband473,	  ṭalāq	  al-­‐tafwīḍ,	  and	  the	  khulʿ.	  In	  1961,	  the	  
Muslim	  Family	  Law	  Ordinance	  (MFLO)	  amended	  the	  DMMA	  and	  added	  another	  
ground	  for	  divorce,	  namely	  if	  the	  husband	  has	  taken	  an	  additional	  wife	  without	  
following	  the	  legal	  procedures	  set	  out	  in	  the	  MFLO474.	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  nature	  of	  S.2(ix)	  of	  the	  DMMA,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  
legislature	  to	  exactly	  specify	  what	  justifies	  a	  marital	  exit	  under	  Islamic	  law	  “turned	  
the	  clause	  into	  a	  meaningless	  dead	  letter	  for	  decades”475.	  Between	  1947,	  when	  
Pakistan	  became	  an	  independent	  state,	  and	  1959,	  the	  courts	  interpreted	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  
an	  option	  to	  be	  granted	  only	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband476.	  This	  meant	  that	  
most	  petitions	  for	  divorce	  relied	  on	  the	  statutory	  grounds,	  particularly	  the	  wife’s	  
allegations	  of	  cruelty	  by	  the	  husband	  or	  his	  failure	  to	  maintain	  his	  wife	  for	  two	  
years.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  1959,	  when	  the	  ground-­‐breaking	  case	  of	  Balqis	  Fatima	  v.	  Najm-­‐
ul-­‐Ikram477	  was	  heard,	  that	  the	  courts	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  irrespective	  of	  the	  husband’s	  
wishes.	  This	  provided	  wives	  with	  the	  option	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  DMMA	  and	  
alternatively	  applying	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  if	  they	  failed	  to	  prove	  one	  of	  the	  fault-­‐based	  
grounds.	  Under	  statutory	  provisions,	  the	  wife	  was	  entitled	  to	  a	  divorce	  without	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473	  Johnson,	  “A	  Note	  on	  the	  Operation	  of	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Muslim	  Marriages	  Act	  
1939,”	  98.	  
474	  S.	  2(ii)	  (a)	  DMMA	  1939.	  S.6	  of	  the	  1961	  MFLO	  states	  that	  a	  husband	  must	  seek	  
permission	  in	  writing	  from	  the	  Arbitration	  Council.	  	  S.6(3)	  allows	  a	  wife	  to	  nominate	  
a	  representative	  to	  the	  Council	  and	  place	  any	  objections	  against	  a	  second	  marriage	  
of	  her	  husband.	  	  If	  her	  husband	  fails	  to	  comply	  with	  these	  procedures,	  she	  has	  the	  
right	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  divorce	  under	  the	  DMMA.	  
475	  Karin	  Yefet,	  “The	  Constitution	  and	  Female	  Initiated	  Divorce	  in	  Pakistan,”	  578.	  
476	  See	  part	  two	  below	  for	  its	  judicial	  development.	  
477	  1959	  PLD	  Lah.	  566.	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financial	  liability.	  However,	  if	  a	  wife	  was	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  early	  years,	  she	  was	  
required	  to	  re-­‐pay	  her	  dower	  to	  her	  husband,	  placing	  an	  onerous	  financial	  burden	  
upon	  her.	  Although	  the	  khulʿ	  provided	  an	  easier	  exit	  from	  an	  unhappy	  marriage,	  the	  
financial	  liability	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  for	  women.	  	  
	  
As	  the	  years	  have	  progressed,	  the	  courts	  have	  constructed	  a	  high	  threshold	  of	  proof,	  
creating	  very	  few	  positive	  outcomes	  for	  women	  under	  these	  statutory	  provisions,	  
with	  the	  courts	  preferring	  to	  grant	  divorces	  under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  khulʿ.	  
Disappointingly,	  the	  courts	  have	  applied	  a	  very	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  what	  
constitutes	  cruelty	  under	  the	  Act.	  Such	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  proving	  the	  matrimonial	  
offences	  that	  Pakistani	  lawyers	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  forgetting	  what	  these	  fault-­‐
based	  grounds	  entail478.	  In	  practice,	  when	  women	  do	  decide	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce,	  
invariably	  they	  have	  been	  advised	  by	  their	  lawyers	  to	  rely	  both	  on	  the	  DMMA	  and	  
alternatively	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  khulʿ479.	  	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  a	  major	  problem	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  DMMA	  has	  been	  the	  
complicated	  procedural	  rules	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  courts.	  They	  are	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  
colonial	  courts	  of	  India,	  which	  has	  meant	  that	  litigation	  is	  prolonged,	  with	  divorce	  
cases	  taking	  more	  than	  six	  years	  to	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  in	  previouse	  years480.	  Part	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478	  Nadia	  Sonnveld,	  Khul,	  Divorce	  in	  Egypt:	  Public	  Debates,	  Judicial	  Practice	  and	  
Everyday	  Life	  (2009),	  PhD.	  Thesis,	  at	  6.5,	  quoted	  in	  Karin	  Yefet,	  “The	  Constitution	  
and	  Female	  Initiated	  Divorce	  in	  Pakistan,”	  611.	  
479	  Sohail	  Warraich,	  “Confusion	  Worse	  Confounded,”	  199.	  
480	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “Qurʾān:	  2:299:	  A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife?”	  95.	  	  However	  the	  
recent	  ammendments	  to	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  (1964)	  has	  a	  much	  quicker	  turn-­‐over	  
of	  divorce	  cases	  than	  before.	  	  See	  Chapter	  Seven	  for	  further	  details.	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of	  the	  delay	  was	  caused	  by	  the	  fault-­‐based	  nature	  of	  the	  grounds,	  since	  a	  petitioning	  
wife	  was	  required	  to	  substantiate	  one	  of	  the	  matrimonial	  offences	  upon	  which	  the	  
suit	  was	  filed.	  This	  proved	  to	  be	  problematic,	  as	  most	  wives	  in	  Pakistan	  live	  within	  
their	  husbands’	  extended	  families481.	  Proof	  of	  matrimonial	  offences	  requires	  
witnesses,	  who	  often	  belong	  to	  the	  husband’s	  family	  and	  therefore	  are	  reluctant	  to	  
come	  forward	  and	  testify	  against	  him482.	  This	  amounted	  to	  an	  almost	  unsurpassable	  
hurdle	  for	  women	  to	  overcome.	  In	  most	  instances	  women	  applied	  under	  s.2	  (vii),	  
citing	  the	  husband’s	  neglect	  or	  failure	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  for	  two	  years,	  and	  s.2	  
(viii)	  of	  the	  DMMA,	  alleging	  cruelty	  by	  the	  husband.	  However,	  without	  external	  
evidence,	  the	  courts	  were	  reluctant	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  contentions	  of	  the	  wife	  only483.	  If,	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  alleged	  cruelty,	  the	  wife	  fled	  the	  matrimonial	  home,	  failure	  to	  
succeed	  under	  s.2	  (viii),	  cruelty,	  meant	  that	  she	  was	  automatically	  disbarred	  from	  
relying	  on	  s.2	  (vii),	  failure	  to	  maintain484.	  The	  courts	  held	  that	  before	  a	  husband	  
could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  neglected	  or	  failed	  to	  provide	  maintenance	  for	  his	  wife,	  it	  must	  
be	  shown	  that	  he	  was	  under	  a	  legal	  duty	  to	  provide	  such	  maintenance485.	  Such	  a	  
duty	  was	  not	  considered	  to	  exist	  where	  the	  wife,	  through	  her	  own	  conduct,	  had	  led	  
the	  husband	  to	  stop	  the	  maintenance486.	  In	  an	  illustrative	  case	  of	  that	  time487,	  a	  wife	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481	  See	  Indralal	  De	  Silva,	  "Demographic	  and	  Social	  Trends	  Affecting	  Families	  in	  the	  
South	  and	  Central	  Asian	  Region,"	  in	  Major	  Trends	  Affecting	  Families:	  A	  Background	  
Document,	  Report	  for	  United	  Nations	  (Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  
Division	  for	  Social	  Policy	  and	  Development	  Program	  on	  the	  Family:	  May	  2003),	  4.	  
Accessed	  September	  16th	  2003.	  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/family/Publications/mtdesilva.pdf.	  	  	  
482	  Carroll,	  “Qurʾān:	  2:2992:	  A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife?”	  95.	  
483	  See	  Fazal	  Muhammad	  v.	  Mst.	  Umatur	  Rahim	  1949	  AIR	  Pesh.	  7.	  
484	  See	  Mst.	  Allah	  Jawai	  v.	  Farid	  1952	  PLD	  Lah.	  31.	  	  	  
485	  Zafar	  Hussain	  v.	  Mst.	  Akbari	  Begum	  1944	  Lah.	  336,	  
486	  Mst.	  Badrulnisa	  Bibi	  v.	  Syed	  Muhammad	  Yusuf	  1944	  AIR	  1944	  All.	  23	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alleged	  that	  she	  had	  been	  treated	  cruelly	  by	  her	  husband	  and	  falsely	  accused	  of	  
adultery,	  and,	  having	  been	  turned	  out	  of	  her	  house	  for	  three	  years,	  her	  husband	  then	  
neglected	  to	  provide	  maintenance	  for	  her	  during	  her	  absence	  from	  the	  matrimonial	  
home.	  As	  in	  many	  of	  these	  cases488	  the	  husband	  resisted	  the	  suit.	  Witnesses	  in	  
support	  of	  the	  husband	  rebutted	  witnesses	  affirming	  the	  wife’s	  claim.	  Since	  the	  wife	  
was	  unable	  to	  provide	  external	  evidence	  of	  her	  plea,	  she	  was	  blamed	  for	  voluntarily	  
leaving	  the	  matrimonial	  home,	  thus	  extinguishing	  any	  right	  to	  be	  legally	  maintained	  
by	  her	  husband489.	  
	  
Whilst	  adjudicating	  cases	  under	  S.	  2	  (viii),	  courts	  have	  often	  created	  a	  very	  narrow	  
interpretation	  of	  what	  constitutes	  cruelty	  under	  the	  Act.	  An	  explicatory	  case	  of	  this	  
time	  is	  Shahida	  Khan	  v.	  Abdul	  Rehim	  Khan490,	  where	  the	  wife	  relied	  on	  several	  
grounds	  under	  the	  DMMA.	  She	  claimed	  that	  her	  husband	  was	  a	  drunken	  womaniser,	  
was	  physically	  and	  mentally	  cruel	  to	  her,	  and	  had	  misappropriated	  her	  property.	  
During	  long,	  drawn-­‐out	  litigation,	  both	  the	  District	  and	  Family	  Courts	  rejected	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487	  Mst.	  Jannat	  v.	  Rahim	  Baksh	  1952	  PLD	  Baghdad-­‐ul-­‐Jadid	  47	  
488	  See	  also	  Fazal	  Muhammad	  v.	  Mst.	  Umatur	  Rahim	  1949	  AIR	  	  Pesh.	  7,	  Mst.	  
Badrulnisa	  Bibi	  v.	  Syed	  Muhammad	  Yusuf	  1944	  AIR	  1944	  All.	  23,	  
489	  Unfortunately	  there	  have	  only	  been	  a	  few	  instances	  where	  a	  wife	  was	  able	  to	  find	  
corroboration	  for	  her	  assertions	  and	  was	  able	  to	  succeed	  under	  the	  DMMA.	  	  In	  
Begum	  Zohra	  v.	  Maj.	  General	  Muhammad	  Ishafaqul	  Majid	  (1955	  PLD	  Sind	  378),	  the	  
wife	  was	  able	  to	  produce	  letters	  written	  by	  her	  husband	  admitting	  to	  beating	  her	  
and	  threatening	  to	  do	  so	  again.	  	  In	  Goas	  Ali	  v.	  Firoza	  Khatoon	  (1969	  PLD	  Dacca	  548),	  
the	  court’s	  own	  observation	  of	  the	  threatening	  demeanour	  of	  the	  husband	  
convinced	  them	  that	  the	  wife	  was	  telling	  the	  truth.	  See	  also	  Muhammad	  Salahuddin	  
v.	  Mst.	  Rubshana	  Saeed	  and	  2	  others	  1987	  CLC	  Kar	  163,	  Rahilan	  v.	  Sana	  Ullah	  1959	  
PLD	  1959	  (W.	  P.)	  Lah	  470	  and	  Mst.	  Asghari	  Sultana	  v.	  Chaudhry	  Shamim	  Ahmad	  and	  
2	  others	  2002	  CLC	  Lah	  123	  for	  instances	  where	  the	  courts	  have	  granted	  a	  divorce	  
under	  the	  DMMA.	  However,	  cases	  of	  this	  type	  have	  been	  rare.	  
490	  Shahida	  Khan	  v.	  Abdul	  Rehim	  Khan	  1984	  PLD	  Lah.	  365.	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wife’s	  claim	  for	  a	  divorce.	  On	  appeal	  to	  the	  Lahore	  High	  Court,	  even	  though	  the	  judge	  
stated	  that	  he	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  lower	  court’s	  assessment	  that	  there	  was	  
insufficient	  evidence	  to	  prove	  an	  offence	  under	  the	  DMMA491,	  he	  still	  refused	  to	  
grant	  a	  judicial	  divorce	  under	  the	  DMMA	  and	  awarded	  the	  wife	  a	  khulʿ	  instead492.	  A	  
common	  rationale	  for	  such	  judgments	  is	  the	  inaccurate	  definition	  that	  the	  courts	  
have	  given	  to	  cruelty.	  Section	  2(viii)	  of	  the	  DMMA	  states	  that	  if	  a	  husband	  ‘habitually	  
assaults’	  his	  wife,	  then	  she	  has	  grounds	  for	  divorce.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  courts	  
extended	  the	  ‘habitual’	  element	  to	  all	  types	  of	  ill	  treatment	  outlined	  under	  the	  
DMMA,	  inadvertently	  creating	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  proof.	  The	  DMMA	  defines	  cruelty	  
as	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  husband	  “habitually	  assaults”	  his	  wife	  and	  then	  states	  
separately	  “or	  makes	  her	  life	  miserable	  by	  cruelty	  of	  conduct	  even	  if	  such	  conduct	  
does	  not	  amount	  to	  physical	  ill-­‐treatment”493.	  It	  is	  manifestly	  clear	  that	  the	  ‘habitual’	  
element	  of	  the	  Act	  refers	  only	  to	  assault,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  remaining	  section	  of	  that	  
clause.	  Nevertheless,	  courts	  have	  still	  justified	  their	  conclusions	  by	  stating	  that	  a	  
wife	  must	  be	  “subjected	  to	  habitual	  cruel	  treatment”494.	  This,	  it	  is	  submitted,	  goes	  far	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491	  Shahida	  Khan	  v.	  Abdul	  Rehim	  Khan	  1984	  PLD	  Lah.	  365,	  para	  5.	  
492	  Similarly,	  in	  Bashiran	  Bibi	  v.	  Bashir	  Ahmad	  (1987	  PLD	  376),	  the	  wife	  provided	  
documentary	  evidence,	  supported	  by	  police	  records,	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  arrest	  warrant	  
and	  a	  criminal	  complaint,	  that	  her	  husband	  had	  beaten	  her,	  causing	  her	  to	  flee	  to	  her	  
mother’s	  house.	  	  She	  was	  then	  abducted,	  along	  with	  her	  family,	  and	  tortured	  until	  
she	  signed	  over	  property	  that	  she	  had	  inherited.	  	  Her	  complaint	  was	  also	  supported	  
by	  medical	  evidence	  and	  strong	  testimony	  by	  her	  family.	  However,	  the	  court	  found	  
that	  this	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  warrant	  ‘cruelty’	  under	  S.	  2	  (viii)	  and	  ordered	  a	  khulʿ-­‐
based	  divorce.	  
493	  S.2	  (viii)	  (a)	  DMMA.	  	  	  
494	  1975	  PLD	  Lah.	  766	  para	  (4).	  Similarly,	  in	  Abdul	  Majid	  v.	  Razia	  Bibi	  (1987	  PLD	  
376),	  the	  wife	  sued	  for	  divorce	  under	  the	  DMMA	  and	  khulʿ	  as	  an	  alternate	  remedy.	  	  
Under	  the	  DMMA,	  she	  relied	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  cruelty,	  ill	  repute	  and	  
misappropriation	  of	  property.	  	  The	  judge	  dismissed	  her	  claim	  under	  the	  DMMA,	  
finding	  that	  there	  “was	  not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  beyond	  any	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beyond	  what	  is	  legislatively	  required	  as	  constituting	  the	  standard	  of	  proof.	  The	  
DMMA	  does	  not	  require	  that	  the	  husband	  be	  ‘habitually’	  cruel,	  or	  that	  he	  ‘habitually’	  
appropriates	  the	  property	  of	  his	  wife.	  A	  single	  act	  of	  cruelty	  or	  misappropriation	  of	  
property	  should	  suffice	  under	  the	  law.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  unfortunate	  that	  courts	  have	  not	  been	  clear	  in	  defining	  and	  distinguishing	  
between	  the	  importance	  of	  granting	  a	  divorce	  under	  the	  DMMA	  and	  the	  financial	  
consequences	  of	  granting	  a	  woman	  a	  khulʿ.	  If	  a	  wife	  obtains	  a	  judicial	  divorce	  under	  
the	  DMMA,	  she	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  repay	  her	  husband	  any	  financial	  compensation.	  
However,	  if	  she	  is	  granted	  a	  khulʿ,	  she	  is	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  repay	  the	  mahr	  that	  
her	  husband	  might	  have	  given	  to	  her	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage.	  Yet	  the	  courts	  continue	  
to	  construe	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  DMMA	  very	  narrowly,	  even	  when	  finding	  
positively	  on	  one	  ground	  of	  the	  DMMA	  but	  still	  insisting	  on	  granting	  a	  khulʿ495.	  Given	  
that	  the	  courts	  give	  no	  reasons	  in	  their	  judgments	  for	  this	  policy	  of	  promoting	  the	  
khulʿ	  instead	  of	  issuing	  a	  remedy	  under	  the	  DMMA,	  the	  question	  naturally	  arises	  as	  
to	  why	  this	  phenomenon	  occurs.	  Pearl	  and	  Mensky	  (1998)	  argue	  that	  the	  judiciary	  
merely	  enforces	  its	  own	  social	  attitudes	  and	  cultural	  beliefs.	  This	  is	  difficult	  to	  
contest,	  since	  the	  highly	  patriarchal	  nature	  of	  Pakistani	  society	  and	  culture	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reasonable	  doubt	  that	  the	  petitioner	  was	  habitually	  cruel	  to	  the	  respondent”.	  	  See	  
1987	  PLD	  376	  para.	  8	  
495	  See	  Muhammad	  Sadiq	  v.	  Mst	  Aisha	  (1975	  PLD	  Lah.	  615),	  where	  a	  court	  found	  
that	  the	  chopping	  off	  of	  a	  wife’s	  nose	  could	  not	  be	  termed	  ‘habitually	  cruel’	  but	  the	  
subsequent	  physical	  scars	  and	  the	  resultant	  psychological	  ‘knots	  and	  barriers’	  
would	  create	  such	  deep	  hatred	  between	  the	  parties	  that	  this	  would	  suffice	  for	  the	  
wife	  to	  claim	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  See	  also	  Bibi	  Anwar	  Khatoon	  v.	  Gulab	  Shah	  (1988	  PLD	  Kar.	  
602),	  where	  an	  11-­‐year-­‐old	  girl’s	  marriage	  to	  her	  78-­‐year-­‐old	  impotent	  and	  violent	  
husband	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  cruel,	  but	  the	  courts	  still	  passed	  a	  khulʿ	  decree.	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already	  been	  briefly	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  elsewhere496.	  However,	  part	  of	  the	  
blame	  may	  also	  lie	  in	  the	  complex	  political	  history	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  enormous	  
pressures	  put	  on	  the	  judiciary	  through	  successive	  military	  dictatorships.	  Law,	  
religion	  and	  politics	  have	  always	  been	  inextricably	  linked	  in	  Pakistan,	  with	  the	  
curtailing	  of	  freedoms	  in	  one	  sphere	  negatively	  impacting	  the	  other.	  In	  order	  to	  
better	  understand	  why	  the	  courts	  refused	  to	  provide	  women	  with	  remedies	  under	  
the	  statutory	  regulations,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  situate	  the	  development	  of	  the	  DMMA	  
and	  the	  khulʿ	  within	  the	  changing	  political	  scene	  of	  Pakistan,	  particularly	  during	  the	  
first	  forty	  years	  after	  independence	  when	  the	  judicial	  precedent	  was	  set,	  providing	  a	  
socio-­‐political	  context	  for	  the	  judgements	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	  
	  
4.3	  Pakistani	  Politics,	  the	  DMMA	  and	  the	  Khulʿ	  
After	  Pakistan	  gained	  independence	  from	  British	  rule	  in	  1947,	  the	  newly	  formed	  
state	  experienced	  great	  economic	  and	  social	  upheaval	  through	  the	  migration	  of	  
millions	  of	  Muslims	  from	  India497.	  At	  first,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  movement	  
looked	  to	  continue	  through	  political	  activism	  post-­‐independence.	  It	  was	  during	  this	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  Maliha	  Gull	  Tarar	  and	  Venkat	  Pulla,	  “Patriarchy,	  Gender	  Violence	  and	  Poverty	  
amongst	  Pakistani	  Women:	  A	  Social	  Work	  Inquiry,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Social	  
Work	  and	  Human	  Services	  Practice	  l,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  56-­‐63;	  Valentine	  M.	  Moghadam,	  
“Pakistan	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Gender	  in	  Modernising	  Societies:	  Iran,	  Pakistan	  and	  
Afghanistan,”	  International	  Sociology	  7,	  no.	  1	  (1992):	  35-­‐53;	  Rubina	  Kidwai,	  
Domestic	  Violence	  in	  Pakistan:	  The	  Role	  of	  Patriarchy,	  Gender	  Roles,	  Culture	  of	  Honor,	  
and	  Objectification	  and	  Commodification	  of	  Women	  (Ph.D.	  thesis,	  	  Alliant	  
International	  University,	  California	  School	  of	  Professional	  Psychology,	  Los	  Angeles,	  
2002).	  
497	  Gyanesh	  Kudaisya	  and	  Tan	  Tai	  Yong,	  The	  Aftermath	  of	  Partition	  in	  South	  Asia,	  
(Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2000),	  8,	  who	  estimated	  the	  number	  of	  refugees	  at	  over	  18	  
million	  for	  both	  nations.	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period	  that	  the	  Rashid	  Commission	  was	  formed	  to	  review	  the	  family	  laws	  of	  
Pakistan,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  greater	  remedies	  and	  protection	  for	  women	  
within	  their	  marital	  lives.	  When	  it	  reported	  in	  1956	  and	  gave	  its	  suggestions	  for	  
major	  reforms,	  however,	  it	  generated	  heated	  debates	  and	  harsh	  criticism	  from	  
religious	  parties	  that	  called	  its	  proposals	  un-­‐Islamic498.	  Although	  President	  Field	  
Marshall	  Ayub	  Khan	  implemented	  some	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  proposals	  through	  the	  
Muslim	  Family	  Law	  Ordinances	  in	  1961	  (MFLO),	  his	  ten-­‐year	  rule	  of	  martial	  law	  
(1957-­‐1968)	  derailed	  any	  further	  political	  activism499.	  The	  struggle	  for	  women’s	  
rights	  dispersed	  as	  socialist	  groups	  endeavoured	  to	  maintain	  their	  identities	  under	  
the	  new	  military	  regime	  rather	  than	  fight	  against	  gender	  inequalities500.	  Matters	  
deteriorated	  further	  during	  the	  military	  rule	  of	  General	  Zia-­‐ul-­‐Haq	  from	  1977	  to	  
1988.	  In	  his	  first	  televised	  speech,	  General	  Zia	  promised	  to	  uphold	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  
‘chadder	  and	  chardiwari’	  (‘the	  veil	  and	  the	  four	  walls’)501.	  The	  military	  dictatorship	  
began	  the	  task	  of	  Islamising	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  institutions,	  which	  began	  a	  
systematic	  process	  of	  rescinding	  women’s	  rights502.	  The	  combination	  of	  military	  and	  
religion	  within	  state	  power	  proved	  devastating.	  Laws	  were	  passed	  by	  the	  military	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  Rahat	  Imran,	  “Legal	  Injustices:	  The	  Zina	  Hudood	  Ordinance	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  Pakistan	  and	  Its	  
Implication	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  Journal	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  International	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  7,	  2	  (2005):	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  Farida	  Shaheed,	  “The	  Women’s	  Movement	  in	  Pakistan:	  Challenges	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Achievements,”	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  Movement	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  Farida	  Shaheed,	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  Nighat	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government	  that	  effectively	  made	  women	  second-­‐class	  citizens:	  laws	  which	  were	  
then	  justified	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Islam503.	  The	  most	  infamous	  of	  these	  laws	  were	  the	  
Hudood	  Ordinances	  of	  1979,	  which	  criminalised	  rape,	  zina	  (adultery),	  drunkenness	  
and	  bearing	  false	  witness.	  The	  Ordinances	  made	  zina	  a	  criminal	  offence	  against	  the	  
state504,	  with	  a	  maximum	  punishment	  of	  stoning	  to	  death	  for	  married	  Muslims	  and	  
100	  lashes	  for	  un-­‐married	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims505.	  Problems	  occurred	  when	  
women	  accused	  men	  of	  rape.	  In	  order	  to	  prove	  the	  crime	  of	  rape,	  the	  new	  laws	  of	  
evidence506	  stated	  that	  the	  equivalent	  of	  four	  Muslim	  male	  witnesses	  must	  verify	  a	  
woman’s	  claim	  to	  sexual	  penetration	  and	  rape507.	  However,	  if	  a	  woman	  was	  unable	  
to	  convince	  the	  court	  of	  her	  allegation	  of	  rape,	  this	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  confession	  of	  
zina,	  with	  the	  woman	  therefore	  implicating	  herself	  and	  rendering	  herself	  liable	  to	  
criminal	  prosecution508. 	  
	  
The	  abrogation	  of	  women’s	  rights	  through	  these	  turbulent	  political	  times	  is	  also	  
reflected	  in	  the	  judicial	  reasoning	  of	  this	  era.	  Many	  applications	  for	  divorce	  that	  
should	  have	  been	  granted	  under	  the	  fault-­‐based	  legislation,	  making	  the	  husband	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culpable,	  were	  instead	  granted	  under	  a	  khulʿ,	  relieving	  the	  husband	  of	  any	  blame.	  
The	  courts,	  undoubtedly	  aware	  of	  the	  strict	  political	  regime,	  became	  extremely	  
reluctant	  to	  enforce	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  that	  openly	  criticised	  male	  dominance	  and	  
male	  power	  to	  abuse	  their	  wives.	  Providing	  women	  with	  a	  remedy	  under	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  khulʿ,	  where	  a	  woman	  is	  financially	  penalised	  for	  making	  her	  claim,	  
might	  have	  helped	  to	  assuage	  male	  outcries	  that	  women	  were	  now	  being	  granted	  
divorces	  irrespective	  of	  their	  husbands’	  objections,	  while	  still	  providing	  the	  relief	  
that	  was	  so	  desperately	  needed.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  was	  a	  legal	  endeavour	  by	  the	  
judiciary	  to	  bypass	  the	  state	  agenda	  without	  subjecting	  themselves	  to	  any	  state	  
repercussions.	  Rather	  than	  grant	  women	  divorces	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  
husband,	  which	  would	  have	  brought	  them	  into	  direct	  opposition	  to	  Zia’s	  social	  and	  
political	  aims,	  they	  used	  the	  doctrine	  of	  khulʿ	  to	  provide	  a	  legal	  remedy	  to	  women	  
that	  was	  palatable	  to	  those	  in	  power.	  The	  1980s	  were	  marked	  with	  a	  plethora	  of	  
cases	  that	  not	  only	  granted	  women	  the	  right	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  but	  also	  lowered	  the	  legal	  
threshold	  required	  in	  order	  to	  be	  granted	  one509.	  	  
	  
This	  judicial	  enterprise	  also	  occurred	  during	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  political	  activism	  by	  
women’s	  groups	  designed	  to	  resist	  the	  legal	  changes	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  Hudood	  
Ordinances	  and	  Laws	  of	  Evidence,	  which	  made	  it	  almost	  impossible	  to	  prove	  
allegations	  of	  rape	  whilst	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  women	  being	  convicted	  of	  
adultery.	  In	  1975,	  young	  professional	  women	  formed	  a	  group	  to	  create	  awareness	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regarding	  women’s	  rights	  and	  development,	  called	  Shirkat	  Gah510	  (‘place	  of	  
participation’).	  Spurred	  on	  by	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  these	  new	  laws,	  they	  formed	  
the	  Women’s	  Action	  Forum	  (WAF),	  which	  became	  a	  lobby	  group	  to	  defend	  women’s	  
rights.	  WAF	  attracted	  both	  individual	  women	  and	  women’s	  groups	  from	  a	  wide	  
political	  spectrum,	  but	  was	  based	  upon	  a	  specific	  agenda	  of	  repealing	  the	  Hudood	  
Ordinances511.	  General	  Zia’s	  measures	  galvanised	  women	  into	  militant	  action	  in	  the	  
defence	  and	  extension	  of	  their	  rights512.	  They	  organised	  protests,	  sits-­‐ins	  and	  
demonstrations.	  Other	  women’s	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Democratic	  Women’s	  
Association	  and	  the	  Women’s	  Front513,	  joined	  this	  struggle,	  which	  saw	  an	  
unprecedented	  mass	  mobilisation	  of	  women514.	  Although	  most	  belonged	  to	  the	  
urban	  middle	  classes,	  the	  women	  from	  the	  Sindh	  province	  formed	  the	  first	  rural-­‐
based	  organisation	  for	  women,	  called	  the	  Sindhi	  Women’s	  Movement515.	  During	  
these	  turbulent	  times,	  the	  courts	  did	  not	  adopt	  an	  openly	  confrontational	  route,	  as	  
the	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  did,	  which	  would	  have	  surely	  brought	  the	  wrath	  of	  
General	  Zia	  down	  on	  the	  judiciary.	  Instead,	  after	  a	  few	  years	  of	  inertia,	  they	  worked	  
quietly	  but	  consistently,	  and	  slowly	  developed	  an	  enforceable	  female-­‐initiated	  
divorce	  right.	  In	  later	  years,	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Zia	  regime,	  subsequent	  governments	  
have	  been	  more	  tolerant	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  reflected	  in	  the	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positive	  judicial	  development	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  The	  next	  section,	  however,	  will	  first	  trace	  
the	  initial	  inertia	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  its	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  before	  
detailing	  its	  more	  positive	  role.	  Between	  1944	  and	  1959	  the	  courts	  refused	  to	  grant	  
a	  khulʿ	  without	  a	  husband’s	  consent,	  which	  meant	  that	  women	  found	  little	  or	  no	  
relief	  if	  they	  wished	  to	  exit	  an	  unhappy	  marriage.	  However,	  in	  1959,	  they	  passed	  a	  
landmark	  case	  allowing	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  irrespective	  of	  the	  husband’s	  consent,	  
which	  has	  paved	  the	  way	  to	  a	  slow	  yet	  steady	  path	  to	  the	  empowerment	  of	  women	  
through	  the	  development	  of	  a	  no-­‐fault,	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  law.	  
	  
4.4	  Judicial	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Khulʿ:	  Traditional	  View	  Upheld	  
(1944-­‐1959	  
Between	  1944	  and	  1959	  the	  courts	  took	  a	  restrictive	  view	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  interpreting	  
Ḥanafī	  law	  as	  necessitating	  the	  husband’s	  consent	  in	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce.	  In	  an	  
important	  case	  in	  1944,	  the	  Lahore	  High	  Court	  dealt	  with	  two	  appeals	  from	  women	  
in	  a	  single	  judgement	  where	  both	  had	  applied	  for	  divorce	  under	  S.2(viii)	  of	  the	  
DMMA,	  alleging	  cruelty516.	  The	  Court	  was	  faced	  with	  two	  questions.	  Could	  a	  court	  
provide	  relief	  to	  a	  wife	  through	  the	  legal	  remedy	  of	  khulʿ	  without	  the	  husband’s	  
consent,	  and	  was	  incompatibility	  of	  temperament	  a	  valid	  ground	  for	  divorce	  under	  
Islamic	  law?	  The	  High	  Court	  answered	  both	  questions	  in	  the	  negative.	  Justice	  Abdur	  
Rahman,	  presenting	  the	  main	  judgement	  of	  the	  High	  Court,	  observed	  that	  it	  was	  
quite	  possible	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  be	  physically	  capable	  of	  bearing	  the	  child	  of	  a	  man	  she	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516	  Mst	  Umar	  Bibi	  v.	  Mohammad	  Din	  1944	  All	  Indian	  Law	  Reports	  25	  Lah.	  542.	  
	  
158	  
detests	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  validate	  a	  divorce	  on	  such	  a	  ground517.	  Justice	  Rahman	  
seemed	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  what	  he	  viewed	  as	  the	  dangers	  of	  creating	  
liberal	  divorce	  rights	  for	  women.	  In	  his	  judgement	  he	  described	  women	  as	  being	  
“fickle	  minded	  and	  impressionable”	  and	  claimed	  that	  due	  to	  this	  “temperamental”	  
nature,	  they	  might	  seek	  divorce	  as	  a	  “passing	  fancy”,	  reducing	  the	  institution	  of	  
marriage	  to	  a	  farce518.	  	  
	  
This	  antiquated	  and	  highly	  gendered	  reasoning	  was	  followed	  almost	  a	  decade	  later	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  Sayeeda	  Khanam	  v.	  Muhammad	  Sami519.	  A	  full	  bench	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  
was	  convened.	  Commenting	  on	  the	  famous	  hadith	  of	  Jamila	  and	  Thābit,	  it	  held	  that	  
the	  Prophet	  had	  not	  granted	  Jamīla	  a	  divorce	  in	  his	  judicial	  capacity;	  rather,	  he	  had	  
ordered	  Thābit	  to	  grant	  the	  divorce.	  As	  Jamīla	  had	  agreed	  to	  return	  the	  garden,	  the	  
court	  held	  that	  Thābit’s	  willingness	  for	  the	  marriage	  to	  be	  dissolved	  for	  financial	  
advantage	  enabled	  the	  release	  of	  Jamīla520.	  The	  consensual	  nature	  of	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  
hadith	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  of	  paramount	  importance.	  Where	  there	  was	  mutual	  
agreement	  on	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  agreement	  upon	  what	  compensation	  the	  wife	  should	  
give,	  a	  divorce	  would	  be	  given	  by	  the	  husband	  extra-­‐judicially,	  without	  the	  
interference	  of	  a	  judge	  or	  court	  of	  law.	  The	  court	  further	  held	  that	  the	  Prophet	  had	  
adjudicated	  the	  matter	  in	  his	  capacity	  of	  ‘law-­‐giver’,	  rather	  than	  in	  his	  judicial	  
capacity,	  and	  that	  the	  law	  that	  he	  had	  established	  was	  that	  of	  khulʿ	  by	  consent521.	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  1944.	  	  
518	  1944	  All	  Indian	  Law	  Reports	  25	  Lah.	  543.	  
519	  1952	  PLD	  Lah.	  113.	  




The	  court	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  any	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  in	  coming	  to	  this	  decision	  but	  
based	  their	  reasoning	  upon	  their	  own	  logic.	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  for	  over	  a	  decade	  it	  was	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  women	  to	  obtain	  a	  
legal	  remedy	  to	  vacate	  an	  unhappy	  marriage.	  The	  high	  standard	  of	  proof	  desired	  by	  
the	  court,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  the	  DMMA’s	  grounds,	  forced	  wives	  to	  
sue	  for	  the	  alternate	  remedy	  of	  khulʿ.	  Not	  only	  was	  this	  financially	  detrimental	  to	  
them,	  but	  this	  judicial	  remedy	  could	  only	  be	  obtained	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  
husband.	  Pearl	  and	  Mensky	  (1998)522	  believe	  that	  the	  courts	  hid	  behind	  their	  own	  
barely-­‐concealed	  social	  views	  of	  the	  matter,	  rather	  than	  address	  the	  principles	  of	  
Muslim	  law.	  They	  argue	  that,	  rather	  than	  apply	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  DMMA,	  the	  
judges	  were	  far	  more	  content	  to	  uphold	  traditional	  Ḥanafī	  law523.	  Ironically,	  it	  is	  not	  
Ḥanafī	  law	  that	  the	  judges	  were	  implementing,	  but	  a	  pseudo	  version	  of	  it	  that	  had	  
been	  adopted	  by	  their	  British	  colonial	  rulers,	  and	  then	  reinforced	  by	  the	  judiciary	  
and	  the	  ʿulamāʾ	  themselves.	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  prevailing	  negative	  social	  
attitudes	  to	  female	  marital	  freedom,	  the	  judiciary	  finally	  took	  up	  the	  legislative	  
gauntlet	  for	  which	  the	  architects	  of	  the	  DMMA	  had	  so	  determinedly	  fought.	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  Pearl	  and	  Mensky,	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  316.	  
523	  Pearl	  and	  Mensky,	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  316.	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4.5	  Judicial	  Development	  of	  the	  Khulʿ	  Irrespective	  of	  a	  Husband’s	  
Consent	  
In	  the	  ground	  breaking	  case	  of	  Balqis	  Fatima524,	  the	  court	  finally	  held	  that	  a	  wife	  is	  
entitled	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  irrespective	  of	  her	  husband’s	  desires525.	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  wrote	  the	  
final	  judgement	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  bench,	  which	  provides	  an	  illuminating	  insight	  into	  
his	  judicial	  reasoning.	  He	  began	  his	  reasoning	  by	  referring	  to	  verse	  2:229	  of	  the	  
Qurʾān,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  considered	  in	  the	  previous	  cases.	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  
interpreted	  this	  verse	  as	  permitting	  dissolution	  of	  the	  marriage	  by	  the	  wife	  if	  she	  
returns	  her	  mahr	  to	  her	  husband	  irrespective	  of	  her	  husband’s	  wishes.	  He	  reasoned	  
that	  the	  words	  ‘if	  you	  fear’	  in	  the	  verse	  refer	  to	  ‘ūlī	  al-­‐amr’,	  i.e.	  the	  state	  or	  a	  judge,	  
since	  the	  spouses	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  third	  person	  as	  ‘they’	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  
verse.	  This	  verse	  was	  to	  be	  read	  as	  “if	  you	  [the	  judges]	  fear”	  that	  they	  [the	  spouses]	  
“will	  not	  keep	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  Allah”	  then	  the	  judges	  have	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  
against	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  marriage.	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  be	  
meaningless	  for	  a	  judge	  to	  have	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  whether	  spouses	  had	  
transgressed	  the	  limits	  of	  Allah	  but	  then	  have	  no	  right	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  such	  a	  
transgression	  without	  a	  husband’s	  consent526.	  	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  an	  arbitrary	  
restriction	  would	  be	  placed	  on	  a	  judge’s	  power	  to	  adjudicate.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524	  Balqis	  Fatima	  v.	  Najm-­‐ul-­‐Ikram	  1959	  PLD	  Lah.	  566.	  
525	  Fyzee	  (1965)	  argued	  that	  this	  bypassed	  centuries	  of	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  law	  and	  in	  
his	  opinion	  the	  decision	  in	  Sayeeda	  Khanum	  represented	  the	  classical	  view	  of	  the	  
Ḥanafī	  jurists	  as	  understood	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  See	  Asaf.	  A.	  Fyzee,	  Cases	  in	  the	  
Muhammadan	  Law	  of	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1965),	  
170.	  
526	  1959	  PLD	  Lah.	  566,	  572-­‐573.	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Judge	  Kaikaus	  supported	  his	  arguments,	  quoting	  the	  hadith	  of	  Jamīla	  and	  Thābit	  and	  
another	  hadith	  regarding	  Thābit’s	  second	  wife,	  Ḥabība.	  Unlike	  the	  case	  of	  Sayeeda	  
Khanum,	  where	  the	  courts	  held	  that	  the	  Prophet	  had	  acted	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  
lawgiver,	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  stated	  that	  the	  Prophet,	  after	  listening	  to	  both	  women,	  
ordered	  Thābit	  to	  divorce	  his	  wives	  after	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr.	  He	  analysed	  
different	  accounts	  of	  the	  second	  divorce	  regarding	  Ḥabība,	  noting	  that	  words	  such	  
as	  khale	  sabilaha’	  and	  farqha’	  were	  used	  to	  mean	  ‘divorce	  her’.	  In	  neither	  case	  did	  
the	  Prophet	  blame	  Thābit	  or	  make	  any	  pronouncements	  of	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  
the	  wives’	  attitude.	  The	  Prophet	  did	  not	  ask	  Thābit	  if	  he	  agreed	  with	  his	  wife,	  but	  
was	  satisfied	  that	  husband	  and	  wife	  could	  no	  longer	  live	  together527.	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  
accepted	  that	  some	  of	  his	  reasonings	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  Mālikī	  fiqh,	  but	  the	  main	  
thrust	  of	  his	  argument	  came	  from	  his	  assertion	  that	  whilst	  dealing	  with	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  Qurʾān,	  the	  judiciary	  were	  not	  bound	  by	  the	  opinion	  of	  any	  
classical	  jurists.	  If	  they	  were	  clear	  on	  what	  God	  or	  the	  Prophet	  intended,	  then	  it	  was	  
their	  duty	  to	  abide	  by	  it528.	  Although	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  relied	  on	  Maulana	  Maududi’s	  
moral	  and	  legal	  arguments	  regarding	  women’s	  right	  to	  seek	  dissolution	  of	  their	  
marriage,	  he	  was	  of	  the	  view	  that	  authorities	  on	  Islamic	  law,	  be	  they	  past	  or	  present,	  
were	  only	  to	  be	  used	  to	  assist	  jurists	  in	  interpreting	  the	  Qurʾān,	  with	  the	  final	  say	  
being	  reserved	  for	  the	  judges.	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  1959	  PLD	  Lah.	  566,	  573-­‐574,	  586.	  
528	  1959	  PLD	  Lah.	  566,	  584.	  	  He	  also	  up	  held	  the	  view	  that	  the	  compensation	  would	  
still	  need	  to	  be	  paid	  in	  return	  for	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	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Clearly,	  the	  full	  bench	  was	  asserting	  its	  right	  to	  decipher	  the	  Qurʾān	  independently.	  
The	  courts,	  rather	  than	  just	  stating	  and	  interpreting	  the	  law,	  now	  proposed	  to	  
become	  its	  architects.	  They	  determined	  that	  they	  were	  the	  competent	  authority	  to	  
determine	  the	  basic	  postulates	  of	  Islam	  derived	  from	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  hadith	  
according	  to	  contemporary	  needs.	  In	  one	  decisive	  stroke,	  the	  exclusivity	  of	  the	  
ʿulamāʾ	  was	  taken	  away	  by	  this	  “revolutionary	  conclusion	  of	  potentially	  far-­‐reaching	  
import”529.	  This	  decision	  was	  all	  the	  more	  remarkable	  since	  there	  had	  been	  a	  
general	  reluctance	  in	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  to	  provide	  judges	  with	  a	  meaningful	  role	  
in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law530.	  Although	  Judge	  Kaikaus’s	  judgement	  was	  an	  
extraordinary	  example	  of	  judicial	  activism531,	  particularly	  when	  examined	  in	  the	  
light	  of	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  constraints	  of	  the	  time,	  his	  high-­‐handedness	  in	  
dealing	  with	  the	  classical	  authorities	  did	  not	  sit	  well	  with	  subsequent	  cases.	  It	  is	  
unfortunate	  that	  at	  this	  important	  juncture,	  the	  High	  Court	  bench	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  
the	  primary	  sources	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh	  and	  provide	  more	  solid	  reasoning	  to	  justify	  
this	  decision.	  Unlike	  Thanawi’s	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  in	  his	  fatwa,	  Judge	  Kaikaus’s	  
failure	  to	  provide	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  authorities	  in	  support	  of	  his	  arguments	  meant	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “Qur’an:	  299:	  A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife,”	  106.	  
530	  Christopher	  Ford,	  “Siayar-­‐ization	  and	  its	  Discontents:	  International	  Law	  and	  
Islam’s	  Constitutional	  Crisis,”	  Texas	  International	  Law	  Journal	  30	  (1995):	  528.	  
531	  He	  also	  disagreed	  with	  the	  court’s	  assessment	  that	  granting	  women	  a	  right	  to	  
divorce	  by	  rendering	  up	  their	  dowries	  would	  make	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage	  
meaningless	  (as	  held	  in	  the	  Sayeeda	  Khanam	  case).	  	  Instead	  he	  stated	  that	  if	  a	  man	  
could	  divorce	  his	  wife	  at	  will,	  even	  though	  she	  was	  not	  to	  blame,	  “why	  should	  there	  
be	  such	  a	  disparity	  between	  the	  rights	  of	  spouses?”	  (p.	  592).	  Mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
his	  reasoning	  could	  be	  challenged,	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  put	  an	  important	  limitation	  upon	  
the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right.	  	  The	  wife,	  he	  argued,	  could	  not	  demand	  a	  divorce	  upon	  any	  
‘passing	  fancy’	  but	  it	  was	  up	  to	  the	  court	  to	  decide,	  looking	  at	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  
whether	  the	  rift	  between	  the	  spouses	  was	  serious	  enough	  to	  warrant	  dissolution	  of	  
the	  marriage	  (p.593).	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many	  judges	  simply	  refused	  to	  follow	  this	  new	  precedent,	  describing	  it	  as	  having	  
been	  “born	  of	  the	  new-­‐fangled	  ideas	  of	  the	  equality	  of	  spouses”532.	  	  
	  
It	  took	  almost	  a	  decade	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  finally	  affirmed	  the	  ruling	  on	  the	  
Balqis	  Fatima	  case,	  endorsing	  the	  view	  of	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  that	  under	  Muslim	  law	  a	  
wife	  is	  entitled	  to	  a	  khulʿ,	  as	  of	  right,	  if	  she	  satisfies	  the	  court’s	  conscience	  that	  
refusal	  will	  mean	  forcing	  her	  into	  a	  hateful	  union533.	  The	  leading	  judgement	  was	  
delivered	  by	  Judge	  S.A	  Rahman	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  full	  bench,	  and	  has	  been	  described	  
as	  reiterating	  many	  of	  the	  same	  arguments	  and	  referring	  to	  much	  of	  the	  same	  
material	  as	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  in	  the	  Balqis	  Fatima	  case534.	  However,	  a	  closer	  study	  of	  
the	  judgement	  reveals	  that	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  the	  case.	  Rather,	  a	  more	  subtle	  
approach	  was	  adopted	  by	  Justice	  Rahman,	  who	  took	  great	  pains	  to	  cite	  as	  many	  
classical	  authorities	  as	  possible	  to	  support	  his	  reasoning	  and	  ensure	  the	  legitimacy	  
of	  his	  claim.	  Although	  the	  judgement	  begins	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  taqlīd	  is	  a	  
doctrine	  that	  was	  invented	  by	  followers	  of	  the	  four	  orthodox	  imams,	  who	  
themselves	  had	  never	  claimed	  the	  conclusiveness	  of	  their	  opinions535,	  Judge	  
Rahman	  did	  go	  on	  to	  rely	  on	  classical	  authorities	  in	  Islam	  for	  his	  decision.	  Within	  the	  
main	  body	  of	  the	  judgement,	  he	  followed	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  words	  ‘if	  you	  fear’,	  
delivered	  by	  Judge	  Kaikaus,	  as	  referring	  to	  ūlī	  al-­‐amr	  or	  qāḍīs,	  but	  cited ʿAbd	  Allāh	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532	  Mst.	  Resham	  Bibi	  v.	  Muhmmad	  Shafi	  1967	  PLD	  AJK	  32,	  46.	  	  See	  also	  Ghulam	  
Sakina	  v.	  Umar	  Baksh	  1964	  PLD	  SC	  456,	  where	  the	  court	  refused	  to	  follow	  precedent	  
in	  the	  Balqis	  Fatima	  case.	  	  	  
533	  Mst	  Khurshid	  Bibi	  v.	  Muhammad	  Amin	  1967	  PLD	  SC	  97	  para	  (c).	  
534	  See	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “Qurʾān	  2:299:	  A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife?”,	  10,	  and	  
Alamghir	  Serajuddin,	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  Secular	  Courts	  and	  Muslim	  Women	  of	  South	  
Asia:	  A	  Study	  in	  Judicial	  Activism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  125.	  
535	  1967	  PLD	  SC	  97	  para	  (a).	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al-­‐Qurṭubī’s536	  commentary	  on	  the	  Qurʾān,	  al-­‐Jāmiʿ	  li-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Qurʾān,	  as	  his	  
authority	  on	  this	  point,	  supported	  by	  the	  views	  of	  ʿAbd	  Allāh	  b.	  ʿAbbās537	  and	  Mālik	  
b.	  Anas538.	  He	  also	  cited	  the	  famous	  Ḥanafī	  jurist	  Shāh	  Walī	  Allāh	  al-­‐Dihlawī539	  and	  
al-­‐Miṣrī	  al-­‐Shāmī540,	  who	  stated	  that	  a	  wife’s	  dislike	  of	  her	  husband	  was	  sufficient	  
grounds	  to	  warrant	  a	  khulʿ,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  fault	  of	  the	  husband.	  Yet,	  most	  
importantly,	  he	  argued	  that	  although	  it	  is	  the	  view	  of	  some	  Ḥanafīʿ	  ʿulamāʾ	  that	  a	  
wife	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  face	  of	  her	  husband’s	  opposition,	  from	  his	  own	  
research	  into	  the	  matter,	  he	  had	  concluded	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  such	  express	  
treatment	  of	  this	  matter	  in	  the	  treatises	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  of	  the	  formative	  
period541.	  Judge	  Rahman	  acknowledged	  that	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  contend	  that	  
ṭalāq	  is	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  the	  husband,	  but	  that	  they	  make	  no	  such	  claim	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  khulʿ542.	  Whilst	  he	  did	  not	  delve	  deeper	  into	  the	  Ḥanafī	  view,	  he	  
provided	  this	  as	  a	  justification	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  answers.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  
differentiated	  between	  a	  mubāraʾa,	  as	  an	  extra-­‐judicial	  khulʿ	  which	  can	  only	  occur	  
with	  mutual	  consent,	  and	  a	  judicial	  khulʿ,	  where	  a	  judge	  or	  qāḍīs	  has	  the	  right	  to	  
dissolve	  the	  marriage.	  If	  a	  wife	  can	  prove	  that	  the	  parties	  can	  no	  longer	  live	  within	  
the	  limits	  prescribed	  by	  God,	  then	  “any	  other	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536	  A	  famous	  classical	  mufassir	  of	  the	  13th	  Century	  from	  Cordoba,	  of	  Mālikī	  origin.	  
537	  The	  paternal	  cousin	  of	  the	  Holy	  Prophet	  and	  revered	  by	  Muslims	  for	  his	  expertise	  
on	  the	  exegesis	  of	  the	  Qurʾān.	  
538	  The	  founder	  of	  the	  Mālikī	  school	  of	  fiqh.	  
539	  Qutb-­‐ud-­‐Dīn	  Ahmad	  ibn	  'Abdul	  Rahīm,	  commonly	  known	  as	  Shāh	  Walīullāh	  and	  
known	  as	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  modern	  Islamic	  thought	  from	  the	  Indian	  
Subcontinent.	  	  Justice	  Rahman	  quotes	  him	  from	  al-­‐Musawwa-­‐min-­‐Ahadith-­‐al-­‐Muatta	  
vol.	  11.	  P.	  60	  at	  1967	  PLD	  SC	  97	  para	  (c).	  
540	  A	  Sunni	  Shafi	  scholar	  of	  the	  10th	  century	  A.D.	  Justice	  Rahman	  quotes	  from	  his	  
book	  Al-­‐Mizan-­‐ul-­‐Kubra	  vol.	  11	  p.	  117,	  quoted	  at	  1967	  PLD	  SC	  97	  para	  (c).	  




regarding	  khulʿ	  would	  deprive	  it	  of	  all	  efficacy	  as	  a	  charter	  granted	  to	  the	  wife”543.	  
Moreover,	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  hadith	  regarding	  Thābit	  and	  Jamīla,	  Justice	  Rahman	  did	  
not	  interpret	  it	  according	  to	  his	  own	  reasoning,	  as	  Judge	  Kaikaus	  had.	  Instead,	  in	  
order	  to	  distinguish	  this	  case	  from	  that	  of	  Sayeeda	  Khanum,	  he	  cited	  ʿAbd	  Allāh	  al-­‐
Ḥakīm	  al-­‐Nīsābūrī544,	  Ibn	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Barr545,	  Muhammad	  al-­‐Shawkānī	  546	  and	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  
al-­‐ʿAsqalānī547	  as	  authorities	  who	  stated	  that	  the	  Prophet	  had	  ordered	  Thābit	  to	  
divorce	  his	  wife,	  irrespective	  of	  Thābit’s	  consent,	  thus	  strengthening	  his	  own	  
decision	  that	  a	  judge	  has	  the	  power	  to	  do	  the	  same	  in	  a	  wife’s	  divorce	  petition.	  	  
	  
This	  painstaking	  approach	  to	  rely	  on	  renowned	  and	  accepted	  classical	  authorities	  of	  
Islam	  was	  crucial	  for	  the	  social	  acceptance	  of	  this	  judgement,	  since	  the	  khulʿ	  
severely	  curtailed	  the	  power	  that	  men	  had	  held	  over	  women	  for	  many	  years.	  The	  
need	  for	  husbands’	  approval	  had	  been	  a	  powerful	  negotiating	  tool,	  enabling	  
husbands	  to	  seek	  financial	  recompense	  from	  wives	  desperate	  for	  release	  from	  
unhappy	  marriages.	  Justice	  Rahman	  must	  have	  been	  aware	  that	  the	  precedent	  laid	  
down	  in	  Balqis	  Fatima	  had	  not	  been	  followed	  and	  that	  most	  courts	  preferred	  to	  rely	  
on	  Sayeeda	  Khanum.	  Justice	  Rahman’s	  reasonings	  (representing	  the	  full	  bench	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court)	  illustrate	  not	  only	  their	  judicial	  awareness	  of	  their	  role	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543	  Ibid.	  
544	  See	  Al-­‐Mustadrak	  `alâ	  al-­‐Sahîhayn	  al-­‐Mustadrak.	  	  Al-­‐Nishaburi	  is	  also	  known	  as	  
Imam	  Hakim,	  and	  was	  a	  leading	  classical	  Sunni	  scholar	  and	  muhaddith	  of	  the	  10th	  
Century	  A.D.	  
545	  See	  Al-­‐Isti'ab	  fi	  ma'rifat	  al-­‐ashab.	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Barr	  was	  a	  Sunni	  Scholar	  belonging	  to	  
the	  Mālikī	  school	  of	  the	  11th	  Century	  A.D.	  
546	  See	  Nayl	  al-­‐Awṭār.	  Muhammad	  al-­‐Shawkānī	  was	  a	  Yemeni	  sunni	  mujtahid	  of	  the	  
19th	  Century	  A.D.	  




lawmakers,	  but	  also	  the	  social	  consequences	  of	  their	  judgements.	  They	  clearly	  
understood	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  legal	  precedent	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  warrant	  this	  
new	  application	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  and	  resist	  further	  
opposition,	  they	  had	  to	  justify	  their	  stance	  within	  the	  classical	  legal	  body	  of	  Islam.	  
Unlike	  Justice	  Kaikaus,	  who	  utilised	  his	  own	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  
hadith,	  Justice	  Rahman	  paid	  due	  deference	  to	  the	  classical	  jurists	  of	  Islam,	  creating	  
an	  estoppel	  for	  any	  future	  agitation	  against	  this	  case.	  
	  
In	  1968,	  Hinchcliffe	  (1968a)	  observed	  that	  although	  this	  decision	  now	  meant	  that	  a	  
matrimonial	  offence	  no	  longer	  needed	  to	  be	  proven,	  and	  went	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  
making	  the	  position	  of	  spouses	  equal,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  wife	  still	  had	  to	  prove	  that	  life	  
was	  impossible	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  be	  prepared	  to	  repay	  the	  benefits	  she	  had	  
received	  from	  the	  marriage,	  despite	  her	  not	  being	  at	  fault,	  was	  still	  not	  a	  happy	  state	  
of	  affairs548.	  She	  also	  predicted	  that	  without	  specific	  legislation,	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  
visualise	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  husband	  would	  not	  wish	  to	  repudiate	  his	  wife,	  for	  fear	  
of	  losing	  the	  mahr,	  but	  might	  still	  make	  life	  difficult	  for	  her	  without	  contravening	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  DMMA.	  This	  would	  put	  him	  in	  a	  powerful	  position	  either	  to	  
negotiate	  a	  mubāraʾa	  in	  return	  for	  the	  relinquishment	  of	  the	  wife’s	  dower,	  or	  to	  
force	  his	  wife	  to	  seek	  a	  judicial	  khulʿ	  through	  the	  courts	  to	  her	  financial	  detriment549.	  
Initially,	  it	  appeared	  that	  Hinchcliffe’s	  (1968a)	  reservations	  about	  the	  judicial	  
decision	  in	  the	  Khurshid	  Begum	  case	  would	  be	  borne	  out,	  as	  many	  lower	  courts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548	  Hinchliffe,	  “Divorce	  in	  Pakistan,”	  24.	  
549	  Hinchliffe,	  “Divorce	  in	  Pakistan,”	  25.	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were	  still	  reluctant	  to	  grant	  a	  woman	  a	  khulʿ550.	  However,	  as	  more	  and	  more	  khulʿ	  
cases	  were	  brought	  before	  the	  courts,	  the	  judiciary	  finally	  began	  to	  chastise	  the	  
lower	  courts’	  failure	  to	  follow	  precedent	  and	  implement	  the	  khulʿ551.	  The	  Supreme	  
Court	  held	  that	  a	  wife	  need	  not	  prove	  her	  aversion	  to	  her	  husband,	  but	  must	  simply	  
demonstrate	  that	  she	  was	  unable	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  peace	  and	  harmony	  in	  her	  marriage,	  
to	  warrant	  granting	  her	  a	  khulʿ552.	  	  
	  
4.6	  Judicial	  Development	  of	  a	  No-­‐Fault	  Khulʿ	  
This	  judgement553	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  catalyst,	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  judicial	  
enterprise	  to	  make	  the	  khulʿ	  a	  practical	  avenue	  for	  women	  to	  take	  in	  order	  to	  escape	  
an	  unhappy	  marriage.	  This	  judgement	  was	  passed	  during	  the	  height	  of	  the	  
repressive	  regime	  of	  General	  Zia,	  and	  contrasted	  starkly	  with	  the	  cases	  decided	  
under	  the	  fault-­‐based	  grounds	  of	  the	  DMMA,	  where	  the	  courts	  consistently	  failed	  to	  
provide	  remedies	  for	  women	  seeking	  divorce.	  Over	  the	  last	  thirty	  years,	  since	  the	  
demise	  of	  the	  Zia	  regime,	  Pakistan	  has	  been	  oscillating	  between	  democracy	  and	  
military	  rule.	  Successive	  governments	  have	  promised	  to	  improve	  the	  socio-­‐
economic	  and	  legal	  rights	  of	  women,	  and	  have	  passed	  limited	  measures	  to	  this	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  See	  Siddiq	  v.	  Sharfan1968	  PLD	  Lah.	  411,	  where	  the	  court	  held	  that	  allowing	  a	  
khulʿ	  based	  on	  the	  wife’s	  admission	  to	  adultery	  would	  threaten	  the	  institution	  of	  
marriage,	  which	  was	  a	  sacred	  tie	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  God.	  	  	  
551	  See	  Hakimzadi	  v.	  Nawaz	  Ali	  1972	  PLD	  Kar.	  540,	  Abdul	  Rahim	  v.	  Shahida	  Khan	  
1984	  PLD	  S.C	  329.	  




effect554.	  	  Although	  their	  effectiveness	  has	  not	  been	  profound,	  they	  have	  resulted	  in	  
greater	  political	  awareness	  that	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  rights	  of	  disenfranchised	  
groups,	  particularly	  women,	  must	  be	  an	  element	  of	  any	  party’s	  agenda	  if	  it	  wishes	  to	  
enjoy	  the	  support	  of	  the	  masses.	  This	  consciousness	  also	  resonates	  in	  recent	  
Pakistani	  divorce	  jurisprudence,	  which	  appreciates	  the	  need	  to	  adopt	  female-­‐
friendly	  interpretations	  of	  the	  law.	  Whilst	  adjudicating	  khulʿ	  decisions,	  court	  
judgements	  now	  reflect	  sensitivity	  to	  human	  emotion	  and	  recognise	  that	  marital	  
splits	  are	  very	  personal	  in	  nature	  and	  cannot	  be	  objectively	  defined.	  Courts	  have	  
held	  that	  aversion	  or	  hatred	  between	  couples	  can	  develop	  at	  any	  time,	  and	  cannot	  
be	  determined	  by	  any	  objective	  “measurement,	  scale	  or	  weight”555.	  Hatred,	  
abomination	  or	  detestation	  between	  spouses	  “may	  arise	  from	  any	  incident	  of	  a	  
single	  word”556.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  even	  necessary	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  wife	  to	  produce	  
evidence	  of	  facts	  and	  circumstance	  to	  show	  her	  hatred557	  –	  it	  is	  merely	  necessary	  
that	  the	  court’s	  conscience	  should	  be	  satisfied	  that	  to	  not	  dissolve	  the	  marriage	  
would	  mean	  a	  hateful	  union558.	  The	  judiciary	  recognises	  that	  emotional	  dynamics	  
within	  marriages	  cannot	  be	  subject	  to	  rational	  analysis	  and	  are	  “often	  at	  times	  
incomprehensible”559.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554	  Weiss,	  “The	  Slow	  Yet	  Steady	  Path	  to	  Women’s	  Empowerment	  in	  Pakistan,”	  133.	  
555	  M.	  Mahmood,	  The	  Code	  of	  Muslim	  Family	  Law;	  Amendment	  and	  Case	  Law	  Up	  To	  
Date	  (Lahore:	  Pakistan	  Law	  Times	  Publications,	  2006),	  356.	  
556	  See	  Akthar	  Ali	  Kureshe,	  Twenty	  Nine	  Years’	  Family	  Law	  Digest	  1978-­‐2006	  
(Lahore:	  National	  Law	  Book	  House,	  2006),	  quoting	  case	  2004	  UC	  739	  at	  397.	  
557	  Mst	  Ruqqia	  Bibi	  v.	  Muhammad	  Munir	  1999	  MLD	  812.	  
558	  The	  court	  in	  Shakila	  Bibi	  v.	  Muhammad	  Farooq,	  1994	  CLC	  231,	  held	  that	  a	  wife	  
does	  not	  need	  to	  justify	  the	  reasons	  why	  she	  has	  developed	  hatred	  for	  her	  husband,	  
presumably	  meaning	  that	  she	  no	  longer	  needs	  to	  provide	  any	  evidence	  to	  that	  effect	  
either.	  	  	  	  




In	  the	  case	  of	  Naseem	  Akthar	  v.	  Muhammad	  Rafique560,	  for	  example,	  the	  wife	  had	  
been	  refused	  a	  khulʿ	  by	  the	  family	  court	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  she	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  
provide	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  her	  khulʿ	  application.	  But	  when	  the	  case	  reached	  the	  
Supreme	  Court,	  Justice	  Javed	  Iqbal	  observed	  that	  emotions	  of	  hatred	  and	  aversion	  
could	  not	  be	  confined	  to	  a	  limited	  sphere.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  courts	  had	  not	  created	  
any	  mechanism	  to	  express	  ‘hatred	  or	  aversion’	  in	  a	  definitive	  manner,	  but	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  wife	  had	  filed	  a	  petition	  for	  khulʿ	  was	  in	  itself	  demonstrative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
she	  did	  not	  want	  to	  live	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  indicated	  a	  degree	  of	  hatred	  and	  
aversion	  on	  her	  part561.	  A	  primary	  reason	  for	  judicial	  facilitation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  appears	  
to	  be	  that	  courts	  are	  appreciative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Pakistani	  culture	  frowns	  upon	  
divorce	  in	  general	  and	  khulʿ	  divorces	  in	  particular,	  and	  so	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  a	  woman	  
is	  prepared	  to	  circumvent	  these	  social	  constraints	  is	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  the	  
seriousness	  of	  her	  claim.	  The	  courts	  are	  also	  mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  often	  
extremely	  difficult	  to	  prove	  matrimonial	  offences,	  as	  illustrated	  earlier	  in	  the	  failure	  
of	  women	  to	  find	  remedies	  under	  the	  statutory	  provisions	  of	  the	  DMMA.	  Witnesses	  
to	  the	  events	  invariably	  belong	  to	  the	  husband’s	  extended	  family,	  as	  many	  women	  
leave	  their	  homes	  to	  take	  up	  residence	  in	  this	  extended	  network.	  
	  
The	  courts	  are	  notably	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  emotional	  well-­‐being	  of	  women	  
than	  with	  producing	  an	  objective	  standard	  of	  hatred.	  If	  a	  wife	  fails	  to	  invoke	  words	  





of	  hatred	  in	  her	  statement,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  held	  to	  be	  fatal	  to	  her	  plea562.	  Even	  if	  
the	  causes	  of	  the	  wife’s	  aversion	  to	  her	  husband	  are	  not	  based	  on	  any	  substantial	  
reasons,	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  to	  look	  at	  the	  wife’s	  state	  of	  mind	  
rather	  than	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  state563.	  Such	  has	  been	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  judicial	  
enterprise	  to	  grant	  a	  khulʿ	  that	  a	  woman	  has	  merely	  to	  make	  a	  statement	  of	  
repugnance	  that	  is	  sufficient	  to	  satisfy	  the	  courts	  that	  she	  no	  longer	  wishes	  to	  live	  
with	  her	  husband.	  A	  wife’s	  claim	  that	  she	  would	  be	  “rather	  shot	  with	  a	  bullet”	  than	  
live	  with	  her	  husband564,	  or	  her	  desire	  to	  spit	  on	  her	  husband565,	  have	  been	  taken	  as	  
ample	  proof	  to	  justify	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ.	  Similarly,	  a	  wife’s	  declaration	  that	  she	  
would	  “prefer	  to	  die	  or	  drown	  in	  the	  river	  than	  to	  live	  in	  the	  house	  of	  her	  
husband566”	  or	  would	  prefer	  to	  die	  than	  to	  live	  with	  her	  husband567	  have	  all	  been	  
accepted	  as	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  warrant	  a	  dissolution.	  
	  
Surprisingly,	  this	  sympathetic	  approach	  has	  also	  been	  taken	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  
sought	  as	  a	  result	  of	  polygamous	  marriages,	  which	  are	  perfectly	  legitimate	  under	  
Ḥanafī	  law.	  The	  institution	  of	  marriage	  has	  been	  described	  as	  being	  based	  on	  love	  
and	  mutual	  respect,	  which	  will	  inevitably	  shatter	  upon	  a	  husband’s	  revelation	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562	  Ghulam	  Zohra	  v.	  Faiz	  Rasool	  1988	  MLD	  1353.	  
563	  1988	  MLD	  1353	  para	  (4).	  
564	  Mst.	  Rashidan	  Bibi	  v.	  Bashir	  Ahmed,	  1993	  KLR	  CC	  31,	  32.	  
565	  Mst.	  Shah	  Begum	  v.	  District	  Judge,	  Saikot,	  PLD	  1995	  Lah.	  19,	  26.	  
566	  Kureshie,	  Twenty	  Nine	  Years’	  Family	  Law	  Digest,	  quoting	  case	  2001	  CLC	  1759	  at	  
344.	  
567	  Kureshie,	  Twenty	  Nine	  Years’	  Family	  Law	  Digest,	  quoting	  case	  2000	  SD	  560	  at	  	  
343.	  	  In	  Mst.	  Nazir	  v.	  Additional	  District	  Judge	  Rhaim	  Yarkahan,	  1995	  CLC	  296,	  297–
98,	  the	  court	  categorically	  stated	  that	  a	  statement	  by	  the	  wife	  that	  she	  hates	  her	  
husband	  is	  all	  that	  it	  takes	  to	  affect	  a	  khulʿ.	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second	  marriage568.	  In	  Allah	  Ditta	  v.	  Judge	  Family	  Court569	  the	  husband	  had	  
contracted	  a	  second	  marriage	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  his	  first	  wife.	  Justice	  
Muhammad	  Naseem	  accepted	  that	  the	  wife’s	  detestation	  of	  this	  act	  was	  “well	  
imagined”,	  and	  based	  his	  judgement	  on	  the	  wife’s	  broken	  heart.	  “Such	  conduct	  of	  the	  
husband	  towards	  the	  wife	  certainly	  breaks	  her	  heart	  if	  not	  her	  bones,	  and	  when	  the	  
heart	  is	  broken	  it	  is	  simply	  immaterial	  if	  the	  bones	  are	  intact”570,	  he	  ruled.	  It	  is	  
heartening	  to	  see	  this	  judicial	  attitude,	  where	  the	  courts	  appreciate	  the	  emotional	  
damage	  that	  a	  second	  marriage	  may	  inflict	  on	  a	  woman.	  	  
	  
The	  compassion	  in	  the	  judicial	  rhetoric	  that	  pervades	  the	  cases	  highlighted	  above	  
suggests	  that	  a	  primary	  interest	  of	  the	  courts	  is	  to	  circumvent	  the	  patriarchal	  
tendencies	  of	  Pakistani	  culture	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  khulʿ.	  In	  the	  
name	  of	  Islam,	  sensitivity	  is	  shown	  to	  the	  domestic	  happiness	  of	  women;	  their	  
feelings	  are	  discussed	  and	  concern	  is	  paid	  to	  their	  emotional	  satisfaction.	  This	  seems	  
to	  defy	  conservative	  Pakistani	  society,	  which	  is	  littered	  with	  male	  authority,	  
particularly	  in	  matters	  of	  the	  husband’s	  authority.	  Haider	  (2000)	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  
part	  of	  the	  courts’	  agenda	  for	  supporting	  marital	  and	  domestic	  happiness	  “for	  love	  
and	  perhaps	  even	  romance”571.	  Certainly,	  love	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  element	  in	  marital	  
bliss	  by	  courts,	  which	  declare	  that	  if	  a	  wife	  does	  not	  love	  her	  husband,	  then	  she	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568	  Jan	  Ali	  v.	  Mst.	  Gul	  Raja	  1994	  PLD	  245	  para	  (5).	  
569	  1995	  MLD	  Lah.	  1852.	  
570	  1995	  MLD	  Lah.	  1852	  para	  (3).	  	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  khulʿ	  was	  granted	  
unconditionally	  without	  any	  consideration	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  wife,	  as	  the	  judge	  held	  
that	  the	  husband	  had	  presented	  no	  cogent	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  	  	  
571	  Nadya	  Haider,	  “Islamic	  Legal	  Reform,”	  327.	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no	  option	  but	  to	  leave	  him572.	  A	  wife’s	  inability	  to	  love	  her	  husband	  has	  been	  set	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  proof	  for	  a	  khulʿ573,	  as	  are	  a	  wife’s	  inner	  feelings	  for	  her	  
husband,	  which	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  paramount	  importance	  when	  deciding	  khulʿ	  
cases574.	  	  
	  
Equality	  and	  justice	  also	  play	  a	  key	  role	  when	  determining	  whether	  a	  marriage	  
should	  persist575.	  The	  courts	  have	  described	  marriages	  as	  ‘unfair	  and	  cruel’	  
wherever	  women	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  remain	  and	  husbands	  treat	  them	  “as	  if	  they	  
were	  chattels	  which	  could	  be	  parted	  at	  will”576.	  A	  wife	  need	  not	  come	  out	  with	  the	  
sort	  of	  logical,	  objective	  and	  sufficient	  reasons	  that	  would	  satisfy	  an	  ordinary	  
court577	  so	  long	  as	  the	  marital	  court	  is	  satisfied	  that	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  of	  the	  
parties	  living	  in	  harmony578.	  Courts	  are	  loath	  to	  allow	  unhappy	  marriages	  to	  
continue,	  holding	  that	  “it	  is	  better	  to	  separate	  than	  to	  live	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  
perpetually	  saturated	  with	  suspicion,	  mutual	  distrust,	  discord	  and	  hatred	  for	  each	  
other.	  In	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  type	  aforementioned,	  human	  life	  becomes	  a	  mere	  
waste”579.	  Judges	  have	  painted	  an	  idealistic,	  romantic	  vision	  of	  marriage	  justified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Saki	  Muhammad	  v.	  Taj	  Begum	  1985	  CLC	  734,	  737,	  the	  court	  stated:	  
“when	  the	  spouses	  fail	  to	  maintain	  mutual	  respect,	  confidence	  and	  love	  there	  
develops	  extreme	  hatred	  and	  separation	  is	  the	  only	  solution	  which	  the	  courts	  
should	  order”.	  
573	  Jan	  Ali	  v.	  Jan	  Raja	  PLD	  1994	  Pesh.	  245,	  249.	  
574	  Muhammad	  Arif	  Khan	  v.	  Shakoor	  Akhtar	  1999	  YLR	  985.	  
575	  Hafiza	  Bibi	  v.	  District	  Judge	  Narowal	  1995	  MLD	  Lah.	  136	  para	  (10).	  
576	  Abdul	  Ghafoor	  v.	  Judge	  Family	  Court	  1992	  CLC	  Lah.	  2201	  para	  6.	  
577	  Mst.	  Balqis	  Fatima	  v.	  Najm-­‐ul-­‐Qureshi,	  PLD	  1959	  Lah.	  566,	  577.	  
578	  Muhammad	  Yaqoob	  v.	  Shagufta	  Begum	  1981	  CLC	  143	  para	  (b).	  	  See	  also	  Saffiya	  
Bibi	  v.	  Fazal	  Din	  2000	  YLR	  2678,	  where	  the	  judge	  refused	  to	  force	  a	  reunion	  that	  
would	  ‘give	  birth	  to	  a	  hateful	  reunion’.	  
579	  Muhammad	  Amin	  v.	  Judge	  Family	  Court	  2001	  MLD	  Lah.	  52,	  para	  (3).	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upon	  Islamic	  premise,	  reiterating	  on	  many	  occasions	  that	  “Islam	  does	  not	  thrust	  
upon	  parties	  a	  marriage	  devoid	  of	  harmony	  and	  happiness”580.	  A	  happy	  and	  content	  
marriage	  is	  held	  up	  as	  an	  Islamic	  precept	  and	  a	  sacred	  goal581.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  surprising	  to	  note	  that	  women	  are	  not	  condemned	  for	  seeking	  a	  khulʿ	  or	  made	  
to	  feel	  responsible	  for	  breaking	  up	  a	  family,	  even	  where	  there	  are	  children	  involved.	  
Indeed,	  on	  occasion	  courts	  have	  even	  criticised	  and	  condemned	  those	  women	  who	  
are	  forced	  into	  ‘hateful	  unions’	  but	  still	  do	  not	  want	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  are	  prepared	  to	  live	  
even	  in	  “those	  disgusted	  and	  disappointed	  unions”582.	  Courts	  feel	  duty	  bound	  to	  
grant	  a	  khulʿ	  when	  spouses	  develop	  hatred	  and	  disrespect583,	  likening	  this	  to	  the	  
saving	  of	  two	  living	  souls	  from	  the	  agony	  of	  a	  hateful	  union584.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580	  Muhammad	  Rizwan	  v.	  Samina	  Khatoon	  PLJ	  1989	  Kar.	  239,	  240.	  
581	  Muhammad	  Rizwan	  v.	  Samina	  Khatoon	  PLJ	  1989	  Kar.	  239,	  para	  (9).	  
582	  Kureshie,	  Twenty	  Nine	  Years’	  Family	  Law	  Digest,	  quoting	  case	  2004	  UC	  739	  at	  
397.	  
583	  Kureshie,	  Twenty	  Nine	  Years’	  Family	  Law	  Digest,	  quoting	  case	  1999	  SD	  736	  at	  
353.	  	  	  
584	  Inamul	  Haque	  v.	  Sharifa	  Bibi	  1993	  CLC	  46	  para	  (10).	  	  There	  have	  been	  instances	  
where	  the	  wife	  has	  neither	  expressly	  requested	  a	  khulʿ	  nor	  even	  expressed	  her	  
hatred	  of	  her	  husband,	  yet	  still	  the	  court	  has	  taken	  it	  upon	  itself,	  having	  considered	  
the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  to	  invoke	  a	  khulʿ	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  wife.	  See	  Mir	  Qualam	  Khan	  v.	  
Shamin	  Bibi,	  1995	  CLC	  731.	  In	  another	  case,	  although	  the	  wife	  did	  not	  make	  a	  plea	  of	  
khulʿ	  in	  her	  plaint	  for	  dissolution	  of	  marriage,	  the	  court	  still	  granted	  the	  wife	  a	  khulʿ,	  
as	  she	  had	  decided	  that	  she	  no	  longer	  wished	  to	  live	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  was	  firm	  
in	  her	  stance.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  it	  merely	  had	  to	  satisfy	  its	  conscience	  to	  this	  effect.	  	  




4.7	  Judicial	  Relaxation	  in	  the	  Implementation	  of	  Compensation	  
Despite	  this	  liberal	  approach	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  khulʿ,	  a	  fundamental	  problem	  
lies	  in	  the	  notion	  that	  women	  are	  essentially	  buying	  their	  freedom585,	  perpetuating	  
the	  perception	  that	  women’s	  divorce	  rights	  are	  inferior	  to	  those	  of	  men.	  As	  
illustrated	  earlier,	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  despite	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  to	  the	  
contrary,	  contemporary	  interpretations	  of	  Ḥanafī	  law	  state	  that	  a	  woman	  who	  
wishes	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  must	  repay	  any	  benefit	  she	  may	  have	  received	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  her	  marriage	  to	  her	  husband,	  normally	  constituting	  her	  mahr.	  This,	  however,	  can	  
create	  an	  onerous	  duty	  upon	  the	  wife,	  who	  may	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  readily	  
repay	  her	  husband,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  may	  empower	  the	  husband	  to	  settle	  
terms	  to	  his	  financial	  advantage.	  The	  gender	  disparities	  that	  exist	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  
extremely	  wide.	  Financial	  independence	  for	  women	  in	  Pakistan	  is	  an	  uncommon	  
phenomenon,	  with	  women	  comprising	  only	  21.8	  per	  cent	  of	  Pakistan’s	  labour	  
force586.	  This	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  low	  literacy	  rates,	  with	  a	  school	  dropout	  rate	  for	  
girls	  before	  grade	  5	  of	  77	  per	  cent587.	  Lack	  of	  financial	  independence	  means	  that	  the	  
repayment	  of	  the	  mahr	  can	  be	  an	  arduous	  liability	  for	  women,	  placing	  men	  in	  an	  
extremely	  powerful	  position	  when	  seeking	  to	  dissolve	  a	  marriage.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  until	  2002,	  there	  was	  no	  legal	  statute	  in	  Pakistan	  that	  dealt	  exclusively	  
with	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  khulʿ;	  consequently,	  all	  problems	  pertaining	  to	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  including	  compensation,	  fell	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585	  Monsoor,	  From	  Patriarchy	  to	  Gender	  Equity,	  190.	  




judiciary588.	  An	  overview	  of	  recent	  case	  law	  demonstrates	  that	  Pakistani	  courts	  have	  
risen	  to	  this	  challenge,	  creating	  a	  ‘no-­‐fault’	  divorce	  law	  paralleled	  by	  a	  sensitive	  
approach	  to	  financial	  relief.	  The	  cases	  presented	  below	  illustrate	  judicial	  awareness	  
that	  the	  economic	  vulnerability	  of	  divorced	  women	  in	  the	  South	  Asian	  subcontinent	  
is	  a	  major	  socio-­‐legal	  challenge	  facing	  Muslims589.	  Rather	  than	  merely	  lowering	  the	  
evidential	  requirements	  of	  granting	  a	  khulʿ,	  the	  courts	  have	  gone	  further	  and	  created	  
ingenious	  mechanisms	  to	  bypass	  these	  financial	  liabilities.	  
	  
The	  courts	  have	  begun	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  payment	  of	  consideration	  is	  not	  a	  
punishment	  of	  the	  wife	  for	  daring	  to	  demand	  a	  khulʿ,	  or	  compensation	  for	  the	  
husband	  for	  the	  usurping	  of	  his	  right	  to	  object.	  Instead,	  it	  stems	  from	  the	  financial	  
inequality	  of	  male	  and	  female	  dissolution	  rights.	  The	  duty	  to	  return	  the	  mahr	  by	  the	  
wife	  is	  equal	  in	  nature	  to	  the	  duty	  of	  a	  husband	  to	  forego	  his	  claim	  to	  the	  mahr	  if	  he	  
pronounces	  a	  repudiation	  (ṭalāq)590.	  Upon	  pronouncement	  of	  a	  ṭalāq,	  a	  husband	  
must	  always	  return	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  the	  mahr	  that	  was	  promised	  to	  his	  wife591.	  
However,	  the	  Pakistani	  courts	  have	  been	  much	  more	  lenient	  in	  enforcing	  the	  
compensation	  rule	  with	  respect	  to	  women,	  and	  have	  responded	  very	  scathingly	  
towards	  men	  who	  prolong	  litigation	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  vengeance	  against	  ‘poor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588	  In	  2002	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Amendment	  Ordinance	  was	  passed,	  amending	  the	  
Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  (FCA).	  	  S.10	  (4)	  of	  the	  FCA	  was	  empowered	  to	  formally	  
regulate	  petitions	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ	  with	  the	  following	  proviso	  added:	  “Provided	  
that	  notwithstanding	  any	  decision	  or	  judgment	  of	  any	  Court	  or	  tribunal,	  the	  Family	  
Court	  in	  a	  suit	  for	  dissolution	  of	  marriage,	  if	  reconciliation	  fails,	  shall	  pass	  decree	  for	  
dissolution	  of	  marriage	  forthwith	  and	  shall	  also	  restore	  to	  the	  husband	  the	  Haq	  
Mehr	  received	  by	  the	  wife	  in	  consideration	  of	  marriage	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage”.	  
589	  Lucy	  Carroll,	  “Qurʾān	  2.299:	  A	  Charter	  Granted	  to	  the	  Wife,”	  126.	  
590	  2004	  SD	  894	  quoted	  by	  Kureshie,	  Twenty	  Nine	  Years	  Family	  Laws	  Digest,	  383.	  	  
591	  Esposito	  and	  De-­‐Long,	  Women	  in	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  23,	  25.	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women’592.	  They	  have	  devised	  mechanisms	  to	  provide	  as	  much	  relief	  as	  possible	  to	  
wives	  and	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  gaining	  a	  more	  financially	  viable	  divorce.	  	  
The	  courts	  have	  enforced	  an	  important	  principle	  that	  a	  woman	  is	  only	  liable	  to	  
repay	  the	  exact	  amount	  of	  the	  mahr	  given	  to	  her	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  marriage,	  and	  
nothing	  more593.	  This	  is	  significant,	  as	  a	  cultural	  aspect	  of	  marriage	  in	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  
dowry.	  Often,	  women	  do	  not	  receive	  any	  mahr	  from	  their	  husbands,	  but	  instead	  
bring	  many	  household	  items,	  jewellery	  and	  even	  money	  to	  the	  marriage	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  
status	  and	  respect.	  In	  Perveen	  Begum	  v.	  Muhammad	  Ali594,	  the	  wife	  had	  not	  been	  
paid	  any	  mahr	  by	  her	  husband,	  but	  had	  brought	  many	  household	  items	  to	  the	  
marriage	  that	  together	  were	  termed	  her	  dowry.	  The	  Family	  Court	  granted	  her	  a	  
khulʿ,	  but	  ordered	  that	  she	  allow	  her	  husband	  to	  retain	  this	  dowry	  as	  compensation.	  
Upon	  appeal,	  the	  High	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  husband	  could	  not	  take	  back	  more	  than	  he	  
had	  given	  to	  his	  wife,	  as	  this	  was	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  established	  traditions	  of	  the	  
Prophet.	  Judge	  Zaidi	  argued	  that	  although	  Mālikī	  and	  Shāfiʿi	  laws	  allow	  the	  husband	  
to	  take	  back	  more	  than	  the	  mahr	  upon	  a	  khulʿ,	  this	  is	  highly	  disapproved	  of	  by	  Abu	  
Ḥanīfa595.	  Judge	  Zaidi	  was	  also	  concerned	  about	  the	  husband’s	  superior	  right	  to	  
dissolve	  a	  marriage	  unilaterally	  whenever	  he	  likes,	  without	  providing	  a	  reason.	  
Judge	  Zaidi	  acknowledged	  that	  it	  is	  the	  husband	  who	  controls	  the	  marital	  ties,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592	  Muhammad	  Khan	  v.	  Zarina	  Begum	  1975	  P.L.D	  27.	  	  	  
593	  Shamshad	  Begum	  v.	  Abdul	  Haque	  1977	  PLD	  Kar.	  855,	  857,	  858.	  	  The	  High	  Court	  
was	  extremely	  critical	  of	  the	  lower	  court’s	  decision	  in	  awarding	  an	  inflated	  dowry	  to	  
the	  husband.	  	  Justice	  Channa	  found	  that	  the	  lower	  courts	  were	  more	  concerned	  with	  
the	  husband’s	  future	  financial	  prospects	  of	  securing	  another	  wife	  rather	  than	  with	  
ascertaining	  the	  correct	  amount	  of	  mahr	  due,	  calling	  such	  an	  act	  “patently	  illegal”.	  	  
594	  1981	  PLD	  LAH	  116.	  
595	  1981	  PLD	  LAH	  116	  para	  (8).	  	  Judge	  Zaidi	  notes	  that	  although	  al-­‐Shaybānī	  
considers	  this	  a	  lawful	  act,	  it	  is	  still	  a	  loathsome	  act.	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that	  this	  dominant	  position	  is	  open	  to	  abuse,	  as	  “there	  is	  always	  a	  likelihood	  of	  
fleecing	  and	  robbing	  helpless	  and	  poor	  wives	  by	  some	  revengeful	  husbands”596.	  
Quoting	  the	  hadith	  of	  Thābit	  and	  Jamila,	  he	  observed	  that	  the	  Prophet	  only	  ordered	  
the	  return	  of	  the	  garden,	  which	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  Prophet	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  and	  
eliminate	  any	  chance	  of	  exploitation	  and	  extortion	  “at	  the	  hands	  of	  merciless	  
husbands”597.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  monetary	  burden	  on	  women	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  be	  in	  a	  
stronger	  position	  to	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  a	  khulʿ,	  the	  courts	  have	  narrowed	  the	  
definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  benefits	  they	  must	  return,	  excluding,	  for	  example,	  
expenses	  incurred	  on	  a	  wife’s	  education598	  or	  money	  paid	  to	  a	  wife’s	  grandfather599.	  
In	  several	  cases,	  the	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  payments	  paid	  to	  the	  father	  or	  parents	  of	  
the	  wife	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage	  are	  not	  recoverable,	  since	  the	  mahr	  must	  be	  paid	  
personally	  to	  the	  wife600.	  Ahanger	  (1993)	  laments	  the	  injustice	  of	  these	  decisions601,	  
as	  it	  is	  common	  in	  Pakistan	  that	  the	  parents	  of	  the	  bride	  will	  receive	  the	  mahr	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596	  1981	  PLD	  LAH	  116	  para	  (10).	  
597	  1981	  PLD	  LAH	  116	  para	  (12).	  	  See	  also	  Abdul	  Sattar	  v.	  Mst.	  Kalsoom	  2006	  PLD	  
KAr.	  273	  and	  Muhammad	  Zafar	  v.	  Judge	  Family	  Court	  2005	  CLC	  1844.	  	  
598	  Malik	  Sanaullah	  v.	  Mst.	  Rohella	  Hassan	  	  1996	  MLD	  702,	  703.	  
599	  Muhammad	  Aslam	  v.	  Kuasar	  Perveen	  1987	  CLC	  256,	  259.	  
600	  In	  Hashim	  v.	  Family	  Court	  Judge	  2002	  CLC	  1409,	  although	  the	  marriage	  contract	  
showed	  that	  the	  husband	  had	  paid	  95,000	  rupees	  to	  his	  wife’s	  father	  in	  return	  for	  
her	  hand	  in	  marriage,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  husband	  had	  failed	  to	  prove	  that	  his	  
wife	  had	  received	  the	  monies	  personally.	  In	  Ghulam	  Sarwar	  v.	  Muniran	  1984	  CLC	  
1688,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  a	  sum	  of	  10,000	  rupees	  paid	  to	  the	  wife’s	  parents	  was	  not	  
recoverable	  as	  benefits	  to	  be	  returned	  upon	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  See	  also	  Ghulam	  Muhammad	  v.	  
Noor	  Bibi	  1985	  CLC	  2540.	  	  	  
601	  Mohammad	  Ahanger,	  “Compensation	  in	  Khul:	  An	  Appraisal	  of	  Judicial	  




their	  daughter’s	  behalf,	  and	  that	  they	  have	  the	  sole	  discretion	  to	  retain	  it	  for	  
themselves	  or	  return	  it	  to	  their	  daughter.	  Most	  Pakistani	  parents	  pay	  for	  their	  
daughters’	  weddings,	  and	  thus	  the	  mahr	  provides	  some	  recompense	  for	  that.	  
Although	  this	  is	  a	  common	  local	  custom,	  such	  cultural	  attitudes	  actually	  contravene	  
the	  purpose	  of	  the	  mahr	  in	  Islamic	  law,	  which	  is	  a	  financial	  gift	  that	  should	  be	  given	  
directly	  to	  the	  wife	  for	  her	  to	  dispose	  of	  as	  she	  pleases.	  Technically,	  it	  is	  a	  benefit	  
that	  she	  has	  the	  right	  to	  negotiate	  herself	  for	  her	  personal	  use,	  but	  in	  practical	  terms	  
this	  is	  rarely	  the	  case	  and	  instead	  is	  relegated	  to	  the	  sidelines	  during	  the	  contractual	  
stages	  of	  her	  marriage.	  In	  fact,	  the	  groom’s	  family	  will	  often	  present	  gold	  or	  other	  
valuables	  to	  the	  wife,	  but	  not	  include	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  mahr	  in	  the	  marriage	  
contract	  in	  order	  to	  deprive	  the	  wife	  of	  full	  property	  rights602.	  This	  is	  also	  done	  
because	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  husband	  divorcing	  his	  wife	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  a	  
wife	  demanding	  a	  khulʿ.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former,	  the	  husband	  must	  forfeit	  whatever	  
mahr	  he	  has	  stipulated	  in	  the	  marriage	  contract.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  this	  future	  
penalty,	  then,	  the	  mahr	  is	  sometimes	  kept	  to	  a	  bare	  minimum,	  with	  gifts	  given	  to	  the	  
wife	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  will	  be	  more	  easily	  retained	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  breakup	  of	  
the	  marriage.	  Mindful	  of	  this	  fact,	  the	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  under	  no	  circumstances	  
is	  the	  wife	  obligated	  to	  return	  bridal	  gifts	  given	  to	  her	  by	  her	  husband	  other	  than	  by	  
way	  of	  the	  dower603.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Shakeel	  Saood	  Dhon	  v.	  Rizwana	  Khanum	  and	  another	  (PLD	  2012	  
Lahore	  43),	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  word	  ‘dower’	  had	  to	  be	  given	  its	  ordinary	  and	  
plain	  meaning	  and	  could	  not	  be	  stretched	  to	  include	  bridal	  gifts	  or	  benefits	  other	  
than	  the	  dower	  received	  by	  the	  wife.	  	  If	  gold	  was	  given	  but	  not	  specifically	  stipulated	  
as	  the	  mahr,	  then	  this	  was	  not	  to	  be	  returned.	  
603	  Abdul	  Sattar	  v.	  Mst	  Kalsoom	  2006	  PLD	  Kar.	  272.	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Even	  where	  a	  husband	  has	  proved	  payment	  of	  benefits	  to	  his	  wife	  personally,	  courts	  
have	  further	  diminished	  such	  payments	  upon	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  benefits	  
that	  the	  wife	  may	  have	  received	  during	  the	  marriage604.	  This	  may	  include	  the	  
spouses	  continuously	  living	  together605,	  a	  wife’s	  housekeeping	  duties,	  and	  her	  
looking	  after	  the	  children606.	  All	  of	  these	  duties	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  benefits	  
received	  by	  a	  husband	  from	  his	  wife,	  and	  counteract	  a	  claim	  for	  the	  return	  of	  the	  
mahr.	  The	  courts	  have	  also	  taken	  into	  account	  a	  wife’s	  ability	  to	  repay	  the	  mahr	  
when	  coming	  to	  their	  decisions,	  especially	  where	  a	  wife	  may	  face	  financial	  
hardship607.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Auranzeb	  v.	  Gulnaz608	  the	  parties	  had	  been	  married	  for	  
one-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  years.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  this	  length	  of	  time	  could	  be	  treated	  as	  
sufficient	  reciprocal	  benefit	  received	  by	  the	  husband	  for	  a	  dower	  of	  42,000	  
rupees.	  The	  court	  also	  observed	  that,	  since	  the	  wife	  belonged	  to	  a	  poorer	  family,	  
she	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  repay	  the	  dower,	  and	  therefore	  ordered	  the	  khulʿ	  
without	  any	  compensation	  to	  the	  husband609.	  
	  
Whilst	  adjudicating	  what	  benefits	  must	  be	  returned,	  the	  courts	  are	  also	  reluctant	  to	  
enforce	  mahr	  repayments	  when	  the	  husband	  is	  found	  to	  be	  at	  fault.	  In	  Perveen	  
Begum	  v.	  Muhammad	  Ali610	  the	  court	  justified	  its	  position	  by	  following	  Muḥammad	  
Shaybānī’s	  who	  asserts	  that	  when	  cruelty	  comes	  from	  the	  husband’s	  side,	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604	  Saqlain	  Zaheer	  v.	  Mst.	  Zaibun	  Nisa	  alias	  Zaibi	  1988	  MLD	  427.	  
605	  Mst.	  Balqis	  Fatima	  v.	  Najmul	  Ikram	  Qureshi	  1959	  PLD	  Lah.	  566.	  
606	  Saqlain	  Zaheer	  v.	  Mst.	  Zaibun	  Nisa	  alias	  Zaibi	  1988	  MLD	  427.	  
607	  Muhammad	  Khalil	  v.	  Shazia	  Iqbal	  2006	  CLC	  1033.	  
608	  2006	  PLD	  Kar.	  563.	  
609	  2006	  PLD	  Kar.	  563	  para	  (9).	  
610	  1981	  PLD	  Lah.	  116.	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request	  for	  compensation	  for	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  unlawful611.	  This	  was	  reiterated	  by	  the	  
courts	  after	  applying	  the	  law	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  al-­‐Hidāya612	  and	  later	  clarified	  by	  
the	  Peshawar	  High	  Court613.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  wife	  applied	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  cruelty	  of	  her	  husband	  and	  requested	  the	  return	  of	  15	  tola614	  of	  gold	  jewellery	  
that	  constituted	  her	  mahr.	  The	  court	  formulated	  its	  question	  as	  follows:	  does	  the	  
court	  have	  the	  power	  to	  refuse	  the	  return	  of	  the	  dower	  to	  the	  husband,	  or	  to	  release	  
him	  from	  payment	  of	  a	  deferred	  dower,	  when	  a	  wife	  is	  compelled	  to	  resort	  to	  khulʿ	  
due	  to	  her	  husband’s	  cruelty?615	  The	  court	  considered	  the	  Qurʾānic	  verse	  2:299	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  the	  hadith	  and	  the	  interpretations	  put	  forward	  by	  classical616	  and	  
modern	  jurists617.	  They	  found	  that	  although	  a	  husband	  is	  entitled	  to	  receive	  
consideration	  from	  his	  wife	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  khulʿ,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  entitlement.	  The	  
entitlement	  is	  affected	  by	  nushūz:	  cruelty.	  The	  court	  explained	  that	  Islam	  preaches	  
love	  and	  mutual	  affection,	  and	  aggressively	  condemns	  cruelty	  in	  all	  its	  
manifestations618.	  If	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  a	  husband’s	  aggressiveness	  has	  
compelled	  a	  wife	  to	  seek	  dissolution	  of	  her	  marriage,	  then	  the	  court	  has	  the	  power	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611	  1981	  PLD	  Lah.	  116	  para	  (9).	  
612	  Anees	  Ahmad	  v.	  Uzma	  1998	  PLD	  Lah.	  52.	  
613	  Karim	  Ullah	  v.	  Shabana	  2003	  PLD	  Pesh.	  146.	  
614	  ‘Tola’	  is	  the	  common	  unit	  of	  weight	  used	  for	  gold,	  equivalent	  to	  11.33	  grams	  of	  
gold.	  
615	  Karim	  Ullah	  v.	  Shabana	  2003	  PLD	  Pesh.	  146.	  
616	  The	  courts	  relied	  on	  Radd	  al-­‐Muḥtār	  ʿalā	  Durr	  al-­‐Mukhtār	  by	  18th	  century	  
Islamic	  scholar	  Ibn	  ʿĀbidīn;	  Fatawa-­‐e-­‐Alamgiri,	  a	  compilation	  of	  Sunni	  laws	  
primarily	  based	  on	  Ḥanafī	  principles;	  Fatḥ	  al-­‐Barī	  a	  commentary	  on	  Sahih	  Bukhari	  
by	  Ibn	  Ḥajar	  Al-­‐ʿAsqalānī	  and	  Kitab-­‐ul-­‐Fiqa	  Ala	  Mazaahib-­‐e-­‐Arbaa	  by	  Abdur	  Rehman	  
Aljazeeri.	  	  See	  Karim	  Ullah	  v.	  Shabana	  2003	  PLD	  Pesh.	  146	  para	  (7).	  
617	  Tafheem-­‐ul-­‐Qurʾān	  by	  Maulana	  Abul	  Aala	  Maudoodi.	  
618	  2003	  PLD	  Pesh.	  146	  para	  (11).	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to	  refuse	  the	  dower	  to	  the	  husband,	  or	  to	  refuse	  to	  release	  him	  from	  the	  liability	  to	  
pay	  the	  dower619.	  	  
	  
On	  a	  more	  philosophical	  note,	  the	  court	  justified	  its	  conclusion	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  
automatic	  payment	  of	  compensation	  on	  the	  request	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  would	  allow	  husbands	  
to	  manipulate	  this	  provision.	  Their	  “cruelty	  would	  be	  purpose-­‐orientated”	  to	  break	  
the	  bonds	  of	  marriage	  at	  the	  financial	  expense	  of	  the	  wife620.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  
criticisms	  levelled	  at	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  wife	  has	  to	  purchase	  her	  freedom	  as	  
opposed	  to	  having	  a	  right	  free	  from	  any	  financial	  consideration.	  Although	  this	  is	  the	  
prevailing	  image	  of	  a	  khulʿ,	  it	  is	  not	  something	  the	  courts	  have	  taken	  for	  granted.	  
They	  have	  determined	  that	  there	  is	  no	  automatic	  right	  to	  benefits	  in	  return	  for	  a	  
khulʿ,	  which	  would	  be	  decided	  by	  the	  facts	  and	  circumstances	  of	  each	  case621.	  The	  
courts	  reiterated	  this	  view	  in	  the	  recent	  case	  of	  Nasir	  v.	  Rubina622,	  where	  it	  was	  held	  
that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  Family	  Court	  to	  determine	  the	  quantity	  of	  benefits	  that	  a	  wife	  is	  
liable	  to	  return	  to	  her	  husband.	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  court	  took	  into	  account	  
the	  period	  of	  wedlock,	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  two	  children	  and	  the	  wife’s	  detestation	  of	  her	  
husband’s	  polygamous	  marriage,	  which	  all	  resulted	  in	  the	  court	  granting	  the	  wife	  a	  
khulʿ	  without	  the	  repayment	  of	  any	  dower623.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619	  Ibid.,	  13.	  
620	  Ibid.,	  12.	  
621	  Razia	  Begum	  v.	  Saqir	  Ahmad	  1988	  CLC	  Que.	  1586.	  
622	  2012	  M	  L	  D	  1576	  Peshawar,	  para	  (9).	  
623	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Abdul	  Aleem	  Khan	  v.	  Tabinda	  Nazeer	  Qazi	  2011P	  L	  D	  Kar.	  196,	  the	  
court	  observed	  that	  “if	  a	  husband	  contends	  that	  a	  khulʿ	  cannot	  be	  granted	  without	  
restitution	  of	  the	  dower	  and	  other	  benefits	  are	  accepted,	  then	  a	  destitute	  wife,	  who	  
is	  found	  otherwise	  entitled	  to	  khulʿ,	  will	  stand	  deprived	  of	  the	  right	  simply	  because	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What	  is	  most	  interesting	  is	  that	  even	  if	  a	  wife	  is	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  conditional	  upon	  
payment	  of	  benefits	  to	  her	  husband,	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  this	  condition	  creates	  a	  civil	  
liability	  only624.	  The	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  the	  return	  of	  benefits	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  
precedent	  to	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriage.	  Even	  if	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  decreed	  conditional	  upon	  
the	  repayment	  of	  the	  dower,	  failure	  to	  repay	  the	  dower	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  khulʿ,	  which	  still	  operates	  to	  dissolve	  the	  marriage625.	  Non-­‐payment	  of	  the	  mahr	  
neither	  negates	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  nor	  retroactively	  invalidates	  the	  decree.	  
Courts	  have	  been	  categorical	  in	  their	  judgements	  that	  granting	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  not	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  wife	  repaying	  the	  mahr	  first,	  meaning	  that	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  this	  
condition	  does	  not	  render	  the	  khulʿ	  ineffective626.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  
has	  endorsed	  this	  position,	  holding	  that	  a	  husband	  has	  a	  right	  to	  pursue	  the	  matter	  
in	  the	  civil	  courts	  but	  cannot	  contest	  the	  khulʿ	  itself.	  These	  cases	  illustrate	  that	  the	  
courts	  are	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  economic	  disadvantages	  faced	  by	  women	  in	  
Pakistani	  society.	  During	  the	  life	  of	  a	  marriage,	  wives	  are	  often	  completely	  
financially	  dependent	  upon	  their	  husbands,	  so	  any	  financial	  liability	  incurred	  upon	  
its	  dissolution	  is	  an	  onerous	  one	  to	  bear.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  courts	  are	  seeking	  to	  
redress	  the	  economic	  imbalance	  faced	  by	  women	  Pakistan	  by	  sending	  a	  clear	  
message	  that	  women	  must	  be	  financially	  compensated	  when	  a	  marriage	  contract	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of	  her	  incapacity	  to	  return	  the	  benefits,	  which	  will	  be	  highly	  unfair	  and	  against	  the	  
spirit	  of	  law	  and	  justice”	  (para	  6).	  
624	  Dr.	  Aqhlaq	  Ahmed	  v.	  Kishwar	  Sultana	  1983	  PLD	  SC	  169.	  
625	  Saima	  Akbar	  v.	  Muhammad	  Zubair	  1990	  PLD	  Lah.	  71.	  
626	  See	  also	  Muhammad	  Shabbir	  v.	  Mst.	  Zahida	  and	  others	  1991	  CLC	  1541	  and	  
Dilshad	  v.	  Judge,	  Family	  Court,	  Kharian	  and	  another	  1991	  CLC	  1564,	  where	  the	  
husband’s	  right	  to	  recover	  the	  mahr	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  civil	  liability	  only.	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negotiated,	  but	  that	  upon	  its	  dissolution,	  they	  will	  take	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  into	  
account	  when	  deciding	  what	  must	  actually	  be	  repaid.	  
	  
4.8	  Conclusion	  
The	  development	  of	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  law	  in	  Pakistan	  illustrates	  the	  dilemma	  
that	  the	  courts	  have	  faced	  in	  providing	  legal	  remedies	  for	  women	  that	  are	  palatable	  
to	  Pakistani	  Muslim	  men.	  Law	  is	  not	  practiced	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  and	  its	  interpretation	  
and	  implementation	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  social,	  cultural	  and	  religious	  norms	  of	  the	  
time.	  The	  restrictive	  implementation	  of	  the	  statutory	  provisions,	  where	  judges	  
would	  have	  had	  to	  find	  men	  at	  fault	  whilst	  taking	  away	  from	  them	  their	  exclusive	  
monopoly	  on	  divorce	  rights,	  proved	  too	  difficult	  a	  route	  for	  the	  courts,	  which	  are	  
also	  products	  of	  the	  patriarchal	  social	  structure	  of	  Pakistani	  society,	  to	  pursue.	  
Rather	  than	  ease	  evidential	  standards,	  the	  judiciary	  elevated	  the	  ‘fault’	  threshold	  
that	  a	  wife	  needed	  to	  prove	  a	  divorce,	  making	  the	  DMMA	  an	  impotent	  legislative	  
endeavour.	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  khulʿ,	  for	  a	  period	  of	  fifteen	  years	  the	  judiciary	  interpreted	  this	  according	  
to	  the	  principles	  of	  contemporary	  Ḥanafī	  ʿulamāʾ	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  classical	  jurists	  
of	  the	  past.	  This,	  though,	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  these	  rules	  
with	  the	  changing	  social	  conditions	  of	  Pakistani	  society:	  a	  society	  that	  heavily	  
favours	  men,	  where	  women	  are	  underprivileged,	  economically	  disadvantaged	  and	  
generally	  considered	  as	  the	  weaker	  segment	  of	  society.	  Having	  failed	  to	  make	  the	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DMMA	  into	  a	  potent	  remedy	  for	  women,	  the	  judiciary	  finally	  realised	  that,	  rather	  
than	  faithfully	  follow	  these	  ʿulamāʾ,	  they	  needed	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  
economic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  intervening	  years,	  
and	  to	  adapt	  and	  adjust	  the	  law	  according	  to	  the	  pressing	  social	  needs	  of	  the	  time.	  
They	  thus	  formulated	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  that	  was	  in	  fact	  more	  in	  line	  with	  
classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurists	  of	  the	  formative	  period	  of	  Islam.	  	  
	  
The	  judicial	  activism	  exhibited	  by	  the	  courts	  is	  truly	  astonishing	  when	  compared	  to	  
its	  earlier	  gendered	  reasoning	  under	  the	  statutory	  legislation.	  This	  lends	  credence	  to	  
the	  belief	  that	  much	  of	  the	  negative	  rhetoric	  displayed	  in	  the	  earlier	  cases	  was	  a	  
legislative	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  the	  courts	  to	  ensure	  that	  women	  gained	  a	  legal	  
remedy	  but	  without	  alienating	  men	  en-­‐masse.	  Failure	  to	  provide	  remedies	  under	  
the	  DMMA	  meant	  that	  men	  were	  not	  overtly	  blamed	  for	  their	  marital	  breakdown.	  
However,	  providing	  divorces	  under	  the	  khulʿ	  meant	  that	  women	  gained	  an	  easier	  
exit	  from	  their	  marriages	  whilst	  the	  courts	  bypassed	  state	  scrutiny.	  It	  is	  important	  
to	  remember	  that	  this	  judicial	  enterprise	  was	  developed	  during	  the	  rule	  of	  General	  
Zia	  and	  his	  period	  of	  Islamisation,	  which	  sought	  to	  erode	  women’s	  freedoms.	  It	  is	  
difficult	  to	  assess	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  judiciary	  was	  aware	  at	  that	  time	  of	  how	  its	  
actions	  would	  resonate	  in	  governmental	  channels.	  However,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  
if	  women	  had	  been	  given	  divorces	  relatively	  easily	  under	  the	  statutory	  provisions	  
during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  Pakistan’s	  political	  history,	  the	  DMMA	  and	  the	  khulʿ	  would	  
have	  received	  major	  public	  attention,	  particularly	  negative	  attention,	  from	  the	  
religious	  authorities,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  General	  Zia	  himself.	  The	  judiciary	  must	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therefore	  be	  commended	  for	  rising	  from	  its	  earlier	  stupor	  and	  navigating	  political	  
and	  religious	  censure	  by	  adopting	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  divorce	  law	  reform,	  
which	  has	  finally	  provided	  a	  remedy	  for	  women	  whilst	  appeasing	  traditional	  male	  
prerogatives.	  The	  judicial	  commitment	  to	  improving	  women’s	  divorce	  rights	  during	  
these	  turbulent	  times	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day	  has	  shown	  that	  Muslim	  jurisprudence	  is	  
fully	  capable	  of	  liberalising	  the	  rules	  of	  family	  law	  relating	  to	  divorce,	  by	  promoting	  
social	  justice	  and	  equality	  for	  women	  whilst	  keeping	  within	  the	  underlying	  goals	  
and	  spirit	  of	  Islam.	  The	  negation	  of	  a	  ‘hate	  standard’	  for	  the	  doctrine	  of	  khulʿ	  and	  a	  
relaxation	  of	  the	  rules	  regarding	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  are	  innovative	  efforts	  that	  
have	  brought	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  law	  into	  legal	  practice.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  also	  illustrates	  that	  activist	  courts	  can	  act	  as	  engines	  of	  progress	  and	  
social	  change.	  Whilst	  interpreting	  the	  law,	  judges	  have	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  social	  
and	  economic	  contexts	  in	  which	  these	  interpretations	  must	  take	  place,	  and	  have	  
adapted	  and	  reconciled	  the	  law	  to	  its	  changing	  needs	  and	  requirements.	  Justice	  
Krishna	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  law	  cannot	  remain	  static,	  but	  that	  a	  judge	  must	  mould	  
the	  law	  so	  that	  it	  can	  serve	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  changing	  mores	  of	  society627.	  It	  must	  
adopt	  an	  activist	  role	  in	  the	  process	  of	  social	  transformation	  and	  move	  with	  the	  
changing	  concepts	  and	  values	  of	  society628.	  The	  Pakistani	  judiciary	  should	  be	  
credited	  for	  leading	  the	  way	  in	  judicial	  creativity	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Islamic	  
principles,	  and	  for	  dispelling	  the	  myth	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  cannot	  keep	  pace	  
with	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  advancement	  of	  society.	  Indeed,	  their	  judicial	  activities	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  Fuzlunbi	  v.	  K.	  Khader	  Vali	  1980	  AIR	  SC	  1730,	  1732.	  
628	  Serjuddin,	  Muslim	  Family	  Law,	  2.	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led	  to	  the	  Presidential	  Ordinance	  of	  2002,	  requiring	  family	  law	  cases,	  particularly	  
khulʿ	  cases,	  to	  be	  resolved	  within	  six	  months	  of	  the	  plaint	  being	  issued	  with	  the	  most	  
recent	  amendment	  reducing	  the	  time	  to	  four	  months629	  in	  order	  to	  further	  enhance	  
the	  judicial	  process.	  The	  right	  to	  female	  marital	  dissolution	  may	  be	  a	  small	  stepping-­‐
stone	  in	  the	  overall	  scheme	  of	  ensuring	  an	  equal	  footing	  with	  men,	  but	  any	  
improvement	  will	  surely	  promote	  overall	  progress	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  state.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629	  S.	  12	  (A)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  See	  Chapter	  Seven	  




RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  FOR	  THE	  FIELD	  WORK	  	  
	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  methodology	  used	  during	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  research	  design,	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  for	  this	  project.	  It	  
aims	  to	  link	  up	  with	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  put	  forward	  in	  Chapter	  One	  and	  
provide	  the	  foundations	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  empirical	  research.	  This	  chapter	  
outlines	  the	  qualitative	  methods	  used	  as	  a	  channel	  for	  compiling	  and	  analysing	  data	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  structured,	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  unstructured	  interviews	  and	  
observations.	  It	  assesses	  the	  role	  of	  the	  researcher	  in	  the	  field	  and	  the	  ethical	  issues	  
faced	  during	  the	  research	  process.	  In	  order	  to	  contextualise	  the	  study,	  the	  research	  
sites	  and	  the	  sampling	  methodology	  used	  to	  recruit	  the	  participants	  are	  delineated,	  
and	  the	  details	  of	  the	  participants	  interviewed	  are	  provided.	  
	  
5.2	  Research	  Theory	  
Grounded	  theory	  methodology,	  which	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  1960s	  through	  the	  
pivotal	  works	  of	  Glaser	  and	  Strauss	  (1967),	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  the	  
fieldwork	  in	  this	  study630.	  The	  aim	  of	  grounded	  theory	  is	  to	  ‘generate	  or	  discover	  a	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  Barney	  Glaser	  and	  Anselm	  Strauss,	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Grounded	  Theory:	  Strategies	  
for	  Qualitative	  Research	  (Chicago:	  Aldine,	  1967);	  Barney	  Glaser	  and	  Anselm	  Strauss,	  
Awareness	  of	  Dying	  (Chicago:	  Aldine,	  1965).	  	  Whilst	  Glaser	  and	  Strauss	  were	  
	  
188	  
theory’,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  “the	  discovery	  of	  theory	  from	  data	  systematically	  
obtained	  from	  social	  research”631.	  Grounded	  theory	  was	  chosen	  for	  this	  research	  
because	  it	  focuses	  on	  discovering	  elemental	  social	  mechanisms	  and	  processes.	  
Crooks	  (2001)	  argues	  that	  grounded	  theory	  is	  particularly	  useful	  where	  very	  little	  is	  
known	  about	  the	  contextual	  factors	  that	  impact	  an	  individual’s	  life,	  whilst	  Glaser	  
(1978)	  stresses	  that	  grounded	  theory	  allows	  a	  researcher	  to	  delve	  beyond	  
presumptions	  and	  understand	  the	  innate	  processes	  that	  dictate	  behaviour.	  During	  
an	  initial	  exploration	  of	  this	  topic,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  very	  little	  research	  has	  been	  
conducted	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  women’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  their	  experience	  of	  
recourse	  to	  legal	  remedies	  for	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce.	  The	  grounded	  theory	  
approach	  therefore	  proved	  extremely	  useful	  to	  probe	  the	  intrinsic	  behaviour	  of	  
women	  and	  discover	  why	  some	  women	  remain	  in	  unhappy	  and	  often	  abusive	  
marriages	  whilst	  others	  opt	  to	  enforce	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  divorce.	  It	  allows	  a	  
researcher	  to	  comprehend	  the	  meanings	  behind	  behaviour	  and	  construct	  a	  unique	  
theory	  for	  the	  project	  rather	  than	  generalise	  from	  universal	  laws.	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  
grounded	  theory	  methodology	  has	  also	  been	  used	  in	  research	  in	  Pakistan	  to	  
investigate	  the	  bias	  in	  local	  customary	  laws	  that	  are	  not	  favourable	  to	  women	  and	  
discriminate	  against	  them	  (Kamal	  2003).	  The	  research	  found	  that	  women	  are	  seen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pioneers	  of	  this	  method,	  they	  later	  diverged	  to	  follow	  different	  paths,	  with	  Glaser	  
criticising	  Strauss	  for	  concentrating	  less	  on	  theories	  and	  more	  on	  concepts.	  
631	  Glaser	  and	  Strauss,	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Grounded	  Theory,	  2.	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as	  distrusting	  alternative	  dispute	  resolutions	  such	  as	  jirghas632,	  preferring	  formal	  
court	  procedures	  to	  resolve	  their	  disputes	  and	  complaints633.	  	  
	  
Research	  based	  on	  grounded	  theory	  demands	  that	  data	  be	  systematically	  analysed	  
and	  then	  a	  theory	  be	  constructed	  that	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  experiences	  and	  views	  of	  
the	  respondents634.	  The	  theory	  can	  be	  inductively	  obtained	  from	  an	  inquiry	  of	  the	  
phenomenon	  it	  embodies635.	  Glaser	  (1978)	  argues	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  an	  inductive	  
approach	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  researcher	  is	  not	  biased	  by	  preconceived	  ideas	  
regarding	  the	  research	  matter,	  knowing	  that	  there	  is	  no	  definite	  theory	  to	  prove	  
through	  the	  data,	  but	  that	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  from	  the	  field	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  
for	  a	  grounded	  theory	  approach.	  However,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  there	  
is	  some	  knowledge	  about	  the	  research	  topic,	  a	  grounded	  theory	  approach	  can	  still	  
be	  used	  if	  a	  new	  point	  of	  view	  is	  desired636.	  Before	  I	  began	  my	  research	  work,	  I	  was	  
aware	  of	  some	  theoretical	  perspectives	  regarding	  the	  notion	  of	  women’s	  autonomy	  
and	  agency	  denoted	  by	  feminist	  legal	  theory	  and	  Islamic	  perspectives	  on	  marriage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632	  An	  informal	  dispute	  resolution	  process	  involving	  senior	  members	  and	  leaders	  of	  
the	  local	  community.	  
633	  S.	  Kamal,	  “Effects	  of	  the	  Interplay	  of	  Formal	  and	  Customary	  Laws	  on	  Women	  in	  
Tribal	  Cultures”,	  Paper	  for	  the	  7th	  Interdisciplinary	  Congress	  on	  Women’s	  Worlds	  99	  
June	  24th,	  1999;	  WLUML	  (2003)	  "Knowing	  our	  Rights:	  Women,	  Family,	  Laws	  and	  
Customs	  in	  the	  Muslim	  World."	  	  Accessed	  February	  26th	  2015	  
http://uit.no/utskrift?p_document_id=169282	  	  
634	  Anselm	  Strauss	  and	  Juliet	  Corbin,	  Basics	  of	  Qualitative	  Research:	  Techniques	  and	  
Procedures	  for	  Developing	  Grounded	  Theory	  (Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage	  Publications,	  
1998),	  12.	  
635	  Glaser	  and	  Strauss,	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Grounded	  Theory,	  3.	  
636	  See	  Anselm	  Strauss	  and	  Juliet	  Corbin,	  Basics	  of	  Qualitative	  Research:	  Grounded	  
Theory	  Procedures	  and	  Techniques	  (Newbury,	  USA:	  Sage,	  1998);	  K.	  Smith	  and	  F.	  
Biley,	  “Understanding	  Grounded	  Theory:	  Principles	  and	  Evaluation”	  Nurse	  
Researcher	  4	  (1997):	  17-­‐30.	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and	  divorce,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  knowledge	  that	  women	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  subject	  to	  both	  
formal	  and	  local	  customary	  and	  religious	  laws.	  Although	  these	  provided	  an	  initial	  
base	  for	  research,	  I	  needed	  to	  acquire	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  lived	  realities	  
of	  married	  women	  and	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  law	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  empower	  women	  in	  
marital	  disputes.	  Unlike	  other	  qualitative	  methods,	  which	  predominantly	  use	  one	  
source	  of	  data,	  grounded	  theory	  research	  allows	  the	  use	  of	  multiple	  sources	  of	  data	  
such	  as	  interviews,	  observations	  and	  life	  histories637.	  These	  multiple	  data	  sources	  
allowed	  me	  to	  gain	  insights	  into	  the	  views	  of	  married	  women	  and	  their	  own	  
perceptions	  of	  married	  life	  and	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  marital	  conflict,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
observe	  court	  processes	  and	  interview	  women	  who	  engage	  with	  the	  law	  and	  the	  
state	  apparatus.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  an	  organised,	  systematic	  and	  methodical	  approach	  to	  
obtaining	  information	  is	  formulated,	  it	  is	  important	  in	  grounded	  theory	  to	  adopt	  a	  
methodology	  that	  will	  assist	  a	  researcher	  in	  understanding	  the	  data	  collected	  and	  
the	  study	  itself	  in	  the	  broadest	  way638.	  Bryan	  (2002)	  states	  that	  the	  best	  position	  for	  
qualitative	  researchers	  is	  to	  view	  phenomena	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  subjects	  of	  the	  
research	  and	  interpret	  the	  ‘social	  world’	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  those	  being	  
studied639.	  Thus,	  this	  research	  attempts	  to	  analyse	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  women	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637	  Christina	  Goulding,	  “Grounded	  Theory:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  Paradigm,	  
Procedures	  and	  Misconceptions,”	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  (University	  of	  
Wolverhampton,	  1999):	  8.	  
638	  Louis	  Cohen	  et	  al,	  Research	  Methods	  in	  Education	  (London:	  Routledge	  Falmer,	  
2003),	  45.	  




initiating	  divorces,	  looking	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  Muslim	  women	  living	  in	  Pakistan.	  
Denzin	  and	  Lincoln	  (1998)	  argue	  that	  any	  qualitative	  study	  must	  take	  a	  ‘naturalistic	  
approach’,	  observing	  subject	  matter	  in	  its	  natural	  setting	  and	  trying	  to	  interpret	  
findings	  “in	  terms	  of	  the	  meanings	  people	  bring	  to	  them”640.	  Moreover,	  Loveland	  
and	  Loveland	  (1995)	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  social	  knowledge,	  the	  researcher	  
must	  “participate	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  another	  human	  being	  (in	  sociological	  terms,	  ‘take	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  other’)”,	  and	  the	  best	  way	  to	  achieve	  this	  is	  through	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  
interaction641.	  Cartledge	  (2003)	  provides	  a	  concise	  description	  of	  what	  a	  
researcher’s	  intent	  and	  purpose	  should	  be	  in	  adopting	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  to	  
research:	  
	  
“Qualitative	  research,	  wishing	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  world	  views	  of	  the	  subjects	  
under	  study,	  tends	  to	  operate	  with	  an	  open	  and	  flexible	  research	  strategy	  
rather	  than	  one	  which	  is	  overly	  prescriptive	  from	  the	  start.	  This	  means	  
that	  research	  problems	  tend	  to	  be	  organized	  around	  more	  general	  and	  
open	  questions	  rather	  than	  tightly	  defined	  and	  theory-­‐driven	  questions.	  
Qualitative	  researchers	  tend	  to	  favour	  a	  process	  that	  formulates	  and	  
tests	  theories	  and	  concepts	  as	  they	  arise	  from	  within	  the	  data	  under	  
collection642”.	  
	  
This	  research	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  Bentzon	  et	  al	  1998,	  who	  have	  used	  the	  grounded	  
theory	  approach	  whilst	  investigating	  the	  predicaments	  faced	  by	  women	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640	  Norman	  Denzin	  and	  Yvonna	  Lincoln,	  Collecting	  and	  Interpreting	  Qualitative	  
Materials	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1998),	  3.	  
641	  John	  Lofland	  and	  Lyn	  Lofland,	  Analyzing	  Social	  Settings:	  A	  Guide	  to	  Qualitative	  
Observation	  and	  Analysis	  (Belmont:	  Wadsworth,	  1995),	  16.	  
642	  Mark	  Cartledge,	  Practical	  Theological-­‐Charismatic	  and	  Empirical	  Perspectives	  
(Carlisle:	  Paternoster	  Press,	  2003),	  17.	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coming	  into	  contact	  with	  alleged	  gender-­‐neutral	  laws643.	  Whilst	  exploring	  the	  
relationship	  between	  law	  and	  practice,	  women’s	  and	  men’s	  lived	  experience	  are	  
used	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  Bentzon	  et	  al	  (1998)	  note	  that:	  
	  
“legal	  concepts	  and	  theories	  need	  to	  be	  critically	  analysed	  through	  the	  
medium	  of	  women’s	  and	  men’s	  lived	  experiences.	  To	  do	  this,	  researchers	  
need	  to	  have	  a	  first-­‐hand	  knowledge	  of	  local	  practices	  and	  procedures	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  researching644”.	  
	  
Similarly,	  Hirsch	  (1998),	  in	  her	  study	  of	  Muslim	  Swahili	  women	  in	  Kenya,	  uses	  the	  
grounded	  theory	  method	  to	  assess	  how	  these	  women	  adopt	  legal	  processes	  to	  
challenge	  religious	  cultural	  norms	  that	  place	  them	  in	  subordinate	  positions	  in	  
society.	  Muslim	  women	  in	  Kenya	  break	  through	  the	  cultural	  deterrent	  of	  Heshima,	  
which	  requires	  them	  to	  keep	  silent	  over	  personal	  marital	  issues,	  and	  instead	  pursue	  
their	  marital	  disputes	  in	  the	  courts,	  emulating	  their	  male	  counterparts645.	  	  	  
	  
5.3	  Research	  Design	  
A	  research	  design	  provides	  a	  framework	  to	  guide	  the	  researcher	  in	  the	  
different	  stages	  of	  research646.	  Cresswell	  (2012)	  demarcates	  three	  categories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643	  See	  A.	  W.	  Bentzon	  et	  al,	  Pursuing	  Grounded	  Theory	  in	  Law:	  South-­‐North	  
Experiences	  in	  Developing	  Women’s	  Law	  (Oslo	  TANO	  Aschehoug;	  Harare,	  Zimbabwe:	  
Mond	  Books	  1998).	  
644	  Bentzon	  et	  al,	  Pursuing	  Grounded	  Theory	  in	  Law,	  25.	  
645	  Susan	  Hirch,	  Pronouncing	  and	  Preserving:	  Gender	  and	  the	  Discourses	  of	  Disputing	  
in	  an	  African	  Islamic	  Court	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1998).	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of	  research:	  quantitative	  research,	  qualitative	  research	  and	  a	  combination	  of	  
both647.	  Quantitative	  research	  involves	  the	  application	  of	  precise	  and	  definite	  
questions	  to	  gather	  perceptible	  and	  observable	  data.	  Only	  particular	  variables	  
are	  studied,	  dependent	  upon	  narrow	  research	  questions	  or	  hypotheses.	  
Qualitative	  research	  applies	  to	  generic	  and	  expansive	  data	  collection	  used	  to	  
seek	  the	  respondents’	  experiences648.	  The	  third	  type	  of	  research	  is	  a	  
combination	  of	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  research.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  research,	  only	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  was	  used.	  One	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  
study	  is	  to	  ascertain	  what	  cultural	  and	  religious	  barriers	  women	  perceive	  exist	  
that	  prevent	  them	  from	  seeking	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriage,	  regardless	  of	  how	  
unhappy	  that	  marriage	  may	  be.	  The	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  the	  topic	  required	  me	  
to	  establish	  a	  rapport	  and	  trust	  between	  each	  of	  the	  participants	  and	  myself	  
before	  I	  could	  ask	  personal	  questions	  of	  this	  type.	  Thus,	  adopting	  a	  
quantitative	  research	  method,	  which	  requires	  a	  large	  number	  of	  participants,	  
would	  not	  have	  been	  suitable	  for	  this	  project.	  	  
	  
Quantitative	  data	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  collection	  of	  numerical	  data	  
to	  explain	  a	  particular	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  analysed	  through	  mathematically	  
orientated	  methods.	  It	  is	  concerned	  with	  measuring	  behaviour	  and	  coming	  to	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  Press,	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statistical	  conclusions	  about	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  a	  population649.	  
Quantitative	  research	  requires	  larger	  sample	  sizes	  to	  increase	  the	  reliability	  
and	  validity	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  studied650.	  However,	  this	  research	  was	  
concerned	  with	  understanding	  behaviour	  in	  its	  natural	  setting	  (Flick	  2002),	  
and	  in	  providing	  subjective	  explanations	  of	  women’s	  behaviour.	  Rather	  than	  
create	  generalisations	  about	  the	  behaviour	  of	  all	  married	  women	  in	  Pakistan,	  
this	  research	  was	  more	  concerned	  about	  women’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  
why	  some	  women	  but	  not	  all	  chose	  to	  utilise	  it.	  The	  research	  required	  an	  in-­‐
depth	  inquiry	  into	  the	  motivations	  behind	  behavioural	  attitudes	  and	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process,	  and	  delved	  into	  culturally	  sensitive	  notions	  of	  
marriage	  and	  divorce.	  A	  qualitative	  approach	  was	  therefore	  deemed	  more	  
appropriate	  for	  this	  study,	  as	  it	  allows	  a	  researcher	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  smaller	  
sample	  for	  his	  or	  her	  study	  and	  thus	  allows	  time	  for	  the	  researcher	  to	  establish	  
a	  rapport	  with	  the	  interviewee	  to	  elicit	  pertinent	  information	  that	  is	  relevant	  
to	  the	  study.	  	  A	  central	  question	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  to	  
married	  women	  and	  their	  perceptions	  regarding	  it.	  It	  seeks	  to	  explore	  whether	  
Pakistani	  women	  are	  even	  aware	  of	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ,	  and	  if	  
so,	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  viable	  legal	  remedy	  for	  them	  to	  entertain.	  It	  also	  seeks	  to	  
explore	  how	  women	  fare	  in	  reality	  when	  they	  actually	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	  
law;	  why	  women	  decide	  to	  break	  through	  religious	  and	  cultural	  deterrents	  to	  
affect	  a	  divorce,	  and	  what	  their	  lived	  experiences	  are	  after	  achieving	  a	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dissolution	  of	  marriage.	  Qualitative	  research	  methods	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  
to	  elicit	  this	  rich	  source	  of	  data	  for	  analysis	  through	  the	  use	  of	  interviews	  and	  
observational	  techniques	  by	  virtue	  of	  using	  a	  smaller	  sample.	  
5.4	  Method	  and	  Execution	  of	  the	  Field	  Work	  
Moore	  (2002)	  describes	  research	  methods	  as	  the	  “tools	  of	  the	  researcher’s	  trade”;	  
these	  methods	  have	  also	  been	  described	  as	  the	  main	  ingredients	  of	  research651.	  
Qualitative	  research	  includes	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  techniques	  for	  gathering	  information,	  
such	  as	  observations,	  interviews	  and	  focus	  groups.	  Data	  for	  this	  research	  were	  
collected	  using	  structured,	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  unstructured	  interviews	  and	  
observations	  of	  the	  family	  court	  processes.	  These	  methods	  allowed	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
understanding	  of	  the	  social	  world	  of	  women	  in	  marriage	  and	  during	  divorce	  
processes	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  that	  world	  by	  women	  
themselves.	  Bell	  (1998)	  argues	  that	  specifically	  interviewing	  women	  is	  of	  particular	  
significance,	  as	  centuries	  of	  legal	  practice	  have	  ignored	  women	  or	  only	  allowed	  men	  
to	  speak	  for	  them652.	  This	  is	  certainly	  true	  of	  Pakistan,	  where	  women	  have	  been	  
generally	  excluded	  from	  the	  law-­‐making	  process,	  with	  very	  little	  representation	  in	  
policy-­‐making	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  needs	  and	  requirements653.	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  Peter	  Clough	  and	  Cathy	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  Justifying	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  (Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage,	  2002),	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  Susan	  Bell,	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  Experiences	  through	  Stories’”	  in	  Gender	  Discourse:	  The	  Power	  of	  Talk,	  ed.	  A	  
Dundas	  Todd	  and	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  97-­‐123.	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The	  field	  work	  for	  this	  research	  took	  place	  over	  several	  periods	  of	  time:	  initial	  field	  
work	  preparation	  in	  December	  2012-­‐January	  2013654,	  actual	  field	  work	  in	  June,	  July	  
and	  August	  2013,	  April	  2014,	  July	  and	  August	  2014,	  and	  follow-­‐up	  work	  in	  July	  and	  
August	  2015.	  The	  summer	  months	  proved	  to	  be	  particularly	  useful,	  as	  these	  
coincided	  with	  the	  Islamic	  month	  of	  Ramadan.	  During	  Ramadan,	  a	  common	  practice	  
in	  Pakistan	  is	  for	  Muslims	  to	  gather	  together	  in	  one	  place	  to	  collectively	  open	  the	  
fast	  at	  sunset	  and	  attend	  iftar	  (the	  evening	  meal)	  parties,	  or	  to	  assemble	  together	  to	  
listen	  to	  lectures	  and	  tafsir	  (explanation)	  of	  the	  Holy	  Qurʾān.	  In	  Pakistani	  society,	  it	  
is	  rare	  for	  women	  to	  frequent	  the	  mosque,	  so	  many	  women	  attend	  these	  gatherings,	  
which	  take	  place	  in	  the	  home	  of	  any	  one	  person,	  rotating	  between	  family	  and	  
friends.	  Through	  friends	  and	  acquaintances,	  I	  became	  aware	  of	  such	  gatherings	  
taking	  place	  in	  the	  selected	  sites655,	  and	  I	  would	  arrive	  before	  the	  other	  participants	  
and	  introduce	  myself	  to	  the	  host	  of	  the	  party	  or	  gathering.	  Thereafter,	  I	  would	  
explain	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  my	  research	  and	  request	  permission	  to	  distribute	  
my	  covering	  letter	  explaining	  my	  research.	  Being	  Pakistani,	  and	  having	  lived	  in	  
Pakistan	  for	  ten	  years	  of	  my	  life,	  I	  was	  unsurprised	  to	  see	  that	  each	  time	  I	  attended	  
these	  gatherings,	  I	  received	  full	  assistance	  from	  the	  host.	  I	  used	  these	  gatherings	  to	  
make	  initial	  contact	  with	  potential	  participants.	  Those	  women	  who	  indicated	  
willingness	  to	  be	  interviewed	  were	  contacted	  later	  by	  phone,	  and	  an	  appointment	  
was	  arranged	  for	  the	  interview	  to	  take	  place.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  confidentiality	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  This	  included	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  the	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  Lahore	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  stage,	  as	  ethical	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  by	  the	  
University	  Ethics	  Committee.	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  See	  Section	  5.7	  below.	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of	  the	  participants,	  none	  of	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  during	  these	  public	  
gatherings.	  
5.5	  The	  Interviews	  
The	  data	  collected	  during	  this	  research	  was	  based	  upon	  fully	  transcribed	  interviews	  
that	  were	  both	  tape-­‐recorded	  and	  written	  down	  manually	  to	  ensure	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
data.	  Three	  main	  types	  of	  interview	  technique	  are	  prevalent	  in	  qualitative	  research,	  
depending	  upon	  the	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  required:	  structured,	  unstructured	  and	  
semi-­‐structured	  interviews656.	  Structured	  interviews	  require	  questions	  to	  be	  
predetermined	  and	  formatted,	  whilst	  unstructured	  interviews	  allow	  complete	  
freedom	  regarding	  the	  content	  and	  sequence	  of	  the	  discussion657.	  In	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews,	  questions	  are	  more	  loosely	  worded,	  allowing	  for	  flexibility,	  with	  more	  
open-­‐ended	  questions658.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  all	  three	  types	  of	  
interview	  were	  conducted.	  Whilst	  interviewing	  lawyers	  and	  judges,	  a	  structured	  
interview	  method	  was	  used,	  where	  specific	  questions	  were	  asked	  relating	  to	  the	  
process	  of	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  family	  courts659.	  However,	  a	  uniform	  interview	  
technique	  was	  not	  used	  whilst	  interviewing	  married	  women	  about	  their	  views	  and	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  Divorce	  and	  the	  possible	  breakdown	  of	  marriage	  is	  an	  
extremely	  sensitive	  topic	  in	  Pakistan.	  From	  my	  pilot	  study,	  I	  realised	  that	  the	  
majority	  of	  women	  were	  quite	  reticent	  about	  their	  views,	  and	  thus	  a	  very	  structured	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656	  Ranjit	  Kumar,	  Research	  Methodology:	  A	  Step	  by	  Step	  Guide	  for	  Beginners	  
(Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage,	  2010),	  123.	  
657	  Ibid.,	  126.	  
658	  Sharan	  B.	  Merriam,	  Qualitative	  Research:	  A	  Guide	  to	  Design	  and	  Implementation	  
(New	  York:	  Jossey-­‐Bass,	  2009),	  90.	  	  
659	  See	  appendix	  III	  for	  all	  interview	  templates.	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interview	  technique	  was	  needed	  to	  elicit	  as	  much	  information	  from	  the	  participants	  
as	  possible.	  This	  accounted	  for	  sixty-­‐nine	  of	  the	  participants.	  As	  each	  of	  the	  
structured	  interviews	  progressed,	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  seemed	  to	  relax	  and	  
become	  more	  forthcoming	  in	  their	  views,	  but	  this	  still	  resulted	  in	  far	  more	  concise	  
answers.	  Other	  participants	  were	  very	  vociferous	  in	  expressing	  their	  views	  on	  the	  
topic	  and	  had	  extensive	  lists	  of	  issues	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  discuss.	  Some	  of	  these	  
participants	  had	  suffered	  a	  great	  deal,	  and	  wanted	  to	  tell	  me	  of	  their	  experiences	  
and	  views.	  However,	  this	  often	  meant	  digressing	  from	  the	  original	  research	  at	  hand,	  
whilst	  some	  women	  vented	  their	  anger	  to	  me	  regarding	  the	  behaviour	  of	  their	  
husbands	  and	  extended	  family.	  During	  the	  pilot	  study,	  I	  found	  myself	  spending	  over	  
two	  hours	  interviewing	  some	  participants	  but	  was	  still	  unable	  to	  cover	  the	  required	  
topics.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  uniform	  information	  for	  easy	  comparability,	  semi-­‐
structured	  interviews	  were	  used	  for	  thirty-­‐one	  of	  the	  participants.	  I	  followed	  the	  
same	  set	  of	  predetermined	  questions	  used	  in	  the	  structured	  interviews,	  but	  during	  
the	  interviews,	  additional	  questions	  were	  asked	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  interviews	  
remained	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  my	  research	  and	  more	  detailed	  responses	  were	  
extracted	  where	  important	  topics	  were	  being	  discussed.	  These	  answers	  were	  kept	  
open-­‐ended	  to	  allow	  my	  interviewees	  to	  express	  their	  points	  of	  interest	  and	  expand	  
upon	  the	  views	  they	  wished	  to	  share	  with	  me.	  With	  respect	  to	  women	  interviewed	  
at	  the	  District	  Family	  Courts	  of	  Lahore,	  I	  used	  unstructured	  interviews.	  The	  women	  
that	  I	  interviewed	  at	  court	  were	  either	  going	  through	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  a	  
khulʿ	  or	  had	  already	  obtained	  one	  and	  were	  dealing	  with	  ancillary	  matters	  of	  
guardianship	  and	  custody	  of	  children	  and	  maintenance	  suits.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  more	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empathetic	  to	  these	  women	  and	  establish	  a	  rapport,	  I	  engaged	  in	  unstructured	  
interviews	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  ‘tell	  their	  stories’.	  Although	  this	  proved	  to	  be	  much	  
more	  time-­‐consuming,	  it	  resulted	  in	  in-­‐depth	  information	  about	  the	  struggles	  that	  
these	  women	  had	  endured	  in	  reaching	  the	  courts,	  and	  allowed	  for	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  their	  motivation	  to	  break	  through	  religious	  and	  cultural	  barriers	  
and	  opt	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  
	  
Most	  of	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  after	  making	  an	  appointment	  with	  the	  
interviewees.	  Interviews	  with	  district	  court	  judges	  and	  lawyers,	  all	  of	  whom	  deal	  
with	  family	  law	  cases,	  were	  arranged	  by	  telephone	  through	  a	  family	  friend	  who	  was	  
a	  prominent	  high	  court	  lawyer	  and	  had	  contacts	  in	  the	  District	  Courts	  of	  Lahore.	  All	  
these	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  on-­‐site	  in	  the	  courthouses	  and	  chambers.	  The	  
individual	  interviews	  with	  married	  woman	  were	  also	  arranged	  by	  appointment	  and	  
were	  carried	  out	  at	  each	  interviewee’s	  home,	  normally	  during	  the	  day	  whilst	  their	  
husbands	  and	  children	  were	  at	  work	  and	  school	  respectively.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  
women	  going	  through	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  their	  khulʿ,	  these	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  
were	  initially	  conducted	  outside	  the	  courthouses	  in	  waiting	  areas,	  and	  some	  were	  
then	  followed	  up	  by	  visiting	  the	  respondent’s	  home	  for	  further	  clarification.	  	  	  
	  
Before	  the	  commencement	  of	  each	  interview,	  a	  letter	  was	  shown	  to	  the	  interviewee	  
introducing	  myself	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  purpose	  of	  my	  research660.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
interviews	  with	  married	  women	  and	  those	  applying	  for	  the	  khulʿ,	  I	  gave	  a	  copy	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660	  See	  appendix	  III	  for	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  participant	  information	  sheet	  and	  consent	  form.	  
	  
200	  
the	  letter	  to	  the	  interviewee	  and	  also	  read	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  letter	  to	  them,	  
explaining	  why	  I	  was	  conducting	  the	  research	  and	  the	  type	  of	  cooperation	  that	  was	  
required	  from	  them.	  Although	  the	  letter	  was	  translated	  into	  Urdu,	  I	  still	  read	  its	  
contents	  aloud	  before	  commencing	  the	  interview.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  outlined	  in	  
Chapter	  One,	  illiteracy	  rates	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  high,	  particularly	  amongst	  those	  who	  
belong	  to	  poorer	  families.	  Interviewees	  were	  also	  asked	  to	  sign	  the	  letter	  of	  
introduction	  indicating	  their	  free	  consent	  to	  the	  interview	  and	  research.	  Whilst	  
some	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  never	  been	  to	  school,	  they	  were	  all	  able	  to	  sign	  their	  
names.	  All	  of	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  primarily	  in	  Urdu.	  Urdu	  is	  my	  second	  
language,	  and	  I	  am	  able	  to	  converse	  fluently	  in	  it.	  During	  some	  of	  the	  interviews,	  
whilst	  I	  asked	  questions	  in	  Urdu,	  the	  replies	  consisted	  of	  a	  mixture	  of	  Punjabi	  and	  
Urdu.	  Punjabi	  is	  a	  local,	  colloquial	  language	  spoken	  by	  many	  people	  in	  Lahore.	  
Punjabi	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  Urdu	  and	  is	  a	  familiar	  language	  to	  me,	  as	  it	  is	  spoken	  by	  my	  
parents.	  I	  was	  thus	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  replies	  quite	  easily,	  as	  well	  as	  rephrase	  
my	  questions	  using	  some	  Punjabi	  words	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  participants	  understood	  
my	  questions	  in	  full.	  
	  
The	  interviews	  were	  recorded	  using	  handwritten	  notes.	  However,	  to	  ensure	  the	  
accuracy	  of	  the	  data	  collected,	  the	  interviews	  were	  also	  audio-­‐recorded	  after	  the	  
requisite	  permission	  was	  granted.	  The	  audio	  recordings	  were	  then	  transcribed	  
either	  later	  that	  day	  or	  the	  next	  day	  at	  the	  latest	  and	  then	  compared	  to	  the	  




5.6	  Research	  Sites	  
Pakistan	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  research	  site	  for	  this	  project.	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  sixth	  most	  
populous	  country	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  a	  population	  of	  182	  million	  (World	  
Development	  Indicators	  (WDI)	  2014).	  It	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  provinces:	  Punjab,	  Sind,	  
Khyber	  Pakhtoonkhwa	  (previously	  known	  as	  NWFP)	  and	  the	  Federally	  
Administered	  Tribal	  Areas	  (FATA).	  Azad	  Jammu	  and	  Kashmir	  make	  up	  the	  last	  part	  
of	  Pakistan	  and	  part	  of	  the	  disputed	  territories661.	  The	  province	  of	  Punjab	  was	  
chosen	  for	  several	  reasons.	  It	  is	  the	  largest	  province	  of	  Pakistan,	  with	  55.6	  per	  cent	  
of	  the	  total	  population	  residing	  within	  it662.	  Moreover,	  the	  primary	  languages	  
spoken	  in	  the	  Punjab	  are	  Punjabi	  and	  Urdu.	  Since	  I	  am	  fluent	  in	  Urdu	  and	  can	  
understand	  Punjabi,	  this	  helped	  to	  facilitate	  the	  research	  and	  collection	  of	  data	  
without	  recourse	  to	  a	  translator.	  The	  city	  of	  Lahore	  was	  chosen,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  capital	  
city	  of	  the	  Punjab	  and	  is	  also	  the	  second	  largest	  city	  in	  Pakistan,	  with	  an	  estimated	  
population	  of	  7.5	  million	  people	  as	  of	  July	  2014663.	  Lahore	  has	  a	  demographically	  
diverse	  population	  who	  have	  settled	  from	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  Punjab	  and	  come	  
from	  differing	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  and	  cultures664.	  It	  is	  also	  home	  to	  large	  
urban	  and	  rural	  enclaves;	  thus,	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  this	  diversity	  of	  population	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661	  See	  Figure	  1	  (Appendix	  II)	  for	  a	  geographical	  map	  of	  Pakistan	  showing	  the	  
province	  of	  Punjab.	  
662	  Ian	  S.	  Livingston	  and	  Michael	  O’Hanlon,	  Pakistan	  Index:	  Tracking	  Variables	  of	  
Reconstruction	  &	  Security	  (December	  29,	  2011),	  accessed	  April	  3rd	  2015	  
	  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign-­‐policy/pakistan-­‐
index/index20111229.PDF	  	  
663Demographia	  World	  Urban	  Areas,	  11th	  Edition,	  January	  2015,	  accessed	  April	  2nd	  
2015	  http://www.demographia.com/db-­‐worldua.pdf	  	  	  
664	  See	  Figure	  2	  (Appendix	  II)	  for	  a	  city	  map	  of	  Lahore.	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be	  included	  in	  the	  research	  project.	  The	  city	  of	  Lahore	  is	  also	  home	  to	  my	  family,	  and	  
so	  I	  am	  familiar	  with	  the	  city,	  having	  lived	  there	  for	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  of	  my	  married	  
life.	  Travelling	  to	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  city	  and	  to	  the	  courts	  was	  made	  easier	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  family	  car	  and	  driver,	  which	  facilitated	  my	  research.	  
	  
5.7	  Sampling	  Method,	  Population,	  Sampling,	  Background	  and	  Selection	  
of	  Survey	  Sites	  
Whilst	  conducting	  qualitative	  research,	  it	  is	  extremely	  important	  to	  identify	  the	  
sources	  of	  the	  information	  that	  is	  needed	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions,	  also	  
called	  the	  units	  of	  analysis.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  there	  were	  several	  
units	  of	  analysis	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  questions.	  In	  order	  to	  ascertain	  
whether	  women	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  divorce,	  and	  to	  
ascertain	  what	  obstacles	  exist	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  implement	  these	  rights,	  the	  unit	  of	  
analysis	  was	  married	  Muslim	  women.	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  
current	  legal	  system	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  the	  problems	  women	  encounter	  when	  
seeking	  marital	  dissolution,	  two	  units	  of	  analysis	  were	  chosen:	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  
profession	  and	  Muslim	  women	  who	  had	  already	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  the	  courts	  or	  
were	  currently	  in	  the	  process	  of	  getting	  one.	  The	  units	  of	  analysis	  were	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1) Married	  Muslim	  women	  	  




3) Muslim	  women	  who	  had	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  or	  were	  going	  through	  the	  process	  
of	  obtaining	  one	  
	  
Once	  units	  have	  been	  identified,	  the	  second	  stage	  is	  to	  select	  who	  will	  represent	  
these	  units.	  Creswell	  (2102)	  defines	  such	  representatives	  as	  holding	  some	  common	  
characteristics	  that	  a	  researcher	  can	  study	  and	  identify665.	  Once	  they	  have	  been	  
selected,	  the	  target	  population	  or	  sampling	  frame	  can	  be	  chosen,	  and	  from	  this	  
sampling	  frame	  it	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  generalise	  the	  findings	  (Sowell,	  2001).	  
Sampling	  is	  the	  process	  of	  taking	  a	  small	  selection	  (namely	  a	  sample)	  from	  a	  larger	  
group	  (the	  sampling	  population)	  in	  order	  to	  predict	  the	  presence	  of	  unknown	  
information	  from	  that	  larger	  group666.	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  sample,	  there	  are	  two	  
approaches	  employed	  in	  qualitative	  research:	  probability	  sampling	  and	  non-­‐
probability	  sampling.	  Creswell	  (2012)	  defines	  probability	  sampling	  as	  the	  selection	  
of	  individuals	  “from	  the	  population	  who	  are	  representative	  of	  that	  population”,	  
whilst	  in	  non-­‐probability	  sampling,	  “the	  researcher	  selects	  individuals	  because	  they	  
are	  available,	  convenient	  and	  represent	  some	  characteristic	  the	  investigator	  seeks	  to	  
study”667.	  	  
	  
During	  the	  research,	  both	  probability	  sampling	  (or	  random	  sampling)	  and	  non-­‐
probability	  sampling	  were	  used	  to	  select	  samples.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  
representative	  respondents	  were	  used,	  a	  stratified	  random-­‐sampling	  technique	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665	  Cresswell,	  Educational	  Research,	  142.	  
666	  Kumar,	  Research	  Methodology,	  164.	  
667	  Cresswell,	  Educational	  Research,	  142,	  145	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also	  used.	  Stratification	  involves	  the	  researcher	  dividing	  the	  population	  based	  upon	  
specific	  characteristics,	  particularly	  when	  a	  variety	  of	  sampling	  characteristics	  are	  
to	  be	  studied.	  Creswell	  (2012)	  notes	  that	  the	  first	  step	  is	  to	  divide	  the	  population	  
into	  groups,	  or	  strata,	  and	  then	  to	  proportionally	  sample	  within	  each	  group	  
according	  to	  their	  representation	  in	  the	  total	  population668.	  This	  technique	  was	  used	  
to	  ensure	  that	  the	  population	  within	  a	  stratum	  was	  consistent	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  
characteristics	  in	  which	  they	  were	  stratified.	  If	  different	  groups	  of	  the	  population	  
are	  adequately	  represented,	  then	  this	  increases	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  research.	  The	  
population	  for	  the	  present	  study	  consisted	  of	  married	  Muslim	  women	  from	  Lahore.	  
The	  city	  of	  Lahore	  is	  divided	  into	  nine	  administrative	  towns,	  which	  are	  then	  further	  
divided	  into	  a	  number	  of	  union	  councils.	  Table	  1	  shows	  the	  city	  of	  Lahore	  divided	  
into	  towns	  and	  Union	  Councils	  (UCs)	  
	  
Table	  1	  –	  Towns	  and	  Union	  Councils	  (UCs)	  of	  Lahore	  District	  
Number	   Name	  of	  Town	   Number	  of	  Union	  Councils	  
1	   Allama	  Iqbal	  Town	   15	  
2	   Aziz	  Bhatti	  Town	   11	  
3	   Data	  Ganj	  Baksh	  Town	   18	  
4	   Gulberg	  Town	   15	  
5	   Nisthar	  Town	   19	  
6	   Ravi	  Town	   30	  
7	   Samanabad	  Town	   19	  
8	   Shalimar	  Town	   11	  
9	   Wagah	  Town	   12	  
Total	   	   150	  
Source:	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics,	  Government	  of	  Punjab,	  Lahore	  (2010)	  
	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  qualitative	  research,	  I	  intended	  to	  collect	  data	  from	  married	  
women	  from	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds,	  so	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  take	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  Ibid.,	  144.	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representative	  samples	  from	  randomly	  selected	  towns	  of	  Lahore.	  Random	  sampling	  
is	  where	  each	  and	  every	  member	  of	  the	  population	  has	  an	  equal	  chance	  of	  being	  
chosen669.	  This	  sampling	  is	  considered	  quite	  precise,	  as	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  
individuals	  who	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  population	  are	  chosen670.	  Since	  it	  was	  not	  
feasible	  for	  me	  to	  question	  or	  interview	  all	  married	  Muslim	  women	  from	  Lahore,	  
two	  towns	  were	  randomly	  selected	  from	  the	  nine	  administrative	  towns.	  These	  were	  
Gulberg	  Town	  and	  Nisthar	  Town.	  Thereafter,	  two	  union	  councils	  were	  selected	  from	  
each	  randomly	  selected	  town	  using	  stratified	  random	  sampling.	  I	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  
that	  women	  from	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  were	  represented	  in	  the	  sample,	  
and	  therefore	  the	  union	  councils	  chosen	  from	  each	  random	  administrative	  town	  
were	  based	  upon	  the	  economic	  figures	  provided	  by	  the	  government	  statistics	  of	  
Pakistan.	  The	  first	  union	  council	  of	  Gulberg	  Town	  is	  located	  in	  the	  affluent	  business	  
community	  of	  Lahore,	  and	  families	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  middle	  
classes	  typically	  reside	  there.	  The	  second	  union	  council	  of	  Gulberg	  Town,	  however,	  
is	  in	  an	  older	  part	  of	  the	  town,	  where	  clustered	  and	  cheaper	  housing	  is	  readily	  
available.	  Poorer	  working	  class	  families,	  and	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  skilled	  or	  semi-­‐
skilled	  labour,	  populate	  this	  union	  council.	  In	  Nishtar	  Town,	  the	  first	  union	  council	  
selected	  primarily	  houses	  affluent	  populations	  with	  families	  of	  professionals.	  
Housing	  is	  expensive	  and	  local	  union	  council	  laws	  only	  allow	  large	  houses	  of	  one	  
canal671	  and	  above	  to	  be	  built	  there.	  However,	  the	  second	  union	  council	  of	  Nisthar	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  Jack	  Fraenkel	  and	  Norman	  E.	  Wallen,	  How	  to	  Design	  and	  Evaluate	  Research	  in	  
Education	  (Maidenhead:	  McGraw-­‐Hill,	  2009),	  93.	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  Cresswell,	  Educational	  Research,	  147.	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  A	  Pakistani	  unit	  of	  measurement	  that	  is	  equal	  to	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  an	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Town	  is	  located	  near	  a	  busy	  market	  with	  much	  cheaper	  housing.	  The	  affordability	  of	  
the	  housing	  means	  that	  it	  is	  primarily	  inhabited	  by	  working	  class	  families.	  	  	  
	  
In	  respect	  of	  the	  choosing	  the	  actual	  participants,	  I	  employed	  non-­‐probability	  
purposive	  sampling.	  Purposive	  sampling	  is	  a	  targeted	  strategy	  of	  deliberately	  
selecting	  participants	  who	  are	  best	  able	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions.	  Within	  
this	  strategy,	  homogenous	  sampling	  was	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  target	  participants	  
who	  share	  similar	  characteristics672.	  Thus,	  married	  women	  were	  selected	  from	  
different	  socioeconomic	  groups	  to	  provide	  more	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  about	  their	  
views	  and	  perceptions	  on	  the	  khulʿ.	  These	  women	  were	  identified	  during	  the	  public	  
gatherings,	  and	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  
This	  sampling	  technique	  also	  enabled	  me	  to	  interview	  different	  members	  of	  the	  
legal	  profession,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  select	  women	  in	  the	  process	  of	  applying	  for	  a	  divorce,	  
allowing	  me	  to	  explore	  women’s	  experience	  of	  attending	  court	  and	  applying	  for	  a	  
khulʿ.	  	  
	  
5.8	  The	  Participants	  
Structured	  and	  Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  used	  to	  interview	  one	  hundred	  
married	  women	  and	  ascertain	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  legal	  
remedy	  of	  khulʿ	  and	  their	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  an	  option	  
for	  marital	  relief.	  Table	  2	  (Appendix	  IV)	  details	  their	  names	  in	  alphabetical	  order,	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along	  with	  their	  age,	  education,	  occupation	  and	  total	  household	  income.	  The	  names	  
of	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  pseudonyms	  to	  protect	  their	  
identities.	  Fifty	  women	  from	  Gulberg	  Town	  and	  fifty	  women	  from	  Nisthar	  Town	  
were	  interviewed.	  Figure	  3	  presents	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  interviews,	  and	  Table	  3	  
shows	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  age	  groups.	  
	  

























Table	  3	  –	  Breakdown	  of	  Participants’	  Age	  Groups	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Age	  Range	  in	  Years	  
12	   18-­‐25	  
20	   26-­‐35	  
60	   36-­‐45	  

























A	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  women	  aged	  between	  36	  and	  45	  were	  interviewed.	  
This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  The	  younger	  
demographic	  primarily	  lived	  with	  their	  extended	  family	  and	  did	  not	  feel	  comfortable	  
discussing	  marriage	  and	  divorce,	  fearing	  that	  their	  husbands	  and	  mothers-­‐in-­‐law	  
would	  not	  be	  happy	  with	  any	  such	  discussion.	  The	  slightly	  older	  demographic,	  
however,	  were	  either	  living	  independently	  from	  their	  extended	  families,	  or	  if	  not,	  
were	  firmly	  established	  within	  the	  marital	  home,	  having	  been	  married	  for	  a	  number	  
of	  years.	  They	  were	  much	  more	  open	  and	  vocal	  in	  their	  views,	  and	  did	  not	  mention	  
any	  particular	  repercussions	  from	  being	  interviewed.	  The	  oldest	  demographic	  were	  
the	  most	  difficult	  to	  interview,	  and	  many	  refused	  point	  blank	  to	  be	  interviewed	  once	  
they	  found	  out	  the	  nature	  of	  my	  inquiry.	  They	  took	  a	  more	  conservative	  approach	  to	  
my	  study,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  participants’	  grounds	  for	  refusal	  concerned	  the	  
inappropriateness	  of	  my	  research.	  	  	  
	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  my	  interview	  involved	  asking	  about	  the	  age	  and	  education	  of	  the	  
participants,	  how	  long	  they	  had	  been	  married,	  how	  they	  had	  met	  their	  partners,	  
their	  own	  occupation	  and	  that	  of	  their	  husband,	  and	  their	  approximate	  total	  
household	  income.	  After	  this,	  they	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  had	  children	  and	  who	  else	  
occupied	  the	  marital	  home.	  All	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  arranged	  marriages,	  and	  
eighty-­‐five	  participants	  lived	  with	  their	  in-­‐laws	  or	  other	  members	  of	  their	  husband’s	  
family,	  whilst	  only	  fifteen	  lived	  independently	  with	  their	  husbands	  and	  children.	  
Fifty	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  an	  approximate	  income	  of	  between	  10,000	  and	  20,000	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rupees	  and	  belonged	  to	  working	  class	  or	  lower	  working	  class	  families.	  Table	  4	  
illustrates	  their	  highest	  educational	  standard	  achieved.	  
	  
	  
Table	  4	  –	  Educational	  Standards	  of	  the	  Participants	  from	  Gulberg	  Town	  U.C.2	  and	  
Nisthar	  Town	  U.C	  2	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Maximum	  Education	  Obtained	  
16	   No	  Schooling	  
5	   Gr.	  1	  
12	   Gr.	  2	  
7	   Gr.	  3	  
9	   Gr.	  4	  




The	  remaining	  fifty	  participants	  belonged	  to	  middle	  or	  upper	  middle	  class	  families,	  
with	  an	  approximate	  total	  household	  income	  of	  between	  30,000	  rupees	  and	  90,000	  
rupees.	  Table	  5	  illustrates	  their	  highest	  educational	  qualification	  achieved.	  
	  
Table	  5-­‐	  Educational	  Standards	  of	  the	  Participants	  from	  Gulberg	  Town	  U.C.1	  and	  
Nisthar	  Town	  U.C	  1	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Highest	  Education	  Obtained	  
2	   Metric	  (Gr.10)	  
18	   FA	  (college)	  
24	   Bachelor’s	  Degree	  
6	   Master’s	  Degree	  
	  
	  
These	  tables	  show	  that	  there	  was	  a	  large	  difference	  between	  the	  educational	  
qualifications	  of	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  participants.	  Those	  participants	  from	  a	  lower	  
socioeconomic	  group	  had	  attended	  very	  little	  school	  during	  their	  lifetime,	  with	  only	  
one	  participant	  attending	  school	  up	  to	  grade	  6	  and	  the	  remainder	  having	  dropped	  
out	  much	  earlier,	  or	  even	  not	  having	  attended	  school	  at	  all.	  In	  comparison,	  those	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participants	  from	  more	  affluent	  backgrounds	  had	  at	  least	  attended	  college	  (with	  the	  
exception	  of	  two),	  whilst	  twenty-­‐four	  had	  obtained	  a	  graduate	  degree,	  and	  six	  of	  
them	  had	  gone	  on	  to	  achieve	  their	  Masters’	  degrees.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  ascertain	  women’s	  experience	  of	  going	  through	  the	  legal	  process	  and	  
obtaining	  a	  khulʿ,	  unstructured	  interviews	  were	  used	  to	  interview	  thirty-­‐one	  women	  
in	  the	  District	  Courts	  of	  Lahore,	  Pakistan.	  Their	  names	  are	  also	  shown	  in	  
alphabetical	  order	  in	  Table	  6	  (Appendix	  IV),	  which	  details	  their	  age,	  education,	  
occupation	  and	  total	  household	  income.	  The	  names	  of	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  have	  
again	  been	  anonymised	  to	  protect	  their	  identities.	  These	  women	  were	  chosen	  at	  
random	  during	  visits	  to	  the	  district	  courthouse.	  All	  of	  the	  women	  interviewed	  were	  
thirty	  years	  of	  age	  or	  younger,	  and	  they	  primarily	  belonged	  to	  lower	  working	  class	  
backgrounds,	  with	  an	  average	  income	  of	  7,000	  to	  15,000	  rupees.	  Each	  participant	  
was	  interviewed	  outside	  the	  family	  courtrooms,	  and	  the	  interviews	  took	  several	  
hours	  to	  complete	  due	  to	  interruptions	  from	  lawyers	  and	  family	  members	  as	  each	  
case	  progressed	  during	  the	  day.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  interview	  was	  used	  to	  ascertain	  
the	  name,	  age	  and	  occupation	  of	  the	  participant	  and	  her	  family	  background.	  Once	  
these	  details	  were	  obtained,	  an	  unstructured	  format	  was	  used	  to	  allow	  the	  
participants	  to	  give	  details	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  them	  being	  in	  court	  and	  literally	  to	  ‘tell	  
their	  stories’.	  During	  the	  interviews,	  some	  specific	  questions	  were	  also	  asked	  
relating	  to	  the	  reasons	  for	  divorce,	  their	  overall	  court	  experience,	  and	  their	  feelings	  
and	  expectations	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  applying	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Thirteen	  follow-­‐up	  
interviews	  were	  also	  conducted	  at	  the	  homes	  of	  the	  participants	  a	  few	  months	  after	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the	  initial	  interview	  in	  the	  courts	  to	  ascertain	  in	  more	  depth	  details	  of	  the	  court	  
experience	  and	  the	  repercussions	  of	  gaining	  a	  khulʿ.	  	  	  
	  
During	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  fieldwork,	  legal	  professionals	  were	  also	  interviewed,	  using	  a	  
structured	  format.	  This	  consisted	  of	  interviews	  with	  six	  family	  court	  judges,	  all	  of	  
whom	  had	  been	  overseeing	  khulʿ	  cases	  for	  several	  years.	  The	  District	  Civil	  Judge	  of	  
the	  Lahore	  District	  Courts	  gave	  permission	  to	  interview	  these	  judges,	  and	  to	  sit	  in	  
the	  family	  courts	  to	  observe	  the	  proceedings.	  Moreover,	  seven	  lawyers	  were	  also	  
interviewed	  who	  specialised	  in	  representing	  women	  in	  khulʿ	  cases	  and	  in	  all	  
ancillary	  matters	  relating	  to	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  and	  dowry	  claims.	  All	  
interviews	  with	  legal	  professionals	  were	  conducted	  at	  the	  district	  courts,	  either	  in	  
judges’	  chambers	  or	  outside	  the	  family	  courts	  themselves.	  	  	  	  
	  
5.9	  Role	  of	  the	  Researcher	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  I	  considered	  myself	  an	  ‘insider’,	  a	  role	  which	  has	  
been	  defined	  as	  “sharing	  the	  characteristic,	  role	  or	  experience	  under	  study	  with	  the	  
participants”673,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  ‘outsider’,	  who	  shares	  no	  such	  commonality	  with	  
the	  participants	  of	  the	  research.	  Being	  a	  Pakistani,	  married	  Muslim	  woman	  who	  has	  
previously	  lived	  in	  Pakistan	  for	  over	  ten	  years,	  I	  share	  an	  identity	  of	  being	  Pakistani,	  
and	  speak	  the	  national	  language	  of	  the	  country,	  Urdu.	  This	  membership	  can	  provide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673	  Sonya	  Corbin	  and	  Jennifer	  Buckle,	  “The	  Space	  Between:	  On	  Being	  an	  Insider-­‐
Outsider	  in	  Qualitative	  Research,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Qualitative	  Methods	  8,	  no.	  
1	  (2009):	  56.	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legitimacy	  to	  a	  researcher674.	  Being	  an	  ‘insider’	  allows	  a	  researcher	  to	  be	  more	  
rapidly	  accepted	  by	  the	  participants,	  and	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  greater	  depth	  and	  breadth	  
of	  the	  data	  collected	  and	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  population675,	  since	  
participants	  may	  be	  more	  open	  in	  their	  views.	  This	  shared	  status	  can	  be	  beneficial	  
during	  the	  research,	  affording	  easier	  access	  and	  entry,	  and	  a	  common	  ground	  from	  
which	  to	  begin	  the	  research676.	  However,	  Kanuha	  (2000)	  argues	  that	  questions	  can	  
be	  raised	  regarding	  the	  objectivity	  and	  authenticity	  of	  a	  project,	  since	  a	  researcher	  
may	  be	  too	  close	  or	  too	  similar	  to	  the	  participants	  being	  studied677.	  There	  is	  a	  
possibility	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  research	  may	  make	  assumptions	  of	  similarity,	  
and	  thus	  fail	  to	  explain	  their	  individual	  experiences	  more	  fully678.	  Moreover,	  a	  
researcher’s	  perceptions	  may	  be	  clouded	  by	  his	  or	  her	  own	  personal	  experiences,	  
and	  thus	  he	  or	  she	  might	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  projecting	  their	  own	  views	  as	  opposed	  to	  
those	  of	  the	  participants.	  During	  an	  interview,	  for	  instance,	  the	  focus	  and	  scope	  of	  
the	  interview	  may	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  views	  of	  the	  researcher,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
participants.	  	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  overcome	  these	  problems,	  Asselin	  (2003)	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  important	  
for	  a	  researcher	  to	  gather	  data	  with	  his	  or	  her	  ‘eyes	  open’,	  and	  approach	  the	  
phenomena	  being	  studied	  with	  no	  assumptions.	  She	  argues	  that	  although	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674	  Patricia	  Adler	  and	  Peter	  Adler,	  Membership	  Roles	  in	  Field	  Research	  (Newbury	  
Park,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1987).	  
675	  Valli	  Kanuha,	  “‘Being’	  Native	  Versus	  ‘Going’	  Native:	  Conducting	  Social	  Work	  
Research	  as	  an	  Insider”,	  Social	  Work	  45,	  no.	  5	  (2000):	  444.	  
676	  Corbin	  and	  Buckle,	  “The	  Space	  Between,”	  58	  
677	  Kanuha,	  “‘Being’	  Native	  Versus	  ‘Going’	  Native,”	  444.	  
678	  Corbin	  and	  Buckle,	  “The	  Space	  Between,”	  58.	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researcher	  may	  have	  a	  shared	  culture	  with	  the	  participants,	  he	  or	  she	  may	  not	  
understand	  the	  subcultures	  that	  exist	  within	  it679.	  Rose	  (1985)	  proposes	  that	  there	  
can	  never	  be	  any	  possibility	  of	  neutrality	  in	  research,	  so	  “there	  is	  only	  greater	  or	  less	  
awareness	  of	  one’s	  biases.	  And	  if	  you	  do	  not	  appreciate	  the	  force	  of	  what	  you’re	  
leaving	  out,	  you	  are	  not	  fully	  in	  command	  of	  what	  you	  are	  doing”680.	  It	  is	  therefore	  
important	  to	  appreciate	  that	  every	  researcher	  will	  have	  some	  form	  of	  bias	  and	  
preconceived	  ideas	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  research.	  However,	  the	  
benefits	  of	  being	  an	  ‘insider’	  were	  significant	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research.	  
Pakistani	  society	  maintains	  a	  segregation	  of	  the	  sexes	  in	  most	  social	  settings,	  and	  
thus	  my	  identity	  as	  a	  woman	  allowed	  me	  access	  to	  participants	  much	  more	  easily.	  
Moreover,	  discussing	  divorce	  in	  any	  context	  is	  a	  highly	  controversial	  topic,	  and	  
therefore	  being	  aware	  of	  cultural	  constraints	  in	  this	  matter	  enabled	  me	  to	  be	  
sensitive	  to	  and	  empathetic	  with	  the	  female	  participants.	  Being	  married	  and	  having	  
children	  also	  created	  a	  common	  bond,	  which	  allowed	  the	  participants	  to	  be	  more	  
relaxed	  in	  my	  company.	  They	  would	  quite	  often	  ask	  if	  I	  was	  married	  and	  whether	  I	  
had	  children,	  and	  then	  inquire	  about	  their	  ages	  and	  schooling.	  Sharing	  these	  
common	  facts	  ‘broke	  the	  ice’	  during	  an	  interview	  and	  allowed	  the	  respondents	  to	  be	  
more	  relaxed,	  and	  thus	  more	  open	  and	  expressive	  in	  their	  views.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679	  Marilyn	  Asselin,	  “Insider	  Research:	  Issues	  to	  Consider	  When	  Doing	  Qualitative	  
Research	  in	  Your	  Own	  Setting,”	  Journal	  for	  Nurses	  in	  Staff	  Development,	  19,	  no.	  2	  
(2003):	  99-­‐103.	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  Phyllis	  Rose,	  Writing	  on	  Women:	  Essays	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Whilst	  being	  an	  ‘insider’	  helped	  me	  with	  the	  participant	  interviews	  of	  married	  
women	  and	  litigants	  in	  the	  family	  courts,	  I	  had	  a	  more	  varied	  response	  from	  the	  
legal	  professionals	  that	  I	  interviewed.	  Most	  of	  the	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  were	  men,	  and	  
regarded	  me	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  scepticism.	  Although	  I	  explained	  the	  purpose	  of	  my	  
research	  before	  each	  interview,	  I	  sensed	  that	  many	  of	  the	  lawyers	  were	  hesitant	  to	  
be	  interviewed,	  fearing	  disclosure	  of	  their	  views.	  After	  I	  had	  reassured	  each	  
participant	  that	  they	  would	  remain	  anonymous,	  and	  that	  no	  references	  would	  be	  
made	  at	  all	  to	  their	  identities,	  they	  became	  more	  relaxed	  and	  open	  with	  their	  views.	  
In	  many	  of	  these	  interviews	  I	  informed	  them	  that	  I	  had	  trained	  as	  a	  lawyer	  in	  my	  
early	  career,	  which	  created	  some	  common	  ground.	  I	  was	  often	  asked	  why	  I	  had	  not	  
pursued	  this	  career	  and	  about	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  legal	  profession	  between	  
Pakistan	  and	  England.	  After	  such	  discussions,	  the	  participants	  would	  become	  more	  
candid	  in	  their	  views,	  viewing	  me	  as	  ‘one	  of	  their	  own’.	  
	  
5.10	  Ethical	  Considerations	  
Whilst	  conducting	  the	  fieldwork,	  care	  was	  taken	  regarding	  a	  number	  of	  ethical	  
issues.	  The	  first	  step	  was	  to	  obtain	  ethical	  approval	  from	  the	  Humanities	  and	  Social	  
Sciences	  Ethical	  Review	  Committee	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Birmingham.	  Conditional	  
approval	  was	  gained	  on	  the	  21st	  of	  June,	  2013	  and	  full	  approval	  was	  obtained	  on	  27th	  
June,	  2013.	  Other	  ethical	  issues	  included	  obtaining	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  participants,	  
ensuring	  that	  no	  harm	  came	  to	  the	  participants	  and	  respecting	  their	  privacy.	  A	  
primary	  issue	  was	  to	  acquire	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  participants	  to	  interview	  them,	  as	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well	  as	  to	  ensure	  their	  willingness	  to	  use	  the	  data	  provided	  by	  them	  for	  this	  
research	  thesis.	  Before	  any	  interviews	  or	  discussion	  took	  place,	  I	  informed	  the	  
participants	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  topic,	  the	  purpose	  and	  objectives	  of	  
the	  study,	  my	  enrolment	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Birmingham	  as	  a	  PhD	  student,	  and	  the	  
types	  of	  question	  that	  they	  would	  be	  asked.	  I	  further	  informed	  them	  of	  the	  
approximate	  length	  of	  the	  interviews	  and	  requested	  additional	  consent	  to	  make	  
notes	  of	  their	  answers	  during	  their	  interview	  and	  audio-­‐record	  their	  answers.	  	  	  
	  
It	  was	  also	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  harm	  was	  caused	  to	  any	  of	  the	  participants.	  
Divorce	  is	  an	  extremely	  contentious	  issue	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  even	  discussing	  the	  topic	  
can	  cause	  suspicion	  and	  mistrust	  from	  other	  family	  members.	  The	  participants	  were	  
therefore	  informed	  that	  their	  answers	  and	  opinions	  would	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	  my	  
research	  project,	  but	  complete	  assurances	  were	  given	  regarding	  anonymity	  and	  the	  
protection	  of	  their	  identities.	  This	  was	  done	  by	  not	  disclosing	  the	  real	  names	  and	  
addresses	  of	  any	  of	  the	  participants;	  instead,	  pseudonyms	  were	  used	  to	  maintain	  the	  
confidentiality	  of	  their	  identities.	  My	  handwritten	  notes	  were	  kept	  in	  a	  locked	  
drawer	  at	  home,	  whilst	  the	  audio-­‐recordings	  were	  downloaded	  onto	  my	  laptop	  and	  
the	  recordings	  were	  subsequently	  erased	  after	  transcription.	  My	  laptop	  is	  password	  
protected	  and	  only	  I	  have	  access	  to	  it.	  
	  
Whilst	  interviewing	  women	  at	  court,	  in	  most	  cases	  I	  spoke	  firstly	  to	  their	  lawyers	  
rather	  than	  approaching	  the	  clients	  directly.	  Having	  explained	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  
of	  my	  research,	  as	  I	  did	  with	  the	  other	  participants,	  I	  then	  asked	  the	  lawyers	  to	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request	  permission	  from	  their	  clients	  to	  speak	  to	  them.	  However,	  if	  the	  lawyer	  had	  
not	  arrived,	  I	  approached	  the	  participant	  directly.	  Once	  contact	  was	  made,	  I	  then	  
went	  through	  the	  entire	  procedure	  of	  obtaining	  consent	  and	  requesting	  the	  
participation	  of	  the	  women,	  as	  outlined	  above.	  Interviewing	  women	  during	  their	  
court	  cases	  was	  also	  quite	  painful	  and	  sad	  at	  times.	  Some	  of	  the	  women	  were	  trying	  
to	  obtain	  custody	  of	  their	  children,	  whilst	  others	  were	  desperate	  to	  enforce	  their	  
maintenance	  orders	  and	  were	  suffering	  acute	  financial	  difficulties.	  Seeing	  their	  
suffering	  and	  then	  hearing	  their	  stories	  invoked	  a	  feeling	  of	  helplessness,	  as	  I	  could	  
not	  provide	  any	  kind	  of	  relief	  for	  them.	  Some	  of	  the	  women	  assumed	  that	  I	  would	  be	  
able	  to	  help	  them	  with	  their	  cases,	  or	  put	  in	  a	  good	  word	  for	  them	  with	  the	  judge.	  It	  
was	  therefore	  extremely	  important	  to	  adopt	  a	  completely	  transparent	  approach	  by	  
explaining	  to	  the	  women	  that	  I	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  judiciary	  or	  the	  
government,	  or	  part	  of	  any	  charitable	  organisation.	  I	  also	  explained	  to	  them	  that	  the	  
research	  was	  not	  being	  funded	  by	  any	  government	  or	  non-­‐governmental	  agency,	  
and	  that	  I	  was	  conducting	  research	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  thesis,	  to	  highlight	  the	  
problems	  and	  issues	  faced	  by	  women	  obtaining	  a	  divorce,	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  
suggesting	  areas	  of	  law	  reform.	  Once	  this	  was	  made	  clear,	  the	  participants	  readily	  
spoke	  to	  me	  about	  their	  experiences.	  
	  
5.11	  Problems	  and	  Limitations	  of	  the	  Field	  Work	  
During	  the	  field	  work,	  I	  encountered	  some	  unexpected	  problems	  and	  limitations.	  
The	  first	  problem	  I	  faced	  was	  that	  of	  the	  weather.	  The	  majority	  of	  my	  research	  work	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took	  place	  during	  the	  summer	  months	  of	  June,	  July	  and	  August	  so	  that	  my	  children	  
could	  accompany	  me	  to	  Pakistan	  during	  their	  summer	  holidays.	  Although	  I	  had	  lived	  
in	  Pakistan	  for	  ten	  years	  (1996-­‐2006),	  during	  this	  residential	  stay	  I	  rarely	  ventured	  
out	  in	  the	  afternoon	  during	  the	  summer	  months	  due	  to	  the	  blistering	  heat.	  However,	  
most	  of	  the	  women	  requested	  interviews	  during	  the	  early	  afternoon	  period,	  so	  I	  
struggled	  with	  my	  physical	  fitness	  due	  to	  the	  hot	  climate.	  This	  was	  compounded	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years,	  Pakistan	  has	  suffered	  from	  power	  shortages,	  
causing	  electricity	  to	  stop	  working	  in	  houses	  and	  shops	  for	  many	  hours	  at	  a	  time.	  
This	  would	  result	  in	  complete	  darkness	  in	  homes,	  with	  no	  access	  to	  fans	  or	  air-­‐
conditioning	  to	  relieve	  the	  heat.	  Thus,	  many	  of	  the	  interviews	  took	  place	  in	  outside	  
courtyards	  and	  gardens	  on	  makeshift	  chairs	  and	  tables.	  Arranging	  appointments	  in	  
the	  evening	  also	  proved	  impossible	  due	  to	  power	  shortages,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
participants	  relying	  on	  candles	  and	  old-­‐fashioned	  oil	  lamps.	  The	  high	  price	  of	  petrol	  
has	  meant	  that	  very	  few	  people	  are	  able	  to	  arrange	  generators	  to	  supplement	  their	  
electricity	  supply.	  I	  was	  fortunate	  that	  my	  family’s	  home	  in	  Lahore	  has	  a	  generator,	  
but	  twice,	  whilst	  transcribing	  my	  notes,	  I	  lost	  my	  work	  on	  my	  laptop	  due	  to	  fuses	  
going,	  causing	  my	  laptop	  to	  shut	  down	  unexpectedly.	  
	  
Another	  important	  limitation	  on	  the	  fieldwork	  is	  the	  law	  and	  security	  situation	  in	  
Pakistan.	  Terrorist	  attacks	  and	  lawlessness	  have	  increased	  manifold	  in	  recent	  years.	  
During	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  August	  2014,	  the	  city	  of	  Lahore	  was	  in	  complete	  lockdown	  
for	  two	  weeks	  due	  to	  political	  unrest	  and	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  Nawaz	  Sharif	  
government.	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  visit	  the	  District	  Family	  Court	  of	  Lahore,	  as	  it	  was	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surrounded	  by	  armed	  police,	  and	  I	  was	  forced	  to	  postpone	  the	  remainder	  of	  my	  visit	  
until	  the	  following	  year.	  
	  
This	  research	  is	  also	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  only	  includes	  participants	  from	  the	  
city	  of	  Lahore	  and	  does	  not	  delve	  into	  the	  experiences	  and	  views	  of	  women	  who	  live	  
in	  the	  rural	  villages	  of	  Pakistan.	  It	  is	  envisaged	  that	  their	  experiences	  may	  differ	  
significantly	  from	  their	  urban	  counterparts,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  legal	  
information	  and	  access	  to	  courthouses.	  Their	  exclusion	  was	  a	  deliberate	  policy,	  as	  it	  
would	  have	  made	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  study	  too	  wide	  and	  made	  it	  too	  difficult	  to	  gather	  
meaningful	  information	  from	  a	  larger	  and	  more	  diverse	  population.	  Moreover,	  since	  
this	  is	  the	  first	  study	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  courts,	  the	  lack	  of	  
any	  prior	  studies	  or	  information	  made	  it	  more	  expedient	  to	  concentrate	  upon	  a	  city	  
setting,	  where	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  gather	  preliminary	  information	  and	  gain	  access	  to	  
research	  participants.	  This	  is,	  however,	  an	  important	  area	  for	  future	  research,	  
particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  women’s	  access	  to	  legal	  remedies	  in	  rural	  Pakistan.	  
	  
5.12	  Data	  Analysis	  
Researchers	  use	  a	  variety	  of	  techniques	  to	  analyse	  data	  in	  grounded	  theory	  
methodology.	  These	  include	  open	  coding,	  axial	  coding	  and	  selective	  coding681.	  Some	  
argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  uniform	  or	  standard	  formula	  for	  analysing	  data,	  and	  that	  a	  
researcher	  can	  develop	  his	  or	  her	  own	  data	  according	  to	  the	  requirements	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681	  Cresswell,	  Educational	  Research,	  426.	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objectives	  of	  the	  research,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  data	  collected	  and	  insights	  gained	  from	  
the	  field682.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  discourse,	  narrative	  and	  
experiences	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  used	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  data	  analysis.	  
The	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis	  during	  my	  research	  consisted	  of	  open	  coding,	  which	  
meant	  carefully	  transcribing	  my	  notes	  and	  the	  audio	  recordings	  of	  the	  interviews	  
using	  Microsoft	  Word.	  Thereafter,	  I	  analysed	  the	  text	  of	  the	  interviews	  line	  by	  line	  
and	  attempted	  to	  identify	  key	  words	  and	  phrases,	  which	  enabled	  me	  to	  connect	  the	  
responses	  of	  the	  participants	  with	  the	  research	  questions.	  Spiggle	  (1994)	  argues	  
that	  “identifying	  a	  chunk	  or	  unit	  of	  data	  (a	  passage	  of	  text	  of	  any	  length)	  as	  
belonging	  to,	  representing,	  or	  being	  an	  example	  of	  some	  more	  general	  
phenomenon”683	  is	  important	  at	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  research.	  	  	  
	  
The	  second	  stage	  involved	  a	  process	  of	  organising	  and	  categorising	  the	  data.	  First	  of	  
all,	  I	  separated	  the	  data	  according	  to	  the	  locality	  of	  the	  women	  interviewed.	  The	  data	  
were	  then	  further	  categorised	  according	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  backgrounds	  of	  
the	  women.	  This	  was	  determined	  by	  analysing	  the	  educational	  level	  of	  the	  women	  
interviewed,	  their	  individual	  incomes,	  the	  incomes	  of	  their	  husbands	  and	  the	  
collective	  incomes	  of	  the	  household.	  The	  occupations	  of	  the	  husband,	  wife	  and	  
parents,	  if	  relevant,	  were	  also	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  creating	  the	  categories.	  The	  
participants	  were	  also	  asked	  for	  their	  own	  perceptions	  of	  what	  class	  they	  were	  in.	  A	  
further	  sub-­‐category	  was	  created	  regarding	  the	  age	  of	  each	  participant.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682	  Bentzon	  et	  al,	  Pursuing	  Grounded	  Theory	  in	  Law,	  237.	  
683	  Susan	  Spiggle,	  “Analysis	  and	  Interpretation	  of	  Qualitative	  Data	  in	  Consumer	  





During	  the	  transcription	  stage,	  notes	  or	  memos	  were	  made	  in	  the	  margins	  to	  assist	  
me	  later	  to	  identify	  concepts	  and	  themes,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  note	  down	  my	  own	  
impressions	  and	  descriptions	  of	  events.	  These	  notes	  were	  written	  in	  red	  to	  ensure	  
that	  they	  were	  kept	  separate	  from	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  interviews	  themselves.	  Once	  
the	  data	  had	  been	  organised,	  the	  third	  stage	  consisted	  of	  axial	  coding:	  analysing	  the	  
data	  for	  general	  themes	  and	  concepts	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  raw	  data	  and	  their	  
interrelationships	  with	  each	  other.	  Key	  themes	  and	  sub-­‐themes	  were	  derived	  from	  
the	  general	  concepts	  that	  began	  to	  emerge.	  Once	  each	  theme	  had	  been	  identified,	  it	  
was	  then	  analysed	  again	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  experiences	  of	  
women	  according	  to	  their	  age,	  socioeconomic	  position	  and	  length	  of	  marriage,	  and	  
explanations	  were	  developed	  to	  understand	  the	  behaviour	  under	  study.	  
	  
5.13	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  outlined	  the	  many	  steps	  involved	  in	  conducting	  and	  managing	  the	  
fieldwork	  study.	  The	  socially	  and	  culturally	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  project	  
meant	  that	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  to	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  deemed	  most	  appropriate.	  
Discussing	  marital	  breakdown	  and	  rights	  to	  divorce	  for	  women	  is	  a	  highly	  
contentious	  issue	  in	  Pakistani	  society.	  Stringent	  patriarchal	  norms	  dictate	  the	  place	  
of	  women	  in	  Pakistani	  family	  life.	  Being	  passive	  and	  submissive	  are	  traits	  that	  are	  
valued	  in	  a	  wife,	  and	  any	  action	  to	  the	  contrary	  is	  viewed	  with	  a	  critical	  eye,	  not	  only	  
by	  the	  male	  members	  of	  a	  family	  but	  also	  by	  other	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  extended	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family,	  including	  females.	  Thus,	  it	  was	  very	  important	  during	  the	  research	  to	  tread	  
carefully	  when	  interviewing	  married	  women	  about	  their	  expectations	  of	  marriage	  
and	  divorce,	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  did	  not	  suffer	  any	  adverse	  reactions	  from	  their	  
husbands	  and	  in-­‐laws.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  women	  insisted	  that	  they	  only	  be	  
interviewed	  during	  the	  afternoon,	  when	  their	  husbands	  were	  away,	  and	  when	  most	  
of	  the	  remaining	  womenfolk	  at	  home	  were	  sleeping	  during	  the	  afternoon	  siesta.	  
Once	  these	  precautions	  had	  been	  taken,	  most	  of	  the	  women	  interviewed	  were	  very	  
happy	  to	  have	  their	  views	  heard,	  and	  they	  were	  extremely	  animated	  during	  the	  
interviews	  and	  discussions.	  The	  adoption	  of	  qualitative	  interview	  techniques	  for	  this	  
research	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  useful,	  as	  it	  created	  a	  fairly	  free	  medium	  for	  women	  to	  
speak	  to	  me	  and	  uncover	  their	  views,	  ideas	  and	  even	  their	  dreams	  for	  themselves	  
and	  their	  future.	  Even	  though	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  little	  or	  no	  formal	  
education,	  they	  were	  very	  articulate	  in	  their	  ideas	  about	  the	  rights	  to	  divorce	  and	  
when,	  if	  at	  all,	  women	  should	  exercise	  these	  rights.	  	  	  
	  
The	  grounded	  theory	  methodology	  of	  listening	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  women	  and	  their	  
lived	  experience	  has	  also	  been	  effective	  in	  addressing	  the	  main	  research	  question	  
regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  improve	  the	  situation	  of	  women	  in	  
marriage	  and	  in	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriage.	  This	  methodology	  was	  particularly	  
useful	  for	  interviewing	  women	  in	  the	  courts	  who	  were	  going	  through	  immense	  
stress	  and	  emotional	  turmoil	  during	  their	  protracted	  legal	  battles.	  Through	  the	  use	  
of	  unstructured	  interviews,	  the	  litigants	  were	  able	  to	  relate	  their	  stories	  of	  hardship	  
and	  the	  pain	  of	  divorce	  without	  interruption,	  and	  to	  present	  their	  stories	  at	  their	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own	  pace	  and	  determination.	  The	  grounded	  theory	  methodology	  was	  useful	  in	  
identifying	  concepts	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  interviews,	  which	  were	  then	  broken	  











This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  which	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  city	  
of	  Lahore	  over	  a	  period	  of	  three	  years,	  2013,	  2014	  and	  2015.	  It	  provides	  an	  analysis	  
of	  the	  key	  themes	  and	  sub-­‐themes	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  data	  collection	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  interviews	  with	  married	  women	  and	  their	  lived	  realities.	  This	  chapter	  examines	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  liberal	  judicial	  interpretation	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  as	  outlined	  in	  
Chapter	  Four,	  has	  filtered	  down	  into	  society	  in	  practice,	  and	  to	  what	  degree	  
Pakistani	  women	  believe	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  them	  to	  consider	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  marital	  breakdown.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
responses	  of	  the	  participants,	  who	  were	  asked	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  their	  
knowledge	  and	  awareness	  of	  the	  legal	  remedy	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  They	  were	  also	  asked	  
what	  obstacles,	  if	  any,	  existed	  if	  a	  woman	  wished	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce,	  and	  to	  
describe	  their	  perceptions	  of	  those	  women	  who	  had	  pursued	  such	  a	  course	  of	  action.	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  interviews	  conducted	  over	  the	  preceding	  years,	  it	  became	  
quite	  apparent	  that	  although	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  aware	  of	  
their	  right	  to	  go	  to	  court	  and	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  (albeit	  not	  always	  known	  to	  them	  as	  
the	  legal	  process	  of	  khulʿ),	  this	  was	  not	  a	  remedy	  that	  they	  considered	  appropriate	  
for	  a	  woman	  to	  enforce.	  Rather,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  more	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befitting	  to	  remain	  in	  an	  unhappy	  and	  even	  violent	  marriage	  as	  opposed	  to	  pursuing	  
a	  legal	  remedy.	  The	  participants	  surveyed	  were	  also	  highly	  critical	  in	  their	  views	  
regarding	  women	  who	  had	  initiated	  a	  khulʿ,	  describing	  them	  as	  selfish,	  impatient	  
and	  rebellious	  towards	  their	  husbands	  and	  extended	  families.	  	  The	  second	  part	  of	  
this	  chapter	  will	  analyse	  the	  views	  of	  the	  partcipants	  in	  light	  of	  feminist	  theories	  
regarding	  ‘adaptive	  preferences’	  and	  ‘deformed	  desires’	  as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  
It	  will	  discuss	  why	  some	  women	  choose	  to	  remain	  in	  unhappy	  and	  even	  abusive	  
marriages	  and	  whether	  these	  decisions	  are	  compatible	  with	  autonomy.	  
	  
6.2	  Married	  Women’s	  Perception	  and	  Understanding	  of	  the	  Khulʿ	  
This	  research	  is	  based	  upon	  structured	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  one	  
hundred	  married	  women	  who	  live	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Lahore,	  Pakistan.	  After	  gaining	  
primary	  information	  from	  the	  women	  relating	  to	  age,	  education,	  employment,	  
household	  income	  and	  family	  background,	  the	  primary	  part	  of	  the	  interview	  
revolved	  around	  each	  participant’s	  knowledge,	  views	  and	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  
khulʿ.	  The	  participants	  were	  first	  asked	  if	  they	  had	  heard	  of	  the	  term	  khulʿ	  and,	  if	  so,	  
what	  they	  thought	  it	  meant.	  Eighty-­‐three	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  heard	  of	  the	  term	  
khulʿ.	  Thirty-­‐two	  of	  these	  participants	  had	  not	  only	  heard	  of	  the	  term,	  but	  were	  able	  
to	  describe	  it	  as	  the	  process	  of	  women	  attending	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce.	  Eighteen	  
of	  these	  thirty-­‐two	  participants	  mentioned	  that	  they	  knew	  of	  someone	  in	  their	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family	  or	  muhallah684	  who	  had	  gone	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ,	  and	  so	  were	  familiar	  
with	  its	  usage.	  See	  Figures	  4	  and	  5	  for	  a	  breakdown	  of	  these	  figures:	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4	  –	  Participants’	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  Khulʿ	  
	  
	  




Fifty-­‐one	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  had	  heard	  of	  the	  term	  khulʿ	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  
any	  definition	  of	  what	  it	  meant.	  All	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  asked	  if	  a	  woman	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684	  Refers	  to	  the	  local	  community	  known	  by	  the	  participants.	  
Participants	  Who	  Had	  Heard	  of	  the	  
Term	  Khulʿ	  
	  Yes	  83%	  
No	  17%	  
Participants	  Who	  Had	  Heard	  and	  





dissolve	  her	  marriage	  if	  her	  husband	  refused	  to	  give	  her	  a	  ṭalāq.	  Ninety-­‐one	  
participants	  stated	  that	  a	  woman	  could	  go	  to	  court	  and	  ask	  the	  judge	  for	  a	  divorce.	  
These	  participants	  were	  quite	  clear	  in	  their	  answers	  and	  unambiguously	  stated	  that	  
a	  woman	  had	  an	  alternate	  court	  remedy	  if	  her	  husband	  refused	  to	  divorce	  her.	  
Figure	  6	  provides	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  their	  responses.	  
	  




The	  research	  suggests	  that	  although	  many	  women	  have	  heard	  of	  of	  the	  word	  khulʿ,	  
most	  of	  them	  did	  not	  know	  what	  the	  word	  actually	  meant.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	  participants	  were	  aware	  that	  a	  woman	  has	  the	  right	  to	  go	  to	  court	  and	  seek	  a	  
dissolution	  of	  her	  marriage,	  they	  did	  not	  know	  this	  to	  mean	  a	  khulʿ.	  Whilst	  this	  
reflects	  the	  position	  of	  most	  of	  the	  participants,	  nine	  of	  the	  respondents	  expressed	  
no	  knowledge	  on	  this	  matter	  and	  did	  not	  think	  a	  woman	  could	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  of	  
any	  kind.	  Sobia,	  a	  50-­‐year-­‐old	  woman	  from	  a	  lower	  working	  class	  background	  who	  
had	  never	  been	  to	  school,	  stated:	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“I	  don’t	  know.	  She	  cannot	  do	  anything.	  She	  will	  have	  to	  suffer	  with	  her	  in-­‐laws	  or	  suffer	  
at	  her	  parents’	  house”685.	  
	  
Khalida,	  who	  did	  not	  know	  her	  age,	  but	  who	  appeared	  to	  be	  in	  her	  late	  50s	  and	  who	  
was	  also	  illiterate,	  stated:	  
	  
“Once	  you	  are	  married	  you	  are	  married.	  The	  husband	  can	  divorce	  you	  if	  he	  wants	  to.	  
She	  cannot	  get	  a	  divorce	  from	  him”686.	  	  
	  
When	  I	  asked	  her	  what	  a	  woman	  could	  do	  if	  her	  husband	  refused	  to	  give	  her	  a	  ṭalāq,	  
she	  replied:	  
	  
“I	  have	  never	  found	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  Most	  husbands	  are	  happy	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  their	  
wives	  and	  get	  another	  one”687.	  
	  
Khalida	  did	  not	  entertain	  the	  thought	  that	  a	  woman	  could	  or	  should	  get	  a	  divorce.	  In	  
her	  experience,	  a	  man	  was	  always	  ready	  to	  give	  his	  wife	  a	  divorce	  if	  she	  so	  desired.	  
Majeeda,	  a	  forty-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  had	  attended	  school	  sporadically	  until	  grade	  
four,	  reiterated	  these	  views:	  
	  
“What	  can	  a	  woman	  do?	  I	  don’t	  know.	  Once	  you	  are	  married,	  unless	  your	  husband	  
throws	  you	  out,	  you	  remain	  in	  his	  house.	  I	  know	  of	  many	  women	  who	  go	  to	  their	  
parents’	  houses	  in	  anger	  or	  when	  they	  are	  upset.	  But	  in	  the	  end	  most	  return,	  or	  if	  they	  
don’t,	  the	  husband	  just	  divorces	  them”688.	  
	  
Bano,	  a	  fifty-­‐one-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  lower	  working	  class	  family,	  also	  said:	  
	  
“She	  can	  do	  nothing.	  She	  will	  have	  to	  tolerate	  her	  lot.	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  she	  can	  do.	  
Especially	  if	  she	  has	  children”689.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  15th	  2013.	  
686	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  7th	  2013.	  
687	  Ibid.	  
688	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  22nd	  2013.	  
689	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  5th	  2013.	  
	  
228	  
Of	  the	  nine	  participants	  who	  were	  unaware	  of	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce,	  
eight	  had	  never	  been	  to	  school	  and	  had	  received	  no	  formal	  education,	  whilst	  one	  
participant	  had	  gone	  to	  school	  but	  only	  sporadically,	  and	  had	  not	  studied	  further	  
than	  grade	  four.	  Moreover,	  all	  of	  the	  nine	  participants	  belonged	  to	  lower	  working	  
class	  families	  with	  a	  total	  household	  income	  ranging	  between	  7000	  and	  10,000	  
rupees.	  Although	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  low	  socio-­‐economic	  
standards	  and	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ,	  the	  converse	  was	  also	  true.	  Of	  
the	  thirty-­‐two	  participants	  who	  had	  some	  knowledge	  about	  the	  khulʿ,	  the	  majority	  
(87.5%	  n=28)	  also	  came	  from	  low	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds.	  Over	  half	  (57%	  
n=18)	  of	  them	  were	  able	  to	  describe	  the	  process	  of	  khulʿ	  in	  some	  depth:	  that	  it	  was	  
not	  very	  costly,	  and	  that	  a	  woman	  was	  able	  to	  get	  a	  divorce	  within	  a	  year.	  Their	  
knowledge	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  knowing	  someone	  in	  their	  own	  social	  circle	  or	  
neighbourhood	  who	  had	  gone	  through	  this	  process	  successfully.	  Only	  four	  of	  the	  
thirty-­‐two	  participants	  came	  from	  higher	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds.	  See	  Figure	  7	  
below:	  
	  
Figure	  7	  –	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Background	  of	  Participants’	  Who	  Had	  Heard	  of	  and	  Could	  






Whilst	  all	  of	  the	  women	  from	  lower	  middle	  class	  or	  middle	  class	  families	  knew	  a	  
woman	  could	  go	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce,	  only	  four	  of	  them	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  
its	  technical	  legal	  name.	  Unlike	  their	  poorer	  counterparts,	  none	  of	  the	  women	  from	  
higher	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds	  had	  met	  anyone	  or	  knew	  of	  anyone	  who	  had	  
gone	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  .	  Moreover,	  these	  particular	  respondents	  all	  stated	  
that	  they	  had	  absolutely	  no	  knowledge	  of	  the	  court	  process	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ.	  Whilst	  
it	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  broad	  generalisations	  in	  this	  study	  (due	  to	  the	  small	  population	  
sample),	  this	  research	  does	  suggest	  that	  women	  from	  lower	  socioeconomic	  
backgrounds	  are	  just	  as	  aware	  of	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  as	  their	  wealthier	  
counterparts,	  and	  indeed	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  met	  a	  woman	  or	  know	  of	  one	  who	  
has	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ.	  Majid	  Iqbal,	  a	  senior	  lawyer	  who	  has	  represented	  many	  women	  
in	  khulʿ	  cases	  over	  the	  last	  ten	  years,	  has	  stated	  that	  it	  is	  the	  poorer	  families	  who	  
utilise	  the	  khulʿ,	  rather	  than	  those	  who	  belong	  to	  the	  middle	  or	  upper	  classes.	  He	  has	  
stated	  that	  poorer	  women	  are	  already	  in	  a	  miserable	  condition	  and	  have	  a	  lot	  less	  to	  
lose	  both	  emotionally	  and	  financially.	  Although	  the	  social	  stigma	  and	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embarrassment	  relating	  to	  divorced	  women	  permeates	  Pakistani	  society,	  women	  
from	  the	  poorer	  classes	  have	  less	  social	  standing	  to	  lose690.	  	  	  
	  
Ali	  Shah,	  another	  family	  lawyer,	  reiterated	  these	  views691.	  He	  stated	  that	  middle	  
class	  families	  have	  a	  higher	  financial	  investment	  when	  girls	  are	  married.	  Money	  is	  
spent	  on	  at	  least	  three	  functions:	  the	  upton692,	  mehndi693	  and	  baraat694.	  The	  girl’s	  
side	  of	  the	  family	  also	  provide	  numerous	  gifts	  to	  the	  boy’s	  side,	  and	  will	  have	  
already	  spent	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  money	  on	  pre-­‐wedding	  dinners	  and	  functions695.	  
However,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  financial	  consequences	  that	  are	  considered,	  but	  also	  the	  
stigma	  attached	  to	  a	  divorce	  and	  the	  ‘dishonour’	  that	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  family.	  
Pakistani	  middle	  class	  families	  are	  inherently	  conservative	  by	  nature,	  and	  have	  a	  
social	  standing	  in	  the	  community	  based	  on	  respectability	  and	  propriety.	  A	  large	  
amount	  of	  that	  propriety	  is	  linked	  to	  maintaining	  the	  honour	  and	  prestige	  of	  the	  
women	  of	  the	  family.	  Divorce	  is	  one	  of	  many	  acts	  that	  reduce	  the	  honour	  of	  a	  
woman,	  and	  by	  default	  reflect	  badly	  on	  her	  natal	  family.	  The	  parents	  will	  be	  blamed	  
for	  not	  instilling	  good	  behavioural	  traits	  within	  their	  daughter,	  and	  thus	  they	  will	  
pressurise	  her	  to	  remain	  in	  her	  marriage.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  April	  30th	  2014.	  
691	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  April	  30th	  2014.	  
692	  The	  bride’s	  family	  applies	  local	  herbal	  cosmetics	  to	  the	  bride	  to	  mark	  the	  launch	  
of	  her	  official	  wedding	  days,	  and	  traditionally	  from	  this	  day	  onwards	  she	  is	  not	  
allowed	  to	  take	  part	  in	  any	  household	  chores	  or	  employment.	  
693	  A	  henna	  party	  arranged	  by	  the	  bride’s	  family	  where	  girls	  and	  the	  bride-­‐to-­‐be	  
have	  intricate	  henna	  designs	  painted	  on	  their	  hands.	  The	  groom’s	  family	  is	  invited	  to	  
the	  event.	  
694	  This	  is	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  wedding	  where	  the	  bride’s	  family	  is	  the	  host	  and	  
provides	  a	  special	  meal	  for	  all	  of	  the	  guests.	  




The	  participants	  were	  also	  asked	  what	  difficulties,	  if	  any,	  a	  woman	  faces	  if	  she	  wants	  
to	  divorce	  her	  husband	  and	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  the	  courts.	  A	  key	  factor	  outlined	  by	  
the	  participants	  is	  financial	  constraints.	  Fifty-­‐nine	  participants	  thought	  that	  











Figure	  8	  –	  Khul‘	  Too	  Expensive	  an	  Option	  to	  Pursue	  
	  
	  
Twenty-­‐one	  of	  these	  participants	  stated	  that	  the	  court	  cost	  would	  be	  at	  least	  50,000	  
rupees,	  whilst	  the	  remaining	  thirty-­‐eight	  participants	  stated	  that	  the	  cost	  would	  be	  
at	  least	  100,000	  rupees.	  These	  views,	  however,	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  actual	  expense	  of	  
going	  to	  court.	  Most	  khulʿ	  cases	  cost	  the	  litigant	  between	  a	  minimum	  of	  5000	  and	  a	  
maximum	  of	  10,000	  rupees,	  with	  only	  a	  few	  cases	  reaching	  15,000	  to	  20,000	  rupees	  
Khulʿ	  	  Too	  Expensive	  an	  
Option	  to	  Pursue	  
Yes	  59%	  
No	  32%	  
Don't	  Know	  9%	  
	  
232	  
and	  in	  exceptional	  cases	  50,000	  rupees696.	  Whilst	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  women	  overall	  
felt	  that	  it	  would	  be	  too	  expensive	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ,	  there	  was	  a	  stark	  difference	  
between	  the	  knowledge	  and	  perception	  of	  court	  costs	  between	  the	  different	  socio-­‐












Figure	  9	  –	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Background	  of	  Participants:	  Khul‘	  Too	  Expensive	  to	  
Pursue	  
	   	  
	  
Figure	  10	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As	  can	  be	  seen,	  of	  the	  fifty-­‐nine	  participants	  who	  thought	  a	  khulʿ	  was	  too	  expensive	  
to	  pursue,	  eighty-­‐three	  per	  cent	  (n=50)	  came	  from	  affluent	  backgrounds.	  However,	  
thirty-­‐two	  participants	  thought	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  going	  to	  court	  were	  not	  too	  high,	  
with	  eighteen	  of	  them	  being	  aware	  that	  not	  only	  was	  the	  court	  process	  relatively	  
quick,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  was	  an	  affordable	  option.	  All	  but	  one	  of	  these	  participants	  
belonged	  to	  lower	  working	  class	  families	  with	  little	  or	  no	  education.	  Rubya,	  a	  thirty-­‐
eight-­‐year-­‐old	  maid,	  stated:	  
	  
“A	  girl	  from	  my	  muhalla	  had	  a	  khulʿ.	  Her	  husband	  would	  beat	  her.	  She	  was	  quite	  poor	  
like	  me	  but	  she	  still	  went	  to	  court.	  So	  it	  can’t	  be	  that	  much	  money”697.	  
	  
	  
A	  common	  feature	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  understood	  the	  court	  costs	  as	  being	  low	  
was	  that	  they	  all	  knew	  of	  someone	  who	  had	  gone	  to	  court	  and	  successfully	  obtained	  
a	  khulʿ.	  They	  were	  also	  very	  well	  versed	  in	  the	  life	  histories	  of	  those	  women,	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  Interview,	  Lahore	  22nd	  July	  2013.	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indicating	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  had	  been	  a	  lively	  topic	  of	  conversation	  and	  debate	  for	  these	  
participants	  in	  the	  past.	  Information	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ	  had	  filtered	  down	  to	  them	  
through	  informal	  channels	  of	  communication	  and	  socialisation	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
dissemination	  of	  formal	  education	  through	  literature,	  advertisements	  or	  workshops.	  
Whilst	  this	  process	  of	  promulgation	  of	  knowledge	  was	  useful	  to	  these	  participants,	  
only	  those	  women	  within	  such	  social	  circles	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  women	  from	  lower	  
working	  class	  families	  –	  had	  access	  to	  such	  information.	  Those	  women	  who	  had	  
never	  met	  or	  known	  anyone	  who	  had	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  were	  at	  a	  disadvantage.	  Nine	  
women	  from	  working	  class	  families	  and	  all	  of	  the	  women	  from	  middle	  class	  families	  
had	  inaccurate	  assumptions	  about	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  khulʿ,	  meaning	  that	  a	  deterrent	  
existed	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  these	  participants	  that	  did	  not	  pertain	  to	  reality.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  expense	  was	  outlined	  as	  a	  key	  obstacle	  for	  women	  who	  might	  wish	  to	  pursue	  
a	  khulʿ,	  lack	  of	  family	  support	  was	  another	  issue	  raised	  by	  the	  participants.	  The	  
overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  (91%:	  n=91)	  cited	  lack	  of	  family	  support	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  reasons	  why	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  have	  
recourse	  to	  a	  legal	  remedy698.	  Courts	  were	  perceived	  as	  male-­‐dominated	  forums,	  
and	  it	  was	  viewed	  as	  inappropriate	  for	  a	  lone	  woman	  to	  attend	  court	  on	  her	  own.	  As	  
a	  result,	  she	  would	  be	  reliant	  upon	  the	  male	  members	  of	  her	  natal	  family.	  However,	  
parents,	  brothers	  and	  uncles	  were	  seen	  as	  unlikely	  to	  support	  a	  woman’s	  decision	  to	  
divorce,	  instead	  preferring	  that	  she	  compromise	  and	  have	  patience.	  The	  participants	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  The	  nine	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  mention	  this	  factor	  were	  those	  who	  had	  no	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  	  They	  were	  very	  reticent	  in	  discussing	  the	  topic	  overall	  and	  
belonged	  to	  very	  low	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds.	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outlined	  sabr	  (patience),	  hikmah	  (wisdom)	  and	  kismet	  (fate)	  as	  common	  phrases	  
used	  by	  parents	  to	  encourage	  a	  girl	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  marriage.	  Sixty-­‐seven	  of	  the	  
participants	  quoted	  a	  phrase	  that	  girls	  often	  hear	  whilst	  growing	  up,	  and	  which	  is	  a	  
concept	  instilled	  in	  them	  at	  an	  early	  age:	  
	  
“Jaab	  bachee	  kee	  shadee	  huwthee	  hai	  thaw	  sirf	  oos	  ka	  janaza	  ghar	  seh	  jay	  gha”:	  
“When	  a	  girl	  marries,	  she	  will	  only	  leave	  that	  house	  upon	  her	  funeral”.	  	  	  
	  
	  
This	  phrase	  reflects	  the	  overall	  mentality	  of	  Pakistani	  parents,	  as	  described	  by	  the	  
participants:	  that	  a	  woman	  must	  do	  her	  utmost	  to	  remain	  within	  the	  marital	  home	  
through	  compromise	  and	  patience.	  Although	  parents	  will	  allow	  their	  daughter	  to	  
return	  to	  the	  natal	  home	  during	  disputes,	  she	  will	  always	  be	  encouraged	  to	  return	  to	  
her	  husband	  and	  his	  family	  after	  a	  few	  days’	  ‘cooling-­‐off	  period’.	  Lack	  of	  parental	  
support	  was	  cited	  as	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  women	  remain	  in	  unhappy	  marriages.	  	  	  
	  
Afifa,	  a	  thirty-­‐six-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  lower	  working	  class	  family,	  stated:	  
	  
“Parents	  give	  no	  support	  at	  all.	  They	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  tell	  their	  daughters	  to	  be	  
patient.	  This	  is	  against	  our	  izzat	  (honour),	  they	  will	  say.	  We	  will	  be	  dishonoured	  if	  you	  
leave	  your	  husband,	  so	  stay	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  our	  respect	  and	  honour.	  Most	  women	  stay	  in	  
unhappy	  marriages	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  izzat	  of	  their	  families	  and	  parents.	  My	  husband	  
has	  hit	  me.	  It	  did	  not	  change	  their	  (parents’)	  mind”699.	  
	  
Lack	  of	  parental	  support	  was	  also	  linked	  directly	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  honour	  and	  shame	  if	  
a	  woman	  seeks	  a	  divorce	  or	  is	  divorced	  by	  her	  husband.	  The	  honour	  of	  a	  ‘daughter’	  
reflects	  the	  prestige	  and	  honour	  of	  her	  own	  family.	  Blame	  and	  fault	  were	  also	  
interlinked	  with	  dishonour.	  Seventy	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  a	  woman	  is	  
always	  blamed	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce.	  Family	  members	  or	  members	  of	  the	  community	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  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  11th	  2013.	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assume	  either	  that	  she	  was	  incapable	  of	  keeping	  her	  husband	  or	  that	  she	  must	  have	  
provoked	  arguments.	  Insubordination	  by	  a	  wife	  is	  interpreted	  as	  bad	  parenting	  by	  
her	  parents,	  who	  must	  have	  failed	  to	  samjah	  (advise	  and	  admonish)	  their	  daughter.	  
Thus,	  parents	  encourage	  their	  daughters	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  marriage	  through	  all	  
means	  possible	  rather	  than	  face	  the	  censure	  of	  their	  friends	  and	  family.	  
	  
Raazia,	  a	  housewife	  from	  a	  middle	  class	  family,	  stated:	  
	  
“The	  main	  problem	  is	  of	  izzat.	  They	  (parents)	  say	  you	  will	  live	  and	  die	  there.	  They	  say	  
your	  funeral	  will	  come	  from	  there.	  Wives	  suffer	  in	  silence.	  What	  else	  can	  they	  do?	  They	  
have	  nowhere	  to	  go.	  Their	  mekkah700	  say	  go	  back.	  I	  see	  in	  our	  muhalla,	  in-­‐laws	  trouble	  
them.	  A	  girl	  had	  in-­‐law	  problems.	  Her	  parents	  could	  not	  help	  her	  and	  did	  not	  help	  her.	  
So	  she	  ate	  poison.	  I	  gave	  her	  the	  gusl701.	  She	  has	  a	  daughter.	  He	  was	  a	  drug	  addict	  and	  
her	  in-­‐laws	  were	  bad	  too.	  No	  one	  helped	  her.	  The	  problem	  is	  all	  about	  finances.	  There	  
are	  so	  many	  problems.	  You	  need	  money,	  pay	  fees,	  travel,	  and	  pay	  for	  the	  buses:	  I	  know	  
you	  can’t	  just	  go	  to	  the	  courts.	  Lawyers	  do	  nothing	  without	  fees”702.	  
	  
When	  asked	  how	  the	  local	  community	  reacts	  to	  a	  woman	  who	  has	  obtained	  a	  
divorce	  or	  is	  divorced	  herself,	  Noorah,	  a	  thirty-­‐nine-­‐year-­‐old	  teacher,	  stated:	  
	  
“Very	  badly	  and	  very	  negatively.	  They	  normally	  think	  that	  she	  is	  to	  blame.	  She	  is	  
expected	  to	  have	  been	  patient	  and	  to	  have	  compromised.	  This	  was	  her	  kismet	  and	  she	  
has	  gone	  against	  that.	  Some	  parents	  may	  help	  but	  that	  is	  very	  few.	  It	  is	  her	  kismet	  and	  
she	  must	  stick	  to	  that”703.	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  combined	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  financial	  means	  and	  
family	  support	  were	  seen	  as	  major	  deterrents	  in	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ,	  eighty-­‐one	  of	  the	  
participants	  were	  also	  very	  adamant	  in	  their	  views	  that	  a	  woman	  should	  still	  
compromise	  within	  her	  marriage	  and	  not	  voluntarily	  opt	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Despite	  
exhibiting	  bitterness	  at	  communal	  censure	  as	  well	  as	  berating	  parents	  for	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700	  Any	  member	  of	  the	  girl’s	  natal	  family.	  
701	  Washing	  a	  dead	  body	  before	  burial	  according	  to	  Islamic	  burial	  rites.	  
702	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  
703	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  11th,	  2013.	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failure	  to	  assist,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  viewed	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  creating	  more	  
problems	  than	  it	  solved,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  perceived	  as	  a	  realistic	  remedy	  to	  be	  
pursued.	  
	  
Kulsoom,	  a	  44-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  very	  low	  working	  class	  family,	  stated:	  
	  
“She	  should	  stay	  put	  and	  stay	  safe	  in	  her	  marriage,	  especially	  if	  there	  are	  children.	  
That	  is	  her	  duty	  and	  how	  she	  should	  work.	  Girls	  don’t	  respect	  their	  husbands	  anymore	  
so	  the	  men	  get	  angry.	  They	  should	  understand	  the	  man	  more.	  Compromise	  with	  him	  
and	  don’t	  talk	  back.	  Life	  will	  be	  easier	  …	  fights	  with	  in-­‐laws	  are	  excuses704.	  	  	  
	  
Kulsoom	  went	  on	  to	  mention	  a	  local	  Pakistani	  idiom	  used	  by	  many	  of	  the	  other	  
participants	  –	  “talia	  dawnaw	  haat	  se	  bajtee	  hai”,	  literally	  meaning,	  “it	  takes	  two	  
hands	  to	  clap”,	  which	  is	  similar	  in	  meaning	  to	  the	  phrase	  “it	  takes	  two	  to	  tango”	  –	  
and	  commented	  that	  wives	  were	  equally	  to	  blame	  during	  marital	  disputes705.	  
	  
Maria,	  a	  twenty-­‐four-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  working	  class	  family,	  echoed	  similar	  
views:	  
	  
“A	  woman	  will	  bring	  shame	  on	  her	  family.	  These	  days,	  women	  are	  not	  ready	  to	  
compromise.	  As	  soon	  as	  it	  gets	  tough	  they	  want	  to	  leave.	  I	  have	  had	  a	  difficult	  
marriage,	  with	  my	  husband	  losing	  work	  and	  problems	  with	  my	  in-­‐laws.	  But	  I	  have	  
remained	  married”706.	  
	  
Ambreen,	  a	  thirty-­‐seven-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  lower	  working	  class	  background	  
who	  had	  attended	  school	  up	  until	  grade	  4,	  blamed	  the	  influx	  of	  Pakistani	  television	  
dramas	  for	  ‘corrupting’	  the	  minds	  of	  women:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  15th	  2013.	  
705	  Ibid.	  
706	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  9th	  2013.	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“These	  dramas	  are	  corrupting	  the	  minds	  of	  girls.	  They	  watch	  these	  romantic	  things	  
and	  think	  that	  is	  what	  they	  should	  have	  too.	  The	  dramas	  make	  it	  seem	  quite	  easy	  and	  
that	  life	  will	  be	  fine.	  Divorce	  your	  husband	  and	  find	  another	  handsome	  one.	  Life	  is	  
nothing	  like	  that.	  The	  girl	  should	  compromise	  and	  be	  patient.	  That	  will	  be	  better	  for	  
her.	  Going	  to	  court	  will	  not	  help	  her”707.	  
	  
Naheed,	  a	  44-­‐year-­‐old	  housemaid,	  regarded	  women’s	  destiny	  as	  an	  important	  
element	  in	  life:	  
	  
“She	  should	  stay	  with	  the	  kids.	  It	  is	  sadaqah708	  to	  stay	  with	  him.	  This	  is	  her	  kismath.	  
Most	  are	  patient	  and	  must	  be	  patient.	  She	  needs	  to	  raise	  the	  children.	  I	  had	  problems	  
in	  my	  marriage.	  I	  have	  patience.	  I	  never	  complain.	  The	  rest	  of	  my	  sisters-­‐in-­‐law	  do	  not	  
have	  patience.	  They	  fight,	  but	  they	  cannot	  do	  anything	  about	  it”709.	  
	  
The	  views	  expressed	  by	  Kulsoom,	  Ambreen,	  Maria	  and	  Naheed	  were	  a	  common	  
theme	  amongst	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  participants,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  
position.	  The	  social	  stigma	  and	  shame	  resulting	  from	  divorce,	  the	  lack	  of	  family	  
support	  and	  the	  inability	  to	  secure	  financial	  independence	  were	  the	  primary	  
reasons	  why	  they	  felt	  that	  women	  should	  remain	  in	  a	  marriage	  no	  matter	  how	  
intolerable	  it	  may	  be.	  Rather	  than	  face	  these	  obstacles,	  it	  was	  considered	  better	  to	  
compromise	  and	  accept	  one’s	  fate.	  Women	  resorting	  to	  khulʿ	  were	  perceived	  as	  
taking	  the	  easy	  way	  out	  and	  creating	  extra	  hardships	  for	  their	  parents.	  They	  were	  
considered	  to	  be	  irresponsible	  regarding	  the	  fate	  of	  their	  children	  when	  choosing	  to	  
live	  as	  single	  mothers.	  Some	  of	  the	  participants	  felt	  that	  those	  women	  who	  had	  
obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  only	  served	  to	  create	  a	  false	  picture	  of	  happiness	  for	  divorcees.	  
They	  set	  a	  bad	  example	  by	  indoctrinating	  other	  women	  in	  their	  families	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  7th	  2013.	  
708	  Literally	  means	  ‘voluntary	  charity’	  but	  in	  this	  context	  refers	  to	  blessings.	  
709	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  15th	  2013.	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rebellious	  and	  insubordinate	  towards	  their	  husbands,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  their	  own	  
welfare.	  
	  
Somia,	  a	  37-­‐year-­‐old	  college	  graduate,	  stated:	  
	  
“I	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  divorce.	  A	  wife	  should	  compromise.	  The	  children	  will	  suffer	  and	  that	  
is	  not	  good.	  Girls	  these	  days	  are	  less	  patient	  and	  tolerant	  and	  just	  want	  an	  easy	  life”710.	  
	  
Misbah,	  another	  college	  graduate,	  echoed	  these	  views:	  
	  
“A	  man	  will	  never	  look	  after	  another	  man’s	  child.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  selfish	  of	  a	  woman	  to	  
divorce.	  I	  have	  had	  problems.	  We	  all	  do.	  But	  she	  will	  be	  worse	  if	  she	  does	  get	  a	  divorce.	  
These	  T.V.	  dramas	  are	  no	  good.	  They	  make	  it	  look	  romantic.	  It	  is	  the	  easy	  way	  out”711.	  
	  
Keisira,	  a	  29-­‐year-­‐old	  factory	  worker,	  was	  very	  vehement	  in	  her	  views:	  
	  
“It	  is	  very,	  very	  tough	  for	  her.	  Her	  husband	  is	  already	  not	  helping	  her	  in	  the	  marriage,	  
so	  how	  can	  she	  go	  to	  the	  courts	  to	  get	  a	  divorce	  when	  she	  has	  no	  assistance?	  Anyway,	  
most	  women	  are	  patient.	  They	  suffer	  from	  unhappy	  marriage	  and	  even	  violence	  but	  
they	  are	  patient	  and	  accept	  that	  this	  is	  normal	  and	  part	  of	  life.	  They	  think	  nothing	  of	  it	  
and	  believe	  they	  are	  not	  worthy	  of	  getting	  divorced.	  In	  fact,	  divorce	  is	  really	  not	  an	  
option	  for	  them.	  What	  can	  they	  do	  after	  that?	  They	  will	  be	  stigmatised	  by	  society.	  At	  
least	  she	  has	  a	  roof	  over	  her	  head	  and	  has	  some	  food	  on	  the	  table”712.	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  majority	  of	  participants	  were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  women	  should	  not	  
voluntarily	  seek	  a	  divorce	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  khulʿ,	  ten	  of	  the	  participants	  expressed	  the	  
view	  that	  a	  woman	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  divorce	  her	  husband	  if	  she	  is	  not	  happy	  in	  
her	  marriage,	  and	  described	  the	  miserable	  conditions	  that	  some	  married	  women	  
face:	  abusive	  husbands,	  interfering	  in-­‐laws,	  and	  being	  forced	  to	  be	  party	  to	  
polygamous	  marriages.	  In	  such	  instances,	  it	  was	  considered	  that	  a	  woman	  was	  
justified	  in	  divorcing	  her	  husband	  and	  had	  the	  right	  to	  a	  dignified	  life.	  However,	  each	  
of	  these	  participants	  qualified	  their	  views	  by	  mentioning	  the	  financial	  constraints	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  
711	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  17th	  2013	  
712	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  9th	  2013.	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that	  women	  face	  in	  opting	  for	  such	  a	  choice.	  Only	  those	  women	  who	  could	  
independently	  support	  themselves	  would	  and	  should	  avail	  themselves	  of	  such	  a	  
right.	  Financial	  independence	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  possible	  factor	  that	  could	  override	  or	  
at	  least	  counteract	  the	  social	  stigma	  attached	  to	  divorced	  women.	  If	  a	  woman	  had	  an	  
independent	  income	  through	  employment	  or	  inheritance,	  then	  she	  would	  not	  be	  
reliant	  upon	  her	  family	  for	  support.	  Parents	  were	  not	  considered	  particularly	  
helpful	  if	  a	  woman	  chose	  to	  divorce.	  Seven	  of	  these	  participants	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  
very	  unlikely	  that	  parents	  would	  encourage	  or	  allow	  their	  daughters	  to	  obtain	  a	  
divorce,	  and	  thus	  women’s	  ability	  to	  support	  themselves	  was	  of	  crucial	  importance.	  
Interestingly,	  the	  ten	  participants	  who	  stated	  that	  women	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  all	  belonged	  to	  well-­‐established	  middle	  class	  families.	  Six	  of	  these	  
participants	  had	  Masters’	  degrees	  and	  the	  remaining	  four	  had	  Bachelors’	  degrees.	  
Moreover,	  all	  of	  these	  participants	  were	  employed	  as	  teachers:	  two	  were	  lecturers	  
in	  a	  local	  college	  and	  one	  was	  the	  principal	  of	  a	  prominent	  private	  girls’	  college.	  
However,	  their	  views	  formed	  a	  minority	  opinion,	  not	  only	  amongst	  the	  sample	  as	  a	  
whole	  but	  also	  amongst	  their	  own	  socio-­‐economic	  group.	  	  	  
	  
Yet,	  contrary	  to	  the	  majority	  view	  of	  the	  participants,	  many	  women	  are	  in	  fact	  
opting	  to	  pursue	  the	  khulʿ	  (as	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter).	  Why,	  then,	  did	  the	  
majority	  of	  these	  participants	  not	  only	  view	  such	  actions	  negatively	  but	  openly	  
censure	  women	  who	  adopt	  such	  a	  route?	  Feminists	  have	  argued	  that	  patriarchal	  
structures	  in	  society	  adversely	  affect	  women	  in	  their	  motivation,	  and	  lead	  to	  
adaptive	  preferences	  or	  deformed	  desires.	  Should	  the	  views	  of	  these	  participants	  be	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considered	  ‘deformed’	  or	  ‘repressive’	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  social	  conditioning,	  and	  
thus	  not	  purely	  autonomous;	  or	  can	  these	  decisions	  be	  understood	  as	  calculated,	  
rational	  and	  therefore	  autonomous	  choices	  made	  for	  their	  own	  long-­‐term	  benefit?	  
There	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  here,	  since	  these	  issues	  can	  influence	  
state	  polices	  and	  future	  law	  making.	  Currently,	  women	  are	  able	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  
relatively	  easily,	  but,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Seven,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  
reforms	  regarding	  ancillary	  matters	  of	  financial	  support	  and	  child	  maintenance.	  If	  
the	  views	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  women	  are	  to	  be	  accepted	  at	  face	  value,	  then	  this	  will	  
lessen	  the	  impetus	  for	  further	  state	  intervention	  in	  facilitating	  the	  khulʿ.	  If	  Pakistani	  
women	  themselves	  do	  not	  think	  women	  should	  ever	  contemplate	  divorce,	  then	  it	  
becomes	  more	  difficult	  to	  galvanise	  pressure	  groups	  and	  get	  people	  to	  lobby	  
Parliament	  for	  further	  reforms.	  The	  views	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  
also	  echoed	  by	  all	  of	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  interviewed,	  male	  and	  female.	  
They	  all	  felt	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  had	  become	  an	  easy	  exit	  route	  for	  women	  to	  adopt,	  and	  
that	  women	  were	  no	  longer	  trying	  hard	  to	  sustain	  their	  marriages,	  as	  they	  had	  done	  
in	  the	  past.	  Many	  of	  the	  lawyers	  interviewed	  stated	  that	  women	  who	  opted	  for	  the	  
khulʿ	  were	  not	  fully	  equipped	  to	  live	  life	  without	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  their	  
husbands	  and	  extended	  families;	  nor	  did	  they	  realise	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  social	  
ostracism	  that	  many	  would	  face	  in	  the	  future.	  However,	  rather	  than	  explore	  the	  
need	  for	  further	  legislative	  reforms	  that	  could	  provide	  financial	  relief	  for	  women,	  all	  
of	  the	  lawyers	  were	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  repercussions	  of	  
the	  khulʿ.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  context	  and	  underlying	  
motivations	  behind	  the	  views	  presented	  above	  for	  future	  policy	  making,	  as	  well	  as	  
	  
242	  
to	  gain	  a	  better	  insight	  into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  which	  are	  discussed	  
below.	  
	  
6.3	  Adaptive	  Preferences,	  Deformed	  Desires	  and	  Autonomy	  
The	  results	  from	  this	  research	  indicate	  that	  while	  many	  women	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  
rights	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  remedy	  that	  they	  consider	  appropriate	  for	  
them	  to	  pursue.	  The	  decisions	  of	  the	  participants	  to	  remain	  within	  marriages	  which	  
are	  abusive	  or	  detrimental	  to	  their	  physical	  or	  emotional	  well-­‐being	  have	  
consequences	  for	  their	  autonomy713;	  that	  is,	  women	  should	  live	  lives	  of	  their	  own	  
choosing	  and	  have	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  autonomy-­‐enabling	  conditions714.	  Such	  
conditions	  include	  living	  their	  lives	  free	  of	  violence	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  violence,	  and	  
free	  from	  paternalistic	  and	  patriarchal	  laws,	  and	  guaranteed	  access	  to	  choices	  and	  
options.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  women	  suffering	  from	  oppression	  have	  deformed	  
desires	  in	  that	  their	  desires	  have	  been	  adapted	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  oppression	  and	  
that	  their	  decisions	  are	  consequently	  not	  made	  autonomously715.	  The	  oppression	  is	  
internalised,	  so	  that	  agents	  who	  are	  oppressed	  come	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  oppressed	  
ideology	  and	  thus	  develop	  preferences	  and	  desires	  in	  the	  light	  of	  that	  ideology.	  Ann	  
Cudd	  (2006)	  describes	  these	  deformed	  desires	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  “the	  oppressed	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  Natalie	  Stoljar,	  “Autonomy	  and	  Adaptive	  Preference	  Formation,”	  in	  Veltman	  and	  
Piper,	  eds.,	  Autonomy,	  Oppression	  and	  Gender,	  227-­‐252.	  
714	  Catriona	  MacKenzie	  and	  Natalie	  Stoljar,	  Relational	  Autonomy:	  Feminist	  
Perspectives	  on	  Autonomy,	  Agency	  and	  the	  Social	  Self	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  1999),	  13-­‐19.	  
715	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  Sex	  and	  Social	  Justice	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
1998),	  30,	  50.	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come	  to	  desire	  that	  which	  is	  oppressive	  to	  them	  [and]	  one’s	  desires	  turn	  away	  from	  
goods	  and	  even	  needs	  that,	  absent	  those	  conditions,	  they	  would	  want”716.	  Sandra	  
Lee	  Bartky	  (1990)	  describes	  deformed	  desires	  as	  “repressive	  satisfactions”	  which	  
“fasten	  us	  to	  the	  established	  order	  of	  domination,	  (to)	  the	  same	  system”717.	  This	  
domination	  then	  leads	  to	  the	  production	  of	  “false	  needs”	  and	  result	  in	  the	  “denial	  of	  
autonomy”718.	  This	  theory	  would	  explain	  why	  participants	  such	  as	  Noorah719,	  
Somia720	  and	  Misbah721	  considered	  that	  leaving	  their	  marriages	  would	  be	  a	  failure	  
on	  their	  part,	  rather	  than	  blame	  their	  abusive	  husbands	  or	  interfering	  in-­‐laws.	  They	  
did	  not	  question	  whether	  their	  husbands	  had	  a	  right	  to	  hit	  them,	  but	  accepted	  this	  
violence	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  own	  perceived	  failure	  to	  keep	  their	  children	  quiet	  or	  
cook	  a	  meal	  on	  time.	  Subordination	  to	  their	  husbands	  and	  mothers-­‐in-­‐law	  was	  
considered	  a	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘respectful’	  demeanour	  to	  adopt,	  whilst	  the	  khulʿ	  was	  
viewed	  as	  harming	  the	  extended	  family,	  rather	  than	  providing	  any	  relief	  to	  a	  wife.	  
Even	  though	  all	  three	  of	  these	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  financially	  support	  
themselves	  and	  their	  children,	  they	  were	  not	  prepared	  even	  to	  consider	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  
an	  option	  but	  considered	  a	  bad	  and	  even	  violent	  marriage	  better	  than	  no	  marriage	  
at	  all.	  Indeed,	  both	  Somia	  and	  Misbah	  defended	  their	  husbands’	  violent	  attitude,	  
blaming	  the	  financial	  strain	  of	  providing	  for	  their	  families	  as	  the	  root	  cause	  for	  their	  
violence.	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  Ann	  E.	  Cudd,	  Analysing	  Oppression	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  
181.	  
717	  Sandra	  Lee	  Bartky,	  Femininity	  and	  Domination:	  Studies	  in	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  
Oppression	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1990),	  39.	  
718	  Ibid.	  
719	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  11th	  2013.	  
720	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  




Thus,	  these	  desires	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  adaptive	  preferences,	  since	  they	  have	  been	  
formed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  unjust	  conditions	  prevalent	  in	  a	  patriarchal	  society	  where	  
men	  are	  deemed	  superior	  to	  women.	  Noorah	  stated	  that	  whilst	  she	  was	  growing	  up	  
her	  father	  was	  often	  violent	  towards	  her	  mother	  and	  herself,	  and	  that	  she	  was	  now	  
witnessing	  the	  same	  pattern	  in	  her	  marriage722.	  Noorah	  explained	  that	  men	  have	  
shorter	  tempers	  and	  less	  patience	  than	  women,	  so	  this	  was	  not	  an	  unexpected	  
event,	  nor	  was	  it	  a	  justification	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  leave	  a	  marriage723.	  Throughout	  her	  
life,	  Noorah	  had	  been	  taught	  to	  be	  subservient	  to	  male	  authority	  and	  not	  to	  question	  
male	  actions	  in	  any	  form	  or	  manner.	  Noorah	  was	  also	  very	  shy	  in	  her	  demeanour	  
and	  quite	  reticent	  whilst	  giving	  her	  views,	  indicating	  to	  me	  that	  she	  would	  accept	  
punishments	  meted	  out	  to	  her	  by	  her	  husband	  without	  complaint.	  	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Cudd’s	  (2006)	  argument,	  a	  woman’s	  desire	  not	  to	  leave	  an	  unhappy	  
marriage	  or	  to	  remain	  in	  an	  abusive	  one	  can	  be	  mistaken	  “for	  legitimate	  expressions	  
of	  individual	  differences”,	  but	  in	  reality	  these	  are	  “formed	  by	  processes	  that	  are	  
coercive:	  indoctrination,	  manipulation	  and	  adaptation	  to	  unfair	  social	  
circumstances”724.	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  many	  Pakistani	  girls	  are	  
brought	  up	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  son	  preference,	  and	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  rights	  
are	  given	  up	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  male	  members	  of	  the	  family.	  This	  results	  in	  
discrimination	  against	  girls	  in	  food	  distribution;	  lack	  of	  educational	  opportunities	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  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  11th	  2013.	  
723	  Ibid.	  
724	  Cudd,	  Analysing	  Oppression,	  183.	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for	  girls;	  an	  increased	  burden	  of	  household	  work	  on	  women	  and	  the	  young;	  violence	  
against	  wives;	  lack	  of	  inheritance	  or	  property	  rights	  for	  women;	  and	  male	  control	  
over	  women’s	  bodies	  and	  sexuality.	  When	  a	  woman	  is	  brought	  up	  in	  an	  oppressive	  
atmosphere,	  her	  autonomy	  is	  undermined,	  and	  this	  precludes	  her	  from	  making	  
decisions	  that	  can	  be	  non-­‐adaptive.	  Liberal	  feminists	  argue	  that	  personal	  autonomy	  
equates	  to	  personal	  freedom,	  i.e.	  living	  the	  life	  of	  one’s	  own	  choosing.	  However,	  in	  
order	  to	  exercise	  full	  personal	  autonomy,	  certain	  enabling	  conditions	  are	  required,	  
as	  cited	  earlier.	  Procedural	  accounts	  of	  personal	  autonomy	  avoid	  judging	  the	  
content	  of	  a	  woman’s	  choices	  but	  instead	  focus	  on	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  her	  
to	  make	  autonomous	  decisions.	  	  	  
	  
Ann	  Cudd	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  being	  free	  of	  violence	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  violence	  is	  one	  
such	  enabling	  condition,	  since	  these	  factors	  violate	  women’s	  dignity725.	  Violence	  or	  
the	  threat	  of	  violence	  will	  force	  women	  to	  make	  choices	  that	  they	  do	  not	  want,	  or	  
curtail	  their	  sphere	  of	  activity	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  harm.	  Brison	  (1997)	  argues	  
that	  violence	  takes	  away	  women’s	  self-­‐respect	  and	  dignity,	  disempowering	  women	  
and	  limiting	  their	  choices.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Afifa726,	  Bilquis727	  and	  Sultana728,	  all	  three	  
admitted	  to	  have	  suffered	  some	  form	  of	  violence	  from	  their	  husbands	  during	  their	  
marriage.	  Bilquis	  also	  said	  that	  her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  had	  slapped	  her	  several	  times	  for	  
not	  preparing	  a	  meal	  on	  time729.	  However,	  none	  of	  these	  participants	  saw	  these	  as	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  Ibid.,	  85-­‐18.	  
726	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  11th	  2013.	  
727	  Interview,	  Lahore	  July	  7th	  2013.	  
728	  Interview,	  Lahore	  July	  15th	  2013.	  
729	  Interview,	  Lahore	  July	  7th	  2013.	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out	  of	  the	  ordinary	  or	  unusual	  phenomena	  in	  marriage.	  When	  questioned	  about	  
domestic	  violence	  within	  marriage,	  Halah,	  a	  47-­‐year-­‐old	  nurse,	  just	  laughed	  and	  
stated:	  
	  
“That	  is	  so	  common	  and	  most	  men	  hit	  their	  wives	  in	  anger	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  I	  see	  many	  
women	  in	  my	  muhallah	  with	  a	  bruised	  eye	  or	  a	  split	  lip.	  That	  is	  so	  common	  and	  if	  we	  
all	  went	  to	  the	  court	  for	  a	  divorce	  just	  because	  of	  that,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  
marriages	  left	  at	  all”730.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  similar	  to	  Martha	  Nussbaum’s	  (2000)	  interpretation	  of	  why	  Vasanti,	  an	  
Indian	  woman,	  stayed	  in	  an	  abusive	  marriage.	  Vasanti	  does	  not	  consider	  herself	  as	  
having	  rights	  that	  are	  being	  violated,	  but	  has	  chosen	  a	  deformed	  preference	  to	  put	  up	  
with	  abuse	  as	  natural	  and	  part	  of	  a	  woman’s	  lot731.	  Smith	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  
freedom	  from	  patriarchal	  and	  paternalistic	  laws	  are	  also	  necessary	  enabling	  
conditions	  for	  personal	  autonomy,	  since	  these	  laws	  restrict	  women’s	  options	  on	  the	  
basis	  that	  they	  are	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  women	  themselves.	  Patriarchal	  laws	  steer	  
women	  into	  a	  socially	  preferred	  way	  of	  life,	  but	  are	  unfair	  because	  they	  restrict	  
women’s	  choices	  –	  choices	  which	  should	  be	  guided	  by	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth	  
and	  their	  own	  values	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  oppressor.	  Walby	  (1986),	  for	  
instance,	  describes	  the	  “patriarchal	  mode	  of	  production”	  in	  which	  women’s	  labour	  
in	  the	  house	  is	  appropriated	  by	  their	  husbands	  and	  the	  extended	  family	  who	  live	  
there732.	  The	  endless,	  backbreaking,	  repetitive	  household	  chores	  done	  by	  women	  
are	  not	  considered	  work,	  and	  they	  receive	  no	  remuneration	  for	  them.	  Women	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
730	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  
731	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  Women	  and	  Human	  Development	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2001),	  68-­‐69.	  
732	  Sylvia	  Walby,	  Patriarchy	  at	  Work	  (Polity	  Press,	  Cambridge	  in	  association	  with	  
Basil	  Blackwell,	  Oxford,	  1986),	  55.	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still	  considered	  dependent	  upon	  their	  husbands,	  who	  retain	  control	  over	  most	  
productive	  resources.	  The	  lack	  of	  economic	  independence	  and	  lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  
their	  contribution	  to	  the	  household	  ensures	  a	  pattern	  of	  subordination	  and	  
dependency,	  destroying	  women’s	  self-­‐respect,	  self-­‐confidence	  and	  self-­‐esteem,	  thus	  
setting	  limits	  on	  their	  aspirations	  and	  goals.	  One	  participant,	  Khadija733,	  stated	  that	  
she	  had	  been	  married	  for	  twenty	  years	  and	  helped	  her	  husband	  in	  the	  fields,	  doing	  
the	  arduous	  job	  of	  gathering	  cotton	  with	  her	  fingers	  for	  hours	  at	  a	  time734.	  However,	  
she	  received	  no	  payment	  for	  her	  duties,	  and	  neither	  did	  she	  expect	  to	  be	  paid,	  as	  she	  
felt	  that	  she	  was	  helping	  her	  husband	  with	  his	  chores.	  She	  also	  said	  that	  a	  woman	  
should	  not	  divorce,	  as	  there	  is	  more	  izzat	  (honour)	  in	  living	  in	  her	  husband’s	  home	  
than	  with	  her	  parents.	  In	  Khadija’s	  mind,	  respectability	  and	  status	  within	  society	  
were	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  her	  husband,	  and	  no	  form	  of	  detachment	  could	  be	  
contemplated	  no	  matter	  how	  difficult	  the	  marriage	  became.	  Since	  Khadija	  never	  
expected	  to	  receive	  any	  kind	  of	  remuneration	  for	  her	  labour-­‐intensive	  work	  (which	  
would	  have	  afforded	  her	  some	  form	  of	  financial	  independence),	  she	  could	  never	  
imagine	  a	  life	  other	  than	  the	  one	  she	  was	  living.	  This	  was	  not	  a	  choice	  that	  she	  had	  
ever	  contemplated,	  or	  a	  right	  she	  expected	  to	  have	  or	  should	  have,	  and	  so	  she	  
stated:	  “We	  are	  one	  family	  and	  we	  work	  hard	  together,	  and	  if	  I	  begin	  to	  ask	  my	  
husband	  for	  money,	  this	  will	  only	  create	  disputes	  within	  the	  family”735.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733	  A	  forty-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  lower	  working	  class	  background	  with	  no	  
formal	  education.	  
734	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  14th	  2013.	  
735	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  14th	  2013.	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Having	  access	  to	  options	  is	  therefore	  seen	  as	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  and	  an	  
enabling	  condition	  for	  making	  autonomous	  decisions.	  Cudd	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  
women’s	  access	  to	  options	  is	  frequently	  and	  unfairly	  curtailed	  due	  to	  economic	  
deprivation	  or	  the	  “feminisation	  of	  poverty”736.	  In	  three	  of	  the	  participants’	  
narratives	  highlighted	  above	  (Afifia,	  Bilquis	  and	  Sultana),	  none	  of	  them	  had	  ever	  
worked,	  and	  they	  were	  solely	  reliant	  upon	  their	  husbands	  for	  every	  financial	  aspect	  
of	  their	  lives.	  They	  had	  not	  received	  any	  substantial	  mahr	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  
marriage,	  and	  their	  jahez	  (dowry)	  consisted	  primarily	  of	  household	  furniture	  and	  
utensils,	  which	  had	  also	  been	  fully	  utilised	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  marriage.	  None	  
of	  them	  had	  attended	  school	  beyond	  grade	  8,	  with	  three	  of	  them	  having	  dropped	  out	  
after	  grade	  four,	  and	  their	  employment	  opportunities	  were	  severely	  curtailed	  as	  a	  
result.	  In	  such	  conditions,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  a	  woman	  could	  contemplate	  
leaving	  an	  abusive	  marriage,	  even	  where	  a	  legal	  remedy	  might	  be	  quite	  accessible,	  
given	  that	  her	  options	  for	  an	  alternate	  life	  are	  so	  limited.	  Chambers	  (2008)	  argues	  
that	  the	  ability	  to	  assess	  one’s	  own	  preferences	  and	  imagine	  an	  alternative	  life	  is	  an	  
essential	  enabling	  condition	  for	  personal	  autonomy.	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  meaningful	  
options	  that	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  making	  choices	  does	  nothing	  other	  than	  to	  affirm	  the	  
status	  quo.	  The	  absence	  of	  these	  internal	  psychological	  enabling	  conditions,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  presence	  of	  external	  conditions	  of	  violence	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  violence,	  gender	  
stereotyping,	  sexual	  discrimination,	  economic	  deprivation	  and	  cultural	  constraints,	  
can	  all	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  reducing	  reflection	  and	  possibilities	  of	  change737.	  Thus,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736	  Cudd,	  Analysing	  Oppression,	  119-­‐154.	  
737	  Clare	  Chambers,	  Sex,	  Culture,	  and	  Justice:	  The	  Limits	  of	  Choice	  (University	  Park:	  
Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  263-­‐264.	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Misbah	  remained	  in	  an	  unhappy	  marriage,	  as	  this	  is	  what	  she	  had	  been	  trained	  to	  
believe	  was	  best	  for	  her738.	  She	  considered	  it	  in	  her	  best	  interest	  to	  remain	  married	  
and	  serve	  her	  husband	  or	  children	  rather	  than	  face	  social	  censure	  and	  the	  stigma	  of	  
divorce.	  Afifa	  was	  very	  critical	  of	  women	  who	  had	  divorced,	  even	  if	  they	  had	  
suffered	  physical	  abuse.	  She	  was	  incredulous	  as	  to	  why,	  if	  she	  was	  able	  to	  cope	  and	  
had	  done	  so	  for	  so	  many	  years,	  others	  could	  not	  follow	  her	  lead	  and	  try	  as	  hard	  as	  
her739.	  Cudd	  (1988)	  argues	  that	  this	  type	  of	  conformity	  to	  patriarchal	  standards	  
perpetuates	  women’s	  oppression	  by	  reaffirming	  stereotypes	  about	  them,	  which	  
harms	  rather	  than	  benefits	  all	  women.	  	  	  
	  
6.4	  Non-­‐Adaptive	  Desires	  and	  Autonomy	  
Whilst	  this	  theoretical	  model	  helps	  to	  analyse	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  women	  such	  as	  
Kulsoom,	  Maria,	  Bilquis,	  Sultana,	  Afifa	  and	  Misbah,	  it	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  views	  of	  the	  other	  participants,	  who,	  faced	  with	  similar	  problems	  
and	  making	  similar	  choices	  about	  their	  marriages,	  were	  aware	  of	  their	  limited	  
opportunities,	  but	  who	  justified	  their	  choices	  based	  upon	  a	  rational	  assessment	  of	  
their	  situation	  and	  what	  was	  best	  for	  their	  welfare.	  In	  their	  cases,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
reconcile	  the	  theoretical	  labelling	  of	  their	  decisions	  as	  deformed	  desires	  and	  
pronounce	  their	  choices	  as	  non-­‐autonomous.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  narratives	  of	  
many	  of	  the	  participants	  exhibited	  various	  degrees	  of	  autonomy,	  and	  whilst	  they	  
might	  have	  adapted	  their	  preferences,	  they	  were	  motivated	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  did	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738	  Interview	  August	  17th	  2013.	  
739	  Interview	  July	  7th	  2013.	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not	  always	  contribute	  to	  their	  oppression.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Uma	  Narayan	  (2002)	  
acknowledges	  that	  women	  under	  patriarchy	  can	  have	  non-­‐deformed	  desires,	  and	  
believes	  that	  through	  patriarchal	  bargaining,	  women	  make	  rational	  (and	  therefore	  
autonomous)	  decisions	  in	  response	  to	  circumstances	  where	  they	  have	  limited	  
options740.	  In	  the	  narrative	  provided	  by	  Keisira741,	  she	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  a	  woman	  
should	  get	  a	  divorce.	  Although	  life	  had	  been	  difficult,	  she	  considered	  it	  positive	  that	  
she	  had	  a	  roof	  over	  her	  head	  and	  financial	  support	  to	  look	  after	  her	  children:	  
“My	  husband	  tries	  his	  best.	  Yes,	  he	  can	  be	  angry	  and	  we	  fight	  and	  he	  hits	  me.	  I	  feel	  
embarrassed	  in	  front	  of	  the	  children	  when	  I	  have	  bruises.	  This	  is	  not	  good.	  But	  he	  also	  
works	  hard	  in	  the	  factory.	  If	  I	  was	  to	  divorce,	  where	  would	  I	  go?	  Who	  would	  look	  after	  
me?	  My	  children?	  My	  parents	  are	  poor	  and	  my	  brother	  is	  also	  not	  working.	  It	  is	  better	  
for	  me	  and	  my	  children	  if	  I	  stay.	  At	  least	  we	  have	  food	  and	  water	  and	  a	  roof.	  We	  even	  
built	  an	  extra	  room	  for	  the	  children.	  It	  is	  better	  for	  me	  and	  my	  children	  and	  my	  family	  
that	  I	  stay”742.	  
	  
Keisira	  has	  rationally	  engaged	  in	  a	  process	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  She	  has	  weighed	  
up	  the	  options	  available	  to	  her,	  and	  after	  consideration,	  has	  decided	  to	  choose	  an	  
option	  that	  is	  best	  for	  her	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  analysis.	  Keisira	  was	  fully	  aware	  that	  
she	  could	  go	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ.	  She	  mentioned	  that	  a	  girl	  in	  her	  muhallah	  had	  
done	  the	  same	  and	  was	  from	  a	  poor	  family743.	  Thus	  she	  knew	  that	  going	  to	  court	  to	  
get	  a	  divorce	  was	  an	  option	  she	  could	  choose.	  Crucially,	  she	  also	  felt	  embarrassed	  
about	  having	  bruises,	  and	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  violence	  was	  not	  good	  for	  her	  or	  
her	  children.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  views	  of	  Somia	  and	  Misbah,	  mentioned	  earlier,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740	  Uma	  Narayan,	  “Minds	  of	  Their	  Own:	  Choices,	  Autonomy,	  Cultural	  Practices,	  and	  
Other	  Women,”	  in	  A	  Mind	  of	  One's	  Own:	  Feminist	  Essays	  on	  Reason	  and	  Objectivity,	  
eds.	  Louise	  M.	  Antony	  and	  Charlotte	  E.	  Witt	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  2nd	  
edition,	  2002)	  418–432.	  
741	  A	  twenty-­‐nine-­‐year-­‐old	  factory	  worker	  with	  no	  formal	  schooling.	  
742	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  9th	  2013.	  
743	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  9th	  2013.	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who	  defended	  their	  violent	  husbands’	  actions	  and	  blamed	  them	  on	  their	  own	  
perceived	  shortcomings744.	  Keisira	  also	  envisaged	  a	  different	  life	  for	  her	  daughter,	  
free	  of	  violence	  and	  abuse:	  something	  Noorah	  had	  never	  considered	  or	  anticipated.	  
Keisira	  stated:	  
“Marriages	  are	  arranged.	  But	  when	  I	  arrange	  my	  daughter’s	  marriage,	  I	  will	  make	  
sure	  her	  husband	  is	  a	  soft	  man	  and	  not	  hard	  and	  nothing	  like	  her	  father”745.	  	  	  
	  
Keisira	  also	  recognised	  the	  benefits	  of	  staying	  at	  home	  and	  tolerating	  the	  abuse.	  Her	  
husband	  provided	  her	  with	  food,	  clothing	  and	  the	  basic	  necessities	  of	  life.	  Thus	  
Keisira	  chose	  to	  stay	  in	  an	  abusive	  marriage	  and	  not	  avail	  herself	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  
through	  a	  process	  of	  patriarchal	  bargaining.	  Narayan	  (2002)	  argues	  that	  those	  who	  
bargain	  with	  patriarchy	  should	  still	  be	  considered	  autonomous.	  Although	  their	  
choices	  are	  constrained	  by	  patriarchy,	  they	  are	  still	  able	  to	  make	  authentic,	  
reasoned	  choices	  within	  these	  constraints.	  	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Saira746,	  the	  
social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  and	  being	  ostracised	  from	  the	  community	  were	  overriding	  
factors	  in	  her	  decision	  to	  remain	  in	  her	  marriage.	  Saira	  said	  she	  would	  never	  
contemplate	  applying	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  such	  circumstances:	  
	  
“It	  is	  better	  to	  have	  a	  husband	  and	  a	  roof	  over	  your	  head.	  At	  least	  it	  is	  your	  own	  home,	  
rather	  than	  being	  a	  beggar	  in	  your	  parents’	  home	  and	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  your	  sister-­‐in-­‐
law.	  	  He	  (husband)	  may	  hit	  me	  and	  I	  feel	  shame	  but	  that	  shame	  is	  in	  my	  home	  and	  not	  
in	  the	  home	  of	  another.	  	  I	  pray	  to	  Allah	  that	  my	  daughters	  have	  a	  better	  life	  than	  me.	  	  
That	  is	  why	  I	  work	  so	  I	  can	  give	  them	  education”747.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744	  Somia	  interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  9th	  2013;	  Misbah	  interview,	  Lahore	  August	  16th	  
2013.	  
745	  Second	  interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  13th	  2014.	  
746	  A	  thirty-­‐seven-­‐year-­‐old	  nurse	  with	  a	  graduate	  degree.	  
747	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  24th	  2013.	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When	  pressed	  further,	  Saira	  admitted	  that	  a	  working	  woman	  with	  money,	  an	  
independent	  life	  and	  her	  family’s	  support	  could	  and	  should	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  if	  she	  
was	  in	  an	  abusive	  marriage,	  but	  she	  felt	  that	  this	  was	  a	  dream	  and	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  
realities	  of	  Pakistani	  life748.	  For	  Rubya749,	  the	  welfare	  of	  her	  children	  was	  of	  
paramount	  importance.	  She	  knew	  of	  a	  woman	  who	  had	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ.	  Although	  
that	  woman	  had	  found	  relief	  from	  an	  unhappy	  marriage,	  Rubya	  regarded	  this	  new-­‐
found	  single	  status	  as	  unenviable.	  	  	  
“She	  is	  the	  mother	  of	  three	  young	  children	  and	  cannot	  afford	  to	  send	  them	  to	  school.	  
Her	  ex-­‐husband	  does	  not	  give	  her	  any	  money	  and	  her	  parents	  refuse	  to	  pay	  too.	  They	  
were	  not	  happy	  with	  her	  decision”750.	  
Many	  of	  the	  participants	  accepted	  that	  khulʿ	  was	  a	  readily	  accessible	  legal	  remedy	  if	  
they	  so	  chose.	  Shamma751	  related	  the	  story	  of	  her	  sister,	  who	  had	  gone	  to	  court	  and	  
obtained	  a	  khulʿ.	  She	  had	  one	  child	  –	  a	  baby	  girl	  –	  and	  was	  now	  living	  with	  her	  
parents.	  Shamma’s	  sister	  had	  not	  suffered	  an	  abusive	  marriage;	  rather,	  her	  in-­‐laws	  
had	  created	  too	  many	  problems	  for	  her	  to	  stay.	  Having	  been	  married	  for	  three	  years	  
and	  endured	  many	  disputes,	  she	  applied	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  However,	  Shamma	  did	  not	  think	  
her	  sister	  was	  now	  in	  a	  better	  position,	  and	  said	  she	  would	  never	  take	  that	  route:	  
	  
“She	  lives	  with	  my	  mother	  and	  my	  brother	  and	  sister-­‐in-­‐law.	  Although	  she	  stays	  with	  
them,	  they	  do	  not	  respect	  her	  or	  provide	  any	  help.	  She	  has	  to	  sew	  to	  support	  herself.	  My	  
bahbi	  (sister-­‐in-­‐law)	  makes	  her	  do	  all	  the	  chores	  of	  the	  house	  and	  is	  always	  taunting	  
her	  –	  putting	  her	  down	  and	  complaining.	  It	  is	  better	  to	  suffer	  in	  your	  husband’s	  house	  
rather	  than	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  your	  bhabi	  –	  at	  least	  your	  husband’s	  house	  is	  yours	  and	  you	  
belong	  there”752.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748	  Ibid.	  
749	  A	  thirty-­‐two-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  2.	  
750	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  22nd	  2013.	  
751	  A	  thirty-­‐seven-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  4.	  
752	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  7th	  2013.	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Harriet	  Barber	  (2007)	  takes	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach,	  arguing	  that	  deformed	  
desires	  merely	  arise	  due	  to	  the	  second	  best	  option	  that	  is	  available	  under	  the	  
circumstances.	  When	  the	  first	  and	  best	  option	  is	  not	  accessible,	  then	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  
choose	  the	  second	  best	  option753.	  If	  a	  woman	  accepts	  oppressive	  conditions,	  this	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  she	  prefers	  what	  she	  chooses:	  “making	  the	  best	  of	  a	  
raw	  deal	  when	  no	  other	  alternatives	  are	  available	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  preferring	  
it”754.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Saira,	  she	  does	  not	  really	  prefer	  her	  husband	  
hitting	  her	  and	  causing	  shame	  but	  that	  is	  a	  better	  option	  for	  her	  than	  the	  shame	  of	  
living	  with	  her	  parents.	  She	  may	  not	  have	  clearly	  articulated	  that	  point,	  but	  her	  
desire	  to	  achieve	  a	  ‘better	  life’	  for	  her	  daughters	  does	  imply	  that	  she	  is	  not	  
completely	  satisfied	  with	  the	  state	  of	  her	  own	  marriage	  and	  wishes	  better	  for	  her	  
children755.	  According	  to	  Baber’s	  (2007)	  theory,	  Saira	  would	  jump	  at	  a	  better	  
situation	  if	  it	  were	  accessible	  to	  her,	  and	  if	  its	  benefits	  outweighed	  the	  benefits	  of	  
remaining	  in	  her	  marriage.	  However,	  remaining	  in	  a	  marriage	  and	  tolerating	  her	  
husband’s	  abuse	  is	  a	  rational	  choice,	  albeit	  a	  second	  choice,	  because	  it	  is	  better	  than	  
the	  reality	  of	  having	  no	  abuse	  but	  being	  homeless.	  This	  is	  also	  illustrated	  through	  
the	  narrative	  of	  Mehvish756.	  She	  clearly	  agrees	  that	  women	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
divorce	  and	  go	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ.	  However,	  lack	  of	  parental	  support,	  financial	  
dependency	  and	  guardianship	  of	  children	  prevent	  women	  from	  exercising	  this	  
preferred	  choice:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753	  Harriet	  Baber,	  “Adaptive	  Preferences,”	  Social	  Theory	  &	  Practice,	  33,	  no.	  1	  (2007):	  
105–126.	  
754	  Baber,	  “Adaptive	  Preferences”,	  114.	  
755	  Second	  interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  13th	  2014.	  




“Of	  course	  a	  woman	  would	  not	  remain	  in	  a	  marriage	  if	  they	  had	  money	  and	  family	  and	  
education.	  The	  educated	  have	  it	  easier.	  They	  already	  have	  love	  marriages	  and	  so	  
divorce	  is	  no	  big	  deal	  for	  them.	  But	  what	  can	  we	  do?	  Their	  parents	  will	  help	  them.	  Ours	  
will	  not.	  We	  will	  be	  blamed	  for	  the	  breakdown	  and	  the	  children	  will	  be	  taken	  away”757.	  
	  
Here,	  just	  like	  Saira	  before	  her,	  Mehvish	  articulates	  very	  well	  that	  if	  options	  were	  
available	  and	  women	  could	  avail	  themselves	  of	  them,	  they	  would	  opt	  for	  a	  better	  
life,	  as	  Baber	  (2007)	  suggests.	  Mehvish	  pinpoints	  family,	  education	  and	  money	  as	  
pivotal	  elements	  that	  would	  enable	  a	  woman	  to	  choose	  a	  better	  life	  for	  herself.	  
Indeed,	  Mehvish	  is	  quite	  adamant	  that	  no	  woman	  would	  choose	  to	  remain	  in	  an	  
abusive	  marriage	  if	  she	  had	  the	  power	  and	  means	  to	  leave758.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  
constraints	  of	  a	  patriarchal	  system	  prevent	  those	  ideal	  choices	  from	  being	  made,	  
and	  thus	  one	  must	  settle	  for	  the	  next	  best	  option.	  During	  her	  interview,	  Mehvish	  was	  
also	  quite	  dismissive	  of	  those	  women	  who	  opt	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  However,	  she	  rationalised	  
her	  opinions	  upon	  the	  basis	  that	  divorced	  women	  were	  still	  subject	  to	  constraints	  
imposed	  onto	  them	  by	  family	  and	  the	  local	  community,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  no	  better	  
off	  than	  when	  they	  were	  married.	  	  
	  
“These	  women	  have	  jumped	  from	  one	  hell	  and	  entered	  into	  another	  hell.	  Now	  they	  
have	  to	  beg	  for	  food	  and	  shelter	  from	  their	  parents,	  who	  cannot	  afford	  to	  feed	  
themselves,	  let	  alone	  a	  divorced	  mother	  and	  her	  children”759.	  
	  
Serene	  Khader	  (2011)	  also	  criticises	  the	  treatment	  of	  adaptive	  preferences	  as	  
impairments	  to	  autonomy,	  which,	  she	  argues,	  can	  lead	  to	  coercive	  policies:	  “if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
757	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  22nd	  2013.	  
758	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  22nd	  2013.	  
759	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  22nd	  2013.	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people	  whose	  preferences	  do	  not	  manifest	  a	  value	  for	  their	  own	  independence	  are	  
not	  autonomous,	  public	  institutions	  may	  reasonably	  coerce	  those	  people	  into	  
changing	  their	  preferences”760.	  Overlooking	  the	  complexity	  of	  agents’	  motivations	  
for	  their	  choices	  can	  result	  in	  state	  policies	  that	  have	  an	  ‘ineffective	  focus’761.	  Baber	  
(2007)	  also	  finds	  it	  morally	  problematic	  to	  oversimplify	  the	  motivation	  of	  agents	  in	  
deprived	  circumstances,	  since	  denying	  a	  woman’s	  adaptive	  preference	  as	  
autonomous	  is,	  she	  argues,	  tantamount	  to	  denying	  her	  agency762.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Rabia763,	  she	  was	  happy	  that	  even	  though	  her	  husband	  had	  been	  mean	  and	  cruel	  to	  
her	  in	  the	  past,	  particularly	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  his	  mother,	  she	  had	  now	  firmly	  
established	  herself	  within	  the	  family	  home	  and	  all	  three	  of	  her	  children	  were	  now	  
attending	  a	  local	  government	  school:	  
	  
“If	  I	  had	  taken	  the	  easy	  way	  and	  got	  a	  divorce,	  what	  would	  have	  become	  of	  my	  
children?	  Who	  would	  have	  supported	  me?	  Where	  would	  I	  have	  lived?	  My	  parents	  
turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  my	  problems.	  My	  brothers	  had	  their	  own	  families	  and	  I	  did	  not	  
want	  to	  be	  a	  burden.	  Now	  I	  have	  a	  house	  and	  my	  children	  are	  at	  school.	  My	  mother-­‐in-­‐
law	  is	  aged	  and	  cannot	  do	  anything”764.	  
	  
Just	  like	  Keisira	  before	  her,	  for	  Rabia,	  a	  psychology	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  was	  
clearly	  in	  operation.	  From	  her	  narrative	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  she	  accepted	  all	  of	  her	  
marital	  problems	  with	  her	  husband	  as	  long	  as	  she	  received	  the	  benefits	  of	  his	  name,	  
shelter	  and	  financial	  help	  in	  return.	  The	  cost	  of	  an	  unhappy	  and	  even	  violent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760	  Serene	  Khader,	  Adaptive	  Preferences	  and	  Women’s	  Empowerment	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2011),	  98.	  
761	  Ibid.,	  100.	  
762	  Baber,	  “Adaptive	  Preferences”,	  114,	  126.	  
763	  A	  thirty-­‐seven-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  who	  had	  graduated	  from	  university.	  
764	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  5th	  2013.	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marriage	  was	  overridden	  by	  the	  benefits	  that	  she	  felt	  she	  attained	  through	  the	  
continuance	  of	  the	  marriage:	  benefits	  she	  would	  lose	  if	  she	  dissolved	  the	  marriage.	  
Rabia	  felt	  that	  her	  perseverance	  and	  compromise	  during	  the	  marriage	  had	  yielded	  
positive	  results	  for	  her	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  appreciate	  the	  
autonomy	  and	  agency	  of	  participants	  such	  as	  Keisira,	  Mehvish	  and	  Rabia,	  who	  have	  
made	  difficult	  decisions	  under	  very	  harsh	  social	  conditions.	  They	  have	  decided	  to	  
deny	  themselves	  legal	  remedies	  that	  could	  provide	  relief	  to	  them	  personally,	  
choosing	  to	  sacrifice	  personal	  freedoms	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  families	  or	  children.	  
Whilst	  they	  may	  appear	  to	  perpetuate	  gender	  stereotypes	  of	  female	  submission	  in	  
marriage,	  it	  is	  their	  very	  submissiveness	  that	  has	  proved	  invaluable	  in	  protecting	  
them	  and	  providing	  some	  stability	  in	  their	  lives.	  Rather	  than	  placing	  casual	  
responsibility	  of	  oppression	  inappropriately	  on	  the	  bearer,	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  
concentrate	  upon	  the	  unjust	  social	  conditions	  that	  permeate	  patriarchal	  society765.	  	  
	  
6.5	  Patriarchal	  Bargaining	  
The	  reluctance	  of	  women	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  khulʿ	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  within	  
Deniz	  Kandiyoti’s	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  patriarchal	  bargains766.	  Kandiyoti	  
(1988)	  argues	  that	  patrilocal	  and	  patrilineal	  societies	  create	  complex	  controls	  that	  
subordinate	  women	  living	  under	  classical	  patriarchy767.	  She	  defines	  classical	  
patriarchy	  as	  the	  dominant	  patrilocal	  and	  patrilineal	  systems	  where	  girls	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765	  Narayan,	  “Minds	  of	  their	  Own”,	  422.	  
766	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	  “Bargaining	  with	  Patriarchy,”	  Gender	  &	  Society	  2,	  no.	  3	  (1988):	  
274-­‐290.	  
767	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	  “Bargaining	  with	  Patriarchy”,	  278.	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married	  at	  a	  young	  age	  into	  an	  extended	  family:	  systems	  which	  in	  turn	  play	  a	  crucial	  
role	  in	  shaping	  women’s	  gender	  norms.	  Women	  deal	  with	  patriarchy	  through	  a	  
variety	  of	  strategies	  in	  order	  to	  maximise	  their	  potential	  based	  on	  their	  limited	  
resources.	  Women	  strategise	  to	  ensure	  the	  best	  financial	  security	  and	  life	  options,	  
engaging	  in	  a	  difficult	  compromise	  between	  unrestrained	  agency	  and	  the	  restraints	  
imposed	  on	  that	  agency,	  which	  occur	  “due	  to	  rules	  and	  scripts	  regulating	  gender	  
relations”768.	  She	  describes	  this	  process	  of	  compromise	  as	  patriarchal	  bargaining.	  
Some	  of	  the	  narratives	  provided	  by	  the	  participants	  highlight	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  
rules	  and	  scripts	  that	  women	  are	  expected	  to	  follow,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strategies	  they	  
employ	  to	  manage	  these	  expectations	  as	  they	  “contest,	  negotiate,	  participate	  in	  and	  
reproduce	  patriarchal	  relations”769.	  Jannah770	  stated	  that	  although	  her	  parents	  were	  
not	  happy	  at	  being	  involved	  in	  her	  marital	  affairs,	  she	  was	  still	  able	  to	  involve	  them	  
in	  negotiating	  with	  her	  in-­‐laws	  to	  provide	  a	  separate	  living	  area	  for	  her	  husband	  and	  
herself,	  albeit	  next	  door771.	  Her	  dowry	  was	  an	  important	  tool	  to	  manipulate	  the	  
family	  into	  providing	  larger	  living	  quarters	  to	  accommodate	  her	  furniture,	  and	  her	  
resistance	  to	  her	  sister-­‐in-­‐law	  by	  ‘giving	  as	  good	  as	  she	  gets’	  meant	  that	  she	  was	  
able	  to	  create	  a	  stronger	  position	  within	  the	  marital	  home.	  Jannah,	  however,	  did	  not	  
believe	  that	  a	  khulʿ	  could	  provide	  a	  useful	  solution	  to	  marital	  unhappiness772.	  
Although	  she	  had	  endured	  many	  arguments	  and	  violent	  conflicts	  with	  her	  husband	  
and	  sister-­‐in-­‐law,	  negotiation,	  manipulation	  and	  resistance	  were	  all	  strategies	  she	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768	  Ibid.	  
769	  I.	  Shankar	  and	  H.C.	  Northcott,	  “Through	  my	  Son:	  Immigrant	  Women	  Bargain	  with	  
Patriarchy,”	  Women’s	  Studies	  International	  Forum	  32,	  no.	  6	  (2009):	  425.	  
770	  A	  thirty-­‐seven-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  college.	  




had	  used	  to	  improve	  her	  marital	  status.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Fatima773	  a	  khulʿ	  was	  
not	  an	  option	  that	  could	  be	  considered.	  	  	  
	  
“My	  family	  would	  be	  devastated	  and	  I	  have	  a	  younger	  sister	  to	  think	  about.	  Any	  girl	  
who	  gets	  a	  divorce	  is	  always	  blamed.	  They	  think	  it	  is	  her	  fault	  and	  not	  the	  man’s.	  They	  
think	  she	  should	  have	  compromised	  or	  that	  (she)	  made	  some	  mistakes.	  My	  sister’s	  
chance	  of	  a	  rishta	  (marriage	  offer)	  will	  lessen.	  My	  misfortune	  will	  affect	  her	  chances	  of	  
marriage”774.	  	  	  
	  
Gerami	  and	  Lehnerer	  (2001)	  note	  that	  women	  sometimes	  accept	  patriarchal	  
arrangements	  because	  they	  expect	  long-­‐term	  benefits775.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Fatima,	  her	  
parents	  refused	  to	  help	  her	  against	  her	  violent	  husband,	  and	  instead	  advised	  her	  to	  
remain	  patient.	  Whilst	  Fatima	  was	  able	  to	  support	  herself	  financially	  through	  her	  
job	  as	  a	  college	  lecturer,	  leaving	  or	  divorcing	  her	  husband	  was	  not	  an	  option	  that	  
she	  could	  contemplate.	  “The	  shame	  would	  be	  too	  much	  and	  I	  have	  younger	  sisters	  to	  
think	  about”.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  exercise	  her	  right	  to	  the	  legal	  remedy	  of	  khulʿ,	  Fatima	  
preferred	  the	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  of	  respectability	  that	  her	  marriage	  offered	  rather	  
than	  the	  dishonour	  that	  a	  divorce	  would	  bring.	  Instead,	  Fatima	  stated:	  	  
	  
“I	  just	  keep	  quiet.	  I	  try	  not	  to	  go	  in	  front	  of	  my	  husband	  when	  he	  is	  in	  a	  bad	  mood.	  I	  put	  
the	  children	  to	  bed	  early	  so	  he	  does	  not	  see	  them	  cry	  or	  fight	  and	  I	  serve	  his	  food	  on	  
time”776.	  	  	  
	  
The	  strategy	  of	  keeping	  quiet	  and	  trying	  to	  be	  inconspicuous	  so	  that	  their	  husbands	  
would	  not	  become	  frustrated	  with	  them	  was	  used	  by	  seventy-­‐seven	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
773	  A	  forty-­‐five-­‐year-­‐old	  college	  lecturer	  with	  a	  Master’s	  degree.	  
774	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  
775	  Shahin	  Gerami	  and	  Melodye	  Lehnerer,	  “Women’s	  Agency	  and	  Household	  
Diplomacy:	  Negotiating	  Fundamentalism,”	  Gender	  and	  Society	  15	  (2001):	  556-­‐573.	  
776	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	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participants.	  Moona777,	  Naheed778,	  Alia779	  and	  Shazia780	  all	  described	  their	  efforts	  to	  
keep	  the	  peace	  between	  themselves	  and	  their	  husbands.	  They	  made	  repeated	  use	  of	  
the	  words	  sabr	  (patience)	  and	  hikmah	  (wisdom).	  “I	  try	  not	  to	  answer	  back	  to	  him	  or	  
commit	  batameezi	  (insubordination)”,	  “I	  just	  keep	  quiet	  and	  leave	  the	  room”,	  “I	  
make	  sure	  his	  food	  is	  cooked	  on	  time”	  were	  all	  strategies	  employed	  by	  participants	  
to	  ensure	  a	  smooth	  marital	  existence.	  In	  exchange	  for	  this	  tolerance,	  twenty-­‐five	  of	  
the	  participants	  said	  that	  these	  strategies	  worked.	  Moona	  stated	  that	  her	  arguments	  
with	  her	  husband	  had	  lessened	  over	  the	  years	  and	  they	  now	  “understood	  each	  
other”781.	  She	  explained	  that	  as	  she	  had	  compromised	  with	  her	  husband	  by	  always	  
trying	  to	  obey	  his	  orders,	  in	  return,	  after	  many	  years	  of	  marriage,	  he	  now	  even	  
defended	  her	  against	  her	  “interfering	  mother-­‐in-­‐law”	  and	  had	  realised	  that	  she	  
(Moona)	  was	  not	  cunning	  like	  other	  girls782.	  Alia	  said	  that	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  her	  
marriage	  were	  the	  worst,	  when	  her	  husband	  would	  insult	  her	  and	  become	  angry	  
with	  her	  over	  trivial	  matters	  pertaining	  to	  household	  chores783.	  Alia	  rationalised	  this	  
behaviour	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  husband’s	  difficult	  job	  and	  the	  long	  hours	  he	  
experienced	  in	  his	  factory.	  Alia	  also	  worked	  as	  a	  maid,	  and	  so	  was	  unable	  to	  spend	  
many	  hours	  at	  home	  to	  cook	  and	  clean.	  However,	  she	  had	  trained	  her	  three	  children	  
to	  complete	  these	  chores,	  which	  not	  only	  relieved	  her	  burden	  at	  home	  but	  also	  
provided	  relief	  in	  her	  marriage.	  Alia	  further	  explained	  that	  she	  had	  achieved	  success	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
777	  A	  thirty-­‐three-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  college.	  
778	  A	  forty-­‐four-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  2.	  
779	  A	  thirty-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  2.	  
780	  A	  twenty-­‐four-­‐year-­‐old	  factory	  worker	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  2.	  
781	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  
782	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	  
783	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  2nd	  2013.	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in	  her	  marriage,	  since	  her	  husband	  was	  not	  so	  disagreeable	  and	  appreciated	  that	  she	  
kept	  the	  house	  clean	  and	  was	  a	  sughr784	  woman.	  	  	  
	  
Kandiyoti	  (1988)	  also	  argues	  that	  many	  women	  in	  classical	  patriarchy	  insist	  that	  
men	  should	  fulfil	  the	  role	  of	  provider	  and	  emphasise	  their	  husbands’	  obligation	  to	  
live	  up	  to	  those	  responsibilities785.	  Women	  often	  prefer	  to	  secure	  the	  economic	  
security	  provided	  by	  their	  husbands	  in	  exchange	  for	  submissiveness	  and	  propriety.	  
Rabia	  expressed	  deep	  dissatisfaction	  regarding	  her	  husband’s	  economic	  
underachievement,	  which	  led	  to	  arguments,	  fights	  and	  physical	  violence	  towards	  
her786.	  Nevertheless,	  she	  said,	  “I	  just	  kept	  patient	  and	  tried	  to	  have	  sabr”787.	  Rabia	  
remained	  in	  the	  marriage	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  her	  husband’s	  economic	  position	  would	  
improve	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  her	  case,	  it	  did,	  and	  thus	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Rabia	  her	  
patriarchal	  bargain	  had	  also	  been	  successful.	  Rabia’s	  short-­‐term	  tolerance	  of	  her	  
husband’s	  violence	  enabled	  her	  to	  have	  the	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  of	  a	  steady	  income,	  
children	  and	  a	  roof	  over	  her	  head.	  Rabia	  was	  also	  very	  much	  aware	  that	  she	  had	  
paid	  a	  high	  price	  for	  her	  current	  position.	  She	  acknowledged	  that	  she	  could	  have	  left	  
her	  husband	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  her	  marriage	  and	  found	  work	  as	  a	  teacher	  after	  
having	  graduated	  from	  university.	  However,	  such	  a	  life	  did	  not	  appeal	  to	  her	  and	  she	  
was	  adamant	  that	  it	  was	  her	  husband’s	  duty	  to	  support	  her	  in	  return	  for	  her	  looking	  
after	  the	  marital	  home	  and	  their	  children.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
784	  Sughr	  describes	  a	  woman	  who	  runs	  her	  house	  very	  efficiently,	  keeps	  it	  neat	  and	  
tidy	  and	  is	  extremely	  house-­‐proud.	  
785	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	  “Bargaining	  with	  Patriarchy”,	  282-­‐283.	  





Fifty-­‐two	  of	  the	  seventy-­‐seven	  participants	  who	  had	  used	  these	  strategies,	  however,	  
said	  that	  their	  initial	  obedience	  and	  patience	  had	  not	  made	  much	  difference	  in	  their	  
marital	  relationship.	  Instead,	  the	  arguments	  had	  grown	  and	  become	  worse	  over	  the	  
years.	  In	  response,	  the	  participants	  used	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  strategies	  to	  resist	  their	  
husbands	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  their	  marriages	  rather	  than	  resort	  to	  a	  khulʿ.	  All	  
fifty-­‐two	  participants	  said	  they	  “answered	  back”	  or	  “talked	  back”	  to	  their	  husbands.	  
Phrases	  such	  as	  “when	  he	  argues	  I	  scream	  as	  hard	  back	  to	  him”,	  “I	  answer	  back	  to	  
him”,	  “I	  also	  fight	  with	  him”	  and	  “we	  shout	  at	  each	  other”	  were	  illustrative	  of	  the	  
strategies	  employed	  by	  these	  participants.	  Saira	  stated,	  “My	  husband	  knows	  that	  if	  he	  
shouts	  at	  me	  I	  will	  shout	  back	  and	  he	  is	  afraid	  the	  neighbours	  will	  hear	  him”788.	  Keisira	  
made	  similar	  comments:	  “all	  our	  houses	  are	  joined,	  so	  when	  we	  fight,	  the	  whole	  
muhallah	  can	  hear	  us.	  So	  my	  husband	  stops”789.	  Raazia	  explained	  that	  she	  used	  a	  
similar	  strategy	  and	  stated	  that	  her	  husband	  hated	  her	  screaming	  back	  at	  him.	  
During	  the	  interview,	  Raazia	  related	  a	  common	  idiom	  and	  said	  that	  although	  it	  was	  a	  
joke,	  it	  was	  based	  on	  reality:	  	  
	  
“In	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  marriage	  the	  husband	  shouts	  and	  the	  wife	  listens.	  In	  the	  second	  
year	  of	  the	  marriage	  the	  wife	  shouts	  and	  the	  husband	  listens,	  and	  in	  the	  third	  year	  of	  
the	  marriage,	  they	  both	  shout	  and	  the	  muhalla	  listens”790.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  very	  neighbourhood	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  major	  deterrent	  
to	  divorce	  for	  many	  women	  also	  provides	  a	  buffer	  for	  some	  wives	  against	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  24th	  2013.	  
789	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  July	  9th	  2013.	  
790	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  August	  15th	  2013.	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husbands’	  power.	  Social	  norms	  in	  Pakistan	  dictate	  that	  a	  wife	  must	  be	  obedient	  and	  
passive	  towards	  her	  husband,	  being	  the	  “self-­‐sacrificing	  wife,	  daughter-­‐in-­‐law	  and	  
mother”791.	  A	  woman’s	  failure	  to	  encompass	  these	  roles	  is	  also	  a	  reflection	  upon	  her	  
husband,	  who	  is	  viewed	  as	  not	  being	  able	  to	  ‘keep	  his	  wife	  in	  check’.	  From	  the	  
participants’	  responses,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  patriarchal	  community	  norms	  also	  
serve	  as	  a	  pressure	  on	  husbands	  to	  stop	  marital	  bickering	  and	  fights	  because	  of	  the	  
fear	  that	  they	  may	  be	  accused	  of	  being	  weak	  and	  ‘unmanly’.	  The	  participants	  
courageously	  exploited	  the	  social	  norms	  of	  the	  ‘submissive	  wife’	  to	  their	  own	  
advantage.	  By	  publically	  resisting	  their	  husbands	  and	  thus	  running	  the	  risk	  of	  
alienating	  themselves	  from	  the	  local	  community,	  as	  well	  as	  tarnishing	  their	  
reputations,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  force	  their	  husbands	  to	  acquiesce	  to	  some	  of	  their	  
demands.	  Saira	  and	  Raazia	  both	  stated	  that	  their	  husbands	  were	  always	  fearful	  of	  




The	  results	  of	  the	  field	  work	  suggest	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  married	  
women	  interviewed	  were	  quite	  aware	  of	  their	  right	  to	  attend	  court	  and	  obtain	  
dissolution	  of	  marriage.	  However,	  rather	  than	  engage	  in	  the	  formal	  process	  of	  state	  
law,	  women	  prefer	  to	  solve	  their	  disputes	  through	  informal	  mechanisms,	  which	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  Margaret	  Abrahams,	  Speaking	  the	  Unspeakable:	  Marital	  Violence	  Among	  South	  





often	  means	  that	  they	  will	  remain	  in	  unhappy	  and	  even	  abusive	  relationships.	  This	  
is	  partly	  a	  response	  to	  their	  precarious	  socioeconomic	  position,	  the	  lack	  of	  social	  
support	  structures	  and	  the	  social	  stigma	  that	  divorce	  entails.	  Kandiyoti	  (1988)	  
argues	  that	  even	  though	  classical	  patriarchy	  puts	  heavy	  obstacles	  in	  women’s	  way,	  
which	  far	  outweigh	  actual	  economic	  and	  emotional	  security,	  women	  still	  resist	  
change,	  as	  any	  new	  transition	  in	  the	  social	  order	  still	  fails	  to	  provide	  any	  
empowering	  alternatives792.	  This	  is	  also	  evident	  from	  the	  views	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	  participants.	  The	  new	  laws	  regarding	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  are	  a	  clear	  challenge	  to	  
the	  traditional	  social	  order	  of	  Pakistani	  patriarchal	  society	  by	  circumventing	  male	  
power	  in	  the	  marriage.	  The	  khulʿ	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  provide	  relief	  to	  women	  by	  
enabling	  them	  to	  escape	  from	  an	  unhappy,	  abusive	  and	  violent	  marriage.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  whilst	  a	  woman	  may	  find	  marital	  emancipation	  from	  her	  abusive	  husband,	  
it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  views	  of	  the	  informants	  that	  this	  benefit	  is	  still	  not	  enough	  of	  an	  
alternative	  to	  persuade	  them	  to	  consider	  this	  route.	  Molyneux	  (1985)	  argues	  that	  
this	  is	  not	  out	  of	  some	  “false	  consciousness”	  exhibited	  by	  women,	  although	  this	  
might	  be	  one	  factor;	  rather,	  it	  is	  that	  changes	  that	  are	  implemented	  in	  piecemeal	  
fashion	  can	  threaten	  the	  short-­‐term	  interests	  of	  some	  women793.	  Thus,	  whilst	  the	  
legal	  remedy	  of	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  has	  become	  substantially	  easier	  through	  the	  
intervention	  of	  the	  courts,	  and	  later	  through	  a	  Presidential	  Ordinance,	  subsidiary	  
matters	  relating	  to	  maintenance	  and	  child	  support	  have	  not	  been	  improved,	  nor	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	  “Bargaining	  with	  Patriarchy”,	  282.	  
793	  M.	  Molyneux,	  “Mobilization	  Without	  Emancipation?	  Women’s	  Interests,	  the	  State	  




the	  actual	  experience	  of	  attending	  court,	  which	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  the	  following	  
chapter.	  Those	  participants	  who	  were	  aware	  that	  they	  could	  go	  to	  court	  and	  obtain	  a	  
khulʿ,	  and	  who	  also	  knew	  that	  it	  was	  relatively	  quick	  and	  inexpensive,	  still	  did	  not	  
feel	  that	  this	  was	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  any	  woman	  to	  take.	  Financial	  considerations,	  
lack	  of	  parental	  support	  and	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  were	  too	  onerous	  
deterrents	  to	  contemplate	  such	  a	  legal	  separation.	  Instead,	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  
considered	  that	  it	  was	  their	  husbands’	  duty	  to	  feed	  and	  clothe	  them	  and	  provide	  a	  
roof	  over	  their	  heads.	  If	  there	  were	  no	  alternative	  arrangements	  provided	  by	  the	  
state	  or	  their	  families,	  then	  obtaining	  a	  divorce	  would	  not	  solve	  their	  problems.	  	  
	  
The	  narratives	  of	  the	  women	  also	  illustrate	  that	  the	  participants	  cannot	  be	  
considered	  a	  homogenous	  group	  with	  uniform	  views	  according	  to	  their	  social	  status.	  
Instead,	  their	  lived	  realities	  are	  far	  more	  heterogeneous,	  exhibiting	  various	  impulses	  
behind	  their	  opinions	  and	  life	  choices.	  Mohanty	  (1986)	  has	  argued	  that	  multiple	  
factors	  must	  be	  considered,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  such	  factors	  affect	  women	  in	  complex	  
ways.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  of	  the	  participants	  of	  this	  research.	  Whilst	  some	  of	  
their	  views,	  particularly	  the	  censure	  towards	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce,	  can	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  adaptive	  desires	  that	  perpetuate	  the	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  society,	  
the	  narratives	  presented	  by	  other	  participants	  illustrate	  that	  the	  motivations	  behind	  
such	  decisions	  are	  far	  more	  complex.	  Rather,	  the	  women	  are	  engaged	  in	  an	  
unceasing	  balancing	  act	  between	  the	  gains	  and	  losses	  that	  they	  would	  incur	  within	  
the	  context	  of	  their	  lived	  realities.	  They	  are	  not	  merely	  passive	  victims	  of	  oppressive	  
patriarchal	  social	  structures,	  but	  make	  continuous	  efforts	  to	  improve	  their	  lives	  that	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will	  enable	  them	  to	  achieve	  the	  best	  possible	  outcome	  for	  them	  in	  the	  circumstances	  
that	  they	  have	  been	  given.	  Moreover,	  they	  take	  pride	  in	  having	  gone	  through	  tough	  
times	  while	  still	  providing	  homes	  for	  their	  children	  and	  giving	  them	  educational	  




KHULʿ	  IN	  PRACTICE:	  IMPLEMENTATION	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This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  that	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  
District	  Courts	  of	  Lahore	  over	  a	  period	  of	  several	  months	  (March,	  April	  2014	  and	  
July,	  August	  2015).	  A	  total	  of	  31	  women	  were	  interviewed,	  who	  were	  either	  going	  
through	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  courts	  or	  who	  had	  already	  obtained	  
one	  and	  were	  involved	  in	  obtaining	  post-­‐divorce	  claims	  of	  maintenance,	  child	  
support	  and	  restitution	  of	  their	  dowries.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  
legal	  procedure	  for	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ,	  followed	  by	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  
many	  of	  the	  participants	  faced	  during	  their	  court	  proceedings.	  Thereafter,	  the	  
primary	  reasons	  for	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  are	  investigated	  and	  the	  salient	  features	  of	  the	  
litigants	  are	  discussed	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  why	  some	  women	  and	  not	  others	  pursue	  
the	  legal	  remedy	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  khulʿ	  
and	  women’s	  agency	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  to	  what	  extent	  women	  who	  pursue	  the	  khulʿ	  
truly	  resist	  patriarchal	  structures	  in	  their	  society	  and	  to	  examine	  the	  emotional	  and	  
physical	  costs	  of	  attempting	  to	  do	  so.	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7.2	  The	  Legal	  Procedure	  to	  Obtain	  a	  Khulʿ	  
The	  legal	  procedure	  of	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  governed	  primarily	  by	  the	  Family	  Courts	  
Act	  1964,	  which	  lays	  out	  the	  technical	  procedures	  to	  follow794.	  Once	  a	  khulʿ	  plaint	  is	  
drafted795	  and	  submitted,	  the	  court	  must	  set	  a	  date	  for	  the	  first	  hearing	  within	  thirty	  
days,	  requiring	  the	  defendant’s	  husband	  to	  appear796.	  If	  the	  husband	  fails	  to	  arrive,	  
the	  court	  has	  discretion	  to	  hear	  the	  case	  ex	  parte,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  proven	  that	  the	  
defendant’s	  husband	  has	  been	  properly	  served	  notice	  of	  the	  plaint797.	  If	  a	  husband	  
does	  arrive	  during	  one	  of	  the	  court	  hearings,	  then	  the	  court	  will	  ascertain	  the	  exact	  
nature	  of	  the	  dispute	  and	  shall	  “attempt	  to	  affect	  a	  compromise	  or	  reconciliation	  
between	  the	  parties,	  if	  possible”798.	  If	  the	  reconciliation	  fails,	  then	  the	  court	  “shall	  
immediately	  pass	  a	  decree	  of	  dissolution	  of	  marriage”799.	  This	  is	  important,	  as	  a	  wife	  
need	  not	  prove	  any	  of	  her	  reasons	  for	  wanting	  a	  khulʿ.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  court	  may	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794	  See	  S.	  7	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964.	  	  Some	  procedural	  amendments	  were	  recently	  
made	  by	  the	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015)	  detailed	  below.	  	  	  
795	  S.	  8	  Muslim	  Family	  Law	  Ordinance	  Act	  1961	  (MFLO)	  allows	  a	  wife	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  
court	  to	  “dissolve	  the	  marriage	  otherwise	  than	  by	  a	  talāq”	  and	  is	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  
the	  submission	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  plaint.	  
796	  S.	  8	  (a)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  Prior	  to	  this	  latest	  
amendment,	  the	  courts	  were	  required	  to	  set	  a	  date	  within	  15	  days	  of	  the	  submission	  
of	  the	  plaint.	  However,	  the	  failure	  of	  most	  husbands	  to	  appear	  so	  quickly	  and	  the	  
resultant	  cost	  to	  the	  wife	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  first	  hearing	  date	  being	  set	  after	  thirty	  
days.	  
797	  S.	  9	  (5)	  (a)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  	  
798	  S.	  10	  (3)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  	  
799	  S.	  10	  (5)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  When	  the	  wife	  is	  
granted	  a	  khulʿ,	  the	  court	  must	  issue	  a	  certified	  copy	  of	  the	  decree	  of	  dissolution	  to	  
the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Arbitration	  Council	  within	  three	  days	  from	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  
khulʿ.	  	  The	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Arbitration	  Council	  is	  then	  required	  to	  act	  as	  if	  he	  had	  
received	  a	  notice	  of	  ṭalāq	  and	  apply	  the	  rules	  under	  the	  MFLO	  1961.	  Under	  S.	  7(4)	  
MFLO,	  the	  Chairman	  is	  required	  to	  constitute	  an	  ‘Arbitration	  Council’	  to	  affect	  a	  
reconciliation	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  within	  thirty	  days	  of	  the	  receipt	  of	  the	  notice.	  	  
However,	  if	  the	  parties	  fail	  to	  reconcile,	  the	  khulʿ	  will	  then	  be	  valid	  ninety	  days	  from	  
the	  day	  on	  which	  the	  notice	  was	  received	  by	  the	  Chairman	  (S.	  7	  (3)	  MFLO	  1961).	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direct	  the	  wife	  to	  surrender	  her	  claim	  to	  up	  to	  50%	  of	  any	  deferred	  mahr	  or	  up	  to	  
25%	  of	  her	  admitted	  prompt	  mahr	  to	  her	  husband800.	  If	  the	  plaintiff	  wife	  has	  also	  
issued	  a	  suit	  for	  maintenance,	  the	  court	  has	  powers	  to	  issue	  an	  interim	  order	  for	  
maintenance,	  and	  failure	  of	  the	  defendant	  husband	  to	  comply	  will	  mean	  that	  his	  
defence	  will	  be	  struck	  off	  and	  the	  maintenance	  suit	  will	  be	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
wife801.	  	  
	  
In	  2002,	  a	  Presidential	  Ordinance	  was	  passed	  requiring	  family	  law	  cases,	  
particularly	  khulʿ	  cases,	  to	  be	  resolved	  within	  six	  months	  of	  the	  plaint	  being	  issued.	  
This	  was	  recently	  amended,	  in	  February	  2015,	  to	  require	  courts	  to	  decide	  marriage	  
dissolution	  cases	  within	  four	  months	  of	  the	  plaint	  being	  issued802.	  This	  series	  of	  
amendments	  to	  the	  Family	  Court	  Act	  1964	  has	  significantly	  speeded	  up	  the	  process	  
compared	  to	  previous	  years.	  The	  new	  amendments	  now	  also	  require	  a	  khulʿ	  plaint	  
to	  contain	  all	  claims	  relating	  to	  the	  return	  of	  the	  dowry	  and	  mahr,	  as	  well	  as	  
maintenance	  and	  child	  custody	  claims,	  to	  be	  submitted	  in	  one	  summons,	  to	  reduce	  
further	  delays803.	  Whilst	  the	  legal	  procedure	  is	  quite	  straightforward	  and	  the	  costs	  
appear	  to	  be	  quite	  small804,	  in	  reality	  things	  do	  not	  always	  run	  as	  smoothly.	  From	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800	  S.	  10	  (5)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  Prior	  to	  February	  
2015,	  the	  courts	  were	  required	  to	  order	  the	  wife	  to	  give	  surrender	  all	  of	  the	  mahr	  in	  
full.	  
801	  S.	  17	  (a)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  	  
802	  S.	  12	  (A)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  	  
803	  S.	  7	  (2)	  The	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Ordinance	  2002	  
(LV	  of	  2002).	  
804	  From	  discussions	  with	  divorce	  lawyers	  regarding	  legal	  expenses,	  obtaining	  a	  
khulʿ	  is	  relatively	  inexpensive	  compared	  to	  other	  court	  procedures.	  	  The	  expenses	  of	  
the	  suit	  are	  normally	  in	  the	  range	  of	  1000	  rupees	  (approximately	  six	  pounds).	  	  A	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my	  observations	  of	  the	  District	  Courthouse	  of	  Lahore	  and	  interviews	  with	  female	  
litigants,	  it	  is	  in	  very	  rare	  cases	  that	  a	  wife	  will	  receive	  her	  khulʿ	  within	  four	  months	  
of	  the	  original	  suit	  (as	  the	  law	  dictates):	  instead,	  it	  takes	  between	  six	  months	  and	  
one	  year	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  be	  granted.	  Moreover,	  costs	  and	  times	  escalate	  because	  of	  
maintenance	  disputes	  and	  dowry	  claims,	  meaning	  that	  cases	  take	  much	  longer	  to	  be	  
resolved.	  The	  section	  below	  therefore	  outlines	  the	  problems	  encountered	  by	  female	  
litigants	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  their	  khulʿ	  claims.	  
	  
7.3	  Khulʿ	  and	  Notification	  Problems	  
In	  khulʿ	  proceedings,	  all	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  case	  are	  borne	  by	  the	  wife805.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  
husband	  who	  attends	  court	  on	  the	  first	  date	  and	  does	  not	  contest	  the	  divorce,	  the	  
khulʿ	  should	  be	  granted	  immediately	  without	  lengthy	  court	  proceedings,	  reducing	  
the	  costs.	  However,	  this	  rarely	  happens:	  twenty-­‐nine	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  
their	  husbands	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  first	  hearing.	  Although	  a	  judge	  can	  pass	  an	  ex	  
parte	  decision	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  wife,	  she	  must	  prove	  that	  her	  husband	  was	  notified	  of	  
the	  proceedings.	  Ali	  Shah806,	  a	  family	  court	  lawyer,	  stated	  that	  this	  is	  quite	  
problematic	  in	  a	  country	  where	  there	  is	  an	  inefficient	  civil	  infrastructure	  and	  weak	  
institutions.	  If	  a	  notice	  has	  been	  sent	  by	  registered	  post,	  any	  member	  of	  a	  family	  can	  
sign	  for	  it,	  and	  thus	  a	  husband	  can	  deny	  being	  served	  if	  he	  did	  not	  sign	  the	  form.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
further	  600-­‐1000	  rupees	  are	  added	  if	  a	  newspaper	  advertisement	  is	  placed	  and	  the	  
minimum	  fee	  of	  a	  cheap	  lawyer	  is	  about	  2000	  rupees.	  	  	  
805	  S.	  8	  (5)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	  	  	  
806	  All	  names	  of	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  pseudonyms	  in	  order	  to	  
protect	  their	  identity	  at	  their	  own	  request.	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Moreover,	  even	  if	  the	  postal	  service	  gets	  a	  receipt,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  
that	  the	  same	  receipt	  will	  be	  found	  in	  the	  court	  files.	  District	  courts	  have	  a	  massive	  
backlog	  of	  cases,	  and	  district	  court	  judges	  have	  the	  jurisdiction	  to	  oversee	  criminal	  
and	  civil	  as	  well	  as	  family	  law	  cases,	  and	  thus	  handle	  a	  multitude	  of	  cases	  at	  any	  one	  
time807.	  Judge	  Shamsuddin	  Iqbal	  stated	  that	  they	  endure	  a	  severe	  lack	  of	  resources.	  
Overworked	  court	  clerks	  deal	  with	  all	  administrative	  matters,	  including	  filing	  and	  
keeping	  documents	  up	  to	  date,	  which	  means	  that	  many	  papers	  and	  receipts	  are	  
simply	  not	  found	  on	  file808.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  Abbas	  stated	  that	  court	  files	  are	  not	  
maintained	  in	  a	  systematic	  way,	  so	  it	  is	  rare	  to	  locate	  proof	  of	  notice	  of	  the	  summons	  
even	  where	  a	  summons	  was	  served809.	  Consequently,	  Judge	  Ummayr	  stated	  that	  he	  
always	  gives	  a	  husband	  at	  least	  three	  chances	  to	  turn	  up	  to	  court	  before	  giving	  an	  ex	  
parte	  decision,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  case	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  an	  appeal	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  
Unless	  there	  is	  concrete	  evidence	  that	  the	  husband	  has	  been	  notified,	  this	  occurs	  in	  
the	  majority	  of	  cases.	  If	  on	  the	  third	  occasion	  the	  husband	  still	  fails	  to	  attend,	  the	  
judge	  will	  then	  order	  an	  advertisement	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  a	  local	  newspaper	  at	  the	  
wife’s	  expense.	  Whilst	  the	  law	  states	  that	  this	  must	  be	  done	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  
original	  issuance	  of	  the	  plaint,	  the	  wife	  is	  usually	  reluctant	  to	  incur	  this	  expense	  so	  
early	  on	  in	  the	  proceedings,	  hoping	  that	  her	  husband	  will	  turn	  up	  to	  court	  on	  the	  
required	  date.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807	  Interview,	  Lahore,	  April	  12th	  2014.	  
808	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  4th	  2014.	  
809	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  4th	  2014.	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In	  an	  ex	  parte	  khulʿ	  case,	  the	  judge	  also	  has	  the	  right	  to	  find	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  
wife’s	  claim	  to	  maintenance	  for	  herself	  and	  her	  children,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  restitution	  of	  
the	  dowry	  and	  waiver	  of	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr.	  However,	  through	  discussions	  with	  
law	  professionals	  and	  female	  litigants,	  I	  discovered	  that	  this	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  happen.	  
Four	  judges	  stated	  that	  rather	  than	  pass	  these	  judgements	  ex	  parte	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
wife,	  as	  the	  law	  requires,	  they	  invariably	  wait	  longer	  before	  making	  a	  ruling	  on	  
matters	  ancillary	  to	  the	  khulʿ.	  Judge	  Ammar	  Arshad,	  for	  example,	  stated	  that	  in	  his	  
experience,	  a	  husband	  will	  not	  turn	  up	  to	  court	  for	  the	  khulʿ	  hearings,	  but	  will	  
inevitably	  challenge	  any	  claim	  to	  dowry	  or	  maintenance	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  In	  order	  to	  
avoid	  having	  his	  judgement	  challenged	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  he	  felt	  it	  more	  expedient	  to	  
wait	  a	  few	  months	  longer	  and	  serve	  more	  notices	  before	  dealing	  with	  ancillary	  
matters810.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  apply	  the	  law	  strictly	  and	  find	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  wife,	  the	  
common	  practice	  is	  to	  allow	  the	  husband	  extra	  time	  to	  challenge	  the	  wife’s	  claim.	  
Although	  this	  judicial	  policy	  is	  clearly	  detrimental	  to	  the	  wife,	  resulting	  in	  increased	  
costs	  and	  court	  delays,	  all	  four	  judges	  defended	  their	  position	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  in	  
property	  matters	  the	  husband	  must	  be	  given	  a	  chance	  to	  provide	  his	  side	  of	  the	  
story.	  Judge	  Bilal	  Butt	  was	  of	  the	  view	  that	  many	  dowry	  claims	  were	  obviously	  
inflated,	  and	  ridiculous	  amounts	  of	  child	  support	  demanded,	  and	  thus	  that	  it	  was	  not	  
just	  to	  grant	  such	  requests811.	  However,	  the	  law	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
the	  husband,	  the	  judge	  must	  deal	  with	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  ancillary	  matters	  ex	  parte,	  even	  
if	  the	  husband	  fails	  to	  attend	  court.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  also	  defended	  his	  decision	  to	  wait	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  11th	  2014.	  
811	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  18th	  2014.	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for	  a	  husband	  to	  attend	  court	  before	  passing	  judgement	  on	  dowry	  and	  maintenance	  
claims	  for	  the	  following	  reasons:	  
	  
“If	  we	  can	  get	  a	  husband	  to	  court,	  then	  he	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  order.	  We	  
can	  threaten	  him	  with	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  and	  try	  to	  gain	  something	  out	  of	  him.	  If	  I	  
make	  an	  order	  ex	  parte	  and	  the	  husband	  has	  never	  come	  to	  court,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
finding	  him	  and	  getting	  him	  to	  return	  the	  dowry	  or	  maintenance	  is	  much	  slimmer”812.	  
	  
However,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  the	  issuance	  of	  arrest	  warrants	  and	  threats	  to	  
imprison	  the	  husband	  do	  not	  materialise	  in	  reality.	  The	  family	  court	  judges	  were	  
quite	  happy	  to	  pass	  khulʿ	  judgements	  to	  facilitate	  wives,	  but	  were	  less	  enthusiastic	  
in	  their	  judicial	  handling	  of	  ancillary	  matters	  of	  maintenance	  and	  dowries.	  
	  
7.4	  Khulʿ	  and	  Maintenance	  
Post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  in	  Pakistan	  has	  very	  little	  statutory	  protection.	  S.	  9	  of	  the	  
MFLO	  1961	  allows	  a	  woman	  to	  apply	  for	  maintenance	  during	  marriage,	  and	  courts	  
have	  widened	  its	  scope	  to	  allow	  claims	  for	  any	  outstanding	  arrears	  due	  during	  
divorce	  proceedings.	  To	  date,	  courts	  have	  interpreted	  this	  legal	  provision	  as	  only	  
applying	  to	  maintenance	  during	  the	  wife’s	  iddah	  (mourning)	  period,	  or	  arrears	  of	  
payment	  during	  marriage	  if	  a	  husband	  failed	  to	  maintain	  his	  wife,	  and	  nothing	  
beyond	  that.	  Successive	  cases	  have	  outlined	  judicial	  policy	  on	  the	  matter,	  clearly	  
stating	  that	  “maintenance	  beyond	  the	  period	  of	  iddah	  is	  illegal	  and	  without	  lawful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  4th	  2014.	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authority”813.	  Although	  the	  MFLO	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  maintenance,	  judicial	  
jurisprudence	  has	  been	  very	  conservative	  in	  the	  matter	  and	  has	  failed	  to	  provide	  
post-­‐divorce	  financial	  relief	  to	  wives,	  even	  when	  they	  have	  been	  parties	  to	  the	  
marriage	  for	  several	  years.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  children,	  there	  are	  also	  no	  
explicit	  legal	  provisions	  under	  Pakistani	  family	  law	  requiring	  fathers	  to	  provide	  
child	  support	  maintenance	  payments	  in	  divorce	  cases.	  Instead,	  the	  courts	  use	  the	  
principles	  of	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  to	  guide	  their	  decisions.	  During	  observations	  of	  
the	  family	  court	  and	  interviews	  with	  the	  participants,	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  
although	  courts	  do	  make	  orders	  of	  child	  support	  payments	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  wife,	  as	  
well	  as	  some	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  payments,	  enforcement	  of	  these	  judicial	  
decisions	  proves	  to	  be	  extremely	  difficult.	  
	  
A	  common	  complaint	  made	  by	  the	  participants	  was	  that	  while	  they	  had	  been	  
granted	  a	  khulʿ	  without	  much	  difficulty,	  enforcing	  the	  maintenance	  provisions	  was	  
most	  problematic.	  Of	  the	  thirty-­‐one	  participants	  interviewed,	  nineteen	  had	  already	  
obtained	  their	  khulʿ	  and	  were	  in	  court	  to	  enforce	  their	  child	  maintenance	  payments	  
and	  recover	  their	  dowry.	  Two	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  been	  coming	  for	  more	  than	  
three	  years,	  while	  ten	  maintenance	  cases	  had	  exceeded	  two	  years,	  and	  the	  
remaining	  nine	  participants	  were	  approaching	  a	  year	  since	  the	  granting	  of	  their	  
khulʿ	  in	  pursuit	  of	  child	  support	  payments.	  Aadila,	  a	  twenty-­‐three-­‐year-­‐old	  divorcee	  
with	  two	  children,	  had	  been	  granted	  a	  khulʿ	  two	  years	  earlier,	  in	  2012.	  At	  that	  time,	  
the	  court	  had	  ordered	  her	  ex-­‐husband	  to	  pay	  1500	  rupees	  a	  month	  for	  each	  of	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
813	  Saadia	  Begum	  v.	  Jangez	  (2004)	  Vol.	  LVI,	  Pesh	  213,	  at	  215.	  See	  also	  Inamul	  Ahsan	  
v.	  Hussein	  Bano	  PLD	  (1976)	  Lah.	  1466.	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children.	  However,	  her	  ex-­‐husband	  had	  never	  been	  regular	  with	  his	  payments,	  and	  
at	  no	  point	  had	  he	  ever	  paid	  the	  full	  amount	  in	  any	  one	  month.	  She	  stated:	  
	  
“I	  have	  to	  come	  here	  every	  month.	  Sometimes	  he	  gives	  just	  1000	  rupees.	  Sometimes	  he	  
gives	  2000	  rupees	  and	  then	  sometimes	  he	  does	  not	  come	  for	  months	  and	  months…he	  
has	  no	  interest	  in	  the	  children	  and	  is	  a	  miserly	  man”814.	  
	  
Sajid	  Khan,	  a	  family	  lawyer	  working	  in	  the	  district	  courts,	  stated	  that	  husbands	  are	  
quite	  adept	  at	  prolonging	  maintenance	  hearings.	  They	  will	  only	  consult	  a	  lawyer	  
after	  several	  months	  have	  passed,	  and	  a	  newly	  appointed	  lawyer	  will	  naturally	  
request	  time	  to	  consult	  his	  client	  and	  take	  appropriate	  instructions815.	  At	  this	  point	  
it	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  make	  an	  interim	  order	  of	  maintenance	  to	  the	  wife.	  
However,	  with	  no	  evidence	  in	  court	  detailing	  the	  husband’s	  income,	  the	  judge	  is	  
very	  unlikely	  to	  do	  this,	  and	  so	  the	  case	  is	  put	  forward	  to	  the	  next	  hearing,	  causing	  
more	  delays.	  Even	  if	  the	  case	  is	  heard,	  it	  is	  also	  very	  difficult	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  prove	  her	  
husband’s	  income.	  Senior	  lawyer	  Majid	  Iqbal	  stated	  that	  very	  few	  people	  in	  Pakistan	  
have	  bank	  accounts,	  instead	  living	  their	  lives	  based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  daily	  wages816.	  
Unless	  the	  husband	  is	  employed	  by	  a	  government	  agency,	  there	  are	  no	  legal	  
requirements	  in	  Pakistan	  to	  provide	  formal	  pay	  slips	  that	  can	  prove	  his	  income.	  
Judge	  Farkhanda	  stated	  that	  a	  husband	  will	  invariably	  attend	  court	  wearing	  old	  
clothes,	  looking	  dishevelled,	  and	  claim	  that	  he	  is	  unemployed,	  or	  will	  declare	  a	  very	  
low	  income.	  The	  onus	  of	  proving	  a	  husband’s	  income	  lies	  with	  the	  wife.	  Unless	  she	  is	  
able	  to	  provide	  sworn	  witness	  statements	  proving	  the	  husband’s	  actual	  income,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  
815	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  12th	  2014.	  
816	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  19th	  2014.	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judge	  can	  only	  make	  a	  nominal	  order	  of	  child	  maintenance817.	  Duaa	  stated	  that	  her	  
ex-­‐husband	  was	  a	  tailor	  and	  earned	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  money.	  However,	  when	  
he	  came	  to	  court,	  he	  claimed	  that	  power	  shortages	  meant	  that	  he	  was	  earning	  less	  
and	  less	  and	  could	  not	  pay	  anything	  to	  support	  his	  children.	  She	  said:	  
	  
“He	  was	  lying.	  He	  has	  a	  manual	  machine	  that	  needs	  no	  motors	  and	  he	  can	  sew	  outside	  
in	  the	  courtyard,	  which	  I	  know	  he	  does.	  I	  told	  the	  judge	  that,	  but	  my	  husband	  lied	  and	  
said	  he	  didn’t	  have	  one.	  The	  judge	  still	  told	  him	  to	  pay	  1000	  rupees	  a	  month	  for	  my	  
baby	  but	  he	  only	  paid	  this	  a	  few	  times.	  I	  hate	  coming	  to	  the	  court	  for	  this”818.	  
	  
If	  a	  maintenance	  suit	  is	  decided,	  then	  a	  separate	  order	  for	  its	  execution	  must	  be	  
issued	  for	  non-­‐compliance.	  This	  requires	  the	  filing	  of	  another	  plaint	  of	  execution	  and	  
the	  relevant	  notices	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  ex-­‐husband.	  Once	  again,	  all	  costs	  of	  the	  
execution	  of	  the	  new	  suit	  are	  borne	  by	  the	  ex-­‐wife.	  She	  must	  re-­‐instruct	  her	  lawyer,	  
or	  get	  a	  new	  one	  and	  endure	  the	  expense	  of	  attending	  court	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
non-­‐appearance	  of	  her	  ex-­‐husband.	  All	  nineteen	  participants	  who	  had	  arrived	  at	  
court	  for	  their	  maintenance	  and	  dowry	  hearings	  stated	  that	  their	  lawyers	  had	  not	  
informed	  them	  of	  these	  potential	  costs	  in	  advance.	  Farah819,	  Bahirah820,	  Farheen821	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  25th	  2014.	  
818	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  8th	  2014.	  
819	  A	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  low	  working	  class	  family	  and	  attended	  school	  
until	  grade	  3.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  7th	  2014.	  	  
820	  A	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  from	  a	  low	  working	  class	  family	  who	  attended	  school	  
until	  grade	  3.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  15th	  2014.	  
821	  A	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  house	  wife	  from	  a	  low	  working	  class	  family	  with	  no	  formal	  
schooling.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  22nd	  2014.	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and	  Kauqab822	  all	  complained	  about	  the	  rising	  cost	  of	  their	  cases	  and	  were	  starting	  
to	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  pursue	  them	  any	  further.	  Farah	  stated:	  
	  
“My	  lawyer	  keeps	  saying	  he	  will	  get	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  and	  force	  him	  (ex-­‐husband)	  to	  




“Our	  lawyer	  tells	  us	  nothing.	  Each	  time	  we	  come	  to	  court	  he	  asks	  for	  a	  hundred	  rupees	  
for	  this	  paper,	  or	  fifty	  rupees	  for	  that	  paper.	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  how	  much	  we	  have	  paid	  him	  
so	  far.	  But	  my	  father	  is	  finding	  this	  more	  difficult.	  Last	  time	  we	  wanted	  to	  stop	  coming	  
but	  our	  lawyer	  said	  ‘just	  try	  one	  more	  time’.	  But	  he’s	  not	  the	  one	  paying	  the	  fees”824.	  
	  
If,	  by	  some	  miraculous	  chance,	  a	  husband	  does	  pay,	  this	  is	  done	  at	  the	  court	  itself.	  
During	  one	  of	  my	  observations,	  Muneera’s	  ex-­‐husband	  came	  to	  court	  to	  give	  1500	  
rupees	  in	  child	  support.	  The	  courtroom	  was	  crowded,	  and	  in	  front	  of	  all	  the	  other	  
lawyers	  and	  their	  clients,	  the	  husband	  paid	  the	  money	  to	  the	  judge.	  Muneera	  
detested	  going	  in	  front	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  receive	  her	  money	  with	  her	  husband	  standing	  
nearby.	  When	  we	  walked	  outside,	  Muneera’s	  ex-­‐husband	  made	  some	  lewd	  
comments	  and	  swore	  loudly	  at	  her.	  Muneera	  had	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  younger	  
brother,	  who	  could	  only	  watch	  and	  stare	  along	  with	  all	  the	  other	  bystanders.	  
Muneera	  stated:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822	  A	  19-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  5.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  
Court	  House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	  
823	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  7th	  2014.	  
824	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  15th	  2014.	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“This	  is	  humiliating.	  I	  feel	  ashamed	  in	  front	  of	  everyone	  and	  having	  to	  see	  him	  (ex-­‐
husband)	  laughing	  and	  insulting	  me.	  I	  cannot	  bear	  this	  shame”825.	  
	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  direct	  bank	  deposits	  to	  be	  made,	  and	  the	  public	  
spectacle	  of	  receiving	  paltry	  sums	  of	  money	  was	  described	  as	  “begging”,	  “shameful”	  
and	  “dishonourable”	  by	  many	  of	  the	  participants.	  Fourteen	  of	  the	  participants	  
complained	  of	  the	  emotional	  trauma	  of	  coming	  to	  court	  each	  time	  to	  receive	  the	  
money,	  particularly	  when	  their	  ex-­‐husbands	  would	  taunt	  them	  and	  even	  abuse	  them	  
outside	  the	  courthouses.	  The	  two	  participants	  who	  had	  been	  coming	  to	  the	  courts	  
for	  more	  than	  three	  years	  had	  finally	  decided	  not	  to	  pursue	  their	  cases	  any	  further	  
due	  to	  the	  rising	  costs	  of	  their	  cases	  and	  the	  humiliation	  involved.	  The	  remaining	  
seventeen	  had	  yet	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  do,	  due	  to	  the	  ancillary	  matters	  of	  the	  return	  of	  
the	  dowry,	  which	  remained	  unresolved.	  	  
	  
The	  court	  also	  has	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  if	  the	  husband	  fails	  to	  pay	  
consecutive	  maintenance	  payments,	  but	  courts	  are	  very	  reluctant	  to	  issue	  these.	  
During	  four	  months	  of	  observations	  of	  the	  family	  courts,	  I	  witnessed	  the	  issuance	  of	  
six	  arrest	  warrants	  for	  husbands	  who	  had	  failed	  to	  make	  child	  support	  payments.	  In	  
each	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  husband	  had	  failed	  to	  pay	  any	  child	  support	  for	  at	  least	  five	  
consecutive	  months.	  During	  my	  interviews,	  only	  four	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  
arrest	  warrants	  had	  been	  issued	  during	  their	  cases,	  whilst	  the	  remainder	  replied	  in	  
the	  negative,	  despite	  continual	  defaults	  in	  payments.	  When	  I	  discussed	  the	  matter	  
with	  practicing	  family	  lawyers,	  they	  stated	  that	  most	  husbands	  who	  appear	  in	  court	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  9th	  2014.	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are	  poor	  themselves.	  They	  are	  unable	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  upkeep	  of	  their	  wives	  and	  
children	  during	  the	  marriage	  itself,	  and	  so	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  able	  to	  do	  so	  after	  
the	  marriage	  is	  almost	  non-­‐existent.	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  wives	  disagreed,	  stating	  
that	  their	  husbands	  could	  pay,	  but	  that	  the	  judges	  did	  not	  bother	  to	  make	  them	  pay.	  
The	  four	  male	  judges	  I	  interviewed	  claimed	  that	  they	  did	  issue	  arrest	  warrants	  in	  
some	  cases,	  but	  I	  did	  not	  observe	  this.	  The	  only	  warrants	  I	  saw	  issued	  were	  by	  two	  
female	  judges,	  Judge	  Farkhanda	  Ameen	  and	  Judge	  Alisha	  Zubair.	  Judge	  Farkhanda	  
openly	  stated	  that	  in	  her	  opinion,	  male	  judges	  were	  much	  less	  inclined	  to	  issue	  an	  
arrest	  warrant,	  and	  that	  they	  favoured	  husbands	  in	  maintenance	  and	  child-­‐support	  
payments.	  Further:	  although	  male	  judges	  verbally	  threatened	  recalcitrant	  husbands	  
with	  such	  warrants,	  rarely	  did	  they	  issue	  them.	  She	  accepted	  that	  many	  husbands	  
were	  unable	  to	  pay	  large	  amounts,	  but	  felt	  that	  they	  should	  still	  be	  held	  accountable	  
for	  some	  payments826.	  	  	  
	  
Judge	  Farkhanda	  stated	  that	  her	  practice	  was	  to	  first	  threaten	  the	  husband	  with	  an	  
arrest	  warrant;	  then,	  if	  he	  continually	  failed	  to	  attend	  court	  and	  pay,	  she	  had	  no	  
hesitation	  in	  issuing	  a	  warrant	  of	  enforcement.	  The	  four	  participants	  in	  my	  research	  
who	  had	  had	  arrest	  warrants	  issued	  on	  their	  behalf	  all	  stated	  that	  their	  judges	  had	  
been	  female,	  whilst	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  cases	  had	  been	  presided	  over	  by	  male	  judges.	  
Although	  further	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  conducted	  on	  the	  frequency	  of	  enforcement	  
procedures,	  Judge	  Farkahnda’s	  and	  Judge	  Alisha’s	  views827	  indicate	  (as	  do	  my	  
observations)	  that	  some	  male	  judges	  are	  not	  applying	  the	  law	  as	  strictly	  as	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  25th	  2014.	  
827	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  11th	  2014.	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should.	  The	  success	  in	  providing	  child	  support	  and	  maintenance	  is	  crucial	  to	  women	  
if	  they	  are	  to	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  having	  any	  semblance	  of	  family	  life	  post-­‐divorce.	  The	  
lack	  of	  judicial	  implementation	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  policy	  initiatives	  
means	  that	  on	  one	  level,	  women	  are	  gaining	  marital	  freedom,	  but	  at	  another	  they	  
are	  still	  the	  subject	  of	  patriarchal	  structures	  enforced	  by	  men.	  
	  
Even	  if	  warrants	  are	  issued,	  the	  police	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  take	  them	  very	  seriously,	  
and	  the	  police	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  side	  with	  the	  husband.	  Mabrooka,	  a	  twenty-­‐eight-­‐
year-­‐old	  divorcee,	  stated	  that	  she	  had	  received	  her	  khulʿ	  in	  2011	  but	  had	  not	  
received	  any	  child-­‐support	  payments.	  After	  a	  year	  of	  non-­‐payment,	  the	  judge	  issued	  
an	  arrest	  warrant.	  She	  stated:	  	  
	  
“That	  did	  nothing.	  The	  police	  told	  him	  they	  were	  coming.	  He	  just	  went	  back	  to	  the	  
village	  for	  a	  few	  days.	  He	  is	  my	  cousin,	  and	  my	  other	  cousins	  in	  the	  village	  told	  me	  the	  
police	  told	  him	  to	  go,	  as	  they	  were	  coming	  to	  get	  him”828.	  
	  
Sabah829	  and	  Rizwana830	  related	  a	  similar	  story.	  They	  had	  both	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  
had	  been	  granted	  child	  support	  payments	  by	  the	  judge.	  After	  frequent	  defaults	  in	  
child-­‐support	  payments,	  the	  judge	  in	  each	  case	  issued	  an	  arrest	  warrant,	  but	  it	  was	  
not	  executed.	  Each	  of	  them	  claimed	  that	  the	  police	  tipped	  off	  their	  husbands,	  who	  
went	  underground	  for	  a	  few	  months.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
828	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  8th	  2014.	  
829	  A	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  from	  a	  working	  class	  family	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  
grade	  5.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  10th	  2014.	  
830	  A	  27-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  with	  no	  formal	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  
Court	  House,	  April	  3rd	  2014.	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7.5	  Khulʿ	  and	  Restitution	  of	  the	  Dower	  and	  Dowry	  
A	  major	  criticism	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  that	  it	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  where	  a	  wife	  
is	  essentially	  purchasing	  her	  freedom	  through	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr831.	  However,	  
this	  criticism	  was	  not	  substantiated	  during	  this	  particular	  research,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  
participants	  interviewed	  had	  received	  very	  nominal	  sums	  of	  mahr	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
marriage	  and	  had	  no	  financial	  liability	  to	  repay	  anything832.	  Only	  one	  participant,	  
Umayyrah,	  was	  forced	  to	  forego	  her	  deferred	  mahr	  during	  the	  khulʿ	  proceedings,	  as	  
discussed	  further	  below.	  See	  Table	  7	  for	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  mahr	  payments.	  
	  
Table	  7	  -­‐	  Amounts	  of	  Mahr	  Given	  to	  the	  Participants	  




14	   None	  Given	   None	  	  
11	  	   32	  rupees	   None	  
1	   200	  rupees	   None	  
2	   500	  rupees	   None	  
2	   1000	  rupees	   None	  
1	   32	  rupees	   30,000	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  posed	  no	  significant	  problem	  to	  these	  participants,	  it	  
was	  the	  restitution	  of	  the	  jahez	  or	  dowry	  that	  was	  most	  problematic.	  During	  the	  
filing	  of	  the	  original	  khulʿ	  plaint,	  the	  wife	  must	  provide	  a	  complete	  list	  of	  all	  items	  of	  
her	  dowry	  that	  she	  took	  to	  her	  husband’s	  house	  upon	  marriage,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831	  Doreen	  Hinchcliffe,	  “Divorce	  in	  Pakistan:	  Judicial	  Reform,”	  Journal	  of	  Islamic	  and	  
Comparative	  Law,	  2	  (1968a):	  25;	  Monsoor,	  From	  Patriarchy	  to	  Gender	  Equity,	  190.	  
832	  Thirty-­‐two	  rupees	  is	  a	  common	  amount	  of	  mahr	  given	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage.	  
Haider	  Abbass,	  a	  family	  court	  judge,	  explained	  that	  according	  to	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh,	  the	  
minimum	  amount	  of	  mahr	  to	  be	  fixed	  for	  a	  marriage	  to	  be	  valid	  is	  2g	  and	  7.5	  mcg	  of	  
silver.	  	  During	  the	  colonial	  period	  in	  India,	  ʿulamāʾ	  had	  valued	  this	  amount	  of	  silver	  
to	  constitute	  32	  rupees.	  	  Families	  unacquainted	  with	  the	  details	  of	  the	  ruling	  had	  
assumed	  that	  the	  mahr	  represents	  32	  rupees	  and	  thus	  this	  tradition	  has	  continued	  




personal	  property.	  In	  cases	  where	  a	  husband	  fails	  to	  attend	  most	  hearings	  (which	  is	  
quite	  common),	  the	  likelihood	  of	  having	  any	  items	  of	  the	  dowry	  returned	  is	  very	  
low.	  The	  first	  problem	  faced	  by	  the	  wife	  is	  proving	  that	  she	  did	  indeed	  purchase	  
these	  items	  and	  take	  them	  to	  her	  husband’s	  house.	  Of	  the	  thirty-­‐one	  participants	  
interviewed,	  twenty-­‐two	  had	  attached	  dowry	  lists	  as	  part	  of	  their	  original	  khulʿ	  
plaints,	  but	  to	  date	  none	  had	  received	  the	  full	  amount	  stipulated.	  Nineteen	  of	  these	  
participants	  had	  already	  obtained	  their	  khulʿ	  and	  were	  engaged	  in	  dowry	  disputes	  
and	  maintenance	  claims.	  All	  nineteen	  participants	  stated	  that	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  
provide	  any	  receipts	  of	  purchase	  for	  everything	  they	  had	  listed	  in	  their	  dowry	  
claims.	  	  	  
	  
Judges	  and	  lawyers	  shared	  their	  experiences	  in	  these	  matters	  during	  our	  
discussions.	  Judge	  Bilal	  Butt	  stated	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  it	  is	  fairly	  obvious	  when	  
inflated	  dowry	  amounts	  have	  been	  listed833.	  If	  no	  receipts	  have	  been	  provided,	  and	  if	  
the	  wife	  has	  no	  other	  external	  proof834,	  then	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  judge	  to	  decide	  the	  
accuracy	  of	  the	  lists	  and	  what	  will	  be	  deemed	  an	  appropriate	  amount.	  If	  a	  husband	  
fails	  to	  attend	  any	  of	  the	  court	  hearings,	  then	  the	  judge	  is	  empowered	  to	  order	  all	  
items	  on	  the	  dowry	  list	  to	  be	  returned,	  with	  or	  without	  proof,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
husband’s	  failure	  to	  attend	  court	  and	  contest	  the	  lists835.	  He	  will	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  
accepted	  the	  list	  of	  contents,	  and	  thus	  required	  to	  return	  the	  dowry	  as	  specified	  in	  
the	  list	  provided	  by	  the	  wife.	  However,	  although	  this	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  judgement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  18th	  2014.	  
834	  Sworn	  witness	  statements	  of	  the	  wife’s	  parents	  or	  other	  family	  members	  were	  
not	  considered	  adequate	  proof	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  dowry	  by	  the	  judges.	  
835	  S.9	  (5A)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	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that	  favours	  the	  wife,	  in	  reality	  a	  husband	  who	  has	  failed	  to	  attend	  the	  court	  even	  
once	  is	  also	  one	  who	  is	  least	  likely	  to	  return	  any	  items	  of	  the	  dowry.	  Moreover,	  eight	  
of	  the	  participants	  who	  had	  received	  an	  ex	  parte	  khulʿ	  stated	  that	  the	  judge	  had	  
refused	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  regarding	  the	  dowry,	  but	  instead	  had	  put	  the	  case	  
forward	  to	  another	  date	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  husband	  would	  turn	  up.	  In	  cases	  where	  
a	  khulʿ	  decision	  had	  been	  made	  ex	  parte,	  judges	  were	  quicker	  to	  entertain	  challenges	  
from	  the	  husband.	  Aadila	  stated	  that	  she	  had	  obtained	  her	  khulʿ	  very	  quickly836.	  Her	  
husband	  had	  not	  attended	  court	  during	  the	  proceedings,	  and	  she	  was	  awarded	  the	  
return	  of	  her	  dowry,	  worth	  1.5	  laks837.	  However,	  once	  her	  husband	  found	  out,	  he	  
came	  to	  court	  and	  claimed	  that	  he	  had	  not	  received	  the	  notice	  and	  contested	  the	  
dowry	  list,	  prolonging	  the	  case	  for	  several	  months.	  	  	  
	  
Once	  a	  court	  accepts	  a	  dowry	  plaint,	  the	  wife	  must	  then	  submit	  a	  new	  plaint	  to	  
enforce	  the	  judgement,	  requiring	  that	  new	  notices	  be	  submitted	  to	  her	  ex-­‐husband.	  
She	  must	  then	  bear	  the	  expense	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  effort	  of	  attending	  each	  court	  
date	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  her	  ex-­‐husband	  will	  appear	  at	  court	  and	  return	  some	  of	  her	  
belongings.	  Yet,	  even	  if	  a	  wife	  is	  lucky	  enough	  to	  have	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  issued,	  
enforcement	  by	  the	  police	  is	  rare.	  All	  the	  judges	  said	  that	  if	  a	  wife	  leaves	  the	  
matrimonial	  home	  without	  her	  dowry	  items,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  she	  will	  be	  able	  
to	  recover	  them	  in	  their	  entirety	  through	  court	  proceedings.	  Majid	  Khan	  stated	  that	  
in	  ten	  years	  of	  acting	  in	  khulʿ	  proceedings	  he	  had	  never	  seen	  a	  case	  where	  a	  wife	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  
837	  1	  lak	  refers	  to	  100,000	  rupees.	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been	  able	  to	  recover	  her	  entire	  dowry838,	  a	  point	  reiterated	  by	  three	  other	  lawyers.	  
The	  participants	  cited	  common	  excuses	  used	  by	  their	  husbands	  to	  avoid	  the	  
restitution:	  “she	  (the	  wife)	  took	  everything	  with	  her	  and	  is	  lying”,	  “we	  both	  sold	  some	  
of	  the	  things	  together	  to	  supplement	  the	  family	  income”,	  “the	  dishes,	  crockery	  and	  
other	  items	  were	  bad	  quality	  and	  broke	  during	  the	  marriage”.	  The	  two	  parties	  spend	  
many	  months	  coming	  back	  and	  forth	  to	  court,	  contesting	  the	  dowry	  lists.	  Farhat839,	  
Gohar840,	  Imaan841,	  Farheen842,	  Mansoora843	  and	  Nasreen844	  all	  stated	  that	  much	  of	  
their	  court	  cases	  had	  revolved	  around	  disputes	  over	  their	  dowries.	  	  	  
	  
The	  failure	  of	  the	  wife	  to	  have	  her	  dowry	  returned	  results	  in	  a	  massive	  financial	  
hardship	  on	  her.	  Often,	  these	  items	  are	  a	  collection	  of	  goods,	  items	  and	  clothes	  built	  
up	  over	  a	  period	  of	  many	  years.	  They	  can	  include	  substantial	  items	  such	  as	  a	  
refrigerator,	  washing	  machine,	  dining	  table	  set,	  bedding	  and	  sofa	  set.	  It	  is	  extremely	  
difficult	  for	  the	  wife	  or	  her	  parents	  to	  replace	  these	  items,	  and	  this	  will	  also	  reduce	  
her	  chances	  of	  re-­‐marriage.	  From	  my	  observations,	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  dowry	  was	  seen	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  worst	  outcomes	  for	  the	  wife	  during	  the	  khulʿ	  process.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
838	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  19th	  2014.	  
839	  A	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  factory	  worker	  with	  no	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  
House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  
840	  A	  27-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  with	  no	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  
House,	  April	  9th	  2014.	  
841	  A	  22-­‐year-­‐old	  factory	  worker	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  Grade	  1.	  	  	  Interview,	  
Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  23rd	  2014	  .	  
842	  A	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  with	  no	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  
House,	  April	  22nd	  2014.	  
843	  A	  28-­‐year-­‐old	  factory	  worker	  with	  no	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  
House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  
844	  A	  26-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  with	  no	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  
House,	  April	  28th	  2014.	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7.6	  Khulʿ	  and	  Court	  Delays	  
Although	  the	  new	  laws	  now	  state	  that	  khulʿ	  cases	  must	  be	  decided	  within	  four	  
months	  of	  the	  initial	  plaint	  being	  filed845,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  survey	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  
rarely	  the	  case.	  Most	  khulʿ	  cases	  take	  between	  six	  months	  and	  a	  year	  to	  be	  granted,	  
whilst	  ancillary	  matters	  relating	  to	  maintenance	  and	  dowry	  were	  on-­‐going	  in	  my	  
study.	  The	  tables	  below	  provide	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  results	  for	  the	  nineteen	  women	  
who	  had	  already	  gained	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  were	  engaged	  in	  post-­‐divorce	  matters.	  
	  
Table	  8	  -­‐	  Completion	  of	  Khulʿ	  Cases	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Time	  Taken	  for	  Khulʿ	  
2	   4	  months	  
5	   6	  months	  
9	   7-­‐9months	  
3	   1	  year	  
	  
	  
Table	  9	  -­‐	  Length	  of	  Proceedings	  for	  Child	  Maintenance	  	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Maintenance	  Time	  
3	   None	  claimed	  (no	  
children)	  
4	   One	  year	  on-­‐going	  
10	   Two	  years	  on-­‐going	  
2	   Three	  years	  on	  going	  
	  
	  
Table	  10	  -­‐	  Length	  of	  Proceedings	  for	  Restitution	  of	  Dowry	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Time	  Taken	  to	  return	  
Dowry	  
5	   None	  (no	  dowry	  claimed)	  
4	   One	  year	  on-­‐going	  
8	   Two	  years	  on-­‐going	  
2	   Three	  years	  on-­‐going	  
	  
The	  tables	  above	  illustrate	  that	  obtaining	  the	  khulʿ	  was	  the	  easiest	  and	  quickest	  part	  
of	  the	  divorce	  process,	  whilst	  ancillary	  matters	  took	  much	  longer	  and	  were	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845	  S.	  12	  (A)	  Family	  Courts	  (Amendment)	  Act	  2015	  (XI	  of	  2015).	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settled	  in	  any	  of	  the	  cases.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  remaining	  twelve	  participants,	  all	  of	  
them	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  granted	  their	  khulʿ	  and	  no	  decisions	  had	  been	  made	  on	  the	  
matters	  ancillary	  to	  their	  cases.	  Yet	  all	  twelve	  participants	  had	  exceeded	  the	  four-­‐
month	  window	  stipulated	  by	  law,	  with	  nine	  participants	  being	  in	  the	  fifth	  month	  and	  
three	  in	  the	  sixth	  month	  of	  their	  cases.	  	  	  
	  
A	  common	  complaint	  made	  by	  the	  participants	  referred	  to	  the	  delaying	  tactics	  used	  
by	  husbands	  to	  increase	  court	  expenses,	  as	  well	  as	  deliberate	  attempts	  at	  
intimidation.	  Ten	  participants	  stated	  that	  their	  husbands	  had	  appeared	  in	  court	  
once	  to	  demand	  reconciliation,	  but	  had	  then	  missed	  subsequent	  court	  dates	  in	  
attempts	  to	  delay	  the	  case	  further.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  lawyers	  on	  both	  
sides	  to	  have	  longer	  court	  cases	  and	  delays,	  since	  the	  more	  paperwork	  generated	  
and	  the	  more	  frequent	  appearances	  in	  court,	  the	  higher	  the	  fees	  that	  will	  accrue.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  of	  the	  lawyers	  in	  khulʿ	  cases	  are	  corrupt	  or	  deliberately	  
extend	  proceedings,	  but	  perceptions	  of	  the	  participants	  regarding	  their	  legal	  counsel	  
were	  not	  very	  positive.	  They	  felt	  that	  their	  lawyers	  had	  no	  particular	  interest	  in	  
their	  cases	  other	  than	  to	  obtain	  their	  fees,	  since	  many	  lawyers	  were	  representing	  
several	  cases	  at	  a	  time	  and	  attended	  multiple	  hearings	  during	  one	  court	  session.	  A	  
communication	  gap	  appeared	  to	  exist	  between	  many	  of	  the	  wives	  and	  their	  lawyers,	  
with	  participants	  exhibiting	  a	  general	  mistrust	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  and	  all	  who	  
represent	  it.	  When	  I	  asked	  if	  the	  participants	  were	  satisfied	  with	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  their	  case	  had	  been	  handled,	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  (Daanya)	  replied	  
in	  the	  negative.	  Thirty	  participants	  offered	  similar	  comments	  about	  their	  lawyers:	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“he	  (the	  lawyer)	  is	  just	  out	  to	  make	  money”	  or	  “he	  does	  not	  care	  for	  the	  case	  and	  what	  
happens”.	  Farhat846,	  Kuasar847	  and	  Mansoora848	  were	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  lawyers	  
were	  all	  “in	  this	  together”,	  meaning	  that	  the	  lawyers	  colluded	  with	  each	  other	  to	  put	  
dates	  forward	  to	  ensure	  a	  longer	  case	  and	  thus	  extra	  fees.	  	  
	  
During	  my	  own	  court	  observations,	  I	  noticed	  that	  although	  court	  proceedings	  
officially	  begin	  at	  9.30am,	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  still	  waiting	  for	  their	  
lawyers	  to	  connect	  with	  them	  at	  midday.	  Those	  who	  had	  arrived	  on	  time	  would	  
immediately	  tell	  their	  clients	  that	  they	  had	  other	  cases	  in	  a	  different	  court	  and	  
would	  be	  back	  shortly.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Farheen849,	  who	  had	  
been	  instructed	  to	  meet	  her	  lawyer	  at	  9.30	  am.	  I	  began	  to	  interview	  Farheen	  at	  9.45	  
am850.	  Although	  her	  lawyer	  had	  briefly	  met	  her	  at	  10	  am,	  he	  only	  returned	  at	  2.30	  
pm	  to	  deal	  with	  her	  case,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  judge	  was	  winding	  down	  the	  day’s	  
proceedings.	  The	  judge	  refused	  to	  listen	  to	  Farheen’s	  lawyer,	  and	  put	  the	  case	  
forward	  for	  another	  month.	  Since	  Farheen’s	  husband	  had	  failed	  to	  attend	  for	  the	  
third	  successive	  time,	  she	  had	  been	  expecting	  an	  ex	  parte	  decision	  in	  her	  favour,	  but	  
her	  lawyer’s	  inefficiency	  meant	  that	  she	  had	  to	  wait	  another	  month	  for	  her	  khulʿ	  to	  
be	  granted.	  Seven	  of	  the	  participants	  claimed	  that	  their	  lawyers	  had	  gone	  on	  holiday	  
without	  informing	  them,	  so	  they	  incurred	  the	  cost	  of	  coming	  to	  court	  and	  their	  cases	  
were	  again	  put	  forward.	  Eleven	  participants	  blamed	  the	  judges	  for	  taking	  too	  long	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
846	  A	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  working	  class	  factory	  worker	  with	  no	  formal	  schooling.	  
847	  A	  20-­‐year-­‐old	  working	  class	  seamstress	  who	  attended	  school	  up	  until	  grade	  3.	  
848	  A	  28-­‐year-­‐old	  working	  class	  factory	  worker	  with	  no	  formal	  schooling.	  
849	  A	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  with	  no	  formal	  education.	  	  	  
850	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  22nd	  2014.	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their	  cases.	  Due	  to	  the	  multiple	  jurisdictions	  of	  the	  district	  court	  judges,	  sometimes	  
judges	  were	  transferred	  to	  other	  cases,	  with	  no	  notice	  given	  to	  either	  the	  lawyer	  or	  
the	  wife.	  Imaan	  complained	  that	  she	  had	  changed	  her	  lawyer	  twice,	  and	  was	  not	  
happy	  at	  the	  judge’s	  unexplained	  absences	  during	  her	  court	  proceedings:	  
“No	  one	  tells	  anyone	  anything.	  Sometimes	  the	  judge	  does	  not	  come.	  Sometimes	  my	  
lawyer	  does	  not	  come.	  Sometimes	  the	  lawyers	  are	  on	  strike.	  Then	  they	  have	  elections.	  
And	  each	  time	  no	  one	  tells	  us	  and	  we	  come	  here	  and	  are	  left	  waiting	  and	  waiting”851.	  
	  	  	  
Since	  there	  is	  no	  systematic	  way	  of	  calling	  cases,	  judges	  work	  at	  their	  own	  speed	  and	  
inclination.	  Six	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  were	  waiting	  outside	  court	  had	  been	  there	  
since	  9	  am,	  but	  the	  judge	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  hear	  their	  case	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day.	  
This	  was	  a	  common	  phenomenon	  during	  my	  court	  observations.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
day’s	  proceedings,	  if	  a	  case	  remained	  unheard,	  then	  a	  fresh	  date	  would	  be	  issued,	  
and	  the	  entire	  process	  would	  begin	  again	  the	  following	  month.	  	  
	  
7.7	  Khulʿ	  and	  Reconciliation	  
S.	  10(3)	  of	  the	  West	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  requires	  the	  judge	  to	  effect	  a	  
reconciliation	  between	  the	  parties	  if	  possible852.	  This	  normally	  occurs	  when	  both	  
parties	  manage	  to	  attend	  court	  on	  the	  same	  day,	  during	  which	  counsel	  for	  the	  wife	  
will	  outline	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  dispute.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  judge	  will	  address	  the	  wife	  
directly	  and	  ask	  if	  she	  really	  desires	  a	  divorce,	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  reasons	  she	  gives	  for	  
this.	  Once	  she	  has	  provided	  her	  side	  of	  the	  story,	  the	  judge	  will	  then	  ask	  the	  husband	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
851	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  




for	  his	  side	  and	  ask	  if	  he	  wishes	  to	  be	  reconciled.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  reconciliation,	  
a	  private	  room	  exists	  at	  the	  side	  of	  every	  courtroom,	  next	  to	  the	  judge’s	  office.	  It	  is	  
normally	  a	  very	  small	  room	  with	  no	  window	  or	  ventilation,	  with	  one	  small	  table	  and	  
two	  chairs.	  If	  the	  presiding	  judge	  so	  chooses,	  he	  may	  order	  both	  the	  husband	  and	  
wife	  to	  go	  into	  the	  room	  to	  discuss	  their	  marriage	  in	  private.	  During	  my	  
observations	  and	  interviews,	  I	  observed	  a	  variety	  of	  responses.	  Ten	  of	  the	  
participants	  stated	  that	  their	  husbands	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  continuing	  the	  marriage,	  
but	  were	  using	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  as	  a	  ruse	  to	  mentally	  torture	  them.	  	  
Somayya’s853	  story	  is	  illustrative	  of	  many	  of	  the	  participants’	  experiences.	  Whilst	  I	  
was	  interviewing	  Somayya	  outside	  the	  courtroom,	  her	  husband	  arrived	  and	  began	  
to	  taunt	  her,	  calling	  her	  names	  and	  insulting	  her	  family,	  shouting:	  “I	  will	  never	  
release	  you”.	  Somayya’s	  lawyer	  had	  not	  yet	  arrived,	  and	  so	  there	  was	  no	  one	  to	  
witness	  this	  other	  than	  her	  family	  and	  myself.	  When	  the	  case	  was	  finally	  called	  into	  
court,	  the	  same	  husband	  declared	  his	  undying	  love	  for	  Somayya	  and	  tried	  to	  
convince	  the	  judge	  of	  his	  sincere	  intentions	  to	  make	  the	  marriage	  a	  success.	  
Although	  the	  husband	  had	  failed	  to	  attend	  three	  previous	  khulʿ	  hearings,	  meaning	  
that	  Somayya	  should	  have	  been	  granted	  an	  ex	  parte	  khulʿ	  on	  the	  third	  hearing,	  Judge	  
Ammar	  ordered	  both	  of	  them	  to	  step	  into	  the	  reconciliation	  room	  and	  discuss	  their	  
situation	  privately.	  Ten	  minutes	  later,	  Somayya	  came	  out	  of	  the	  room	  crying	  and	  
informed	  the	  judge	  that	  her	  husband	  had	  insulted	  her	  again,	  had	  called	  her	  
shameless,	  and	  had	  been	  rude	  to	  her.	  Luckily	  for	  Somayya,	  Judge	  Ammar	  granted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
853	  A	  26-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  2.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  
Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	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her	  a	  khulʿ	  immediately,	  particularly	  since	  her	  husband	  had	  failed	  to	  attend	  three	  
previous	  hearings,	  which	  had	  caused	  the	  case	  to	  be	  delayed	  for	  six	  months.	  	  
	  
During	  my	  conversations	  with	  family	  court	  judges,	  I	  learnt	  that	  they	  had	  differing	  
views	  with	  respect	  to	  reconciliation.	  Judge	  Ammar	  Arshad854	  and	  Judge	  Ummayr	  
Abbas855	  stated	  that	  they	  always	  encouraged	  both	  parties	  to	  reconcile.	  During	  their	  
tenure	  as	  judges,	  they	  viewed	  women	  as	  being	  too	  hasty	  regarding	  khulʿ	  cases.	  The	  
virtual	  lack	  of	  evidential	  requirements	  to	  prove	  a	  khulʿ,	  they	  argued,	  meant	  that	  
many	  women	  came	  to	  court	  seeking	  a	  divorce	  over	  trivial	  matters,	  such	  as	  fights	  
with	  in-­‐laws	  or	  problems	  with	  interfering	  parents	  who	  did	  not	  wish	  the	  parties	  to	  
remain	  married.	  Both	  these	  judges	  felt	  that	  women	  were	  unaware	  of	  the	  post-­‐
divorce	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions	  and	  the	  immense	  difficulties	  they	  would	  face	  
in	  the	  long	  term.	  Thus,	  they	  always	  encouraged	  both	  parties	  to	  attempt	  
reconciliation,	  even	  if	  that	  meant	  delaying	  the	  case	  for	  a	  few	  months.	  Shugufta’s856	  
case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  successful	  reconciliation	  and	  the	  judicial	  strategy	  
adopted	  by	  Judge	  Ummayr.	  I	  had	  interviewed	  Shugufta	  earlier	  in	  the	  morning	  at	  
court,	  and	  she	  had	  informed	  me	  that	  she	  had	  entered	  into	  a	  love	  marriage	  with	  her	  
husband,	  whom	  she	  had	  met	  at	  her	  father’s	  small	  shop857.	  Her	  parents	  had	  opposed	  
the	  marriage,	  as	  they	  wanted	  her	  to	  marry	  her	  first	  cousin,	  and	  had	  asked	  her	  many	  
times	  to	  leave	  her	  husband.	  Shugufta’s	  husband’s	  parents	  were	  also	  against	  the	  
marriage,	  and	  she	  had	  had	  numerous	  fights	  with	  her	  in-­‐laws	  and	  her	  own	  parents.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
854	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  11th	  2014.	  
855	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  4th	  2014.	  
856	  A	  21-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  3.	  	  	  
857	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	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Although	  she	  was	  happy	  with	  her	  husband,	  her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  made	  it	  intolerable	  to	  
live	  in	  the	  matrimonial	  home,	  so	  she	  returned	  to	  her	  parents,	  who	  encouraged	  her	  to	  
apply	  for	  the	  khulʿ.	  Shugufta	  was	  twenty-­‐one	  and	  did	  not	  appear	  very	  happy	  at	  the	  
situation,	  but	  her	  mother	  was	  very	  aggressive.	  During	  the	  interview,	  Shugufta’s	  
mother	  interrupted	  us	  and	  began	  to	  berate	  Shugufta’s	  husband	  as	  a	  useless	  man	  
with	  a	  very	  poor	  future.	  This	  court	  appearance	  was	  the	  first	  for	  both	  parties.	  When	  
the	  case	  was	  finally	  called,	  at	  1	  pm,	  her	  husband	  immediately	  stated	  that	  he	  did	  not	  
want	  a	  divorce	  and	  asked	  his	  wife	  to	  return	  home,	  to	  the	  dismay	  of	  his	  parents	  and	  
those	  of	  his	  wife.	  Judge	  Ummayr,	  assessing	  Shugufta’s	  reluctance,	  ordered	  both	  
parties	  to	  discuss	  their	  situation	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  room.	  As	  they	  were	  entering	  
the	  room,	  Shugufta’s	  mother	  shouted	  to	  her	  daughter	  not	  to	  be	  a	  fool	  and	  trust	  her	  
“useless”	  husband.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  reprimanded	  the	  mother	  and	  threatened	  to	  throw	  
her	  out	  of	  court.	  After	  twenty	  minutes,	  both	  spouses	  returned	  and	  informed	  the	  
court	  that	  they	  wished	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  marriage.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  admonished	  
the	  husband	  for	  his	  failure	  to	  protect	  his	  wife	  from	  his	  interfering	  mother,	  and	  also	  
cautioned	  the	  wife’s	  mother	  to	  leave	  both	  parties	  in	  peace.	  In	  this	  instance,	  Judge	  
Ummayr’s	  decision	  to	  allow	  both	  parties	  to	  reconcile	  proved	  useful.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  Kausar858.	  She	  had	  married	  young,	  at	  seventeen,	  
but	  her	  marriage	  began	  to	  deteriorate	  within	  months	  because	  of	  arguments	  over	  
money	  with	  her	  in-­‐laws	  and	  husband.	  Kausar’s	  own	  parents	  asked	  her	  to	  
compromise,	  particularly	  after	  the	  birth	  of	  her	  daughter,	  and	  made	  her	  return	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
858	  A	  20-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  who	  attended	  school	  until	  grade	  3.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  
Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  7th	  2014.	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matrimonial	  home	  several	  times	  when	  she	  left	  in	  anger.	  However,	  her	  continual	  
refusal	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  marriage	  forced	  her	  parents	  to	  support	  her	  khulʿ	  
application.	  When	  I	  met	  Kausar	  in	  court,	  this	  was	  her	  fifth	  appearance	  and	  her	  
husband’s	  fourth.	  Both	  parties’	  parents	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  extended	  family	  
were	  also	  present.	  When	  the	  case	  was	  called	  in	  court,	  Judge	  Ummayr	  was	  very	  
familiar	  with	  it	  and	  immediately	  accused	  Kausar	  of	  being	  stubborn	  in	  refusing	  to	  be	  
reconciled.	  At	  this	  point	  her	  husband,	  standing	  with	  members	  of	  his	  family,	  shouted	  
across	  the	  room,	  “I	  have	  given	  everything	  to	  you!	  What	  more	  do	  you	  want	  from	  me?”	  
Judge	  Ummayr	  then	  proceeded	  to	  explain	  the	  virtues	  of	  married	  life	  to	  all	  parties,	  
and	  again	  admonished	  Kausar	  for	  pursuing	  this	  case,	  particularly	  when	  she	  now	  had	  
a	  little	  girl.	  The	  judge	  sent	  both	  parties	  to	  the	  reconciliation	  room	  to	  discuss	  their	  
matter.	  During	  the	  reconciliation	  session,	  Kausar’s	  mother	  came	  to	  me	  and	  
complained	  about	  her	  son-­‐in-­‐law:	  	  
	  
“He	  treats	  her	  badly.	  He	  never	  gave	  her	  money	  when	  she	  left	  him,	  never	  gave	  her	  
money	  for	  her	  ultrasound	  and	  never	  her	  gave	  money	  for	  her	  caesarean	  operation.	  We	  
paid	  for	  everything…we	  know	  he	  is	  having	  an	  affair	  now.	  If	  she	  goes	  back	  to	  him	  and	  
then	  has	  more	  children,	  who	  will	  take	  care	  of	  all	  of	  the	  expense?	  He	  won’t	  pay	  for	  it	  
and	  we	  cannot	  afford	  anything	  either”859.	  
	  
Kausar’s	  mother	  expressed	  discontentment	  at	  the	  lengthy	  process	  of	  their	  case.	  
Eight	  months	  had	  passed,	  and	  at	  each	  court	  date	  her	  son-­‐in-­‐law’s	  lawyer	  would	  
request	  a	  stay	  in	  proceedings,	  claiming	  that	  the	  husband	  wanted	  to	  be	  reconciled.	  
The	  mother	  also	  talked	  of	  the	  shame	  and	  humiliation	  that	  the	  divorce	  would	  bring	  to	  
her	  family:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“I	  have	  nothing	  to	  gain	  from	  this	  divorce.	  But	  they	  treat	  her	  so	  badly	  and	  she	  will	  just	  
have	  more	  and	  more	  children	  if	  she	  stays	  with	  him	  with	  more	  and	  more	  mouths	  for	  us	  
feed”860.	  
	  
After	  twenty	  minutes,	  the	  couple	  returned	  to	  the	  court,	  obviously	  un-­‐reconciled,	  
shouting	  at	  each	  other.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  calmed	  both	  parties,	  but	  again	  addressed	  
Kausar	  directly:	  
	  
“What	  will	  you	  do	  about	  your	  daughter?	  She	  will	  be	  without	  a	  father,	  and	  your	  life	  will	  
be	  very	  tough.	  He	  wants	  to	  take	  you	  back,	  so	  why	  not	  give	  him	  one	  more	  chance?”861	  
	  
Kausar	  responded:	  “He	  is	  nothing	  to	  me”.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  asked	  Kausar:	  “Why,	  then,	  
are	  you	  demanding	  maintenance	  from	  him?”	  Kausar	  responded:	  “He	  owes	  me	  money	  
and	  it	  is	  for	  my	  daughter”.	  At	  this	  point	  the	  court	  clerk,	  sitting	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  
judge,	  interjected	  and	  asked	  Kausar’s	  mother	  to	  send	  her	  back	  one	  more	  time,	  
saying:	  “If	  he	  doesn’t	  change,	  then	  get	  a	  khulʿ”.	  Judge	  Ummayr,	  clearly	  exasperated,	  
asked	  the	  mother	  to	  send	  her	  daughter	  back	  to	  her	  husband	  one	  last	  time	  and	  set	  a	  
hearing	  date	  for	  the	  next	  month.	  
	  
This	  exchange	  illustrates	  the	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  Judge	  Ummayr	  (endorsed	  by	  Judge	  
Ammar	  Arshad).	  He	  was	  clearly	  reluctant	  to	  grant	  a	  quick	  khulʿ,	  fearing	  that	  the	  
plaintiff’s	  wife	  would	  be	  in	  a	  worse	  position	  than	  if	  she	  remained	  within	  the	  
marriage.	  Judge	  Ummayr	  took	  his	  duty	  to	  attempt	  reconciliations	  very	  seriously,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  7th	  2014.	  
861	  Observation,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  7th	  2014.	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irrespective	  of	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  wife,	  and	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  despite	  the	  
lengthening	  of	  the	  court	  process.	  He	  also	  offered	  no	  words	  of	  advice	  to	  the	  husband	  
regarding	  his	  failings	  in	  the	  marriage,	  but	  directed	  all	  his	  efforts	  towards	  Kausar	  and	  
her	  failings	  as	  a	  wife	  and	  mother.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  three	  other	  judges	  whom	  I	  interviewed	  at	  the	  same	  district	  court,	  one	  
male862	  and	  two	  female863,	  did	  not	  advocate	  this	  approach.	  All	  three	  of	  them	  were	  of	  
the	  view	  that	  in	  most	  cases,	  when	  a	  woman	  comes	  to	  court,	  this	  is	  a	  last	  resort	  for	  
her,	  and	  she	  has	  normally	  exhausted	  all	  other	  remedies	  to	  improve	  her	  marriage.	  
They	  argued	  that	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce,	  hiring	  a	  lawyer,	  and	  thus	  bringing	  her	  
private	  life	  out	  into	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  so	  daunting	  that	  only	  when	  a	  woman	  has	  
clearly	  made	  up	  her	  mind	  that	  she	  wants	  a	  khulʿ	  will	  she	  be	  prepared	  to	  incur	  the	  
expense	  and	  humiliation	  of	  divorce	  proceedings.	  All	  three	  judges	  were	  of	  the	  
opinion	  that	  unless	  it	  is	  glaringly	  obvious	  that	  the	  parties	  are	  not	  happy	  to	  pursue	  
the	  khulʿ,	  they	  would	  ask	  both	  parties	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  be	  reconciled	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
routine,	  but	  if	  they	  do	  not,	  then	  they	  would	  never	  order	  the	  parties	  to	  attempt	  a	  
reconciliation	  by	  sending	  them	  to	  a	  separate	  room.	  	  
	  
Judge	  Farkhanda	  pointed	  out	  that	  many	  of	  the	  women	  have	  suffered	  physical	  
violence	  from	  their	  husband	  and	  that	  it	  is	  completely	  unwise	  to	  allow	  both	  parties	  to	  
be	  in	  a	  room	  on	  their	  own,	  even	  if	  the	  judge	  and	  family	  members	  are	  nearby.	  Judge	  
Farkhanda	  related	  three	  different	  incidents	  during	  her	  tenure	  as	  a	  judge	  where	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862	  Judge	  Shamsuddin	  Iqbal.	  
863	  Judge	  Farkhanda	  Ameen	  and	  Judge	  Alisha.	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husband	  had	  come	  to	  court	  brandishing	  a	  gun	  and	  threatened	  to	  kill	  his	  wife	  during	  
khulʿ	  proceedings864.	  Judge	  Alisha	  and	  Judge	  Shamsuddin	  reiterated	  these	  views,	  
and	  agreed	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  reconciliation	  was	  futile	  and	  could	  even	  be	  dangerous.	  
Judge	  Alisha	  related	  two	  similar	  incidents	  of	  husbands	  attending	  court	  and	  
threatening	  their	  wives	  with	  guns865.	  Although	  she	  admitted	  that	  these	  types	  of	  case	  
were	  rare,	  it	  is	  still	  true	  that	  where	  a	  wife	  has	  alleged	  physical	  violence,	  “it	  is	  
completely	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  the	  wife	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  room	  on	  her	  own	  with	  an	  
emotionally	  disturbed	  husband,	  and	  expect	  a	  sudden	  reconciliation	  in	  ten	  to	  twenty	  
minutes”866.	  	  
	  
From	  the	  interviews	  with	  the	  participants,	  lawyers	  and	  judges,	  it	  became	  quite	  
apparent	  that	  most	  wives	  arrived	  at	  the	  court	  after	  enduring	  emotional	  and	  physical	  
abuse	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  husbands	  and	  their	  extended	  families.	  Reconciliation	  was	  
not	  a	  possibility	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases,	  and	  most	  just	  wanted	  the	  divorce	  process	  
to	  be	  as	  quick	  and	  painless	  as	  possible.	  Of	  the	  thirty-­‐two	  participants,	  only	  two	  
reconciled	  with	  their	  husbands	  during	  the	  court	  hearing,	  whilst	  the	  remaining	  
twenty-­‐nine	  all	  proceeded	  with	  their	  khulʿ	  case.	  Judge	  Farkhanda	  also	  said	  that	  in	  
her	  opinion,	  male	  judges	  were	  less	  sympathetic	  to	  wives	  than	  female	  judges.	  She	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  26th	  2014.	  
865	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  11th	  2014.	  
866	  Whilst	  listening	  to	  these	  stories,	  it	  sounded	  incredible	  that	  such	  incidents	  could	  
take	  place	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  	  However,	  during	  one	  of	  my	  interview	  sessions	  at	  the	  
Lahore	  District	  Courts,	  I	  heard	  a	  loud	  bang	  and	  screams.	  	  Everyone	  ran	  to	  the	  
balcony	  to	  see	  what	  had	  happened,	  but	  nothing	  could	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  courtyard	  
below	  with	  the	  normal	  throngs	  of	  lawyers,	  clerks	  and	  clients	  engaged	  in	  their	  
activities.	  	  Later	  that	  afternoon	  I	  learned	  that	  a	  brother	  had	  shot	  his	  sister	  dead	  in	  
the	  courthouse	  parking	  lot	  due	  to	  her	  refusal	  to	  divorce	  her	  husband,	  whom	  she	  had	  
married	  through	  a	  love	  marriage.	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claimed	  that	  male	  judges	  often	  insisted	  that	  the	  parties	  engage	  in	  some	  form	  of	  
reconciliation	  and	  delayed	  the	  case	  for	  at	  least	  two	  to	  three	  months	  to	  allow	  both	  
parties	  to	  come	  to	  some	  form	  of	  agreement.	  However,	  since	  it	  is	  only	  in	  a	  very	  small	  
minority	  of	  cases	  that	  husband	  and	  wife	  will	  be	  reconciled,	  she	  felt	  that	  ordering	  a	  
reconciliation	  attempt	  was	  not	  a	  suitable	  policy	  to	  enforce867.	  Moreover,	  the	  wife	  
would	  also	  suffer	  a	  heavier	  financial	  burden	  in	  such	  cases.	  Judges	  who	  put	  cases	  
forward	  rarely	  grant	  interim	  maintenance	  orders	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  wife.	  The	  longer	  a	  
case	  takes,	  the	  higher	  the	  legal	  fees	  incurred	  by	  the	  wife,	  and	  the	  longer	  she	  will	  
have	  to	  wait	  for	  her	  khulʿ	  and	  for	  the	  final	  maintenance	  and	  child	  support	  orders	  to	  
be	  decreed	  by	  the	  court.	  	  	  
	  
7.8	  Khulʿ	  and	  the	  Courthouse	  
Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  daunting	  aspects	  of	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  the	  court	  premises:	  
the	  location,	  style	  and	  setup	  of	  the	  courtrooms.	  The	  Lahore	  District	  Courts	  are	  called	  
‘Aiwan-­‐e-­‐Adal’,	  meaning	  the	  ‘House	  of	  Justice’.	  Inside	  the	  court	  building	  are	  around	  
seventy	  courts,	  which	  are	  allocated	  for	  criminal,	  civil	  and	  family	  law	  cases.	  
According	  to	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964,	  any	  district	  court	  may	  be	  converted	  to	  a	  
family	  court	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  hearing	  family	  court	  cases868.	  Thus,	  the	  family	  courts	  
are	  not	  situated	  in	  a	  separate	  family	  court	  building	  but	  are	  part	  of	  the	  matrix	  of	  the	  
District	  Courthouse.	  They	  are	  merely	  courtrooms	  that	  have	  been	  allocated	  to	  be	  
used	  by	  the	  family	  court	  judges	  where	  designated.	  A	  major	  disadvantage	  to	  this	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
867	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  26th	  2014.	  
868	  S.	  3	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964.	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that	  the	  district	  courts	  are	  also	  where	  criminal	  cases	  are	  heard,	  as	  well	  as	  civil	  
litigation	  proceedings.	  Upon	  entering	  the	  district	  court	  building,	  some	  of	  the	  
courtrooms	  allocated	  for	  family	  cases	  are	  directly	  adjacent	  to	  the	  rooms	  that	  
entertain	  criminal	  cases.	  Thus,	  whilst	  walking	  to	  court	  each	  day,	  I	  saw	  several	  
prisoners,	  all	  men,	  chained	  from	  hand	  to	  feet	  with	  cuffs,	  shuffling	  to	  hear	  their	  cases.	  
They	  were	  surrounded	  by	  the	  armed	  guards	  who	  bring	  a	  constant	  flow	  of	  prisoners	  
to	  and	  from	  the	  courts.	  During	  these	  times,	  I	  was	  often	  leered	  at,	  laughed	  at	  and	  
even	  shouted	  at.	  This	  was	  a	  common	  occurrence,	  with	  the	  guards	  acting	  as	  very	  little	  
deterrent,	  merely	  yanking	  the	  prisoners	  back	  or	  laughing	  with	  them.	  It	  is	  extremely	  
unfortunate	  that	  some	  of	  the	  criminal	  courts	  are	  adjacent	  to	  the	  family	  courts.	  In	  a	  
society	  where	  it	  is	  socially	  unacceptable	  for	  women	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  court	  premises,	  
having	  criminal	  cases	  and	  prisoners	  in	  such	  close	  proximity	  to	  family	  cases	  
exacerbates	  these	  social	  tensions.	  Women	  are	  openly	  stared	  at,	  laughed	  at	  and	  
humiliated	  by	  other	  male	  clients	  and	  their	  family	  members	  through	  jeering.	  
Although	  there	  are	  female	  lawyers	  who	  practice	  law,	  they	  are	  a	  small	  minority.	  
Moreover,	  the	  District	  Courthouse	  is	  also	  an	  unsuitable	  place	  for	  children.	  To	  reach	  
the	  family	  courts,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  walk	  past	  many	  criminal	  courts,	  yet	  many	  of	  the	  
family	  courtroom	  and	  verandas	  are	  crowded	  with	  women	  and	  their	  children,	  for	  
whom	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  arrange	  alternate	  childcare	  arrangements.	  	  	  
	  
The	  courtrooms	  themselves	  are	  also	  in	  a	  very	  dilapidated	  condition.	  They	  are	  
normally	  medium-­‐sized	  rooms	  with	  a	  few	  (broken)	  tables	  and	  chairs	  scattered	  
around	  for	  clients	  and	  lawyers	  to	  use	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  consult	  each	  other.	  The	  judge	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sits	  upon	  a	  slightly	  raised	  platform,	  and	  there	  are	  one	  or	  two	  clerks	  to	  the	  side.	  
There	  is	  one	  place	  for	  a	  witness	  to	  stand	  to	  give	  evidence	  to	  the	  side	  of	  the	  judge.	  
During	  my	  observations,	  I	  detected	  no	  systematic	  or	  methodical	  way	  for	  dealing	  
with	  the	  family	  cases.	  A	  list	  is	  pinned	  to	  the	  front	  door	  detailing	  which	  cases	  are	  to	  
be	  heard	  that	  morning.	  However,	  no	  times	  are	  given.	  Instead,	  whichever	  lawyer	  
arrives	  first	  approaches	  the	  judge	  and	  puts	  his	  case	  forward.	  When	  a	  lawyer	  finally	  
makes	  an	  appearance	  in	  court,	  he	  or	  she	  will	  be	  accompanied	  by	  the	  client	  and	  
members	  of	  the	  client’s	  family.	  This	  can	  just	  be	  the	  father	  or	  brother,	  or	  might	  
consist	  of	  the	  entire	  extended	  family,	  who	  stand	  behind	  their	  lawyer.	  However,	  it	  is	  
rare	  for	  one	  lawyer	  to	  present	  his	  or	  her	  case	  individually.	  Instead,	  during	  my	  
observation	  of	  the	  family	  courts,	  I	  witnessed	  the	  courthouse	  as	  being	  akin	  to	  a	  
market	  place,	  with	  lawyers	  fighting	  to	  get	  attention	  for	  their	  cases	  and	  having	  their	  
matters	  resolved.	  Lawyers	  would	  speak	  at	  the	  same	  time;	  family	  members	  would	  be	  
bickering	  with	  each	  other;	  and	  wives	  could	  be	  seen	  quietly	  weeping	  on	  the	  side,	  
after	  hearing	  insults	  hurled	  at	  them	  by	  estranged	  husbands	  or	  in-­‐laws.	  I	  found	  only	  
one	  judge	  in	  the	  entire	  family	  court	  system	  who	  managed	  to	  maintain	  some	  degree	  
of	  legal	  decorum,	  whilst	  the	  rest	  were	  inundated	  with	  demands	  and	  cross-­‐talking.	  It	  
was	  very	  difficult	  to	  follow	  the	  proceedings,	  with	  the	  judge	  giving	  orders	  to	  his	  
clerks	  as	  the	  arguments	  progressed.	  In	  essence,	  most	  judges	  seemed	  to	  be	  tackling	  
three	  or	  four	  cases	  at	  a	  time.	  	  
	  
To	  compound	  matters,	  the	  electricity	  supply	  often	  fails,	  shutting	  off	  the	  fans	  and	  
further	  slowing	  the	  business	  of	  the	  court.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  place	  that	  exhibits	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some	  respect	  for	  the	  law	  or	  legal	  decorum,	  I	  found	  the	  family	  courts	  to	  be	  a	  
completely	  farcical	  spectacle.	  During	  another	  observational	  day,	  two	  lawyers	  began	  
to	  shout	  at	  each	  other	  and	  almost	  came	  to	  blows.	  The	  judge,	  clerks,	  litigants	  and	  
other	  lawyers	  seemed	  to	  enjoy	  the	  entire	  performance	  as	  a	  form	  of	  entertainment,	  
with	  the	  judge	  only	  intervening	  to	  order	  the	  lawyers	  to	  take	  their	  dispute	  outside.	  
The	  chaos	  of	  the	  proceedings	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  privacy	  for	  the	  litigants	  made	  the	  entire	  
court	  process	  a	  very	  stressful	  event.	  Many	  of	  the	  participants	  expressed	  shame	  and	  
embarrassment	  when	  facing	  the	  judge,	  with	  their	  estranged	  husband	  and	  his	  family	  
at	  such	  close	  proximity,	  whilst	  other	  litigants	  also	  listened	  to	  their	  tales	  of	  woe.	  
Iqraa869	  expressed	  her	  dismay	  and	  shame	  at	  having	  to	  inform	  the	  judge	  of	  her	  
husband’s	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  performed	  sexual	  acts	  with	  his	  
boyfriend	  in	  front	  of	  her.	  	  	  
	  
“My	  father	  and	  brother	  came	  with	  me.	  I	  wish	  I	  could	  have	  died.	  I	  could	  hear	  the	  other	  
people	  sniggering	  at	  me”870.	  
	  
Iqraa	  felt	  that	  she	  was	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  sordid	  drama,	  and	  felt	  humiliated	  by	  the	  
public	  nature	  of	  the	  hearing.	  The	  courtroom	  doors	  are	  not	  closed	  and	  there	  are	  no	  
private	  hearings.	  This	  is	  particularly	  awkward	  given	  that	  the	  criminal	  courts	  are	  in	  
the	  same	  building,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  next	  door.	  Many	  defendants	  are	  out	  on	  bail	  and	  
are	  looking	  for	  a	  place	  to	  sit	  and	  wait	  for	  their	  hearings	  to	  begin.	  The	  lack	  of	  seating	  
arrangements	  outside	  the	  courts	  means	  that	  throngs	  of	  people	  wait	  inside	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
869	  A	  21-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  with	  no	  education.	  	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  
House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	  
870	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	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courtroom	  for	  their	  lawyers	  to	  arrive	  or	  their	  cases	  to	  begin,	  and	  thus	  are	  privy	  to	  
khulʿ	  proceedings.	  Thus	  the	  entire	  process	  of	  coming	  to	  court	  and	  facing	  these	  
obstacles	  was	  viewed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  as	  adding	  to	  the	  stress	  and	  
emotional	  strain	  of	  their	  divorce.	  	  
	  
This	  section	  of	  the	  research	  has	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  legal	  processes	  of	  
gaining	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  the	  problems	  encountered	  by	  the	  participants	  during	  the	  legal	  
proceedings.	  However,	  this	  research	  also	  hopes	  to	  answer	  another	  important	  
question:	  what	  are	  the	  primary	  reasons	  that	  lead	  women	  to	  seek	  formal	  court	  
remedies?	  What	  are	  the	  salient	  factors	  and	  characteristics	  of	  these	  women	  who	  are	  
willing	  to	  bypass	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  and	  enter	  into	  the	  complex	  legal	  arena	  
to	  effect	  a	  khulʿ?	  	  	  
	  
7.9	  Khulʿ	  and	  the	  Reasons	  for	  Divorce	  
Several	  common	  factors	  were	  identified	  during	  the	  interviews	  that	  served	  as	  a	  
reason	  for	  divorce.	  Dowry-­‐related	  problems,	  extended	  family	  disputes,	  poverty	  and	  
domestic	  violence	  were	  common	  denominators	  mentioned	  by	  the	  participants.	  
Twenty-­‐one	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  their	  failure	  to	  bring	  a	  large	  enough	  
dowry	  to	  their	  matrimonial	  home	  had	  become	  a	  source	  of	  dispute.	  Twenty-­‐eight	  
stated	  that	  lack	  of	  money	  was	  a	  constant	  cause	  of	  marital	  strife.	  Eleven	  stated	  that	  
their	  husbands	  had	  lost	  their	  jobs	  after	  the	  marriage	  and	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  
basic	  food	  and	  other	  necessities,	  while	  ten	  stated	  that	  although	  their	  husbands	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worked,	  they	  were	  given	  no	  money	  directly	  by	  their	  husbands	  and	  were	  solely	  
reliant	  upon	  them	  for	  their	  every	  need.	  Seven	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  their	  
husbands	  were	  in	  and	  out	  of	  jobs	  during	  the	  entirety	  of	  their	  marriages.	  The	  lack	  of	  
certainty	  in	  jobs	  and	  their	  low	  pay	  meant	  that	  husbands	  were	  always	  frustrated	  and	  
angry	  and	  vented	  their	  anger	  on	  their	  wives	  and	  families.	  Four	  participants	  stated	  
that	  their	  husbands	  had	  never	  worked	  due	  to	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  addiction.	  Twenty	  of	  
the	  participants	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  never	  enough	  food	  in	  the	  house	  for	  everyone.	  
However,	  the	  biggest	  and	  most	  decisive	  factor	  in	  seeking	  a	  divorce	  was	  domestic	  
violence	  suffered	  by	  the	  wives.	  Twenty-­‐seven	  of	  the	  thirty-­‐one	  participants	  stated	  
that	  they	  had	  suffered	  some	  form	  of	  physical	  abuse	  from	  their	  husbands	  and/or	  
their	  in-­‐laws	  during	  the	  course	  of	  their	  marriage.	  The	  level	  of	  violence	  described	  by	  
the	  wives	  varied.	  Three	  participants	  spoke	  of	  occasional	  punches	  and	  slaps	  when	  
arguments	  between	  them	  escalated.	  Four	  spoke	  of	  more	  severe	  violence,	  
particularly	  when	  their	  husbands	  were	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  drugs,	  alcohol	  and	  
other	  intoxicants.	  This	  included	  being	  hit	  with	  a	  stick,	  a	  cricket	  bat	  or	  an	  iron	  rod,	  
and	  having	  items	  of	  furniture	  thrown	  at	  them.	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
participants	  (twenty-­‐four)	  expressed	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  had	  suffered	  systematic	  
abuse	  over	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  the	  marriage.	  Eighteen	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  
slaps,	  punches	  and	  pulling	  of	  hair	  would	  occur	  over	  trivial	  matters,	  such	  as	  food	  not	  
being	  cooked	  on	  time,	  the	  children	  making	  too	  much	  noise	  or	  the	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  
complaining	  about	  the	  wife’s	  poor	  performance	  in	  doing	  the	  household	  chores.	  The	  
domestic	  abuse	  was	  not	  only	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  husband	  but	  by	  other	  family	  
members	  too.	  Thirteen	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  they	  had	  been	  slapped	  on	  the	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face	  by	  their	  mothers-­‐in-­‐law	  on	  many	  occasions	  during	  the	  marriage.	  Three	  
participants	  stated	  that	  their	  fathers-­‐in-­‐law	  had	  also	  slapped	  them	  during	  
arguments,	  and	  one	  participant	  said	  she	  had	  been	  hit	  with	  a	  hot	  iron	  by	  her	  father-­‐
in-­‐law.	  
	  
It	  was	  apparent	  from	  the	  interviews	  that	  these	  participants	  were	  no	  longer	  
prepared	  to	  suffer	  further	  hardship	  and	  abuse	  within	  their	  marriages,	  and	  thus	  
opted	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  However,	  this	  research	  has	  already	  illustrated	  that	  there	  are	  many	  
women	  in	  Pakistan	  who	  suffer	  emotional	  and	  physical	  abuse	  in	  their	  marital	  lives,	  
yet	  not	  all	  of	  them	  opt	  for	  a	  divorce.	  Indeed,	  many	  of	  those	  women	  were	  particularly	  
opposed	  to	  the	  dissolution	  of	  their	  marriage	  and	  looked	  unfavourably	  upon	  those	  
who	  had	  achieved	  one.	  The	  question	  therefore	  arises	  as	  to	  why	  these	  particular	  
women	  and	  not	  others	  opt	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  What	  are	  the	  salient	  attributes	  of	  these	  
women,	  and	  why	  do	  they	  and	  not	  others	  initiate	  divorce?	  This	  research	  has	  found	  
that	  age,	  duration	  of	  marriage	  and	  the	  socioeconomic	  position	  of	  the	  participant	  
influence	  the	  likelihood	  of	  opting	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  
	  
7.10	  Khulʿ	  Applicants,	  their	  Age,	  and	  the	  Duration	  of	  the	  Marriage	  
In	  total,	  thirty-­‐one	  participants	  were	  interviewed	  who	  were	  either	  in	  the	  
preliminary	  stages	  of	  applying	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  or	  had	  already	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  were	  
engaged	  in	  pursuing	  ancillary	  matters	  of	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  and	  child-­‐
support	  issues.	  The	  first	  notable	  thing	  was	  the	  age	  of	  all	  of	  the	  participants.	  All	  of	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them	  were	  below	  the	  age	  of	  thirty.	  Fifteen	  participants	  were	  aged	  between	  twenty	  
and	  twenty-­‐five,	  and	  sixteen	  were	  aged	  between	  twenty-­‐six	  and	  thirty.	  Table	  11	  
provides	  a	  further	  breakdown	  of	  their	  ages.	  
	  
Table	  11	  –	  Age	  of	  Participants	  Applying	  for	  a	  Khulʿ	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Age	  
5	   19-­‐21	  
11	   22-­‐25	  
6	   26-­‐27	  
9	   28-­‐30	  
	  
The	  average	  age	  of	  the	  husbands	  was	  also	  young,	  with	  a	  slightly	  higher	  maximum	  
age	  of	  thirty-­‐five.	  Moreover,	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  married	  quite	  young:	  
between	  sixteen	  and	  twenty-­‐four	  for	  women	  and	  twenty	  and	  twenty-­‐seven	  for	  men.	  
Table	  12	  provides	  a	  breakdown	  of	  participants’	  ages	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage.	  
	  
	  
Table	  12	  –	  Age	  of	  Participants	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Marriage	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Age	  at	  Time	  of	  Marriage	  
15	   16-­‐18	  
7	   20-­‐22	  
9	   23-­‐24	  
	  
	  
Prior	  research	  has	  indicated	  that	  marriage	  at	  an	  early	  age	  is	  a	  strong	  predictor	  for	  
divorce	  within	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  marriage871.	  Booth	  and	  Edwards	  (1985)	  argue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871	  See	  Mohammad	  Taghi	  Sheykhi,	  “Development	  and	  Divorce	  in	  Iran:	  A	  Sociological	  
Appraisal,”	  International	  Review	  of	  Modern	  Sociology,	  29,	  no.	  2	  (1999):	  23-­‐36;	  P.	  
Glick	  and	  A.	  Norton,	  “Marrying,	  Divorcing	  and	  Living	  Together	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Today”,	  
Population	  Bulletin	  32,	  no.	  5	  (1977):	  142;	  D.M	  Fergusson,	  L.J.	  Horwood	  and	  F.T	  
Shannon,	  “A	  Proportional	  Hazards	  Model	  of	  Family	  Breakdown”,	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  
and	  the	  Family,”	  46	  (1984):	  539-­‐549;	  Sosamma	  Pothen,	  Divorce:	  Its	  Causes	  and	  
Consequences	  in	  Hindu	  Society	  (Madison,	  WI:	  Shakti	  Books,	  1975);	  Nurul	  Alam	  et	  al,	  
“Determinants	  of	  Divorce	  in	  a	  Traditional	  Muslim	  Community	  in	  Bangladesh,”	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that	  couples	  who	  marry	  young	  might	  have	  limited	  life	  experience,	  and	  might	  thus	  be	  
less	  prepared	  for	  the	  stresses	  that	  marriage	  can	  entail872.	  In	  the	  present	  research,	  
eighteen	  of	  the	  participants	  blamed	  their	  husbands’	  inability	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  them	  in	  
the	  marriage.	  Iqraa873	  stated	  that	  her	  husband	  was	  young	  and	  could	  not	  face	  his	  
parents’	  wrath,	  and	  always	  sided	  with	  them	  against	  her,	  even	  when	  he	  knew	  they	  
were	  wrong	  in	  their	  accusations.	  Iqraa’s	  mother	  claimed	  that	  her	  daughter	  was	  too	  
young	  and	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  be	  as	  patient	  as	  she	  herself	  had	  been	  during	  her	  own	  
marriage874.	  Booth	  and	  Edwards	  (1985)	  also	  state	  that	  couples	  may	  be	  less	  
compatible	  with	  each	  other	  when	  young,	  and	  may	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  come	  to	  an	  
understanding.	  Amato	  and	  Rogers	  (1997)	  also	  found	  that	  factors	  which	  increase	  the	  
risk	  of	  divorce,	  such	  as	  jealousy,	  infidelity,	  and	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  abuse,	  decline	  as	  
age	  at	  first	  marriage	  increases875.	  Rao	  and	  Sekhar	  (2002),	  in	  their	  study	  of	  divorce	  
practices	  in	  India,	  argue	  that	  age	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  factor	  in	  determining	  
divorce,	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  divorce	  amongst	  those	  who	  marry	  young876.	  During	  
my	  conversations	  with	  the	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  about	  their	  experience	  in	  court,	  they	  
indicated	  that	  younger	  girls	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  tolerate	  abusive	  and	  unhappy	  
marriages	  compared	  to	  their	  older	  counterparts.	  The	  advent	  of	  social	  media	  and	  
television	  dramas,	  and	  the	  encroachment	  of	  modernity,	  have	  had	  some	  influence	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Demographic	  Research	  (2000)	  accessed	  March	  4th	  2016,	  www.demographic-­‐
research.org/Volumes/Vol3/4/.	  	  
872	  A.	  Booth	  &	  J.	  N.	  Edwards,	  “Age	  at	  Marriage	  and	  Marital	  Instability”,	  Journal	  of	  
Marriage	  and	  the	  Family,	  47,	  no.	  1	  (1985):	  67-­‐75.	  
873	  A	  twenty-­‐one-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  with	  no	  formal	  education.	  
874	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	  
875	  Paul	  Amato	  and	  Stacey	  Rogers,	  “A	  Longitudinal	  Study	  of	  Marital	  Problems	  and	  
Subsequent	  Divorce,”	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  and	  the	  Family,	  59	  (1997):	  612-­‐624.	  
876	  A.B.S.V.	  Ranga	  Rao	  and	  K.	  Sekhar,	  “Divorce:	  Processes	  and	  Correlates:	  A	  Cross-­‐
Cultural	  Study,”	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Family	  Studies	  33,	  no.	  4	  (2002):	  542-­‐563.	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younger	  minds.	  Judge	  Shamsuddin	  Iqbal	  stated	  that	  cable	  TV	  had	  reached	  most	  
urban	  households:	  “There	  may	  not	  be	  food	  on	  the	  table	  but	  there	  will	  be	  a	  T.V	  drama	  
to	  watch”.	  Many	  legal	  professionals	  commented	  that	  Pakistani	  T.V.	  dramas	  portray	  a	  
romantic	  view	  of	  married	  life,	  and	  younger	  girls	  aspire	  to	  have	  this	  life	  rather	  than	  
tolerate	  the	  injustices	  they	  experience	  in	  their	  marriage.	  This	  is	  also	  consonant	  with	  
Levinger	  (1976),	  who	  argues	  that	  when	  the	  barriers	  to	  divorce	  are	  outweighed	  by	  
the	  presence	  of	  alternate	  attractions,	  couples	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  divorce877.	  The	  
lawyers,	  however,	  were	  sceptical	  about	  these	  new	  television	  shows	  that	  romanticise	  
marital	  life,	  and	  which	  do	  not	  show	  the	  reality	  of	  life	  post-­‐divorce.	  They	  argued	  that	  
the	  younger	  generation	  is	  less	  patient,	  and	  is	  unwilling	  to	  compromise	  as	  their	  
mothers	  had	  done	  before	  them,	  not	  realising	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  difficulties	  that	  they	  
are	  likely	  to	  face	  post-­‐divorce.	  	  	  
	  
The	  research	  also	  showed	  that	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  marriages	  was	  quite	  short,	  with	  
the	  longest	  marriage	  lasting	  five	  years	  whilst	  the	  remainder	  varied	  between	  one	  and	  
three	  years.	  See	  Table	  13	  below:	  
	  
Table	  13	  –	  Duration	  of	  the	  Participants’	  Marriages	  
Number	  of	  Participants	   Duration	  of	  Marriage	  
3	   1	  years	  
12	   2	  years	  
10	   3	  years	  
5	   4	  years	  
1	   5	  years	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There	  have	  been	  many	  studies	  indicating	  a	  negative	  link	  between	  the	  length	  of	  
marriage	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  divorce.	  Thornton	  and	  Rogers	  (1987)	  found	  that	  the	  
risk	  of	  divorce	  is	  at	  its	  highest	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  marriage878.	  Choudhary	  
(1988)	  found	  that	  women	  in	  India	  who	  married	  before	  the	  age	  of	  21	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  remain	  married	  for	  less	  than	  four	  years879.	  Becker	  (1991)	  argues	  that	  
negative	  information	  about	  the	  spouse	  often	  arises	  early	  in	  the	  marriage,	  and	  so	  the	  
shorter	  the	  marriage,	  the	  less	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  the	  two	  spouses	  will	  be	  compatible	  
with	  each	  other880.	  White	  and	  Booth	  (1991)	  state	  that	  the	  longer	  a	  marriage	  
persists,	  the	  greater	  the	  chance	  that	  material	  possessions	  will	  be	  amassed,	  thus	  
increasing	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  more	  in	  the	  case	  of	  divorce881.	  A	  shorter	  marriage	  can	  
therefore	  result	  in	  a	  lesser	  investment	  in	  the	  marriage	  in	  terms	  of	  number	  of	  
children	  and	  emotional	  attachment	  to	  the	  spouse.	  In	  this	  research,	  only	  one	  
participant	  had	  five	  children,	  and	  she	  had	  been	  married	  the	  longest:	  for	  five	  years.	  
She	  also	  did	  not	  pursue	  her	  khulʿ	  case,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  
However,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  participants	  either	  had	  no	  children	  or	  had	  a	  maximum	  of	  
one	  or	  two	  children.	  The	  longer	  a	  marriage	  persists,	  the	  greater	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
more	  children	  being	  born.	  This	  in	  turn	  increases	  the	  liability	  upon	  the	  wife	  and	  her	  
family	  in	  terms	  of	  more	  mouths	  to	  feed,	  and	  places	  a	  heavier	  financial	  burden	  upon	  
them	  to	  educate	  and	  look	  after	  the	  children.	  This	  was	  pointed	  out	  by	  Kausar’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
878	  Arland	  Thornton	  and	  Willard	  Rodgers,	  “The	  Influence	  of	  Individual	  and	  Historical	  
Time	  in	  Marital	  Dissolution,”	  Demography	  24	  (1987):	  1-­‐22.	  
879	  Jagdish	  Choudhary,	  Divorce	  in	  Indian	  Society	  (Jaipur:	  Rupa	  Books,	  1988).	  
880	  Gary	  Becker,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Family	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  
1991).	  
881	  Lynn	  White	  &	  Alan	  Booth,	  “Divorce	  and	  the	  Life	  Course,”	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues,	  
12	  (1991):	  5-­‐21.	  
	  
306	  
mother,	  who	  was	  concerned	  about	  her	  daughter	  having	  more	  children	  if	  she	  
remained	  married.	  She	  was	  unhappy	  about	  her	  daughter’s	  decision	  to	  pursue	  the	  
khulʿ,	  but	  considered	  it	  better	  to	  make	  a	  break	  now	  rather	  than	  later,	  when	  her	  
liabilities	  were	  likely	  to	  increase.	  
	  
Booth	  et	  al	  (1986)	  studied	  the	  relationship	  between	  marital	  instability,	  divorce,	  age	  
and	  duration	  of	  marriage.	  They	  concluded	  that	  cementing	  a	  marriage	  is	  causally	  
linked	  with	  the	  aging	  of	  the	  spouses	  and	  their	  marriage.	  An	  increase	  in	  age	  can	  lead	  
to	  improvements	  in	  finances,	  family	  integration	  and	  community	  cohesion,	  as	  well	  as	  
increased	  religiosity882.	  This	  is	  certainly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	  where	  a	  wife	  is	  
more	  likely	  to	  establish	  herself	  firmly	  within	  the	  family	  if	  she	  has	  children.	  As	  
children	  grow	  older,	  they	  can	  act	  as	  a	  buffer	  between	  the	  mother	  and	  the	  extended	  
family,	  as	  well	  as	  firmly	  cement	  her	  position	  in	  that	  family,	  particularly	  if	  she	  has	  a	  
son.	  Thus,	  she	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  contemplate	  divorce	  than	  someone	  who	  has	  been	  
married	  for	  a	  much	  shorter	  time.	  In	  Chapter	  Six,	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  spoke	  of	  
their	  patience	  in	  making	  their	  marriages	  work	  and	  the	  different	  strategies	  they	  used	  
to	  reach	  an	  understanding	  with	  their	  husbands	  and	  mothers-­‐in-­‐law.	  As	  the	  years	  go	  
by,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  new	  bride	  entering	  the	  family	  home	  can	  also	  alter	  family	  
dynamics	  and	  power	  hierarchies.	  The	  baree	  bahu883	  now	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
wield	  her	  own	  influence	  over	  the	  new	  bride.	  She	  will	  have	  had	  time	  to	  create	  
support	  structures	  with	  other	  members	  of	  the	  extended	  family	  that	  will	  allow	  her	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
882	  A.	  Booth	  et	  al,	  “Divorce	  and	  Marital	  Instability	  over	  the	  Life	  Course,”	  Journal	  of	  
Family	  Issues	  7	  (1986):	  421-­‐442.	  
883	  The	  wife	  of	  the	  eldest	  son.	  
	  
307	  
negotiate	  her	  own	  private	  space	  within	  the	  marriage.	  She	  is	  no	  longer	  at	  the	  bottom	  
of	  the	  power	  hierarchy	  but	  instead	  has	  someone	  below	  her	  who	  not	  only	  becomes	  
the	  new	  focus	  of	  attention	  of	  the	  ‘interfering	  mother-­‐in-­‐law’,	  but	  who	  also	  will	  allow	  
the	  baree	  bahu	  to	  vent	  her	  frustration	  on	  someone	  who,	  as	  the	  new	  girl,	  will	  not	  be	  
able	  to	  ‘talk	  back’.	  Although	  such	  attitudes	  reinforce	  patriarchal	  structures	  within	  a	  
family	  and	  are	  not	  beneficial	  to	  women	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  this	  may	  be	  the	  only	  
chance	  of	  survival	  for	  a	  woman	  who	  has	  suffered	  years	  of	  abuse	  and	  emotional	  
turmoil.	  Of	  course,	  this	  can	  only	  occur	  if	  a	  marriage	  persists.	  The	  participants	  
applying	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  had	  all	  been	  married	  for	  a	  very	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  Whilst	  their	  
marriages	  legally	  persist	  until	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  granted,	  many	  of	  them	  had	  already	  left	  the	  
matrimonial	  home	  many	  months	  prior	  to	  applying	  for	  the	  khulʿ.	  Thus	  the	  actual	  
breakdown	  of	  the	  marriage	  was	  much	  earlier	  than	  this	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases.	  The	  
spouses	  had	  first	  physically	  separated,	  and	  then	  a	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  initiate	  
divorce	  proceedings.	  Therefore,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  any	  of	  these	  participants	  
improving	  their	  social	  position	  within	  the	  marriage	  in	  such	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  
was	  more	  remote.	  
	  
7.11	  Khulʿ	  and	  the	  Education	  and	  Socioeconomic	  Position	  of	  Litigants	  
The	  results	  from	  this	  research	  also	  provided	  a	  surprise	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
education	  and	  socioeconomic	  levels	  of	  the	  women	  who	  actually	  applied	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  
In	  Chapter	  Six,	  some	  women	  who	  were	  highly	  educated	  and	  from	  affluent	  
backgrounds	  indicated	  their	  approval	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  compared	  to	  women	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with	  lower	  education	  and	  from	  working	  class	  backgrounds.	  It	  was	  thus	  expected	  
that	  this	  class	  of	  females	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  opt	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  marital	  conflicts.	  
The	  views	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  also	  resonated	  with	  other	  studies	  on	  the	  
causal	  link	  between	  education	  and	  divorce.	  Rao	  and	  Sekhar	  (2002)	  argue	  that	  
education	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  divorce	  in	  India.	  They	  found	  that	  higher	  levels	  
of	  education	  correspond	  with	  more	  divorces.	  The	  same	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  be	  
true	  of	  women	  with	  a	  college	  education,	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  divorce	  than	  those	  
without	  one884.	  	  Carter	  and	  Glick	  (1976)	  found	  that	  women	  with	  a	  graduate	  degree	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  divorce	  than	  those	  with	  a	  college	  degree885.	  Anderson	  and	  
Saunders	  (2003)	  also	  argue	  that	  women’s	  socioeconomic	  position	  and	  education	  are	  
among	  the	  most	  important	  indications	  of	  future	  marital	  breakdown.	  In	  a	  recent	  
study	  by	  Kreager	  et	  al	  (2013)	  to	  assess	  the	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  
divorce	  in	  abusive	  marriages,	  educated	  women	  were	  found	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
consider	  divorce	  in	  abusive	  marriages	  than	  in	  non-­‐abusive	  marriages886.	  Women	  
with	  a	  college	  degree	  were	  10%	  more	  likely	  to	  divorce	  than	  those	  without	  a	  college	  
degree887.	  The	  same	  was	  found	  for	  women	  who	  earned	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  the	  
total	  family	  income888.	  The	  presence	  of	  resources	  creates	  more	  alternatives	  for	  a	  
woman,	  who	  is	  thus	  less	  likely	  to	  endure	  abuse.	  Education	  also	  sensitises	  women	  to	  
abuse,	  creating	  awareness	  that	  it	  negatively	  affects	  their	  dignity,	  self-­‐esteem	  and	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respect889.	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  these	  studies	  correspond	  with	  the	  views	  of	  the	  
participants	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	  During	  those	  interviews,	  women	  who	  had	  
gained	  their	  Bachelors’	  and	  Masters’	  degrees	  and	  who	  belonged	  to	  more	  affluent	  
backgrounds	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	  divorce	  as	  an	  
option	  for	  women.	  Some	  of	  them	  argued	  that	  a	  woman	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
dissolve	  her	  marriage	  if	  she	  is	  not	  happy,	  and	  some	  were	  quite	  adamant	  that	  the	  
khulʿ	  is	  a	  necessary	  right	  that	  all	  women	  should	  be	  aware	  of.	  These	  views	  follow	  
Gary	  Becker’s	  (1981)	  economic	  theory	  of	  the	  family.	  He	  argues	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  
education	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  women	  having	  significant	  economic	  resources	  
and	  independence	  and	  thus	  decrease	  their	  marital	  gains890.	  Following	  this	  theory,	  
conversely,	  those	  women	  from	  lower	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  and	  with	  little	  or	  
no	  formal	  education	  should	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  divorce,	  because	  of	  their	  lower	  
economic	  resources.	  This	  was	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  views	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  Chapter	  
Six.	  Those	  women	  with	  little	  or	  no	  formal	  education	  felt	  that	  women	  should	  not	  
consider	  divorce	  as	  an	  option,	  but	  should	  persevere	  and	  compromise	  in	  order	  to	  
make	  the	  marriage	  work.	  They	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  ‘modern	  
thinking’	  of	  the	  young,	  represented	  by	  Pakistani	  dramas,	  which	  were	  influencing	  
girls	  to	  insist	  on	  ‘new-­‐fangled	  rights’	  that	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  them	  rather	  than	  
bringing	  any	  benefit.	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  Ibid.	  
890	  Gary	  Becker,	  Economics	  of	  the	  Family:	  Marriage,	  Children,	  and	  Human	  Capital	  
(Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1974),	  300.	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However,	  despite	  these	  views	  and	  the	  studies	  outlined	  above,	  it	  appears	  that	  it	  is	  
that	  very	  class	  of	  women	  –	  those	  who	  did	  not	  consider	  khulʿ	  as	  an	  option	  for	  
themselves	  –	  who	  are	  entering	  the	  court	  process	  and	  making	  use	  of	  these	  new	  
rights,	  rather	  than	  those	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  and	  resources.	  Of	  the	  thirty-­‐
one	  participants	  who	  were	  interviewed,	  twenty-­‐eight	  belonged	  to	  lower	  working	  
class	  families	  with	  an	  average	  income	  of	  between	  10,000	  and	  20,000	  rupees.	  Only	  
three	  of	  the	  participants	  had	  attained	  any	  educational	  qualifications,	  whilst	  the	  
remainder	  had	  either	  not	  been	  to	  school,	  or	  had	  only	  attended	  school	  up	  until	  grade	  
six.	  Only	  three	  participants	  who	  were	  interviewed	  had	  higher	  levels	  of	  education,	  all	  
of	  whom	  belonged	  to	  lower	  middle	  class	  families.	  None	  of	  these	  three	  participants	  
worked,	  but	  their	  fathers	  had	  a	  good	  source	  of	  income.	  	  	  
	  
The	  very	  small	  sample	  in	  this	  study	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  making	  broad	  
generalisations	  in	  this	  research.	  However,	  the	  random	  sample	  of	  participants	  does	  
resonate	  with	  the	  views	  of	  all	  of	  the	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  interviewed,	  who	  stated	  
that	  khulʿ	  applications	  are	  more	  often	  pursued	  by	  girls	  who	  belong	  to	  lower	  working	  
class	  families,	  with	  low	  educational	  backgrounds,	  than	  by	  those	  from	  more	  affluent	  
families.	  William	  Goode’s	  (1993)	  theory	  on	  societal	  factors	  and	  the	  social	  
composition	  of	  divorce	  may	  help	  to	  explain	  this	  phenomenon.	  Goode	  (1993)	  argues	  
that	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  modernisation,	  when	  the	  legal,	  social	  and	  economic	  
barriers	  to	  divorce	  begin	  to	  fade,	  people	  from	  lower	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  are	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able	  to	  access	  divorce,	  as	  they	  are	  under	  more	  marital	  strain891.	  Hoem	  (1997)892	  and	  
Oppenheimer	  (1997)893	  also	  argue	  that	  poverty	  and	  lack	  of	  resources	  are	  all	  factors	  
that	  increase	  marital	  strain	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  higher	  prevalence	  of	  divorce.	  Friedberg	  
(1998)894	  and	  Wolfers	  (2003)895	  also	  suggest	  that	  libertarian	  divorce	  legislation	  
increases	  divorce	  rates	  when	  first	  implemented.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	  the	  
liberalisation	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  laws	  has	  certainly	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  increase	  
in	  divorce	  rates.	  Prior	  to	  2002,	  a	  khulʿ	  divorce	  could	  take	  between	  five	  and	  ten	  years	  
to	  achieve.	  After	  the	  2002	  Ordinance,	  the	  process	  became	  much	  quicker	  and	  
cheaper,	  with	  an	  influx	  of	  khulʿ	  applications	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years.	  Goode	  (1970)	  
suggests	  that	  stricter	  divorce	  laws	  would	  mean	  that	  only	  those	  with	  higher	  
resources	  would	  be	  able	  to	  have	  access	  to	  them,	  whilst	  more	  liberal	  laws	  would	  
make	  them	  more	  accessible	  to	  lower	  class	  families896.	  	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  even	  though	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  in	  Pakistan	  is	  still	  very	  high,	  an	  
increase	  in	  divorce	  rates	  may	  not	  necessarily	  make	  it	  a	  more	  acceptable	  remedy	  and	  
thus	  reduce	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  it.	  Instead,	  increased	  social	  interaction	  with	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  W.J.	  Goode,	  World	  Changes	  in	  Divorce	  Patterns	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  
Press,	  1993),	  20.	  
892	  J.	  Hoem,	  “Educational	  Gradients	  in	  Divorce	  Risks	  in	  Sweden	  in	  Recent	  Decades”,	  
Population	  Studies,	  51	  (1997)	  19-­‐27.	  
893	  V.K.	  Oppenhiemer,	  “Women’s	  Employment	  and	  the	  Gain	  to	  Marriage”,	  Annual	  
Review	  of	  Sociology,	  23	  (1997)	  431-­‐453.	  
894	  L.	  Friedberg,	  “Did	  Unilateral	  Divorce	  Raise	  Divorce	  Rates?	  Evidence	  From	  Panel	  
Data,	  American	  Economic	  Review,	  88	  (1988)	  608-­‐627.	  
895	  J.	  Wolfers,	  Did	  Unilateral	  Divorce	  Raise	  Divorce	  Rates?	  A	  Reconciliation	  and	  New	  
Results.	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  10014,	  Cambridge	  MA:	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  
Research	  (2003).	  




those	  who	  have	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ,	  or	  hearing	  about	  such	  women	  through	  secondary	  
sources,	  may	  mean	  that	  this	  behaviour	  can	  spread	  to	  a	  wider	  population	  (Chan	  and	  
Halpin	  2005)897.	  In	  Chapter	  Six,	  it	  was	  highlighted	  that	  it	  was	  only	  women	  from	  
lower	  socioeconomic	  and	  educational	  backgrounds	  who	  had	  ever	  met	  a	  woman	  who	  
had	  applied	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Those	  participants	  had	  more	  accurate	  knowledge	  regarding	  
the	  costs	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  the	  legal	  processes	  involved	  in	  gaining	  one.	  Those	  
participants	  from	  affluent	  backgrounds	  assumed	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  would	  be	  
very	  high	  and	  that	  the	  process	  would	  take	  a	  long	  time.	  Thus,	  whilst	  education	  may	  
provide	  more	  economic	  resources	  for	  a	  woman	  and	  offer	  her	  better	  alternatives	  to	  
remaining	  in	  an	  unhappy	  marriage,	  the	  frequency	  of	  divorce	  within	  a	  certain	  
socioeconomic	  group	  may	  be	  a	  better	  indicator	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  divorce	  
occurring.	  Twenty-­‐three	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  litigants	  interviewed	  stated	  that	  they	  either	  
personally	  knew	  of	  someone	  who	  had	  applied	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  or	  had	  heard	  of	  someone	  in	  
their	  neighbourhood	  who	  had	  done	  so.	  
	  
Although	  there	  has	  been	  a	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  divorce	  laws	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  costs,	  
the	  social	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  still	  remains.	  It	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  that	  women	  
who	  belong	  to	  more	  affluent	  families	  have	  greater	  social	  standing	  in	  the	  community	  
and	  thus	  have	  a	  lot	  more	  to	  lose	  regarding	  reputation	  and	  social	  censure.	  Family	  
lawyer	  Ali	  Shah	  also	  stated	  that	  parents	  of	  middle	  class	  families	  are	  more	  involved	  
in	  negotiations	  during	  family	  disputes.	  Since	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  family	  have	  a	  lot	  more	  
to	  lose,	  parents	  are	  active	  in	  solving	  disputes	  and	  ensuring	  that	  some	  form	  of	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  T.W.	  Chan	  and	  B.	  Haplin,	  The	  Instability	  of	  Divorce	  Risk	  Factors	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  Working	  
Paper	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compromise	  is	  reached.	  Judge	  Shamsuddin	  Iqbal	  stated	  that	  family	  and	  friends	  will	  
try	  to	  actively	  arrange	  reconciliation	  between	  a	  husband	  and	  wife898.	  The	  social	  
stigma	  of	  divorce	  is	  so	  great	  that	  a	  wife’s	  natal	  family	  may	  even	  provide	  monetary	  
incentives	  through	  increased	  dowry	  gifts,	  or	  might	  financially	  help	  their	  daughter	  
through	  bad	  economic	  times.	  Such	  an	  option	  does	  not	  exist	  for	  women	  from	  poorer	  
families.	  During	  the	  court	  research,	  most	  of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  their	  parents	  
provided	  little	  or	  no	  support	  during	  their	  marital	  disputes.	  They	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  
return	  home	  for	  relief,	  but	  were	  merely	  advised	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  patient,	  and	  to	  
compromise.	  Their	  parents	  were	  neither	  able	  to	  financially	  support	  their	  daughters	  
nor	  to	  relieve	  their	  economic	  woes;	  nor	  were	  they	  able	  to	  provide	  any	  respite	  from	  
the	  domestic	  abuse	  suffered	  by	  most	  of	  the	  participants.	  The	  failure	  of	  parents	  to	  
provide	  any	  financial	  support	  for	  their	  daughters	  in	  the	  marriage,	  or	  to	  apply	  
pressure	  on	  the	  husband	  and	  his	  extended	  family	  to	  be	  more	  accommodating	  
towards	  the	  wife,	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  contributory	  factor	  for	  higher	  khulʿ	  divorces	  
amongst	  low	  working	  class	  families	  in	  this	  survey.	  
	  
Amato	  (1997)	  also	  argues	  that	  education	  and	  resources	  can	  lead	  to	  higher	  marital	  
satisfaction.	  Amato	  and	  Rogers	  (1997)	  found	  that	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  divorce,	  such	  
as	  jealousy,	  alcoholism	  and	  drug	  abuse,	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  prevalent	  in	  those	  
with	  lower	  levels	  of	  education899.	  If	  women	  are	  in	  a	  happier	  marriage,	  they	  may	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
898	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  4th	  2014.	  
899	  P.R.	  Amato	  and	  S.J.	  Rogers,	  “A	  Longitudinal	  Study	  of	  Marital	  Problems	  and	  
Subsequent	  Divorce”,	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  and	  the	  Family	  59	  (1997):	  612-­‐624.	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less	  likely	  to	  seek	  alternatives,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  available	  to	  them900.	  Poverty	  and	  
domestic	  violence	  were	  two	  of	  the	  biggest	  factors	  cited	  by	  the	  participants	  that	  led	  
them	  to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ.	  However,	  domestic	  violence,	  dowry-­‐related	  problems	  and	  
economic	  constraints	  were	  issues	  faced	  by	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  from	  middle	  class	  
families,	  albeit	  not	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  their	  lower	  socioeconomic	  counterparts.	  Many	  of	  
the	  divorce	  litigants	  spoke	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  food	  and	  basic	  necessities	  that	  persisted	  
during	  their	  married	  life.	  When	  these	  concerns	  were	  raised	  by	  the	  wives,	  most	  of	  the	  
husbands	  responded	  with	  either	  physical	  violence	  or	  abuse.	  Thus,	  overall,	  lower	  
marital	  satisfaction	  resulted	  in	  the	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  pursuing	  alternate	  remedies,	  
as	  Amato	  (1997)	  suggests.	  
	  
7.12	  Khulʿ,	  Agency	  and	  Empowerment	  
The	  discussion	  above	  has	  highlighted	  that	  most	  of	  the	  participants	  suffered	  
emotional	  and	  physical	  abuse	  during	  their	  marriage,	  meaning	  that	  the	  right	  to	  
initiate	  a	  khulʿ	  provided	  them	  with	  a	  way	  to	  escape	  their	  unhappy	  lives.	  The	  
participants	  also	  encountered	  many	  difficulties	  in	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ,	  as	  well	  as	  
obstacles	  to	  negotiating	  post-­‐divorce	  relief.	  On	  a	  peripheral	  level,	  it	  would	  appear	  
that	  facing	  such	  obstacles	  is	  an	  example	  of	  women’s	  agency	  in	  resisting	  patriarchal	  
structures	  rather	  than	  engaging	  in	  patriarchal	  bargains,	  described	  earlier	  in	  Chapter	  
Six	  of	  this	  research.	  Challenging	  their	  roles	  as	  ‘subordinate	  and	  passive	  wives’,	  the	  
khulʿ	  provides	  a	  vehicle	  for	  women	  to	  counter	  the	  hegemony	  of	  their	  husbands	  and	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  P.	  Amato,	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  the	  Intergenerational	  Transmission	  of	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  Journal	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extended	  family	  in	  marriage.	  However,	  Muhanna	  (2013)	  raises	  two	  important	  
questions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  when	  discussing	  women	  and	  the	  use	  of	  agency.	  
Are	  women	  making	  these	  choices	  freely	  and	  autonomously	  or	  are	  they	  a	  result	  of	  
other	  dynamics	  and	  processes,	  and	  do	  such	  voices	  always	  represent	  resistance	  to	  
patriarchy901?	  If	  these	  choices	  cannot	  be	  characterised	  as	  resistance	  to	  patriarchy,	  
then	  how	  can	  they	  be	  explained902?	  Some	  feminists	  argue	  that,	  despite	  the	  
oppressive	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  system	  around	  them,	  women	  can	  make	  decisions	  and	  
choices	  that	  influence	  their	  lives903.	  	  Some	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  women	  are	  
active	  agents	  of	  change,	  and	  can	  achieve	  interests	  that	  result	  in	  a	  better	  quality	  of	  
life904.	  These	  studies	  show	  that	  women	  can	  and	  are	  resisting	  patriarchy	  and	  male	  
domination	  through	  asserting	  their	  agency.	  Others	  argue	  that	  women	  only	  bargain	  
with	  patriarchy	  and	  compromise	  with	  its	  structures905.	  Johnson	  (2006)	  for	  instance	  
states	  that	  Palestinian	  women	  engage	  in	  cousin	  marriages	  to	  ensure	  family	  stability	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  Aitemad	  Muhanna,	  Agency	  and	  Gender	  in	  Gaza:	  Masculinity,	  Femininity	  and	  Family	  
During	  the	  Second	  Intifada	  (Farnham:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2013),	  31.	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  Ibid.,	  31.	  
903	  See	  Naila	  Kabeer,	  “Resources,	  Agency,	  Achievements:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  
Measurement	  of	  Women’s	  Empowerment”,	  Development	  and	  Change,	  30	  (1999):	  
435-­‐464;	  Naila	  Kabeer,	  “Gender	  Equality	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  Women’s	  Empowerment	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  A	  Critical	  
Analysis	  of	  the	  Third	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal.”	  Gender	  and	  Development	  13,	  
no.	  1	  (2005):	  13-­‐24	  
904	  See	  A.E	  Macleod,	  Accommodating	  Protest:	  Working	  Women,	  the	  New	  Veiling,	  and	  
Change	  in	  Cairo	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1991);	  	  Dianne	  Singerman	  
and	  B.	  Ibrahim,	  “The	  Costs	  of	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  Egypt:	  A	  Hidden	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  New	  
Arab	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  Hopkins,	  (Cairo:	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University	  in	  Cairo	  Press,	  2003)	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and	  protection	  in	  the	  face	  of	  colonial	  occupation906.	  Thus	  women	  do	  not	  challenge	  or	  
resist	  the	  patriarchal	  system,	  but	  strategise	  within	  a	  constrained	  set	  of	  
circumstances	  to	  achieve	  the	  best	  result	  possible	  for	  them.	  Examples	  of	  such	  
strategies	  employed	  by	  women	  were	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  of	  this	  research.	  
	  
However,	  Muhanna	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  agency	  is	  not	  static	  and	  constant	  and	  cannot	  
be	  reduced	  simply	  to	  just	  two	  indicators,	  i.e.	  resisting	  or	  accommodating	  patriarchy.	  
Instead,	  agency	  is	  “always	  in	  motion”	  and	  can	  have	  ambiguous	  and	  unpredictable	  
outcomes907.	  Similarly,	  Lyn	  Parker	  (2005)	  argues	  that	  agency	  is	  not	  a	  monolithic	  
entity,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  employed	  uncritically	  where	  women	  are	  constrained	  in	  
their	  choices	  due	  to	  their	  social	  situation908.	  Kabeer	  (1999)	  defines	  agency	  as	  a	  key	  
dimension	  of	  empowerment,	  comprising	  “the	  ability	  to	  define	  one’s	  goals	  and	  act	  
upon	  them”909.	  Kabeer	  (1999)	  argues	  that	  agency	  encompasses	  the	  purpose	  and	  
motives	  behind	  an	  individual’s	  activity,	  characterised	  as	  the	  ‘power	  within’	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  perceptible	  nature	  of	  the	  action	  itself910.	  Similarly	  to	  Lyn	  Parker	  (2005),	  
Kabeer	  (1999)	  also	  does	  not	  view	  agency	  as	  a	  monolithic	  experience,	  but	  expands	  
her	  definition	  into	  more	  variables.	  She	  outlines	  three	  broad	  concrete	  and	  
perceptible	  methods	  of	  agency:	  deception	  and	  manipulation;	  bargaining	  and	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  Penny	  Johnson,	  “Living	  Together	  in	  a	  Nation	  of	  Fragments”,	  Living	  Palestine:	  
Family	  Survival,	  Resistance	  and	  Mobility	  Under	  Occupation,	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  Taraki	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York:	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  Press,	  2006),	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907	  Aitemad	  Muhanna,	  Agency	  and	  Gender	  in	  Gaza,	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  Lynn	  Parker,	  “Introduction”	  in	  The	  Agency	  of	  Women	  in	  Asia,	  Singapore,	  ed.	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Parker	  (Singapore:	  Marshal	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  Academic,	  2005),	  1-­‐25.	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  Nabila	  Kabeer,	  “Resources,	  Agency,	  Achievements:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  
Measurement	  of	  Women’s	  Empowerment”,	  Development	  and	  Change,	  30	  (1999):	  
438.	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negotiation;	  and	  subversion	  and	  resistance911.	  She	  also	  includes	  more	  imperceptible	  
methods	  of	  “cognitive	  processes	  of	  reflection	  and	  analysis,	  which	  can	  be	  exercised	  
by	  individuals	  as	  well	  as	  be	  collectivised”912.	  Similarly,	  O’Shaughnessy	  (2009),	  in	  her	  
study	  of	  divorce	  litigation	  in	  Indonesian	  courts,	  argues	  that	  agency	  can	  be	  both	  
ambiguous	  and	  broad-­‐ranging.	  She	  therefore	  distinguishes	  agency	  into	  three	  
categories:	  “acquiescence,	  co-­‐optation	  and	  resistance”913.	  She	  defines	  ‘acquiescence’	  
as	  accepting	  the	  existing	  power	  hierarchies,	  which	  may	  be	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  
woman	  and	  thus	  still	  be	  agentive,	  due	  to	  the	  result	  of	  the	  inherent	  cultural	  norms	  of	  
that	  society914.	  Co-­‐optation	  is	  used	  to	  define	  a	  strategy	  where	  women	  may	  use	  
‘hegemonic	  gender	  discourses’	  to	  act	  in	  their	  own	  interests	  or	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  
their	  families915,	  whilst	  resistance	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  patriarchal	  
structures	  of	  society916.	  
	  
The	  narratives	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  research	  illustrate	  different	  levels	  of	  
agency	  encapsulated	  by	  both	  Kabeer	  (1999)	  and	  O’Shaughnessy	  (2009)	  during	  their	  
decisions	  to	  adopt	  the	  khulʿ.	  Some	  of	  the	  decisions	  to	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ	  can	  be	  
characterised	  as	  being	  forced,	  rather	  than	  through	  a	  choice	  made	  freely	  and	  without	  
constraint.	  In	  the	  cases	  of	  Afreen917,	  Bahira918	  and	  Duaa919,	  all	  three	  suffered	  marital	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  Ibid.	  
913	  Kate	  O’Shaughnessy,	  Gender,	  State	  and	  Social	  Power	  in	  Contemporary	  Indonesia:	  
Divorce	  and	  Marriage	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  (Abingdon:	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  132.	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  Ibid.,	  133-­‐139.	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  Ibid.,	  139-­‐150.	  
916	  Ibid.	  
917	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  3rd	  2014.	  
918	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  15th	  2014.	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breakdown	  and	  experienced	  acute	  forms	  of	  domestic	  violence	  and	  abuse.	  However,	  
their	  parents’	  failure	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  any	  way	  meant	  that	  they	  continued	  to	  suffer	  
abuse	  for	  several	  years.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  Afreen’s	  cousin	  intervened	  after	  her	  arm	  
was	  fractured,	  and	  when	  Bahira	  and	  Duaa	  were	  thrown	  out	  of	  their	  houses,	  that	  
their	  parents	  finally	  reacted	  and	  provided	  them	  with	  safe	  places	  to	  stay.	  Whilst	  
Afreen,	  Bahira	  and	  Duaa	  all	  pursued	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  courts,	  this	  is	  more	  evidence	  of	  
their	  husbands’	  power	  and	  control	  over	  their	  lives	  and	  their	  acquiescence	  to	  it	  than	  
examples	  of	  their	  own	  agentive	  action.	  When	  I	  interviewed	  Bahira,	  she	  was	  unhappy	  
with	  her	  current	  situation.	  She	  felt	  that	  she	  had	  lost	  everything,	  despite	  being	  free	  
from	  domestic	  abuse	  and	  violence.	  She	  stated:	  “I	  have	  nothing	  now.	  My	  parents	  hate	  
me	  and	  I	  have	  nowhere	  to	  go”920.	  Bahira	  did	  not	  view	  herself	  to	  be	  in	  a	  better	  
situation,	  but	  was	  bitter	  at	  her	  husband	  for	  having	  forced	  her	  to	  come	  to	  the	  courts	  
and	  suffer	  the	  humiliation	  and	  cost,	  and	  to	  endure	  a	  life	  of	  social	  stigma	  and	  
blame921.	  She	  had	  left	  her	  dowry	  in	  the	  matrimonial	  home,	  and	  was	  still	  pursuing	  its	  
restoration	  a	  year	  after	  gaining	  her	  khulʿ.	  Duaa	  expressed	  similar	  discontentment	  at	  
having	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  endure	  constant	  taunts	  from	  members	  of	  
her	  own	  family922.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  8th	  2014.	  
920	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  15th	  2014.	  
921	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  15th	  2014.	  
922	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  8th	  2014.	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In	  the	  case	  of	  Ummayrah923,	  she	  came	  from	  a	  more	  affluent	  family	  and	  had	  not	  
wished	  to	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ.	  Although	  her	  marriage	  had	  broken	  down,	  she	  had	  asked	  
her	  husband	  to	  pronounce	  a	  ṭalāq	  rather	  than	  force	  her	  to	  attend	  court	  and	  obtain	  a	  
khulʿ.	  However,	  her	  husband	  refused	  to	  do	  so,	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  large	  amount	  
of	  deferred	  mahr	  involved.	  He	  claimed	  that	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  pay	  this	  to	  her,	  and	  
thus	  made	  her	  life	  so	  intolerable	  that	  she	  inevitably	  sought	  a	  khulʿ.	  In	  this	  instance,	  
the	  passiveness	  exhibited	  by	  her	  husband	  in	  refusing	  to	  pronounce	  a	  ṭalāq	  adversely	  
affected	  Ummayrah,	  who	  was	  forced	  to	  go	  to	  court	  to	  gain	  a	  divorce,	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  
her	  mahr.	  The	  action	  taken	  by	  Ummayrah	  in	  reality	  indicated	  her	  acquiescence	  to	  
her	  husband’s	  passivity,	  and	  thus	  Ummayrah	  felt	  disempowered	  as	  a	  result.	  
Ummayrah	  stated	  that	  she	  was	  blamed	  for	  bringing	  shame	  on	  her	  family	  and	  
bringing	  her	  personal	  business	  into	  the	  public	  courts924.	  She	  was	  also	  engaged	  in	  a	  
long	  dispute	  for	  legal	  guardianship	  of	  property	  that	  belonged	  to	  her	  children,	  and	  
was	  forced	  to	  incur	  further	  legal	  expenses.	  In	  these	  cases,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  
right	  to	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ	  is	  less	  about	  female	  agency	  and	  more	  about	  male	  power	  and	  
prestige	  in	  marriage	  and	  society.	  
	  
Kabeer	  (1999)	  also	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘passive	  forms	  of	  agency’	  and	  
‘active	  agency’.	  Passive	  agency	  is	  defined	  as	  making	  a	  decision	  when	  there	  is	  no	  real	  
alternative	  or	  little	  choice	  to	  do	  otherwise,	  whilst	  ‘active	  agency’	  is	  a	  deliberate	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923	  A	  29-­‐year-­‐old	  housewife	  with	  a	  college	  education.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  
Court	  House,	  April	  7th	  2014.	  
924	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  2nd	  2014.	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purposeful	  choice	  in	  order	  to	  maximise	  life	  choices925.	  These	  types	  of	  agency	  are	  
also	  evident	  in	  the	  narratives	  of	  the	  participants.	  For	  example,	  Shagufta926	  had	  not	  
wanted	  to	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ,	  having	  entered	  into	  a	  love	  marriage	  with	  her	  husband.	  
However,	  her	  parents	  and	  in-­‐laws	  were	  not	  happy	  at	  the	  decision,	  and	  Shagufta’s	  
mother	  was	  particularly	  forceful	  in	  insisting	  that	  she	  apply	  for	  a	  khulʿ.	  Although	  
Shagufta	  agreed	  to	  pursue	  the	  khulʿ,	  this	  was	  more	  as	  a	  result	  of	  family	  pressure	  
than	  her	  own	  agentive	  force.	  She	  acquiesced	  to	  her	  family’s	  demands,	  circumventing	  
the	  desires	  of	  her	  husband,	  who	  had	  no	  wish	  to	  come	  to	  court	  and	  enter	  into	  divorce	  
proceedings.	  Whilst	  Shagufta	  did	  not	  solely	  decide	  to	  begin	  khulʿ	  proceedings,	  acting	  
on	  her	  mother’s	  instructions	  proved	  fruitful	  for	  her.	  Threatening	  court	  proceedings,	  
albeit	  through	  ‘passive	  agency’,	  spurred	  her	  husband	  to	  declare	  his	  love	  for	  her	  and	  
promise	  to	  change.	  Thereafter,	  Shagufta	  engaged	  in	  ‘active	  agency’	  by	  denying	  her	  
mother’s	  demands,	  and	  those	  of	  her	  in-­‐laws,	  that	  she	  leave	  the	  marriage.	  Instead,	  
she	  chose	  to	  reconcile	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  maintain	  her	  marriage.	  Here,	  both	  
‘passive	  agency’,	  through	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  khulʿ,	  and	  ‘active	  agency’,	  exercised	  by	  
subsequently	  dropping	  the	  khulʿ,	  provided	  Shugufta	  with	  a	  vehicle	  to	  ensure	  that	  
her	  marriage	  was	  maintained.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925	  Nabila	  Kabeer,	  “Gender	  Equality	  and	  Women’s	  Empowerment:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  
of	  the	  Third	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal,”	  Gender	  and	  Development	  13,	  no.	  1	  
(2005):	  15.	  
926	  A	  21-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  who	  attended	  college	  until	  grade	  3.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  
Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  22nd	  2014.	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Kabeer	  (1999)	  argues	  that	  agency	  can	  also	  be	  exhibited	  through	  bargaining,	  
negotiation	  and	  manipulation.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  through	  the	  case	  of	  Rania927.	  She	  
initiated	  khulʿ	  proceedings	  solely	  as	  a	  way	  to	  force	  her	  husband	  to	  take	  her	  demands	  
seriously.	  Rania	  had	  been	  married	  for	  five	  years	  and	  had	  been	  requesting	  a	  separate	  
residence	  for	  her	  five	  children	  and	  herself.	  Her	  husband’s	  refusal	  to	  arrange	  this	  
resulted	  in	  frequent	  arguments	  and	  conflict	  between	  the	  couple,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  her	  
mother-­‐in-­‐law928.	  Rania	  stated	  that	  she	  had	  left	  her	  husband	  many	  times	  and	  moved	  
into	  her	  parents’	  home,	  but	  each	  time	  she	  had	  returned	  to	  the	  matrimonial	  home	  
after	  her	  husband	  had	  failed	  to	  change929.	  So	  she	  instigated	  khulʿ	  proceedings	  in	  
order	  to	  force	  her	  husband	  into	  action.	  Rania	  used	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  negotiate	  for	  
a	  separate	  house.	  She	  also	  stated	  that	  her	  appearing	  in	  court	  also	  reflected	  badly	  on	  
her	  husband,	  who	  would	  be	  accused	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  control	  his	  wife.	  Rania	  co-­‐
opted	  the	  social	  norms	  of	  the	  ‘submissive	  and	  obedient	  wife’	  and	  accepted	  this	  role	  
as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  She	  agreed	  to	  be	  less	  belligerent,	  and	  used	  the	  khulʿ	  as	  a	  
manipulation	  tool	  to	  achieve	  her	  aims.	  Rania	  was	  successful	  in	  her	  strategy.	  Her	  
husband	  turned	  up	  to	  court	  on	  the	  first	  court	  hearing	  and	  promised	  to	  accede	  to	  her	  
demands	  if	  she	  promised	  not	  to	  return	  to	  court.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  judge	  pushed	  the	  
case	  forward	  for	  a	  month	  in	  order	  for	  the	  couple	  to	  effect	  a	  proper	  reconciliation.	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  cases	  above	  illustrate	  various	  degrees	  of	  agency,	  some	  more	  agentive	  
than	  others,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  the	  research	  reveal	  agency	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
927	  A	  50-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  attended	  college	  up	  until	  grade	  4.	  	  




resistance	  to	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  society.	  The	  narratives	  of	  the	  participants	  
demonstrate	  that	  they	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  their	  marital	  problems	  and	  their	  right	  to	  
live	  lives	  free	  of	  abuse	  and	  violence.	  They	  possessed	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  choices	  in	  
their	  decision	  to	  divorce,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  social	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions.	  For	  
example,	  Gulnar930	  had	  suffered	  physical	  abuse	  from	  her	  husband	  and	  in-­‐laws	  for	  
several	  years.	  However,	  she	  received	  no	  support	  from	  her	  family	  or	  friends,	  who	  
disapproved	  of	  her	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ.	  But	  Gulnar	  was	  able	  to	  ‘define	  her	  
goals	  and	  act	  upon	  them’931	  despite	  their	  opposition.	  She	  was	  also	  able	  to	  reflect	  on	  
her	  motivation	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  her	  actions,	  which	  Kabeer	  refers	  to	  as	  “the	  power	  
within”932.	  Gulnar	  defended	  her	  position	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  a	  maid	  she	  knew	  had	  also	  
obtained	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  was	  leading	  a	  better	  life	  than	  when	  she	  was	  married.	  Gulnar	  
faced	  opposition	  from	  both	  her	  parents	  and	  her	  extended	  family	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  
khulʿ,	  but	  still	  pursued	  it	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  exercising	  her	  freedom	  of	  choice.	  
	  
The	  participants’	  decision	  to	  adopt	  the	  difficult	  route	  of	  khulʿ	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  their	  
dowry	  and	  maintenance	  suits	  also	  shows	  their	  ability	  to	  prioritise	  their	  needs	  and	  
interests.	  These	  women	  pursued	  a	  khulʿ	  in	  the	  face	  of	  community	  censure	  and	  social	  
stigma	  as	  a	  way	  to	  maximise	  the	  positive	  results	  secured	  from	  the	  situation	  they	  
were	  in.	  Some	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  faced	  with	  patriarchal	  structures	  not	  only	  
within	  the	  matrimonial	  home	  but	  also	  within	  the	  legal	  process	  itself.	  The	  insistence	  
on	  reconciliation	  measures	  from	  some	  judges	  was	  resisted	  by	  many	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930	  A	  27-­‐year-­‐old	  maid	  who	  attended	  school	  up	  until	  grade	  6.	  Interview,	  Lahore	  
Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  15th	  2014.	  
931	  Kabeer,	  “Resources,	  Agency,	  Achievements,”	  438.	  
932	  Kabeer,	  “Resources,	  Agency,	  Achievements,”	  438.	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participants,	  who	  were	  adamant	  that	  they	  would	  prefer	  a	  life	  of	  blame	  and	  censure	  
rather	  than	  endure	  more	  years	  of	  physical	  and	  mental	  abuse.	  Kausar’s933	  case	  is	  a	  
prime	  example	  of	  this	  active	  agency.	  I	  met	  up	  with	  Kausar	  three	  months	  after	  the	  
first	  interview	  at	  court.	  She	  had	  been	  granted	  her	  khulʿ	  two	  months	  after	  that	  last	  
hearing,	  but	  was	  still	  waiting	  for	  her	  child	  maintenance	  claim.	  As	  of	  that	  date,	  the	  
judge	  had	  made	  no	  interim	  order	  of	  maintenance	  and	  she	  had	  received	  no	  monies	  
from	  her	  husband.	  I	  asked	  her	  how	  she	  considered	  her	  life	  now	  as	  compared	  to	  her	  
previous	  married	  life.	  Kausar	  informed	  me	  that	  her	  parents	  were	  forced	  to	  support	  
her,	  and	  most	  of	  her	  family	  viewed	  her	  in	  a	  bad	  way934.	  They	  blamed	  her	  for	  the	  
divorce,	  and	  everyone	  would	  have	  preferred	  it	  if	  she	  had	  compromised	  and	  stayed	  
with	  her	  husband.	  She	  stated:	  “I’m	  lucky.	  My	  aunt	  said,	  ‘He	  never	  hit	  you	  a	  lot.	  You	  
should	  have	  stayed’”935.	  Kausar	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  financial	  burden	  of	  raising	  
her	  daughter	  alone	  and	  did	  not	  envisage	  ever	  re-­‐marrying,	  commenting,	  “Who	  would	  
want	  me	  and	  my	  daughter?”936	  In	  order	  to	  support	  herself,	  Kausar	  had	  begun	  to	  sew	  
clothes	  for	  local	  ladies	  and	  was	  using	  the	  money	  to	  purchase	  extra	  goods	  that	  her	  
parents	  could	  not	  afford.	  Kausar	  accepted	  that	  she	  was	  not	  in	  an	  ideal	  situation,	  but	  
the	  fact	  that	  she	  could	  sew	  and	  keep	  her	  money	  rather	  than	  have	  it	  taken	  away	  from	  
her	  by	  her	  husband	  and	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  were	  very	  hard-­‐won	  victories.	  Kabeer	  
(2005)	  argues	  that	  agency	  combined	  with	  resources	  results	  in	  ‘empowerment’,	  the	  
process	  by	  which	  one	  acquires	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  choices	  previously	  denied	  to	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  A	  20-­‐year-­‐old	  seamstress	  who	  attended	  school	  up	  until	  grade	  3.	  	  





one937,	  and	  represents	  “the	  potential	  that	  people	  have	  for	  living	  the	  lives	  they	  
want”938.	  For	  Kausar,	  the	  use	  of	  agency	  in	  divorce	  and	  utilising	  her	  skill	  as	  a	  
seamstress	  provided	  the	  resources	  for	  her	  empowerment. 	  
	  
Kabeer	  (2005)	  also	  argues	  that	  empowerment	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  reflection	  of	  material	  
resources,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  woman	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  her	  own	  worth	  and	  
achievements939.	  Several	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  relieved	  and	  happy	  to	  have	  left	  
their	  marriages,	  and	  felt	  more	  confident	  at	  having	  negotiated	  the	  court	  process	  and	  
achieved	  some	  gains	  regarding	  obtaining	  their	  khulʿ	  and	  some	  of	  their	  dowry.	  
Muneera	  stated	  that	  she	  had	  no	  regrets	  in	  pursuing	  her	  khulʿ940.	  During	  her	  
marriage,	  she	  was	  living	  in	  acute	  poverty	  and	  received	  no	  support	  from	  her	  husband	  
or	  her	  own	  parents.	  Despite	  the	  opposition	  she	  faced,	  Muneera	  stated:	  “At	  least	  I	  can	  
breathe	  now,	  I	  can	  eat	  now,	  I	  can	  sleep	  whenever	  I	  want”941.	  Although	  she	  had	  lost	  
most	  of	  her	  dowry	  and	  was	  subject	  to	  constant	  criticism	  from	  her	  bhabi,	  Muneera	  
was	  satisfied	  with	  her	  choices.	  
	  
However,	  many	  of	  the	  narratives	  post-­‐divorce	  also	  reflect	  the	  constraints	  on	  the	  life	  
choices	  that	  have	  been	  made.	  Resisting	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  Pakistani	  society	  
was	  considered	  to	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  heavy	  cost	  for	  the	  participants.	  Their	  search	  for	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  Kabeer,	  “Gender	  Equality	  and	  Women’s	  Empowerment,”	  13.	  
938	  Kabeer,	  “Resources,	  Agency,	  Achievements,”	  438.	  
939	  Nabila	  Kabeer,	  “Gender	  Equality	  and	  Women's	  Empowerment:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  
of	  the	  Third	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal,”	  Gender	  and	  Development	  13,	  no.	  1	  
(2005):	  15.	  




an	  improved	  life	  through	  a	  khulʿ	  exposed	  them	  to	  serious	  social	  consequences.	  Many	  
of	  the	  participants	  stated	  that	  they	  had	  lost	  the	  emotional	  support	  of	  their	  families	  
and	  were	  shunned	  from	  family	  gatherings.	  Their	  divorced	  status	  had	  become	  a	  topic	  
of	  gossip	  amongst	  neighbours,	  who	  were	  constantly	  reminding	  them	  of	  this	  fact.	  
Others,	  such	  as	  Imaan,	  felt	  that	  their	  morals	  and	  piety	  were	  questioned,	  and	  that	  
they	  had	  been	  labelled	  as	  non-­‐virtuous	  and	  tarnished	  ladies942.	  The	  psychological	  
and	  emotional	  trauma	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  participants	  but	  extended	  to	  the	  wider	  
family.	  Zulaykah	  said	  that	  her	  father	  had	  suffered	  a	  heart	  attack	  shortly	  after	  her	  
khulʿ	  had	  become	  public	  knowledge	  amongst	  the	  family943,	  whilst	  Ummayrah	  and	  
Rifaat	  spoke	  of	  the	  shame	  and	  humiliation	  their	  families	  felt	  at	  them	  being	  at	  home,	  
particularly	  when	  guests	  visited944.	  None	  of	  the	  participants	  envisaged	  that	  they	  
would	  ever	  remarry,	  expecting	  instead	  to	  live	  the	  remainder	  of	  their	  lives	  with	  the	  
label	  of	  ‘divorcee’.	  Some	  stated	  that	  they	  now	  preferred	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  house	  and	  
avoided	  social	  gatherings	  during	  Eid	  or	  weddings.	  	  	  
	  
Thus,	  whilst	  many	  of	  these	  women	  had	  bravely	  circumvented	  patriarchal	  structures	  
of	  male	  hegemony	  in	  marriage	  and	  in	  court,	  some	  had	  now	  acceded	  to	  the	  social	  and	  
cultural	  norms	  of	  subordination	  within	  their	  family	  homes.	  Some	  of	  the	  participants,	  
who	  had	  willingly	  opted	  for	  a	  khulʿ	  through	  ‘active	  agency’	  rather	  than	  passive	  
agency,	  did	  not	  regret	  their	  decision	  to	  adopt	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  were	  grateful	  for	  its	  
existence.	  However,	  the	  social	  costs	  were	  very	  high,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  their	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  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  
943	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  23rd	  2014.	  
944	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  8th	  2014.	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failure	  to	  enforce	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  and	  retrieve	  their	  dowries.	  These	  two	  
issues	  were	  cited	  as	  being	  among	  their	  biggest	  regrets.	  Nineteen	  of	  the	  participants	  
stated	  that	  if	  they	  had	  known	  of	  the	  difficulties	  they	  would	  encounter	  in	  court,	  they	  
would	  have	  planned	  matters	  more	  effectively.	  Rifaat	  stated	  that	  she	  would	  have	  
tried	  to	  take	  parts	  of	  her	  dowry	  slowly,	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  before	  formally	  
separating945.	  Zulaykah	  stated	  that	  she	  would	  have	  taken	  her	  clothes	  and	  small	  
items	  of	  jewellery946.	  The	  loss	  of	  the	  dowry	  and	  failure	  to	  enforce	  child-­‐support	  
payments	  were	  viewed	  just	  as	  negatively	  as	  the	  social	  censure	  that	  they	  received	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  their	  divorces.	  
	  
Kabeer	  (2005)	  also	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘effective’	  and	  ‘transformative’	  agency.	  
Effective	  agency	  “implies	  a	  greater	  efficiency	  in	  carrying	  out	  one’s	  given	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities”947.	  This	  research	  illustrates	  that	  on	  one	  level	  the	  participants’	  
engagement	  in	  effective	  agency	  through	  the	  khulʿ	  enabled	  them	  to	  leave	  abusive	  
marriages	  and	  empower	  themselves	  personally.	  They	  were	  able	  to	  escape	  marital	  
oppression	  and	  achieve	  significant	  change	  in	  their	  lives	  by	  improving	  their	  overall	  
safety	  and	  that	  of	  their	  children.	  However,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  implement	  
‘transformative	  agency’,	  which	  Kabeer	  (2005)	  defines	  as	  the	  “ability	  to	  act	  on	  the	  
restrictive	  aspects	  of	  these	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  in	  order	  to	  challenge	  them”948.	  
The	  participants’	  inability	  to	  combat	  and	  thwart	  community	  censure	  or	  secure	  their	  
economic	  rights	  indicates	  that	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  achieve	  empowerment	  on	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
945	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  3rd	  2014.	  
946	  Interview,	  Lahore	  Family	  Court	  House,	  April	  8th	  2014.	  




‘transformative’	  level,	  as	  indicated	  by	  Kabeer	  (2005).	  Whilst	  the	  khulʿ	  increased	  
their	  individual	  agency,	  their	  exclusion	  from	  community	  life	  meant	  that	  this	  was	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  their	  social	  existence.	  The	  khulʿ	  provides	  physical	  and	  emotional	  
safety	  as	  well	  as	  freedom	  to	  work	  and	  engage	  in	  gainful	  employment,	  but	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  it	  serves	  to	  disempower	  women	  within	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  
perpetuates	  serotypes	  of	  the	  disobedient	  and	  immoral	  divorcee/wife.	  
	  
7.13	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  highlighted	  the	  manifold	  problems	  that	  women	  have	  to	  overcome	  
in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  the	  courts	  and	  obtain	  marital	  freedom.	  Although	  the	  
legal	  framework	  has	  created	  a	  relatively	  simple	  procedure	  for	  the	  implementation	  
of	  the	  khulʿ,	  administrative	  matters	  during	  the	  court	  proceedings	  result	  in	  delays	  
and	  increased	  costs.	  Lack	  of	  information	  and	  knowledge	  of	  court	  proceedings	  lead	  to	  
longer	  cases	  than	  necessary.	  Moreover,	  the	  failure	  of	  lawyers	  to	  consult	  adequately	  
with	  their	  clients	  by	  providing	  relevant	  information	  about	  the	  legal	  proceedings	  not	  
only	  creates	  further	  delays,	  but	  also	  fosters	  a	  sense	  of	  mistrust	  between	  the	  
participants	  and	  their	  lawyers,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  judges.	  The	  chaotic	  proceedings	  in	  
court	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  systematic	  mechanism	  for	  the	  hearing	  of	  cases	  add	  to	  the	  
strain	  and	  stress	  of	  court	  appearances	  for	  the	  participants.	  	  
	  
It	  was	  also	  found	  that,	  although	  women	  are	  able	  to	  successfully	  apply	  for	  the	  khulʿ,	  
there	  is	  little	  or	  no	  success	  in	  gaining	  relief	  in	  post-­‐divorce	  matters	  of	  personal	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maintenance,	  child	  support	  and	  restoration	  of	  the	  dowry.	  This	  is	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  failure	  of	  wives	  to	  prove	  the	  existence	  of	  their	  husbands’	  income,	  or	  to	  prove	  
ownership	  of	  their	  dowries.	  However,	  the	  failure	  of	  some	  judges	  to	  implement	  the	  
law	  with	  sufficient	  rigour	  compounds	  the	  situation.	  Rather	  than	  enforce	  the	  strict	  
letter	  of	  the	  law,	  which	  would	  be	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  husband,	  some	  courts	  
reproduce	  gendered	  cultural	  norms	  of	  a	  husband’s	  right	  to	  property	  and	  penalise	  
women	  for	  obtaining	  the	  khulʿ.	  The	  leniency	  displayed	  by	  some	  judges	  towards	  
husbands	  who	  fail	  to	  make	  child	  maintenance	  payments	  means	  that	  male	  power	  
within	  marriage	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  not	  challenged.	  Judicial	  discretion	  and	  
policy	  mean	  that	  courts	  consistently	  fail	  to	  penalise	  husbands	  for	  their	  failure	  to	  
support	  their	  children	  and	  return	  dowries.	  Moreover,	  rather	  than	  chastise	  husbands	  
for	  their	  abominable	  behaviour	  during	  marriage,	  many	  wives	  are	  exhorted	  to	  return	  
and	  ‘try	  harder’,	  and	  are	  encouraged	  to	  remain	  submissive	  and	  passive	  in	  their	  
relationships.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  also	  illustrated	  that	  several	  factors	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  breakdown	  
of	  marital	  life.	  Dowry	  disputes,	  financial	  constraints	  and	  interference	  from	  extended	  
family	  members	  were	  all	  cited	  as	  reasons	  for	  instigating	  the	  khulʿ.	  However,	  
domestic	  violence	  and	  abuse	  was	  indicated	  as	  the	  pivotal	  and	  decisive	  reason	  for	  
divorce.	  In	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	  participants	  suffered	  from	  physical	  and	  
emotional	  abuse	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  husbands,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  from	  their	  
mothers	  and	  fathers-­‐in-­‐law.	  Unfortunately,	  very	  few	  of	  the	  participants	  found	  any	  
relief	  from	  friends	  or	  family,	  and	  suffered	  the	  abuse	  alone	  and	  in	  silence.	  It	  was	  also	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found	  that	  those	  women	  who	  chose	  to	  break	  free	  from	  these	  unhappy	  marriages	  
primarily	  belonged	  to	  lower	  working	  class	  families	  or	  were	  from	  poorer	  
backgrounds.	  Most	  had	  little	  or	  no	  formal	  schooling,	  and	  were	  either	  employed	  in	  
low-­‐paid	  jobs	  or	  did	  not	  work.	  The	  participants	  were	  also	  very	  young,	  both	  at	  the	  
age	  of	  marriage	  and	  also	  at	  the	  time	  of	  applying	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  marriage.	  
Moreover,	  the	  marriages	  that	  ended	  in	  divorce	  were	  also	  relatively	  short,	  with	  the	  
longest	  marriage	  having	  lasted	  for	  just	  five	  years.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  has	  also	  shown	  that,	  despite	  the	  legal	  difficulties	  encountered	  during	  
court	  proceedings,	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  an	  important	  legal	  remedy	  for	  women	  who	  wish	  to	  
leave	  an	  unhappy	  marriage.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  is	  also	  an	  expression	  of	  resistance	  
to	  patriarchal	  structures	  in	  Pakistani	  society,	  and	  an	  illustration	  of	  women’s	  agency	  
to	  overcome	  the	  hegemonic	  gendered	  roles	  of	  family	  life.	  The	  perseverance	  of	  many	  
of	  the	  participants	  in	  overcoming	  family	  pressure	  and	  community	  censure	  are	  clear	  
examples	  that	  Pakistani	  women	  are	  not	  merely	  passive	  victims	  of	  male	  oppression	  
in	  the	  family,	  but	  can	  be	  active	  agents	  of	  control	  and	  power	  in	  their	  own	  lives.	  
Recourse	  to	  the	  law	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  can	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  female	  
empowerment	  in	  marriage.	  However,	  the	  cost	  of	  this	  agency	  and	  self-­‐empowerment	  
is	  also	  very	  high.	  Whilst	  the	  women	  were	  able	  to	  achieve	  ‘effective’	  agency	  on	  a	  
personal	  level,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  achieve	  transformative	  change	  at	  any	  public	  or	  
social	  level.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  this	  will	  not	  happen.	  But	  from	  the	  narratives	  of	  
these	  participants,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  have	  had	  to	  pay	  a	  very	  high	  price	  for	  






8.1	  Findings	  of	  the	  Research	  
	  
This	  research	  has	  been	  a	  socio-­‐legal	  study	  of	  the	  Islamic	  remedy	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  has	  
investigated	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  legal	  device	  has	  been	  able	  to	  empower	  women	  
through	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights.	  After	  providing	  a	  theological	  and	  historical	  
context	  to	  this	  study,	  the	  research	  has	  delved	  into	  the	  responses	  of	  women	  from	  the	  
cloistered	  shelter	  of	  their	  homes	  to	  the	  public	  stage	  of	  the	  courts.	  This	  research	  has	  
provided	  a	  window	  onto	  the	  private	  and	  often	  hidden	  lives	  of	  women	  to	  inquire	  
about	  their	  marital	  lives,	  and	  see	  what	  factors	  allow	  them	  to	  break	  free	  of	  their	  
unhappy	  marriages	  or	  prevent	  them	  from	  doing	  so.	  By	  listening	  to	  their	  voices	  and	  
thus-­‐far	  untold	  stories,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  a	  more	  realistic	  account	  has	  been	  given	  of	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  divorce	  law	  reform	  has	  affected	  married	  women	  in	  Pakistan,	  as	  well	  
as	  suggesting	  areas	  for	  law	  reform.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  is	  quite	  capable	  of	  providing	  
effective	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  rights	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  
unfortunate	  that	  for	  many	  years	  these	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  scriptures	  have	  been	  
misinterpreted	  and	  misapplied	  by	  religious	  scholars,	  judicial	  officers	  and	  
academicians	  in	  the	  past	  and	  present-­‐day	  Pakistan.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  highlights	  
that	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  Ḥanafī	  madhhab	  provided	  the	  right	  to	  a	  khulʿ	  to	  women	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irrespective	  of	  their	  husbands’	  wishes	  and	  without	  the	  need	  to	  prove	  a	  particular	  
ground	  for	  divorce.	  Moreover,	  they	  never	  envisaged	  that	  women	  should	  be	  
needlessly	  penalised	  for	  seeking	  a	  khulʿ	  through	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr.	  Rather,	  this	  
was	  made	  dependent	  upon	  the	  nushūz	  of	  either	  party,	  a	  fact	  that	  has	  been	  neglected	  
by	  scholars	  for	  many	  years.	  This	  research	  is	  extremely	  important	  for	  Pakistani	  
women,	  as	  calls	  for	  further	  divorce-­‐law	  reform	  have	  been	  met	  with	  resistance	  from	  
religious	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  who	  believe	  that	  the	  current	  
khulʿ	  divorce	  laws	  are	  a	  deviation	  away	  from	  Ḥanafī	  fiqh.	  Most	  recently,	  the	  Islamic	  
Council	  of	  Ideology	  stated	  that	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  khulʿ	  by	  the	  Pakistani	  courts	  without	  
the	  consent	  of	  the	  husband	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  the	  Sunna,	  and	  called	  for	  
its	  abolition	  in	  its	  current	  form949.	  Unfortunately,	  these	  conservative	  religious	  forces	  
play	  an	  extremely	  active	  role	  in	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  cannot	  be	  
ignored	  when	  proposals	  for	  reform	  are	  put	  forward.	  They	  gain	  moral	  high	  ground	  
by	  claiming	  to	  legitimate	  their	  views	  through	  an	  adherence	  to	  the	  Ḥanafī	  madhhab,	  
and	  shoot	  down	  any	  attempts	  to	  deviate	  from	  it,	  particularly	  if	  they	  perceive	  
proposals	  to	  be	  through	  some	  form	  of	  ijtihād.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  
rights	  of	  women	  within	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  in	  general,	  and	  through	  divorce	  law	  
reform	  in	  Pakistan	  more	  specifically,	  it	  is	  extremely	  important	  not	  only	  to	  engage	  
with	  the	  primary	  sources	  of	  Islam,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  also	  to	  have	  due	  deference	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to	  existing	  juristic	  principles	  of	  Islamic	  law	  and	  to	  the	  Ḥanafī	  madhhab,	  as	  I	  have	  
attempted	  to	  do	  in	  this	  research.	  
	  
In	  the	  same	  vein,	  this	  research	  has	  highlighted	  that	  when	  proposals	  for	  reform	  are	  
made	  through	  an	  adoption	  of	  the	  classical	  techniques	  of	  takhayyur	  or	  talfīq,	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  acceptance	  and	  thus	  enforcement	  is	  much	  higher.	  The	  efforts	  of	  
Maulana	  Ashraf	  Ali	  Thanawi,	  for	  example,	  were	  much	  more	  successful	  than	  those	  of	  
the	  Rashid	  Commission	  of	  1955	  purely	  because	  of	  the	  former’s	  adherence	  to	  
accepted	  juristic	  principles	  within	  the	  four	  madhhabs	  when	  advocating	  reform.	  
Moreover,	  by	  creating	  a	  coalition	  of	  the	  leading	  ʿulamāʾ	  of	  his	  time,	  Thanawi	  was	  
able	  to	  confer	  ‘Islamic’	  legitimacy	  to	  his	  proposals.	  This	  strategy	  was	  also	  successful	  
in	  the	  judicial	  development	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  The	  landmark	  case	  of	  Balquis	  Fatima	  was	  
not	  widely	  followed	  precisely	  because	  the	  ruling	  in	  it	  attempted	  to	  understand	  the	  
Qurʾān	  and	  Sunna	  directly,	  without	  recourse	  to	  the	  learned	  authorities	  of	  Islam.	  
Judicial	  precedent	  was	  only	  strictly	  followed	  a	  decade	  later,	  after	  Justice	  Rahman’s	  
painstaking	  approach	  to	  providing	  arguments	  based	  upon	  classical	  Islamic	  legal	  
texts950.	  Although	  he	  endorsed	  the	  views	  of	  Justice	  Kaikus	  in	  the	  Balquis	  Fatima	  
case,	  his	  more	  nuanced	  approach,	  and	  his	  deference	  to	  established	  jurists	  of	  the	  
past,	  proved	  more	  palatable	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  follow.	  This	  research	  has	  illustrated	  
that	  whilst	  ijtihād	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  legal	  device	  within	  Islamic	  
jurisprudence,	  reform	  of	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  in	  Pakistan	  has	  a	  much	  greater	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chance	  of	  success	  if	  traditional	  legal	  devices	  are	  exhausted	  before	  other	  avenues	  are	  
implemented.	  
	  
This	  study	  has	  also	  revealed	  that	  law	  does	  not	  operate	  within	  a	  vacuum,	  and	  that	  
despite	  the	  judicial	  endeavours	  and	  legislative	  reforms	  in	  Pakistan,	  the	  failure	  to	  
provide	  a	  broader	  framework	  of	  legal,	  social	  and	  economic	  reform	  has	  limited	  the	  
scope	  of	  its	  achievements.	  This	  research	  has	  shown	  that,	  whilst	  many	  women	  are	  
aware	  of	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce,	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  perceive	  this	  
as	  a	  positive	  initiative.	  Indeed,	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  women	  interviewed	  
exhibited	  dismay	  at	  any	  talk	  of	  divorce	  –	  particularly	  one	  initiated	  by	  a	  woman	  –	  and	  
were	  clearly	  of	  the	  view	  that	  divorce	  was	  not	  a	  right	  but	  a	  liability.	  They	  looked	  
unfavourably	  upon	  women	  who	  might	  take	  this	  exit	  route	  out	  of	  marriage,	  and	  
preferred	  that	  women	  tolerate	  an	  unhappy	  marriage	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  children.	  
Crucially,	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  felt	  that	  the	  khulʿ	  could	  only	  provide	  short-­‐term	  
relief	  and	  would	  not	  alleviate	  the	  poverty	  and	  social	  stigma	  that	  they	  would	  face	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  divorce.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  State	  to	  provide	  a	  broader	  framework	  of	  reforms	  
that	  could	  provide	  financial	  security	  to	  women	  meant	  that	  for	  many,	  the	  khulʿ	  would	  
create	  more	  problems	  than	  it	  solved.	  Instead,	  these	  women	  preferred	  to	  engage	  in	  
‘patriarchal	  bargains’	  with	  their	  husbands	  and	  extended	  families	  by	  submitting	  to	  
their	  demands	  in	  return	  for	  some	  measure	  of	  long-­‐term	  marital	  security.	  The	  
experiences	  and	  voices	  of	  these	  women	  have	  also	  illustrated	  that	  despite	  low	  
socioeconomic	  standards	  and	  even	  illiteracy,	  their	  lived	  realities	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  
they	  are	  passive	  victims:	  rather,	  they	  are	  struggling	  hard	  for	  themselves	  and	  for	  the	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sake	  of	  their	  children.	  They	  are	  continually	  engaged	  in	  a	  balancing	  act	  to	  protect	  
their	  interests	  and	  those	  of	  their	  children.	  For	  these	  women,	  informal	  solutions	  
within	  marriage	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  stability	  than	  formal	  recourse	  
to	  the	  law	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  khulʿ.	  
	  
The	  primary	  findings	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  also	  revealed	  that	  those	  women	  who	  chose	  to	  
resort	  to	  the	  khulʿ	  faced	  a	  number	  of	  obstacles	  in	  court.	  Many	  of	  the	  litigants	  were	  
faced	  with	  absent	  husbands	  who	  deliberately	  forced	  the	  lengthening	  of	  divorce	  
proceedings,	  inducing	  unnecessary	  court	  delays	  and	  expense.	  The	  general	  apathy	  of	  
the	  Pakistani	  legal	  system	  was	  compounded	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  many	  judges	  to	  enforce	  
legal	  measures	  designed	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  divorce	  process.	  This	  is	  partly	  attributed	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  no	  specialised	  family	  law	  judges	  who	  are	  trained	  specifically	  
to	  deal	  with	  family	  law	  cases;	  instead,	  judges	  are	  chosen	  at	  random,	  depending	  upon	  
their	  availability	  at	  the	  time	  when	  a	  case	  is	  assigned951.	  This	  lack	  of	  expertise	  and	  
wide	  disparity	  in	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  cases	  was	  clearly	  evident,	  with	  some	  
judges	  being	  more	  concerned	  than	  others	  with	  ensuring	  that	  reconciliation	  occurred	  
between	  the	  husband	  and	  wife,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  latter’s	  wishes.	  During	  the	  khulʿ	  
proceedings,	  many	  of	  the	  judges	  also	  failed	  to	  pass	  an	  ex	  parte	  judgement	  in	  favour	  
of	  the	  wife,	  even	  though	  she	  was	  legally	  entitled	  to	  one,	  and	  there	  was	  also	  a	  wide	  
disparity	  in	  the	  issuing	  of	  arrest	  warrants	  when	  defendant	  husbands	  failed	  to	  make	  
child-­‐support	  payments.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
951	  S.	  4	  of	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  states	  that	  any	  district	  judge	  can	  be	  appointed	  
as	  a	  judge	  of	  the	  family	  courts.	  The	  provincial	  government	  therefore	  has	  no	  need	  to	  




There	  was	  also	  a	  paucity	  of	  public	  information	  regarding	  the	  khulʿ	  proceedings,	  
which	  resulted	  in	  frustration	  and	  mistrust	  between	  the	  participants	  and	  their	  legal	  
representatives.	  This	  research	  has	  revealed	  that	  many	  of	  the	  female	  khulʿ	  litigants	  
were	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  legal	  proceedings	  and	  had	  not	  been	  fully	  briefed	  by	  their	  
counsel.	  Many	  also	  felt	  that	  they	  had	  been	  overcharged	  by	  their	  lawyers,	  and	  were	  
unaware	  of	  the	  legal	  costs	  of	  the	  writ	  and	  ancillary	  matters.	  The	  female	  litigants	  also	  
felt	  very	  vulnerable	  and	  exposed	  in	  the	  male-­‐dominated	  courthouse,	  and	  were	  often	  
subject	  to	  ridicule	  and	  abuse	  from	  complete	  strangers	  as	  well	  as	  their	  former	  
husbands	  and	  their	  extended	  families.	  Although	  the	  State	  is	  obliged	  to	  establish	  one	  
or	  more	  family	  courts	  in	  each	  district	  of	  Pakistan952,	  rather	  than	  create	  independent	  
family	  courthouses,	  any	  courtroom	  is	  simply	  declared	  a	  family	  court	  by	  the	  local	  
government,	  irrespective	  of	  its	  suitability	  for	  hearing	  sensitive	  family	  law	  cases953.	  
This	  has	  meant	  that	  serious	  criminal	  cases	  involving	  murder	  or	  sexually	  motivated	  
crimes	  are	  often	  held	  next	  door	  to	  family	  court	  hearings	  involving	  vulnerable	  
women	  and	  children.	  Such	  close	  proximity	  of	  these	  conflicting	  jurisdictions	  places	  
unnecessary	  strain	  on	  female	  divorce	  litigants.	  
	  
Whilst	  most	  participants	  managed	  to	  obtain	  a	  khulʿ	  from	  the	  courts	  and	  exhibited	  
many	  forms	  of	  ‘effective’	  agency,	  many	  of	  them	  felt	  that	  this	  was	  an	  empty	  victory	  
due	  to	  their	  failure	  to	  secure	  ancillary	  financial	  relief	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
952	  S.	  3	  Family	  Court	  Act	  1964.	  
953	  S.	  6	  of	  the	  FCA	  states	  “Subject	  to	  any	  general	  or	  special	  orders	  of	  Government	  in	  
this	  behalf,	  a	  Family	  Court	  shall	  hold	  its	  sitting	  at	  such	  place	  or	  places	  within	  the	  
District	  or	  areas	  for	  which	  it	  is	  established	  as	  may	  be	  specified	  by	  the	  District	  Judge”	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children.	  Their	  inability	  to	  secure	  the	  return	  of	  their	  dowries	  or	  claim	  adequate	  
child-­‐support	  maintenance	  meant	  that	  many	  of	  them	  escaped	  the	  servitude	  of	  their	  
marriages	  only	  to	  then	  become	  completely	  dependent	  upon	  their	  natal	  families	  for	  
food	  and	  shelter.	  Their	  struggles	  for	  marital	  freedom	  impeded	  their	  efforts	  to	  
exercise	  ‘transformative’	  agency	  within	  their	  social	  environment.	  The	  manifold	  
problems	  that	  women	  encounter	  when	  attending	  court,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  social	  and	  
cultural	  norms	  present	  in	  Pakistani	  society,	  suggest	  that	  a	  broader	  framework	  of	  
reforms	  needs	  to	  be	  implemented	  to	  truly	  empower	  women	  within	  the	  marital	  
arena.	  The	  Pakistani	  Constitution	  provides	  constitutional	  commitments	  to	  achieve	  
gender	  equality	  through	  the	  elimination	  of	  gender	  discrimination954	  and	  outlines	  
that	  all	  citizens	  are	  equal	  before	  the	  law955.	  However,	  it	  also	  empowers	  the	  State	  to	  
make	  special	  provisions	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  women	  and	  children956	  and	  obligates	  
the	  State	  to	  protect	  marriage,	  the	  family,	  the	  mother	  and	  the	  child957	  and	  to	  ensure	  
the	  availability	  of	  inexpensive	  and	  expeditious	  justice958.	  These	  constitutional	  
provisions	  provide	  a	  clear	  framework	  for	  the	  state	  to	  amend	  family	  laws	  in	  favour	  of	  
women	  and	  children,	  and	  thus	  the	  following	  recommendations	  are	  made	  based	  
upon	  this	  research	  work.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
954	  Aysha	  Shahid,	  “Post-­‐Divorce	  Maintenance	  For	  Muslim	  Women	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  
Bangladesh:	  A	  Comparative	  Perspective”,	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Policy	  and	  the	  
Family	  27,	  no.	  2	  (2013),	  197-­‐215,	  200.	  
955	  Article	  25	  (1).	  
956	  Article	  25	  (2).	  
957	  Article	  35.	  
958	  Article	  37	  (d).	  	  The	  State	  has	  been	  defined	  to	  include	  ‘judicial	  officers’	  by	  the	  
Supreme	  Court.	  See	  Mst	  Fazal	  Jan	  v.	  Roshan	  Din	  PLD	  1990	  SC	  661	  665.	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8.2	  Recommendations	  for	  Reform	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  family	  courts	  be	  located	  in	  a	  completely	  separate	  
building,	  away	  from	  other	  judicial	  jurisdictions.	  Moreover,	  separate	  waiting	  rooms	  
should	  be	  created	  where	  female	  litigants	  and	  children	  can	  wait	  until	  their	  cases	  are	  
called,	  protecting	  them	  from	  the	  likelihood	  of	  abuse	  and	  ridicule	  from	  angry	  
husbands	  and	  their	  relatives.	  This	  will	  also	  provide	  privacy	  for	  women	  to	  nurse	  
their	  children.	  Such	  waiting	  rooms	  should	  also	  be	  equipped	  with	  television	  screens	  
broadcasting	  the	  court	  proceedings	  to	  the	  waiting	  litigants,	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  
harassment	  from	  members	  of	  their	  husbands’	  families,	  which	  often	  occurs	  in	  open	  
court959.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  after	  khulʿ	  proceedings	  are	  finished	  and	  
female	  litigants	  have	  to	  return	  to	  court	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis	  to	  receive	  their	  child-­‐
support	  monies.	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  husbands	  should	  provide	  such	  monies	  to	  
the	  judge	  or	  clerk	  without	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  ex-­‐wife,	  who	  can	  watch	  from	  the	  
waiting	  room	  and	  be	  called	  if	  deemed	  necessary	  by	  the	  judge.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  specialised	  family	  law	  judges	  be	  appointed	  to	  deal	  solely	  
with	  family	  law	  cases.	  If	  a	  judge	  is	  able	  to	  concentrate	  on	  one	  field	  of	  law,	  then	  he	  or	  
she	  will	  be	  fully	  acquainted	  with	  all	  of	  the	  procedural	  rules	  and	  regulations	  of	  that	  
branch	  of	  the	  law	  and	  will	  thus	  be	  able	  to	  dispose	  of	  cases	  more	  effectively.	  Daily	  
dealing	  with	  and	  exposure	  to	  family	  law	  cases	  will	  allow	  a	  judge	  to	  understand	  the	  
emotional,	  social	  and	  cultural	  complexities	  of	  family	  law	  cases	  in	  Pakistan,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
959	  The	  courts	  would	  also	  have	  the	  power	  to	  turn	  off	  the	  screens	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  hold	  
a	  private	  hearing.	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will	  assist	  in	  providing	  ‘better	  remedies’,	  as	  outlined	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Pakistan960.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  it	  be	  made	  mandatory	  for	  every	  civil	  judge	  appointed	  as	  a	  
family	  law	  judge	  to	  attend	  intensive	  training	  in	  Muslim	  personal	  law	  and	  Pakistani	  
family	  law.	  Courses	  specialising	  in	  khulʿ	  litigation,	  child	  support	  maintenance	  and	  
guardianship	  cases	  should	  be	  specially	  formulated,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  cultural	  
norms	  of	  Pakistani	  society	  and	  considering	  how	  best	  to	  provide	  effective	  remedies	  
to	  litigants.	  Currently	  there	  are	  only	  two	  judicial	  academies	  in	  the	  whole	  of	  Pakistan	  
–	  the	  Federal	  Judicial	  Academy,	  established	  by	  the	  federal	  government,	  and	  the	  
Sindh	  Judicial	  Academy,	  established	  by	  the	  Sindh	  provincial	  government	  –	  and	  
wider	  use	  should	  be	  made	  of	  their	  services961.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  remaining	  three	  provinces	  (Punjab,	  Baluchistan	  and	  
the	  North-­‐West	  Frontier)	  also	  set	  up	  similar	  training	  academies	  to	  ensure	  that	  
judges	  from	  all	  areas	  of	  Pakistan	  have	  suitable	  access	  to	  training	  academies.	  If	  
uniform	  professional	  instructions	  can	  be	  given	  to	  all	  family	  law	  judges,	  then	  this	  will	  
allow	  more	  consistency	  in	  court	  decisions,	  as	  well	  as	  ensure	  that	  the	  judges	  are	  fully	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
960	  In	  Adnan	  Afzal	  v.	  Capt.	  Sher	  Afzal	  PLD	  1969	  SC	  187,	  193,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
interpreted	  the	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  to	  provide	  ‘better	  remedies’	  
to	  women	  and	  children	  
961	  A	  visit	  of	  the	  Federal	  Judicial	  Academy	  (www.fja.gov.pk)	  reveals	  that	  there	  are	  no	  
specialist	  training	  courses	  available	  for	  civil	  judges	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	  family	  
law.	  	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  course	  available,	  which	  provides	  general	  instruction	  
in	  family	  law	  procedures	  and	  is	  specifically	  reserved	  for	  female	  judges	  only.	  	  See	  
http://www.fja.gov.pk/uploaded_files/calendar_2015-­‐2016.pdf,	  last	  accessed	  
4.01.2016	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aware	  of	  their	  powers,	  particularly	  when	  dealing	  with	  recalcitrant	  husbands	  and	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  judicial	  orders.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  family	  court	  cases	  means	  that	  
judges	  have	  the	  daunting	  task	  of	  ensuring	  that	  procedural	  rules	  are	  followed	  and	  
that	  they	  remain	  neutral	  whilst	  navigating	  a	  minefield	  of	  moral	  and	  ethical	  issues	  
relating	  to	  marriage	  and	  divorce.	  From	  the	  field	  work,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  there	  
was	  tension	  between	  judges	  who	  based	  their	  decisions	  on	  following	  the	  law	  strictly	  
or	  following	  legal	  precedent	  and	  those	  who	  based	  their	  decisions	  on	  what	  they	  
perceived	  would	  benefit	  the	  family	  as	  a	  whole.	  Therefore,	  training	  courses	  will	  equip	  
judges	  not	  only	  with	  knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  implement	  the	  law	  more	  successfully	  and	  
consistently,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  skills	  to	  deal	  with	  vulnerable	  women	  and	  children	  
within	  the	  court	  system.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  family	  judges	  be	  provided	  with	  refresher	  courses	  on	  the	  
powers	  available	  to	  them	  to	  award	  ex	  parte	  khulʿ	  applications	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
provide	  expedited	  justice,	  as	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  amendments	  clearly	  
dictate.	  Judges	  need	  to	  be	  reminded	  about	  the	  detriments	  to	  all	  parties	  of	  
unnecessary	  delays	  that	  take	  place	  in	  family	  court	  cases	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  
judicial	  decorum	  and	  control	  of	  their	  courtrooms.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  refresher	  courses	  should	  also	  include	  details	  about	  judicial	  
powers	  of	  arrest	  warrants	  that	  must	  be	  issued	  if	  a	  husband	  continually	  fails	  to	  




*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  judicial	  powers	  to	  punish	  violent	  husbands962	  be	  included	  
in	  these	  refresher	  courses.	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  judges	  be	  provided	  with	  judicial	  
directives	  during	  these	  training	  courses,	  and	  be	  advised	  to	  use	  these	  powers	  as	  a	  
bargaining	  tool	  on	  behalf	  of	  wives	  to	  ensure	  that	  child	  support	  and	  dowry	  claims	  are	  
enforced,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  combat	  domestic	  violence	  in	  marriages.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act	  1964	  be	  amended	  so	  that	  a	  separate	  
application	  for	  enforcing	  maintenance	  decrees	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  wife	  should	  not	  have	  
to	  be	  made.	  This	  only	  serves	  to	  increase	  court	  expenses	  and	  delays	  in	  receiving	  
monies	  owed	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  wife	  and	  children.	  Instead,	  once	  a	  maintenance	  order	  is	  
passed	  after	  the	  khulʿ,	  then	  the	  mode	  of	  execution	  of	  that	  order	  should	  also	  be	  stated	  
by	  the	  judge,	  so	  that	  the	  defendant	  husband	  is	  ordered	  to	  make	  immediate	  
payments	  and	  warned	  of	  criminal	  sanctions	  in	  the	  event	  of	  failure	  to	  pay.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  proviso	  to	  s.	  10(4)	  of	  the	  Family	  Courts	  Act,	  which	  
requires	  the	  compulsory	  return	  of	  the	  mahr	  in	  consideration	  of	  the	  khulʿ,	  should	  be	  
abolished.	  This	  will	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  complete	  clarity	  in	  the	  law,	  and	  will	  send	  a	  
strong	  message	  to	  women	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  automatically	  financially	  penalised	  
for	  seeking	  a	  divorce.	  Instead,	  policy	  directives	  should	  be	  provided	  to	  judges	  when	  
deciding	  if	  and	  how	  much	  mahr	  should	  be	  returned	  to	  the	  husband.	  It	  was	  
illustrated	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  that	  family	  court	  judges	  have	  already	  set	  judicial	  
precedents	  regarding	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  mahr	  should	  be	  returned.	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
962	  S.	  5(2)	  FCA	  as	  amended	  in	  2002	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has	  also	  been	  held	  that	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  wife	  during	  the	  marriage	  should	  also	  
be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  deciding	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  return	  of	  the	  mahr,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  husband.	  Therefore,	  training	  should	  be	  provided	  to	  
family	  court	  judges	  regarding	  the	  correct	  Ḥanafī	  opinion	  on	  this	  matter,	  as	  well	  as	  
written	  policy	  directives	  and	  outlines	  of	  legal	  precedent.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  large	  posters	  be	  put	  up	  on	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  courts	  detailing	  
the	  costs	  and	  process	  of	  the	  khulʿ	  and	  other	  family	  law	  cases.	  Currently,	  the	  walls	  
outside	  the	  courtrooms	  are	  filled	  with	  old,	  torn	  campaign	  posters	  belonging	  to	  
lawyers	  contesting	  positions	  in	  numerous	  bar	  elections.	  Such	  posters	  should	  be	  
taken	  down	  and	  replaced	  with	  ones	  providing	  important	  details	  to	  potential	  
litigants.	  These	  can	  include	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  guide	  to	  how	  a	  khulʿ	  and	  other	  such	  cases	  
should	  proceed,	  and	  should	  include	  information	  such	  as	  what	  documents	  are	  
required	  and	  how	  many	  copies.	  Other	  posters	  can	  include	  how	  to	  initiate	  a	  plaint	  
and	  the	  costs	  involved	  in	  typing	  the	  plaint,	  how	  to	  issue	  a	  writ,	  how	  to	  send	  one	  to	  
three	  consecutive	  summons,	  how	  to	  advertise	  the	  summons	  in	  a	  newspaper	  and	  the	  
cost	  of	  photocopying	  documents.	  All	  of	  these	  steps	  are	  taken	  by	  the	  lawyers	  outside	  
the	  court	  building	  and	  are	  relatively	  inexpensive.	  However,	  the	  female	  litigants	  
mentioned	  that	  exorbitant	  amounts	  had	  been	  charged	  for	  these	  legal	  duties.	  By	  
outlining	  the	  basic	  costs	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  litigants	  will	  then	  be	  able	  to	  judge	  how	  
much	  each	  lawyer	  is	  actually	  spending	  upon	  each	  attendance.	  These	  posters	  should	  
also	  contain	  details	  of	  how	  to	  overcome	  the	  possibility	  of	  missing	  documents	  (such	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as	  birth	  certificates	  and	  copies	  of	  the	  marriage	  contract),	  the	  process	  of	  sworn	  
affidavits,	  and	  addresses	  and	  phone	  numbers	  of	  the	  local	  union	  offices.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  government	  initiate	  a	  free	  legal	  aid	  scheme	  aimed	  
particularly	  at	  women	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  are	  given	  free,	  easily	  accessible	  advice	  
pertaining	  to	  marriage	  and	  divorce.	  In	  particular,	  they	  should	  be	  provided	  with	  
workshops	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  and	  the	  clauses	  that	  are	  
contained	  within	  it	  that	  have	  been	  specifically	  inserted	  to	  protect	  them	  in	  marriage	  
and	  divorce.	  This	  would	  include	  the	  function	  of	  the	  mahr,	  and	  should	  emphasise	  the	  
importance	  of	  documenting	  dowries.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  rights	  in	  Islam	  be	  taught	  as	  a	  
separate	  topic	  in	  schools.	  Islamic	  studies	  (Islamiyyat)	  is	  already	  a	  compulsory	  part	  
of	  the	  school	  curriculum	  in	  all	  private	  and	  public	  educational	  sectors.	  A	  separate	  
section	  on	  women’s	  Islamic	  legal	  rights	  in	  marriage,	  divorce	  and	  inheritance	  should	  
be	  introduced	  within	  the	  Islamiyyat	  syllabi	  in	  schools,	  along	  with	  an	  explanation	  of	  
the	  statutory	  provisions	  available	  to	  women	  to	  enforce	  these	  rights.	  During	  such	  
classes,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah,	  the	  mahr,	  dowry	  
lists,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  inserting	  marriage	  stipulations	  within	  the	  marriage	  
contract	  be	  discussed	  in	  schools	  to	  ensure	  that	  as	  many	  members	  of	  society	  as	  
possible	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  rights	  within	  Islam.	  In	  particular,	  these	  documents	  
should	  be	  made	  physically	  available	  for	  all	  students	  to	  study	  so	  that	  they	  can	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familiarise	  themselves	  with	  them	  and	  be	  properly	  informed	  when	  making	  decisions	  
regarding	  their	  marriages	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  be	  amended	  with	  a	  clause	  inserted	  
detailing	  what	  dowry,	  if	  any,	  a	  wife	  has	  brought	  to	  the	  marriage.	  Just	  as	  the	  amount	  
of	  the	  mahr	  must	  be	  inserted,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  a	  clause	  should	  allow	  a	  list	  to	  be	  
inserted	  detailing	  all	  the	  dowry	  items	  brought	  to	  the	  marriage	  by	  the	  wife	  and	  their	  
value.	  The	  amended	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  should	  also	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  details	  entered	  
into	  the	  marriage	  contract	  will	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dispute,	  
and	  thus	  it	  should	  be	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	  what	  gifts	  were	  exchanged	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  the	  marriage.	  	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  government	  create	  a	  pamphlet	  that	  explains	  in	  detail	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  as	  a	  legal	  document	  to	  be	  kept	  safe,	  and	  
highlight	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  different	  clauses	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  protect	  women	  
during	  a	  dispute.	  	  
	  
*	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  an	  addendum	  to	  S.5	  (5)	  (i)	  be	  added	  to	  the	  MFLO	  to	  make	  
it	  mandatory	  for	  the	  nikāḥ	  registrar	  to	  read	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  pamphlet	  to	  both	  
parties	  individually	  before	  the	  solemnisation	  of	  the	  marriage.	  Under	  S.5	  (2)	  of	  the	  
MFLO,	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  is	  issued	  by	  an	  official	  called	  the	  nikāḥ	  registrar,	  and	  it	  is	  his	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duty	  to	  provide	  all	  marriage	  documents	  to	  the	  marriage	  parties963.	  Once	  provided,	  
both	  parties	  should	  attest	  that	  they	  have	  understood	  the	  contents	  and	  then	  sign	  the	  
pamphlet.	  Only	  after	  the	  pamphlet	  has	  been	  signed	  should	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  be	  
completed.	  This	  will	  hopefully	  give	  the	  prospective	  wife	  and	  her	  family	  some	  
opportunity	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  nikāḥ-­‐nāmah	  and	  complete	  the	  marriage	  contract	  
accordingly.	  	  
	  
8.3	  Areas	  for	  Further	  Research	  
A	  particular	  area	  that	  I	  have	  not	  addressed	  in	  my	  recommendations	  is	  that	  of	  the	  
problems	  surrounding	  khulʿ	  and	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  in	  Pakistan.	  Chapter	  
Seven	  revealed	  that	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  problems	  facing	  women	  pursuing	  a	  
khulʿ	  is	  their	  loss	  of	  financial	  support	  from	  their	  husbands	  after	  the	  dissolution	  of	  
their	  marriage.	  Under	  current	  statutory	  and	  common	  law	  provisions,	  divorced	  wives	  
are	  only	  liable	  to	  be	  maintained	  by	  their	  husbands,	  known	  as	  the	  mata’a,	  for	  up	  to	  
three	  months	  after	  the	  divorce	  is	  finalised,	  which	  is	  described	  as	  the	  period	  of	  ʿidda.	  
Regardless	  of	  how	  long	  a	  woman	  may	  have	  been	  in	  a	  marriage,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  she	  may	  have	  financially	  contributed	  to	  her	  husband’s	  overall	  wealth,	  current	  
judicial	  practice	  has	  refused	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  extending	  the	  period	  of	  
maintenance	  any	  further	  than	  the	  period	  of	  ʿidda964.	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  extremely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
963	  S.	  5(5)	  MFLO	  1961.	  	  Once	  the	  marriage	  contract	  is	  completed	  it	  must	  be	  
registered	  at	  the	  local	  union	  council	  office	  (S.5	  (5)	  MFLO	  1961).	  
964	  The	  MFLO	  is	  silent	  on	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  and	  the	  judiciary	  have	  
categorically	  stated	  that	  maintenance	  beyond	  the	  period	  of	  Iddah	  is	  “illegal	  and	  
without	  lawful	  authority”.	  	  See	  Saadia	  Begum	  v.	  Jangreez	  (2004)	  vol.	  LVI,	  Pesh	  213	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detrimental	  to	  a	  divorced	  wife,	  and	  is	  a	  primary	  reason	  why	  many	  women	  choose	  to	  
remain	  in	  abusive	  marriages,	  as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	  Pakistan	  does	  not	  have	  a	  
welfare	  state,	  so	  a	  divorced	  woman	  has	  no	  source	  of	  income	  other	  than	  receiving	  
handouts	  from	  her	  own	  natal	  family	  or	  friends.	  There	  are,	  however,	  Qurʾānic	  
injunctions	  that	  clearly	  state	  that	  divorced	  women	  should	  be	  maintained	  by	  their	  ex-­‐
husbands	  for	  a	  reasonable	  period965.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Qurʾān	  states	  that,	  
“…divorced	  women	  must	  also	  be	  provided	  with	  maintenance	  according	  to	  what	  is	  
fair.	  This	  is	  compulsory	  for	  the	  pious”966.	  There	  are	  no	  provisos	  for	  this	  verse,	  only	  
that	  the	  maintenance	  should	  be	  ‘reasonable’.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  posited	  by	  most	  
scholars	  that	  classical	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  mata’a	  to	  be	  
extended	  beyond	  the	  ʿidda	  period,	  and	  thus	  it	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  
decades	  by	  religious	  scholars	  and	  the	  judiciary	  for	  preventing	  the	  extension	  of	  
maintenance	  rights	  post-­‐marriage967.	  I	  would	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  this	  particular	  
area	  needs	  further	  research,	  with	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  original	  Ḥanafī	  texts	  regarding	  
their	  position	  on	  this	  matter.	  In	  particular,	  is	  it	  accurate	  to	  state	  that	  Ḥanafī	  
jurisprudence	  does	  not	  allow	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  after	  the	  ʿidda	  period	  has	  
elapsed	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  and,	  if	  so,	  what	  is	  the	  rationale	  behind	  these	  
views?	  Shahid	  (2013)	  states	  that	  Shāfiʿī	  fiqh	  does	  contemplate	  a	  post-­‐divorce	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
965	  Al-­‐Qura’n	  2:	  236,	  Al-­‐Quran	  2:	  241,	  Al-­‐Qura’n	  65:6-­‐7.	  
966	  Al-­‐Quran	  2:	  241.	  
967	  See	  Ayesha	  Shahid,	  “Post-­‐Divorce	  Maintenance	  for	  Muslim	  Women	  in	  Pakistan	  
and	  Bangladesh:	  A	  Comparative	  Perspective,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Policy	  
and	  the	  Family,	  27,	  no.	  2	  (2013):	  197-­‐215,	  204-­‐210	  who	  details	  the	  Pakistan	  Law	  
and	  Justice	  Commissions	  unsuccessful	  attempts	  to	  amend	  S.9	  of	  the	  MFLO	  to	  include	  
provisions	  of	  post-­‐divorce	  maintenance	  (Report	  No.	  77:	  10-­‐3)	  in	  1999	  and	  2009.	  
Shahid	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  these	  reform	  proposals	  were	  rejected	  by	  the	  Islamic	  
Ideology	  Council	  as	  being	  un-­‐Islamic	  and	  not	  based	  on	  Ḥanafī	  jurisprudence.	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maintenance	  period	  beyond	  the	  ʿidda968,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  
talfīq,	  so	  elegantly	  applied	  by	  Thanawi	  in	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  female-­‐initiated	  divorce	  
laws	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  further	  research	  in	  this	  area.	  It	  
is	  also	  of	  note	  that	  mata’a	  has	  been	  included	  in	  family	  law	  reforms	  in	  other	  Muslim	  
countries,	  including	  Qatar,	  Egypt,	  Morocco,	  Malaysia	  and	  Iran969.	  	  	  
	  
Further	  research	  is	  also	  needed	  regarding	  the	  socio-­‐demographic	  characteristics	  of	  
khulʿ	  litigants.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  this	  research,	  all	  of	  the	  thirty-­‐one	  participants	  
who	  had	  obtained	  or	  were	  going	  through	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining	  a	  khulʿ	  belonged	  
to	  low	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds.	  However,	  the	  small	  number	  of	  participants	  
involved	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  make	  the	  broad	  generalisation	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  only	  
women	  from	  poorer	  backgrounds	  who	  are	  utilising	  the	  khulʿ	  process.	  I	  would	  
recommend	  that	  quantitative-­‐based	  research	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  district	  courts	  of	  
Lahore,	  using	  questionnaires	  to	  find	  out	  which	  demographic	  group	  of	  women	  are	  in	  
fact	  making	  use	  of	  these	  new	  laws,	  and	  what	  different	  experiences,	  if	  any,	  they	  have	  
had	  in	  their	  court	  experience.	  	  
	  
It	  would	  also	  be	  ideal	  to	  follow	  up	  this	  research	  by	  conducting	  further	  qualitative	  
interviews	  with	  these	  particular	  thirty-­‐one	  participants,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  other	  khulʿ	  
litigants,	  at	  least	  a	  year	  or	  two	  after	  they	  have	  obtained	  their	  khulʿ	  decrees.	  It	  would	  
be	  extremely	  important	  to	  find	  out	  how	  these	  women	  have	  fared	  after	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





dissolution	  of	  their	  marriages,	  and	  what	  successes	  or	  failures	  they	  perceived	  that	  
they	  had	  achieved	  in	  their	  post-­‐divorce	  lives.	  Were	  they	  able	  to	  successfully	  
integrate	  back	  into	  their	  pre-­‐marital	  lives?	  And	  what	  problems	  have	  they	  faced	  from	  
family,	  friends	  and	  potential	  employers	  as	  newly	  divorced	  women?	  Such	  research	  is	  
important	  because	  if	  it	  can	  highlight	  the	  particular	  hurdles	  and	  obstacles	  that	  these	  
women	  face	  post-­‐divorce,	  then	  discussion	  can	  begin	  on	  bringing	  about	  reforms	  and	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GLOSSARY	  OF	  ARABIC	  WORDS	  
	  
Ashʿariyya	  	   The	  followers	  of	  Abu-­‐al-­‐Hassan	  Ashʿariyyi,	  an	  early	  
theological	  school	  of	  law	   	   	  
Iftidāʾ,	  	   	   	   A	  separation	  
Ikhtilā	  	   	   	   The	  process	  of	  detachment	  or	  extraction	  
Badal	   	   	   	   Some	  form	  of	  recompense	  
Barāʾat	   	   	   To	  become	  free	  
Bara’ah	   	   	   To	  release	  
Darar	   	   	   	   Hurt	  
Fa-­‐lahā	  	   	   	   Freedom	  
Faqīh,	  pl.	  Fuqahāʾ	  	   	   Islamic	  jurist	  
Fasād	  	  	   	   	   To	  create	  mischief	  or	  conflict	  
Faskh	   	  	   	   	   Annulment	  or	  Dissolution	  of	  marriage	  
Fiqh	  	   	   	   	   Islamic	  jurisprudence	  
Ghusl	   	   	   	   Ablution	  of	  the	  full	  body	  
Hadith,	  pl.	  AHadith	  	   Reports	  that	  describe	  the	  words,	  action	  and	  habits	  of	  
the	  Holy	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  (s.a.w)	  
Ḥanafī	  	   One	  of	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  Sunni	  jurisprudence,	  named	  
after	  its	  founder,	  Abū	  Ḥanīfa	  an-­‐Nu'man	  ibn	  Thābit	  	  
Ḥanbalī	  	   One	  of	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  Sunni	  jurisprudence,	  named	  
after	  its	  founder,	  Ahmad	  ibn	  Hanbal	  
Harām	  	   	   	   Prohibited	  or	  unlawful	  in	  Islam	  
Hukm	   	  	   	   	   A	  commandment	  derived	  from	  religious	  scripture	  
ʿIdda	  	   	   	   	   Mandatory	  waiting	  period	  for	  a	  woman	  after	  divorce	  
Ijmāʿ	  	   	   	   	   Consensus	  of	  opinion	  by	  Muslim	  scholars	  
Ijtihād	  	   	   	   Independent	  reasoning	  
Ikrāh	   	   	   	   Coercion	  or	  compulsion	  
	  ‘Iwad	   	   	   	   Some	  form	  of	  compensation	  
Jāʿiz	  	   	   	   	   Permissible	  
Janoon	  	   	   	   Insanity	  
Kathīr	   	   	   	   Abundance	  
Kufr	  	   	   	   	   Disbelief	  
Libas	   	   	   	   Clothing	  or	  dress	  
Māl	  	   	   	   	   Wealth	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Madhhab	  	   	   	   A	  doctrine	  or	  school	  of	  thought	  in	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  
Mahr	  	   Obligatory	  dowry	  given	  by	  the	  husband	  to	  the	  wife	  upon	  
marriage	  
Mahr	  al-­‐mithl	  	   	   Dowry	  which	  is	  given	  to	  women	  of	  similar	  standing	  	  
Mahr-­‐al-­‐Muajaal	  	   	   Dowyr	  paid	  to	  the	  wife	  promptly	  upon	  marriage	  
Makrūh	  	   	   	   An	  act	  that	  is	  disliked	  or	  detested	  
Makrūh-­‐al-­‐Taḥrīmī	  	   	   An	  act	  that	  is	  strongly	  disliked	  or	  strongly	  detested	  
Mālikī	  	   One	  of	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  Sunni	  jurisprudence,	  named	  
after	  its	  founder,	  Mālik	  ibn	  Anas	  
Maqāṣid	   	   	   Aim	  or	  purpose	  
Maslaha	   	   	  	   In	  the	  public	  interest	  or	  common	  good	  
Maulvis	  	   	   	   Urdu	  word	  to	  describe	  a	  religious	  teacher	  
Mubāraʾa	  	   A	  divorce	  through	  mutual	  consent	  with	  the	  release	  of	  
financial	  obligations	  of	  a	  husband	  towards	  his	  wife	  
Mufāʿala	  	   Arabic	  grammatical	  term	  denoting	  the	  involvement	  of	  
two	  persons	  
Mujtahid	  	   A	  person	  who	  has	  an	  extensive	  knowledge	  of	  Islam	  and	  
is	  qualified	  to	  engage	  in	  ijtihād.	  
Murtad	  	   	   	   One	  who	  rejects	  faith	  or	  an	  apostate	  
Nafaqa	  	   Husband’s	  liability	  to	  provide	  food	  and	  clothing	  to	  his	  
wife	  
Nikāḥ	   	  	   	   	   Contract	  of	  marriage	  
Nushūz	  	   	   	   Marital	  discord/harm	  
Qāḍī	  	   	   	   	   Muslim	  judge	  
Qalīl	   	   	   	   Little	  or	  less	  
Qiyās	  	   	   	   	   Analogy	  
Sahih	  	   	   	   	   Authentic	  
Ṣaḥāba	  	   The	  companions	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  (s.a.w)	  who	  
embraced	  Islam	  in	  his	  lifetime	  
Sarf	   Arabic	  grammatical	  device	  explaining	  the	  change	  and	  
patterns	  of	  Arabic	  words	  
Shāfiʿi	  	   One	  of	  the	  four	  schools	  of	  Sunni	  jurisprudence,	  named	  
after	  its	  founder,	  Abū	  ʿAbdullāh	  Muhammad	  ibn	  Idrīs	  al-­‐
Shāfiʿi	  
Sharah	  	   	   	   Explanation	  or	  commentary	  
Shariah	  	   	   	   Islamic	  laws	  derived	  from	  the	  Qurʾān	  and	  hadith	  	  
Suknā	   	  	   	   	   Husband’s	  liability	  to	  provide	  housing	  to	  his	  wife	  
Sunna	   	  	   	   	   Recommended	  practices	  of	  the	  Prophet	  
Tābiʿīn	  	   Second	  generation	  followers	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  
(s.a.w)	  who	  were	  the	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  ṣaḥāba	  
Talāq	   	   	   	   Divorce	  
Talāq-­‐ul-­‐Bain	  	   	   An	  irrevocable	  divorce	  
Talāq-­‐ul-­‐Tafwīḍ	  	   Where	  a	  husband	  delegates	  his	  right	  of	  divorce	  to	  his	  
wife	  




Takhayyur	   Adopting	  different	  opinions	  from	  within	  one	  or	  more	  
schools	  of	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  
Tamkīn	   	   	   To	  enable	  or	  consolidate	  
Taqlīd	  	  	   	   	   Adherence	  to	  one	  school	  of	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  
Thawb	  	   	   	   An	  ankle-­‐length	  garment	  
ʿUlamāʾ	  	   	   	   A	  group	  of	  Muslim	  scholars	  
Wahshat	  	   	   	   Hideous	  or	  terrible	  
Wājib	  	  	   	   	   Obligatory	  
Zina	  	   	   	   	   Unlawful	  sexual	  relations	  outside	  marriage	  












Figure	  2	  Map	  of	  Lahore	  
	  
	  






Participant	  Information	  Sheet	  
	  
Purpose	  of	  the	  study	  
My	  name	  is	  Ghazala	  Hassan	  Qadri.	  	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  enrolled	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Birmingham.	  	  I	  am	  conducting	  research	  on	  women’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  I	  will	  
be	  talking	  to	  a	  number	  of	  women	  about	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  divorce	  laws	  of	  Pakistan	  
and	  within	  Islam.	  	  I	  will	  be	  asking	  them	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  
easier	  access	  to	  divorce	  and	  what	  problems	  they	  think	  exist	  within	  Pakistani	  culture	  
and	  society	  for	  women	  who	  want	  a	  divorce.	  	  
	  
Your	  Participation	  
If	  you	  agree	  to	  take	  part,	  I	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  sign	  a	  consent	  form.	  	  I	  will	  then	  ask	  you	  to	  
answer	  some	  questions	  in	  an	  interview.	  	  There	  aren’t	  any	  right	  or	  wrong	  answers	  –	  I	  
just	  want	  to	  hear	  about	  your	  opinions.	  	  The	  interview	  should	  not	  take	  more	  than	  an	  
hour	  at	  the	  longest.	  	  	  You	  do	  not	  have	  to	  answer	  all	  the	  questions.	  	  Please	  note	  that	  some	  
of	  the	  questions	  will	  relate	  to	  your	  personal	  life	  experiences.	  You	  can	  pass	  on	  any	  
question	  that	  makes	  you	  feel	  uncomfortable.	  You	  can	  pull	  out	  of	  the	  interview	  at	  any	  
time.	  
	  
Do	  you	  have	  to	  take	  part?	  
No,	  taking	  part	  is	  voluntary.	  	  If	  you	  do	  not	  want	  to	  take	  part,	  you	  do	  not	  have	  to	  give	  a	  
reason	  and	  no	  pressure	  will	  be	  put	  on	  you	  to	  try	  and	  change	  your	  mind.	  	  Please	  note:	  if	  
you	  choose	  not	  to	  participate,	  or	  pull	  out	  during	  the	  interview,	  this	  will	  not	  negatively	  
affect	  you	  in	  any	  way	  
	  
Confidentiality	  
Hand	  written	  notes	  will	  be	  made	  of	  the	  interview.	  	  It	  will	  also	  be	  audio	  recorded.	  	  
However,	  your	  name	  will	  not	  be	  audio	  taped.	  	  If	  you	  feel	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  audio	  
recording,	  you	  can	  request	  that	  it	  be	  turned	  off	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  interview.	  	  
Insights	  given	  by	  you	  and	  other	  participants	  will	  be	  used	  in	  writing	  up	  my	  thesis	  for	  my	  
PhD.	  	  Although	  direct	  quotes	  from	  you	  may	  be	  used	  in	  the	  paper,	  your	  name	  or	  any	  
identifying	  information	  will	  not	  be	  associated	  with	  any	  part	  of	  the	  written	  thesis. My	  
supervisor,	  a	  second	  marker	  and	  an	  external	  examiner	  will	  see	  the	  thesis.	  Future	  
students	  on	  the	  course	  may	  read	  the	  thesis	  and	  this	  study	  may	  be	  published	  in	  a	  
research	  journal.	  	  	  
	  
What	  will	  happen	  to	  the	  information	  you	  give?	  
The	  data	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  study.	  On	  completion	  of	  the	  




What	  are	  the	  possible	  disadvantages	  of	  taking	  part?	  
I	  don’t	  envisage	  any	  negative	  consequences	  for	  you	  in	  taking	  part.	  However,	  if	  you	  feel	  
that	  your	  family	  or	  friends	  will	  object	  to	  this	  interview,	  you	  may	  wish	  to	  withdraw	  from	  
this	  interview	  at	  any	  time.	  
	  
Any	  further	  queries?	  	  
If	  you	  need	  any	  further	  information,	  you	  can	  contact	  me:	  Ghazala	  Hassan	  Qadri.	  





I………………………………………agree	   to	   participate	   in	  Ghazala	  Hassan	  Qadri’s	   research	  
study.	  
	  
The	  purpose	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  study	  has	  been	  explained	  to	  me	  orally	  and	  in	  writing.	  
	  
I	  am	  participating	  voluntarily.	  
	  
I	  do/do	  not	  give	  permission	  for	  my	  interview	  to	  be	  noted	  down	  in	  writing	  
	  
I	  do/do	  not	  give	  permission	  for	  my	  interview	  to	  be	  audio	  recorded	  
	  
I	  understand	  that	  I	  can	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study,	  without	  repercussions,	  at	  any	  time,	  
whether	  before	  it	  starts	  or	  while	  I	  am	  participating.	  
	  
I	   understand	   that	   I	   can	   withdraw	   permission	   to	   use	   the	   data,	   in	   which	   case	   the	  
material	  will	  be	  deleted.	  
	  
I	   understand	   that	   anonymity	   will	   be	   ensured	   in	   the	   write-­‐up	   by	   disguising	   my	  
identity.	  
	  
I	  understand	  that	  disguised	  extracts	  from	  my	  interview	  may	  be	  quoted	  in	  the	  thesis	  
and	  any	  subsequent	  publications	  if	  I	  give	  permission	  below:	  
	  
I	  agree/do	  not	  agree	  to	  quotation/publication	  of	  extracts	  from	  my	  interview	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PhD ليیے کے تکميیل جزوویی کی تقاضوںں کے مقالہہ 	 
معلوماتت ليیے کے وواالوںں ليینے حصہہ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو 	 
مقاصد وو ااَغرااضض 	 
 ڈڈیی اايیچ پی ميیں برمنگهھم آآفف ووررسڻٹی يیونی ميیں ہے۔ قاددرریی حسن غزاالہہ ميیراانامم    
 ااپنے ہوںں۔ ررہی کر تحقيیق پر ططالقق حقِ  کے خوااتيین ميیں پاکستانن ميیں ہوںں۔ ااسکالر
 کے ططالقق ميیں تناظظر ااسالمی ميیں پاکستانن سے خوااتيین مختلف ليیے کے مقالہہ تحقيیقی
 کرنا معلومم يیہہ سے خوااتيین ميیں ہيیں۔ ددررکارر معلوماتت ميیں باررےے کے آآگہی سے قواانيین
 ررااستہہ آآسانن ليیے کے کرنے حاصل ططالقق ميیں حاالتت ناگزيیر اانتہائی کہہ گی چاہوںں
 پاکستانی ميیں خيیالل کے اانن ااوورر ہيیں آآررااء کيیا کی اانن ميیں سلسلے کے کرنے ااختيیارر
 مسائل کيیا ميیں ررااهه کی کرنے حاصل ططالقق کو عوررتت اايیک ميیں سوسائڻٹی ااوورر کلچر
ہيیں۔ ددررپيیش 	 
ضابطہہ کا شرکت 	 
 سب تو ہيیں چاہتی ليینا حصہہ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو متعلقہہ سے موضوعع باال مذکوررهه ااگرآآپپ    
 آآپپ ميیں پهھر کريیں۔ ااظظہارر کا ررضامندیی ااپنی کرکے ددستخط پر فاررمم متعلقہہ ہلےپ سے
 يیا‘ہاںں’ سوااالتت ووهه ليیکن گی پوچهھوںں سوااالتت چند ذذرريیعے کے اانڻٹروويیو اايیک سے
 کی آآپپ متعلق سے موضوعع بحث ززيیر ميیں بلکہہ گے ہوںں نہيیں ميیں شکل کی‘ نہيیں’
 ليیکن ہوگا کا ددوورراانيیہہ گهھنڻٹہہ اايیک ززيیاددهه سے ززيیاددهه اانڻٹروويیو يیہہ گی۔ چاہوںں جاننا رراائے
 بعض ہے ممکن گی۔ ہوںں نہيیں پابند کی دديینے جوااباتت کے سوااالتت تمامم تمامم آآپپ
 جواابب کے سوااالتت اايیسے آآپپ لٰہذاا ہوںں۔ متعلق سے تجرباتت ذذااتی کے آآپپ سوااالتت
کريیں۔ خيیالل نامناسب ليیے ااپنے آآپپ جنہيیں ہے سکتی کر بهھی اانکارر سے دديینے 	 
 نقطہہ ااپنا ہيیں۔ مختارر خودد پر ططورر کلی ميیں ليینے حصہہ ميیں مذااکرهه ااسس آآپپ
 ااگر اانڻٹروويیو ددووررااننِ  گا۔ جائے ڈڈااال نہيیں ددباؤؤ کوئی پر آآپپ ليیے کے کرنے تبديیل نظر
 ااسس آآپپ تو ہے نامناسب لےےے کے آآپپ ليینا حصہہ ميیں ااسس کہہ کريیں محسوسس آآپپ
 کسی ميیں ددررميیانن يیا ميیں آآغازز کے اانڻٹروويیو آآپپ ہيیں۔ ہوسکتی ددستبردداارر سے اانڻٹروويیو
 عمل ططرزز يیہہ کا آآپپ ہےںں۔ سکتی کر اانکارر سے ليینے حصہہ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو ووقت بهھی
گا۔ جائے کيیا نہيیں تصورر عارر پر ططورر قطعی 	 
ررااززدداارریی صيیغہہ 	 
 گے۔ جائيیں کئے تيیارر بهھی نوڻٹس کے ااسس ساتهھ ساتهھ کے کرنے رريیکاررڈڈ اانڻٹروويیو    
 کر بهھی منع سے رريیکاررڈڈنگ اانڻٹروويیو ددوورراانن تو چاہتيیں نہيیں رريیکاررڈڈنگ آآڈڈيیو آآپپ ااگر
 خوااتيین دديیگر ااوورر آآپپ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو ااسس جائے۔ ددیی کر بند رريیکاررڈڈنگ تاکہہ ہيیں سکتی
 کی شامل ميیں مقالہہ PhD ميیرےے معلوماتت اافرووزز بصيیرتت وواالی ہونے حاصل سے
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 ہيیں جاسکتے پوچهھے سوااالتت ررااست برااهه سے آآپپ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو ااگرچہہ گی۔ جائيیں
 کی نہيیں شامل ميیں قالےم صوررتت بهھی کسی شناخت ااوورر کوئی يیا کانامم آآپپ ليیکن
 ططرحح ااسی ااوورر گے دديیکهھيیں بهھی ممتحن ااوورر محققيین دديیگر کو مقالہہ ااسس گی۔ جائے
 ميیں جراائد تحقيیقی مقالہہ يیہہ نيیز ہيیں۔ سکتے پڑهھھھ ااسے بهھی ططالباتت وو ططلباء کے مستقبل
 گئی کئی حاصل ذذرريیعے کے اانڻٹروويیو کہہ ہے اامر شدهه ططے يیہہ ہمہہ بايیں ہوگا۔ شائع بهھی
 مقالہہ ااسس معلوماتت يیہہ گی۔ جائيیں ررکهھی ميیں رراازز صيیغہہ پر ططورر کملم معلوماتت تمامم
 تلف اانہيیں بعد کے ااسس ااوورر گی ررہيیں محفوظظ تک ماهه چهھ بعد کے ہونے مکمل کے
گا۔ جائے کردديیا 	 
ہيیں؟ ہوسکتے نقصاناتت سے شرکت ميیں اانڻٹروويیو کيیا 	 
 کيیونکہہ گے ہوںں نہيیں ااثرااتت منفی پرکوئی آآپپ سے ليینے حصہہ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو ااسس    
 ااسس کے آآپپ ددووست يیا فيیملی کی آآپپ بهھی پهھر تاہم ہے۔ علمی مقصد کا اانڻٹروويیو ااسس
 بهھی ووقت کسی سے ہونے شامل ميیں اانڻٹروويیو ااسس آآپپ تو ہوںں پرمعترضض اانڻٹروويیو
ہيیں۔ کرسکتی اانکارر 	 
:نوٹٹ 	 
 کر رراابطہہ سے مجهھ تو ہوںں ددررکارر معلوماتت کوئی کو آآپپ ااگر ميیں سلسلہہ ااسِس    
ہيیں۔ سکتی 	 
 لف مہربانی برااهه تو ہيیں پرررضامند ليینے حصہہ ميیں اانڻٹروويیو العاتیمط ااسس آآپپ ااگر    
دديیں۔ فرما ددستخط پر فاررمم شدهه 	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اانڻٹروويیو براائے فاررمم ررضامندیی 	 
 کے قاددرریی حسن غزاالہہ ------------------------------------------------ ميیں 	۔١۱
۔ررضامندہوںں پر ليینے حصہہ ميیں ووررکک رريیسرچچ 	 
 پر ططورر تحريیریی ااوورر ززبانی سے نوعيیت ااوورر مقصد کے رريیسرچچ ااسس مجهھے 	۔٢۲
ہے۔ کردديیاگيیا آآگاهه بالتفصيیل 	 
ہوںں۔ ررہی لے حصہہ ااکرااهه وو جبر بال پر ططورر ررضاکارراانہہ ميیں ااسس ميیں 	۔٣۳ 	 
 ميیں شکل تحريیریی اانڻٹروويیو ميیراا کہہ دديیتی نہيیں/  ہوںں دديیتی ااجاززتت کی باتت ااسس ميیں 	۔۴
جائے۔ اليیا 	 
	 کيیاجائے۔ رريیکاررڈڈ اانڻٹروويیو ميیراا کہہ دديیتی نہيیں/  ہوںں دديیتی ااجاززتت کی باتت ااسس ميیں 	۔۵ 
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 اانڻٹروويیو مطالعاتی ااسس ميیں کے ددباؤؤ کسی بغيیر کہہ ہے علم بخوبی کا ااَمر ااسِس مجهھے 	۔٦
ہوںں۔ سکتی کر اانکارر سے ليینے حصہہ ووقت بهھی کسی ميیں ددررميیانن يیا آآغازز کے 	 
 ااستعمالل کو مواادد شدهه حاصل چاہوںں جب ميیں کہہ ہے علم بخوبی کا ااَمر ااسِس مجهھے 	۔۷
 سے اانڻٹروويیو ميیرےے مواادد ووهه ميیں صوررتت ااسس لوںں۔ لے ووااپس نامہہ ااجاززتت کا کرنے
گا۔ جائے کردديیا حذفف 	 
 تحريیریی کو اانڻٹروويیو ااوورر ررکهھنے خفيیہہ نامم ميیراا کہہ ہے علم بخوبی کا ااَمر ااسِس مجهھے 	۔٨۸
گا۔ جائے بنايیا يیقيینی عمل کا ررکهھنے پوشيیدهه شناخت ميیریی ووقت التے ميیں شکل 	 
 اانڻٹروويیو ميیرےے کر چهھپا کو شناخت ميیریی کہہ ہے علم بخوبی کا ااَمر ااسِس مجهھے 	۔٩۹
سکتاہے۔ جا کيیا شامل ميیں مقالے کاحصہہ 	 
 کے اانڻٹروويیو گئے ليیے سے مجهھ کہہ ہوںں نہيیں/  ہوںں ررااضی پر باتت ااسس ميیں 	۔١۱٠۰
جائيیں۔ کردديیے شايیع ااقتباساتت 	 
: خط ددست --------------------------------------- 	 
:تارريیخ 	  
	  
Interview	  Template	  for	  Lawyers,	  Judges	  and	  Legal	  Academicians 
	  
1. Assalam	  u	  alaykum.	  	  Can	  you	  give	  me	  some	  details	  about	  your	  legal	  
background,	  what	  type	  of	  law	  you	  have	  been	  practicing	  and	  for	  how	  long?	  
2. How	  do	  women	  seeking	  a	  divorce	  normally	  find	  out	  about	  your	  legal	  
services?	  
3. What	  are	  the	  main	  methods	  women	  use	  to	  contact	  you	  when	  seeking	  a	  
divorce?	  	  
4. How	  many	  women	  file	  for	  a	  divorce	  on	  average	  in	  any	  given	  year	  in	  Pakistan?	  
5. How	  many	  women	  file	  for	  a	  divorce	  on	  average	  in	  any	  given	  year	  in	  Lahore?	  
6. What	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  women	  divorce	  petitioners	  that	  you	  deal	  with	  
in	  any	  given	  year?	  
7. Are	  court	  records	  kept	  of	  divorces	  and	  how	  could	  I	  gain	  access	  to	  them?	  
8. What	  is	  the	  exact	  procedure	  for	  a	  woman	  applying	  for	  a	  divorce	  –	  the	  legal	  
process?	  
9. How	  long	  does	  it	  take	  for	  a	  case	  to	  get	  to	  court	  and	  then	  for	  a	  judgment	  to	  be	  
passed?	  
10. What	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  an	  average	  case?	  
11. In	  your	  experience,	  what	  are	  women’s	  main	  reasons	  for	  seeking	  a	  divorce?	  
12. What	  social	  class	  of	  women	  normally	  seek	  a	  divorce	  through	  the	  courts?	  
13. What	  percentage	  of	  women	  pursue	  their	  cases	  fully	  through	  the	  courts?	  
14. How	  many	  women	  do	  not	  pursue	  a	  case	  further?	  
15. In	  your	  opinion,	  how	  efficient	  are	  the	  family	  courts	  during	  khulʿ	  proceedings?	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16. Do	  you	  think	  judges	  are	  sympathetic	  to	  female	  petitioners?	  
17. How	  sympathetic	  are	  the	  court	  staff	  and	  clerks	  to	  women	  seeking	  a	  divorce?	  
18. What	  problems	  do	  women	  most	  often	  encounter	  when	  seeking	  a	  divorce?	  
19. How	  effective	  are	  arrest	  warrants	  in	  forcing	  litigants’	  husbands	  to	  comply	  
with	  court	  orders?	  
20. In	  your	  experience,	  how	  often	  are	  warrants	  issued	  and	  under	  what	  
circumstances?	  
21. What	  are	  your	  views	  on	  the	  reconciliation	  process?	  
22. What	  are	  your	  views	  and	  opinions	  regarding	  women	  who	  pursue	  a	  khulʿ?	  
23. What	  reforms	  would	  you	  suggest	  to	  make	  the	  process	  much	  easier	  for	  
women?	  
24. How	  aware	  are	  women	  of	  their	  divorce	  rights	  before	  they	  seek	  your	  advice?	  
25. How	  much	  support	  do	  you	  feel	  family	  gives	  to	  a	  litigant	  wife?	  
26. What	  are	  the	  financial	  consequences	  of	  applying	  for	  a	  khulʿ?	  
27. What	  other	  obstacles	  do	  women	  face	  when	  seeking	  a	  divorce?	  
	  
Interview	  Template	  For	  Married	  Women	  
	  
Notes	  for	  Interview	  Process:	  
After	  general	  meet	  and	  greet,	  present	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
interview	  and	  provide	  the	  information	  sheet	  and	  consent	  form.	  	  Read	  out	  aloud	  the	  
contents	  of	  both	  forms	  and	  explain	  the	  contents	  in	  Urdu.	  	  Present	  the	  form	  for	  
signature	  and	  ask	  permission	  again	  specifically	  to	  record	  the	  interviews.	  	  Remind	  
the	  participants	  that	  their	  information	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  their	  identities	  
will	  remain	  anonymous.	  
	  
1. Can	  I	  please	  ask	  some	  personal	  questions	  relating	  to	  you	  and	  your	  family?	  
2. Can	  you	  please	  tell	  me	  your	  name?	  
3. Can	  you	  tell	  me	  how	  old	  you	  are	  and	  your	  date	  of	  birth?	  
4. Can	  you	  tell	  me	  your	  education	  background?	  
5. Are	  you	  married?	  
6. How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  married?	  
7. Do	  you	  have	  any	  children?	  
8. How	  did	  you	  find	  your	  marriage	  partner?	  
9. How	  old	  is	  your	  husband?	  
10. What	  is	  his	  educational	  background?	  
11. Is	  he	  related	  to	  you?	  
12. Do	  you	  or	  your	  husband	  work	  and	  if	  so	  where?	  
13. How	  much	  do	  you	  and	  your	  husband	  earn?	  
14. What	  is	  your	  average	  monthly	  income?	  
15. Where	  do	  you	  normally	  live?	  
16. Who	  else	  lives	  with	  you	  in	  the	  house?	  
17. 	  When	  you	  married,	  did	  you	  see	  the	  Nikāḥ	  Nāmah	  before	  you	  signed	  it?	   	  
18. Where	  did	  your	  Nikka	  take	  place:	  at	  time	  of	  rukhsati?	  At	  engagement?	  At	  
mehndi?	  
19. Did	  you	  read	  your	  Nikāḥ	  Nāmah?	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20. Did	  anyone	  explain	  the	  Nikāḥ	  Nāmah	  to	  you?	  
21. Do	  you	  know	  what	  the	  Haq	  Mahr	  is?	  
22. What	  was	  your	  mahr?	  
23. Is	  this	  a	  traditional	  amount	  where	  you	  live?	  
24. Did	  you	  have	  a	  jahez?	  
25. How	  important	  is	  the	  jahez	  for	  a	  woman	  in	  marriage?	  
26. Have	  you	  heard	  of	  the	  term	  talāq-­‐ul-­‐tafwīḍ,	  and	  if	  so,	  can	  you	  explain	  what	  it	  
means?	  
27. Have	  you	  heard	  of	  the	  term	  khulʿ?	  If	  not,	  go	  to	  question>	  35	  
28. 	  If	  yes,	  can	  you	  explain	  what	  it	  means?	  
29. Does	  a	  woman	  need	  permission	  from	  her	  husband	  to	  get	  a	  khulʿ?	  
30. How	  does	  a	  woman	  get	  a	  khulʿ?	  
31. Is	  this	  a	  difficult	  thing?	  
32. Is	  this	  a	  costly	  thing?	  	  
33. Would	  you	  ever	  consider	  seeking	  a	  khulʿ	  if	  your	  marriage	  broke	  down?	  
34. How	  likely	  are	  other	  women	  to	  seek	  a	  khulʿ	  if	  their	  marriage	  breaks	  down?	  
35. Do	  you	  know	  of	  other	  ways	  a	  woman	  can	  obtain	  a	  divorce?	  	  If	  yes,	  please	  
explain.	  
36. Would	  you	  be	  prepared	  to	  go	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce?	  
37. In	  your	  opinion,	  would	  other	  women	  be	  prepared	  to	  go	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  
divorce?	  
38. Would	  your	  family	  support	  you	  if	  you	  wanted	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce?	  
39. In	  your	  opinion,	  would	  families	  support	  a	  woman	  if	  she	  wanted	  to	  initiate	  a	  
divorce?	  
40. Do	  you	  know	  where	  your	  local	  courts	  are	  located?	  
41. If	  you	  had	  to	  hire	  an	  advocate,	  do	  you	  know	  how	  to	  do	  this?	  
42. How	  does	  your	  local	  society	  treat	  women	  who	  seek	  a	  divorce?	  
43. How	  do	  you	  feel	  about	  women	  who	  ask	  for	  a	  divorce/khulʿ	  
44. In	  your	  opinion,	  what	  are	  the	  main	  problems	  that	  women	  face	  when	  they	  
have	  to	  get	  a	  divorce?	  
45. What	  do	  you	  think	  are	  the	  main	  causes	  for	  women	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  divorce?	  
46. What	  do	  you	  think	  would	  make	  obtaining	  a	  divorce	  easier	  for	  women?	  	  	  
47. What	  reforms	  or	  changes	  would	  you	  suggest?	  
	  
Interview	  Template	  for	  Women	  in	  the	  District	  Courts	  of	  Lahore	  
	  
Notes	  for	  Interview	  Process:	  
After	  general	  meet	  and	  greet,	  present	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
interview	  and	  provide	  the	  information	  sheet	  and	  consent	  form.	  	  Read	  out	  aloud	  the	  
contents	  of	  both	  forms	  and	  explain	  the	  contents	  in	  Urdu.	  	  Present	  the	  form	  for	  
signature	  and	  ask	  permission	  again	  specifically	  to	  record	  the	  interviews.	  	  Remind	  
the	  participants	  that	  their	  information	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  their	  identities	  
will	  remain	  anonymous	  
	  




Possible	  questions	  to	  ask	  during	  the	  interview	  to	  elicit	  additional	  information	  if	  not	  
covered	  by	  the	  participants’	  responses.	  
	  
1. Can	  I	  ask	  for	  your	  name	  and	  age?	  
2. What	  is	  your	  educational	  background?	  
3. Are	  you	  married?	  	  If	  yes,	  how	  long	  have	  you	  been	  married?	  
4. Do	  you	  have	  any	  children,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  many?	  
5. Can	  you	  give	  me	  some	  general	  background	  about	  your	  family	  and	  your	  
husband?	  
6. Are	  you	  or	  your	  husband	  working?	  	  If	  so,	  can	  you	  provide	  some	  details	  about	  
the	  work?	  
7. How	  did	  you	  find	  and	  marry	  your	  husband?	  
8. Do	  you	  have	  a	  marriage	  certificate	  (Nikāḥ	  Nāmah)?	  	  If	  yes,	  who	  filled	  it	  in?	  
9. Did	  you	  see	  the	  Nikāḥ	  Nāmah	  before	  you	  signed	  it?	  	  	  
10. Do	  you	  know	  what	  a	  khulʿ	  is?	  	  If	  yes,	  can	  you	  explain	  briefly	  what	  it	  is?	  
11. What	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  breakdown	  of	  your	  marriage?	  
12. How	  did	  you	  find	  out	  about	  a	  khulʿ?	  
13. Did	  you	  know	  of	  anyone	  else	  who	  had	  obtained	  a	  khulʿ?	  
14. How	  did	  you	  find	  out	  about	  getting	  a	  lawyer?	  
15. Who	  helped	  you	  in	  getting	  a	  khulʿ?	  
16. Did	  you	  get	  any	  help	  from	  family	  and	  friends?	  
17. How	  much	  has	  it	  cost	  you	  so	  far?	  
18. How	  easy	  or	  difficult	  was	  it	  to	  get	  the	  khulʿ?	  
19. How	  cooperative	  has	  your	  husband	  been	  in	  coming	  to	  court?	  
20. What	  was	  it	  like	  going	  to	  court?	  Can	  you	  share	  your	  experiences?	  
21. Did	  you	  go	  through	  any	  reconciliation	  process?	  
22. How	  helpful	  did	  you	  find	  your	  lawyers?	  
23. What	  was	  your	  experience	  with	  the	  judges?	  
24. Who	  brought	  you	  here	  to	  court?	  
25. Did	  you	  find	  it	  a	  friendly	  place?	  
26. What	  has	  happened	  about	  your	  mahr?	  
27. What	  has	  happened	  about	  your	  dowry?	  
28. Who	  has	  custody	  of	  the	  children?	  
29. Did	  you	  get	  any	  interim	  maintenance	  relief?	  
30. Overall,	  how	  do	  you	  rate	  your	  experience	  in	  getting	  a	  khulʿ?	  
31. What	  are	  the	  financial	  problems	  of	  obtaining	  a	  divorce?	  
32. Is	  there	  a	  stigma	  attached	  to	  women	  seeking	  a	  divorce?	  
33. Did	  your	  family	  support	  your	  divorce	  petition?	  
34. In	  your	  opinion,	  how	  important	  is	  it	  for	  women	  to	  have	  easy	  access	  to	  
divorce?	  
35. What	  measures	  do	  you	  think	  would	  make	  obtaining	  a	  divorce	  easier	  for	  
women?	  	  	  
36. In	  your	  opinion,	  would	  other	  women	  be	  prepared	  to	  go	  to	  court	  to	  obtain	  a	  
divorce?	  
37. What	  reforms	  or	  changes	  would	  you	  suggest	  to	  improve	  your	  experience	  of	  










NAME	   AGE	   EDUCATION	   PROFESSION	   TOTAL	  
HOUSEHOLD	  
INCOME	  
1	   Abida	   25	   Gr.	  2	   Maid	   11,000	  
2	   Afifa	   36	   Gr.	  4	   Housewife	   10,000	  
3	   Aliya	  	   30	   Gr.	  2	   Maid	   12,000	  
4	   Ambreen	   37	   Gr.	  4	   Housewife	   12,000	  
5	   Amina	   27	   BA	   Teacher	   50,000	  
6	   Ayesha	   41	   Gr.	  3	   Seamstress	   16,000	  
7	   Badr	   33	   None	   Maid	   13,000	  
8	   Bano	   51	   None	   Housewife	   12,000	  
9	   Basima	   44	   FA	   Housewife	   40,000	  
10	   Bashirah	   40	   FA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
11	   Batool	   20	   Gr.4	   Maid	   12,000	  
12	   Bilquis	   40	   Gr.2	   Housewife	   10,000	  
13	   Bushra	   32	   BA	   Housewife	   44,000	  
14	   Duha	   37	   Gr.	  2	   Housewife	   11,000	  
15	   Durah	   50	   FA	   Housewife	   55,000	  
16	   Erum	   27	   BA	   Teacher	   50,000	  
17	   Elisha	   29	   FA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
18	   Eman	   19	   Gr.4	   Maid	   15,000	  
19	   Faiza	   39	   Metric	   Housewife	   45,000	  
20	   Fareeha	   38	   BA	   Teacher	   55,000	  
21	   Farkhanda	   25	   None	   Housewife	   11,000	  
22	   Farwah	   23	   Gr.3	   Maid	   15,000	  
23	   Farzana	   23	   BA	   Housewife	   40,000	  
24	   Fatima	   45	   MA	   	  Lecturer	   50,000	  
25	   Fizzah	   24	   BA	   Housewife	   55,000	  
26	   Fouzia	   34	   Gr.3	   Seamstress	   14,000	  
27	   Gohar	   30	   Gr.	  2	   Housewife	   12,000	  
28	   Gulnar	   42	   BA	   Teacher	   55,000	  
20	   Gulshan	   55	   None	   Maid	   19,000	  
30	   Gulzar	   57	   Gr.3	   Housewife	   15,000	  
31	   Halla	   47	   BA	   Nurse	   42,000	  
32	   Haleema	   25	   BA	   Housewife	   55,000	  
33	   Habiba	   30	   Gr.	  1	   Housewife	   12,000	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34	   Hala	   29	   Gr.2	   Maid	   14,000	  
35	   Hajira	   35	   None	   Housewife	   10,000	  
36	   Hassana	   35	   FA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
37	   Hasina	   55	   BA	   Teacher	   60,000	  
38	   Hawwah	   32	   FA	   Office	  work	   39,000	  
39	   Imaan	   33	   Gr.	  1	   Housewife	   14,000	  
40	   Imtiaaz	   36	   FA	   Housewife	   49,000	  
41	   Inayat	   30	   None	   Housewife	   15,000	  
42	   Iqra	   36	   BA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
43	   Jameela	   44	   MA	   Principal	   90,000	  
44	   Jannah	   37	   FA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
45	   Jariyah	   45	   Gr.	  1	   Maid	   15,000	  
46	   Jasmine	   43	   BA	   Tutor	   55,000	  
47	   Javeria	   37	   FA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
48	   Kainaat	   44	   None	   Housewife	   15,000	  
49	   Keisira	   29	   None	   Factory	  
Work	  
15,000	  
50	   Khadija	   40	   None	   Housewife	   10,000	  
51	   Khalida	   50	  plus	   None	   Housewife	   12,000	  
52	   Kulsoom	   44	   None	   Housewife	   8,000	  
53	   Layla	   40	   BA	   Teacher	   60,000	  
54	   Linah	   37	   Gr.1	   Maid	   15,000	  
55	   Lubna	   37	   FA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
56	   Maha	   37	   Gr.	  6	   Factory	  
work	  
15,000	  
57	   Majeeda	   40	   Gr.	  4	   Maid	   16,000	  
58	   Malka	   44	   BA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
59	   Maria	   24	   Gr.	  3	   Housewife	   12,000	  
60	   Mehvish	   24	   Gr.	  2	   Maid	   15,000	  
61	   Misbah	   37	   FA	   Housewife	   37,000	  
62	   Mobeen	   42	   MA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
63	   Moona	   33	   FA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
64	   Nadia	   19	   BA	   Teacher	   55,000	  
65	   Najaf	   37	   None	   Housewife	   15,000	  
66	   Najma	   45	   Gr.	  4	   Seamstress	   15,000	  
67	   Naheed	   44	   Gr.	  2	   Maid	   12,000	  
68	   Nazia	   41	   MA	   VicePrincipal	   60,000	  
69	   Nighat	   30	   Gr.	  3	   Housewife	   12,000	  
70	   Noora	   39	   BA	   Teacher	   35,000	  
71	   Nyla	  	   20	   BA	   Teacher	   38,000	  
72	   Perveen	   40	   FA	   Housewife	   40,000	  
73	   Rabia	   37	   BA	   Housewife	   52,000	  
74	   Raadiya	   39	   Gr.	  2	   Housewife	   12,000	  
75	   Radwa	   44	   None	   Maid	   15,000	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76	   Rashida	   27	   BA	   Teacher	   40,000	  
77	   Raazia	   39	   Metric	   Housewife	   45,000	  
78	   Robina	   32	   Gr.	  2	   Ayah	  	   15,000	  
79	   Rubya	   38	   Gr.	  2	   Maid	   16,000	  
80	   Sabine	   37	   FA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
81	   Saima	   42	   BA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
82	   Saira	   37	   BA	   Nurse	   50,000	  
83	   Saja	   36	   None	   Housewife	   11,000	  
84	   Sajida	   22	   Gr.	  4	   Seamstress	   18,000	  
85	   Salma	   35	   None	   Maid	   10,000	  
86	   Shahida	   37	   Gr.	  4	   Maid	   15,000	  
87	   Shaista	   24	   Gr.	  2	   Factory	  
Work	  
18,000	  
88	   Shamma	   37	   Gr.	  4	   Seamstress	   15,000	  
89	   Siama	   42	   BA	   Nurse	   40,000	  
90	   Sobia	   50	   None	   Housewife	   10,000	  
91	   Somia	   37	   FA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
92	   Sultana	   45	   None	   Housewife	   12,000	  
93	   Sumaira	   42	   Gr.1	   Housewife	   15,000	  
94	   Sumayya	   36	   Gr.	  3	   Maid	   12,000	  
95	   Tanzeela	   42	   FA	   Housewife	   40,000	  
96	   Tanzeem	   37	   FA	   	   	  
97	   Tasleema	   44	   BA	   	   	  
98	   Tasmin	   38	   MA	   	   	  
99	   Tasmia	   45	   BA	   Principal	   70,000	  




Table	  6	  –Details	  of	  Participants	  Interviewed	  in	  the	  District	  Courts	  of	  Lahore	  
Number	  of	  	  
Participants	  	  	  	  	  
Name	   Age	  	  	  	   Education	   Profession	   Total	  
Household	  
Income	  
1	   Aadila	   23	   None	   Seamstress	   12,000	  
2	   Afreen	   23	   None	   Maid	   10,000	  
3	   Bahira	   25	   Gr.	  3	   Housewife	   11,000	  
4	   Daanya	   25	   None	   Housewife	   12,000	  
5	   Duaa	   22	   Gr.2	   Housewife	   7000	  
6	   Farhah	   22	   Gr.3	   Housewife	   10,000	  
7	   Farhat	   25	   None	   Factory	  
Worker	  
15,000	  
8	   Farheen	   23	   None	   Housewife	   12,000	  
9	   Gohar	   27	   None	   Housewife	   10,000	  
10	   Gulnar	   27	   Gr.6	   Maid	   12,000	  
11	   Hafsa	   30	   Gr.1	   Maid	   14,000	  
12	   Imaan	   22	   Gr.1	   Factory	  
Worker	  
13,000	  
13	   Iqrah	   21	   None	   Seamstress	   12,000	  
14	   Ishraat	   29	   None	   Housewife	   10,000	  
15	   Karimah	   28	   None	   Seamstress	  
	  
14,000	  
16	   Kaukab	  
	  
19	   Gr.5	   Maid	   12,000	  
17	   Kausar	   20	   Gr.3	   Seamstress	   12,000	  
18	   Mabrooka	  
	  
28	   Gr.2	   Housewife	   14,000	  
19	   Mansoora	  
	  
28	   None	   Factory	  
Worker	  
10,000	  
20	   Muneera	  	   20	   None	   Housewife	   15,000	  
21	   Nasreen	   26	   None	   Housewife	   13,000	  
22	   Raheela	   26	   None	   Housewife	   14,000	  
23	   Rania	   5	   Gr.	  4	   Maid	   12,000	  
24	   Raifaat	   29	   BA	   Housewife	   45,000	  
25	   Rizwana	   27	   None	   Seamstress	   14,000	  
26	   Sabah	   25	   Gr.5	   Seamstress	   15,000	  
27	   Shaguftah	   21	   Gr.3	   Seamstress	   15,000	  
28	   Somayya	   26	   Gr.2	   Housewife	   9000	  
29	   Ummayrah	   29	   FA	   Housewife	   55,000	  
30	   Zulaykah	   28	   BA	   Housewife	   50,000	  
31	   Hala	   25	   Gr.3	   Housewife	   12,000	  
	  
